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Chapter IV


UN and CSCE Policies in Transcaucasia

Olivier Paye & Eric Remacle

Chapter IV consists of 3 parts (1,2,3) + notes

  1. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
    1. Lack of Action before January 1992

      Before the breaking up of the Soviet Union, the CSCE did not discuss the political and ethnic tensions in Transcaucasia. This was consistent with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Participating States (Principle VI of the Helsinki Final Act). Nevertheless, some declarations by the CSCE's Committee of Senior Officials (CSO(81)) on the Yugoslav war in 1991 had already emphasized that the commitments undertaken in the sphere of the human dimension of the CSCE were matters of direct and legitimate concern to all Participating States, and did not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the States concerned.(82) Since the human dimension of the CSCE includes not only human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also the rights of minorities, democracy and the rule of law (83), and since the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh clearly violated several CSCE commitments in these fields, there was theoretically a window of opportunity for action by the CSCE in Transcaucasia from the autumn of 1991 onwards. The CSCE did not take any initiative at the end of 1991 for three main reasons: the novelty of such an intervention in internal conflicts (even in the case of Yugoslavia); uncertainty about the situation in the Soviet Union; and the priority given to the Yugoslav crisis. On the other hand, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan had succeeded, in September 1991, in mediating an agreement between the Armenian and Azeri Presidents regarding first steps towards the shaping of a peacemaking process (Zheleznovodsk Communique of 23 September 1991). The question of the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh was dealt with by the CSCE only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (December 1991), the acceptance of the Transcaucasian countries as full members of the CSCE and the failure of the Yeltsin/Nazarbaev peace initiative in January 1992.

      Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the other Member States of the CIS, were welcomed as Participating States of the CSCE by the Prague Meeting of the CSCE Council on 30-31 January 1992(84), while Georgia had sent its request for accession later and joined the CSCE only during the Helsinki Additional Meeting of the Council on 24 March 1992.(85) This may help to explain why the CSCE's action on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh began earlier than its action in Georgia. A second reason for this may be that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had an "inter-state" character, whereas the latter was an "internal" conflict. The complexity of the political spectrum in Georgia in the beginning of 1992, the early involvement of Russia in the settlement of the conflict between Georgia and the South Ossetians and the non-participation of Georgia in the CIS may be additional reasons which account for the CSCE's different policies in the two conflicts.

      The following analysis will be divided into two sections: the first will deal with Nagorno-Karabakh and the second with the Georgian case (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

    2. The CSCE and Nagorno-Karabakh

      1. "Soft Action" and Neutral Position

        The admission of new Participating States into the CSCE is traditionally followed by the sending of Rapporteur Missions to these States. The Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, sent a Rapporteur Mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan with a special focus on the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.(86) This mission (12-18 February 1992) - led by the former President of the International Helsinki Federation and current head of Vaclav Havel's cabinet, Karel Schwartzenberg - gave the CSCE a leading role in the management of the crisis at a time when combat was intensifying and the US, Russia, France, the European Parliament and Iran were repeatedly appealing for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Secretary of State James Baker had expressed the American government's concern to find a solution within the framework of the CSCE(87) - probably in the hope of preventing unilateral action by Russia, or Iranian involvement in the region.(88)

        The CSO of the CSCE discussed the Interim Report of the Rapporteur Mission on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh during its seventh regular meeting in Prague on 27-28 February 1992.(89) Firstly, it called on "all forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of the Azerbaijan Republic" to impose an immediate cease-fire and to implement the agreement recently adopted by the Russian, Armenian and Azeri Foreign Ministers.(90) The CSO underlined that ‹groups of eminent personsŠ from CSCE States could contribute to such a process. Secondly, the CSO requested all CSCE States and all other States in the region - i.e., Iran and the Arab countries - to impose an immediate embargo on the delivery of weapons to all combat forces. Thirdly, it took several initiatives at the humanitarian level to relieve the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian and Azeri refugees, for example in creating safe corridors for aid and supporting an exchange of hostages and dead bodies. Fourthly, it stressed the need to respect international obligations, to guarantee the rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities and to abandon territorial claims against neighbouring countries. At this time, the CSCE did not accuse any party of responsibility for acts of aggression or the use of force. This attitude is very similar to the CSCE's and EC's "neutral" statements on the Yugoslav crisis between June and September 1991; only during the last months of 1991 did they take a more critical stand towards Serbia and Montenegro.

        In case of the former Yugoslavia, the CSCE Council and CSO called for "respect for the inviolability of all borders, whether internal or external, which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement"(91), but at no stage did they use such terms in speaking of the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh. From May 1992, the CSCE condemned the "continuing aggression" led by Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army, who were supporting irregular Serbian forces.(92) The role of the Armenian government was never denounced with such vigour. There were indeed condemnations of the occupation of Azeri territory around Nagorno-Karabakh in May 1992 and April 1993, but Armenian support for the Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh itself were not included in them. Accusations arising from this were discussed by the CSCE at a time when there was still no agreement about the use of the "consensus-minus-one" procedure, which may partly explain its moderate tone.

        After this first period of "soft action" (Rapporteur Mission and political declaration), the CSO immediately took more concrete action.

      2. From Soft Action to Peacemaking

        On 13-14 March 1992, the eighth regular meeting of the CSO decided to hold an extraordinary session of the CSCE Council on 24 March, at the beginning of the Helsinki follow-up meeting, in order to take the initiatives necessary to prevent the escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and, in particular, to launch a peace process.(93) A second mission, led by Jan Kubis, Chairman-in-Office of the CSO, was sent to the region from 19 to 23 March 1992.(94) On 24 March, the Foreign Ministers of the Participating States reiterated their call for an immediate and effective cease-fire, welcomed the complementary efforts of other organizations and their Member States (Iran is not mentioned) and by the UN Secretary-General. For the first time, the Ministers agreed explicitly that the CSCE "must play a major role in promoting a peace process relating to the conflict" and requested the Chairman-in-Office "to keep in close contact with the United Nations (...) and to arrange for regular exchanges of information".(95) This formulation quite accurately describes the respective roles of the UN and the CSCE.

        The Council took three important decisions. Firstly, it sent the Chairman-in-Office, Jiri Dienstbier, to the region in order to examine the possibilities of establishing a cease-fire and an overall peaceful settlement.

        Secondly, it requested the Chairman-in-Office to convene a peace conference in Minsk under the auspices of the CSCE, with 11 Participating States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the US) and "elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh" to be invited "as interested parties by the Chairman of the Conference after consultation with the States participating in the Conference".(96) This first application of the principle of delegating some tasks to an ad hoc group of States(97) was intended to establish an efficient body which would not be paralyzed by a cumbersome decision-making process based on unanimity among more than 50 countries. It included the participation of the main regional players (except Iran) and some powers which had traditionally played a role in the region (France, Russia, the USA and Turkey). Taking part were not only the present Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE (Czechoslovakia), but also the former and future Chairs (Germany and Sweden).

        Thirdly, the Council urged all CSCE Participating States and all concerned parties to help in providing humanitarian assistance, opening safe corridors and organizing international monitoring.

        This first peacemaking exercise led by the CSCE encountered many difficulties in its implementation. The designation of Mario Raffaelli as Chairman of the Minsk Conference on 7 April 1992 by the Chairman-in-Office; the CSO's decisions regarding the practical organization of the Conference and the invitations to the UN and the UNHCR; the CSO's agreement to the sending of a CSCE monitoring mission once a cease-fire had been achieved(98) - none of these factors managed to prevent a worsening of the situation. The seizure by the Armenian forces of the last Azeri city in the enclave, Shusha (9 May 1992), and of the Lachin corridor on Azeri territory, which linked Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh (17 May 1992), were significant steps in the escalation of the war. On 10 May, CSCE mediators tried unsuccessfully to enter the region.(99) On 21 May, the US proposal to summon an emergency meeting of the Minsk Conference participants was rejected by Armenia because it explicitly mentioned the condemnation of "the extension of the conflict to other regions of Azerbaijan" and a most forceful demand for "respect for Azerbaijan's territorial integrity".(100) The "consensus-minus-one" procedure requested by Azerbaijan was refused by some countries, in particular France and Greece.(101) After five rounds of preparatory talks, held in Rome between June and September 1992, attempts to convene the Minsk Conference became deadlocked in disputes over the official status of representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian community and over the responsibility of the Armenian government for the actions of all unofficial Armenian militias.(102) The agreement by the parties on the potential deployment of peacekeeping forces was the only significant result of these talks, although the question as to whether these forces would act under the command of the CSCE or the UN remained unanswered.(103) This ambiguity reflected the difficulty of co-ordinating the UN Security Council's deeper involvement in the crisis since May 1992 with the CSCE's willingness to act as a regional arrangement of the UN under Chapter VIII of the Charter, and to carry out peacekeeping operations(104) as such, as proclaimed in the Helsinki Summit of July 1992.

        The period between May and December 1992 showed that the respective roles of the CSCE and the UN were not yet clearly defined, for three reasons:

        • the continuing escalation of the conflict made a break-through by the peace process impossible;
        • the two organizations had no previous experience of such co-operation;
        • Armenia seemed to favour intervention by the UN Security Council while Azerbaijan would have preferred action by the CSCE: the presence or absence of France, Russia, Iran and Turkey in these bodies was clearly the main reason behind their preferences.

        The Stockholm meeting of the CSCE Council on 14-15 December 1992 was unable to take any new initiatives and merely asked Mario Raffaelli and the Minsk Group "to continue their tireless efforts to advance the peace process".(105)

      3. From Peacemaking to Peacekeeping

        Despite these failures, the CSO decided - at its 17th regular meeting in Prague on 5-6 November 1992 - to establish an open-ended ad hoc group in Vienna in order to prepare an Advance Monitoring Group to be sent to the area. CSCE States which had already sent monitors to the region were urged to integrate them into the CSCE group in order to unify the chain of command.(106) The relative stabilization of developments on the ground in January 1993 gave Mario Raffaelli the opportunity to organise new negotiations on this initiative. The Minsk Conference reconvened in Rome on 26 February 1993, and a preliminary agreement was signed on 2 March for the deployment of a CSCE "observer mission" to monitor a cease-fire, a separation of forces, the withdrawal of foreign military advisers and heavy weapons, and the return of refugees.(107) This agreement focused primarily on the parts of Azeri territory around Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azeri proposal for a demilitarization of Nagorno-Karabakh itself was not included.

        The new Armenian offensive in the region of Kelbajar at the end of March threatened to wreck the whole peace process once again. Seventeen countries supported Azerbaijan's request to convene an emergency meeting of the CSO in accordance with the emergency mechanism created by the Berlin Council Meeting of June 1991.(108) The meeting was held during the 21st regular meeting of the CSO (26-29 April 1993). A statement proposed jointly by the US, the Swedish Chairman-in-Office and Mario Raffaelli, calling for an "immediate and complete withdrawal of occupying forces from the Kelbajar and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan" was rejected by Armenia. Turkey and Azerbaijan requested the use of the consensus-minus-one procedure, but this proposal did not find agreement among the other States, as had already been the case after the seizure of Lachin eleven months before. The failure of the CSCE to mediate in the conflict was followed on 30 April by the vote on Resolution 822 by the UN Security Council.

        This confirms that the decision-making process of the UN Security Council is more flexible than the cumbersome consensus or unanimity voting systems of regional organizations like the CSCE, EU, WEU or NATO. This did not prevent the UN from supporting the CSCE's mediation efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh.

        In particular, the Security Council:

        • reaffirmed its "unreserved support" for the current CSCE peace process as well as for the CSCE Minsk Group's "tireless efforts"(109);
        • urged the parties immediately to resume the negotiations to reach a settlement of the conflict within the peace process of the Minsk Group of the CSCE(110), as well as to negotiate a final settlement through direct contact with one another(111);
        • endorsed the continuing peace efforts by the CSCE's Minsk Group, including efforts to implement UN resolution 822(112);
        • recommended that parties accept the so-called "Modified Calendar of urgent measures" drawn up in the Minsk Group of the CSCE(113);
        • requested the Secretary-General to delegate a representative to the CSCE's Minsk Conference and to supply all necessary assistance to the Conference peace talks(114);
        • expressed its support for the CSCE's monitoring mission.(115)

        The particularly close co-operation between the UN and the CSCE concerning Nagorno-Karabakh was placed under the political leadership of this latter organization. Most of demands and requests issued in the Security Council Resolutions corresponded to Raffaelli's suggestions(116), especially those in which the Security Council referred explicitly to CSCE initiatives and where it:

        • condemned the seizure of the districts of Agdam(117) and Zanghelan(118);
        • condemned attacks on civilians and the bombardment of inhabited areas(119);
        • demanded an immediate cessation of all hostilities and the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces involved from the districts of Agdam/Zanghelan and all other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic.(120)

        With the exception of the first resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh (UNSC Resolution 822), all the other Security Council resolutions were based on reports issued by the chairman of the CSCE's Peace Conference, Mario Raffaelli, and not by the UN Secretary-General.(121) This is remarkable insofar as Article 54 of the UN Charter stipulates that "the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken under or in contemplation of regional agreements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security". In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the division of labour between CSCE and UN was not limited by this restricted approach.

        In parallel with this positive evolution of the relationship with the UN, the "observer mission" agreed on by the parties on 2 March 1993 has been continuously prepared by a CSCE ad hoc group.(122) An Initial Operation Planning Group was subsequently set up in Vienna, within the framework of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), in order to implement this mandate. Five stages were planned for the operation: a verification stage (verification of the cease-fire and of the withdrawal of all armed personnel from the Kelbajar area), followed by four stages of monitoring. The Planning Group was to include 600 people (mostly military) in its final stage. A number of Blue Berets from the Golan Heights were also to take part in the operation. Furthermore, in June and July 1993, the Minsk Group intended to implement UNSC Resolution 822 with a "Calendar of urgent measures" accepted by the Armenian and Azeri Presidents as well as by the Armenian President of the Supreme Council of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the ousting of the Azeri President, Elcibey, in June and the seizure of the Azeri town of Agdam by the Armenian forces of Nagorno-Karabakh in July(123) created an entirely new situation, leading to a loss of leadership in crisis management for the CSCE.

      4. Russia's Involvement and the Marginalisation of the CSCE

        The replacement of President Elcibey by President Aliyev on 24 June significantly changed the role of the CSCE. Like the EC one week before(124), on 24 June the CSCE condemned any unconstitutional attempt to remove the democratically elected President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and urged a peaceful solution to the present crisis without outside interference and in which respect for democratic institutions and the rule of law are upheld. The maintenance of constitutional order was seen as essential for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 822 and for the success of the CSCEs efforts to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict dealt with by the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh".(125) This attitude had of course no influence on the shift of power in Baku or on President Aliyev's new policy, which was to start direct negotiations on a cease-fire with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, with Russian mediation, and to accept the entrance of Azerbaijan into the collective security agreement of the CIS (Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992). Moscow acquired a hegemonic position in the management of the crisis, even though it tried to settle it within the framework of the CSCE.

        After autumn 1993, the CSCE's role diminished noticeably, despite several statements which continued to promote the Minsk process(126), the appointment of a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office (the Swedish diplomat Mattias Mossberg) for the area of Nagorno-Karabakh on 9 September(127), and the new "Modified Calendar of urgent measures" proposed on 1 October by the Minsk Group in order to implement UNSC Resolutions 822 and 853, including the opening of the Minsk Conference on 2 November 1993.(128) This conference was never convoked. The conclusions of the Rome Council on 30 November and 1 December 1993 did not even refer to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.(129) During the same period, negative declarations from both Armenian and Azeri officials indicated that they had lost confidence in the CSCE-led process and would prefer Russian and/or Iranian mediation.(130) Moscow wanted to take advantage of the political change in Baku to replace the CSCE with the CIS in the peacemaking/ peacekeeping process, even though it envisaged this replacement within the framework of the CSCE. Russia had already managed to include a cautious reference, in the July 1992 CSCE Summit Declaration, to possible support for CSCE peacekeeping operations from "the peacekeeping mechanism of the CIS"(131), and had proposed to adapt the UN Charter in order to legitimize the role of regional organizations like the CIS in dealing with regional conflicts.(132) In late July 1993 (the date on which the armistice talks began between President Aliyev's representatives and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh), the Russian special negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh, Vladimir Kazimirov, stated that "the CSCE mediation was ineffective because this organization did not have at its disposal the means of enforcing any cease-fire agreement that might be reached". The Russian attitude was also motivated by the unwillingness of the other CSCE Participating States to contribute actively to the military side of the crisis management. The Western States did indeed refuse to send more than 30 soldiers for the first team of 150-200 troops to be deployed as the CSCE's peacekeeping force in the region.

        The Moscow talks between Russian President Yeltsin, Turkish Prime Minister Ciller and Azeri President Aliyev in early September 1993 showed that Turkey accepted Russia as the CSCE's replacement in the role of main mediator.(133) The Turkish attitude did not, however, include acceptance of the deployment of either a unilateral Russian peacekeeping force or even a mixed Russian-Turkish one.(134)

        In this situation, the CSCE could do no more than take note of Moscow's mediation efforts between Azerbaijan and the Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and reaffirm the central role of the Minsk process.(135). Although it has demonstrated a certain potential for the role of peacemaker and/or peacekeeper, the policies of the big powers prevented the CSCE from realizing this potential to the full. Its future role in Nagorno-Karabakh may depend to a large extent on the policies of Russia and the CIS. The leadership of the CIS in the management of conflicts in the post-Soviet area could reduce the CSCE's future role to preventive diplomacy. On the other hand, a failure of Russian mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could lead to a revival of the CSCE Minsk process, which officially never ended.(136)

        This second scenario seemed to result from President Aliyev's current hesitations regarding co-operation with Russia on military and energy policies and his efforts to have Russian troops in Azerbaijan deployed within the framework of the CSCE.(137) This paved the way for a new diplomatic effort by the Minsk Group since September 1994 and for a (difficult) consensus on a CSCE peacekeeping operation at the Budapest Summit in December 1994.(138)

    3. The CSCE and the Conflicts on the Territory of Georgia

      1. Fact-finding Missions and Support for other Peace Initiatives

        Georgia's entry into the CSCE, at the Helsinki Additional Meeting of the Council on 24 March 1992, was followed by a first Rapporteur Mission (5 to 22 May 1992). The CSCE only began to show real interest in the ethnic conflicts in that country when, at the request of the Georgian government, it sent a CSCE fact-finding mission to the region from 25 to 30 July 1992, after the signing in June of the Sochi Agreement.(139) This intervention by the CSCE in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was curtailed by the Russian leadership at a much earlier stage of the settlement process than was the case for Nagorno-Karabakh.

      2. CSCE Leadership in South Ossetia and UN Primacy in Abkhazia After the return of the fact-finding mission, the CSO decided to request the Chairman-in-Office to designate a Personal Representative(140) who should be accompanied by a staff of two diplomatic and five military advisers. The team was mandated(141):

        • to begin discussions with all parties involved in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in order to eliminate sources of tension and to extend law and order and political reconciliation beyond the immediate cease-fire zone;
        • to initiate a visible CSCE presence in the region;
        • to establish contacts with the local military commanders of the trilateral peacekeeping force(142) deployed under the Sochi Agreement of June 1992 and to help strengthen the cease-fire;
        • to facilitate the creation of a wider political framework for a lasting political solution on the basis of CSCE commitments;
        • to help establish a negotiating framework between the parties to the conflict in Abkhazia.

        The general aim of the mission - "to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement"(143) - indicates that the CSCE was trying to participate more actively in the political settlement of the crisis.

        The mission, led by the Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmati, began work in Tbilisi on 3 December 1992. It signed Memorandums of Understanding with Georgia on 23 January 1993 and with the South Ossetian leadership on 1 March 1993. After an initial three months, the mission has been extended for additional periods of six months.(144) This - the lengthiest mission in the history of the CSCE - represents the core of CSCE involvement in the conflict. The CSCE has to act here in close co-operation with Russia and the United Nations, and the Personal Representative exchanges regular information with the UN and other international organizations involved in the conflict.

        The mission's mandate also refers to Abkhazia, as - after the beginning of this crisis in February 1992 - the CSCE had for several months nursed the hope of having a limited peacemaking role there.(145) Ambassador Gyarmati himself, who had proposed this extension of the mission to Abkhazia, stated that the conflict had not yet reached the point where "a large-scale CSCE involvement would be possible".(146) The involvement of Russia and the United Nations reduced the possibility that the CSCE could have a mediating role of its own in the settlement of the Abkhazian conflict.

        The need for close co-operation between CSCE and UN became apparent at an early stage of their involvement in Georgia. The Security Council noted explicitly, on 8 October 1992, that "the current Chairman of the CSCE intends to dispatch a mission to Georgia in the near future and [it] underlines the need to ensure co-ordination between the efforts of the United Nations and those of the CSCE aimed at restoring peace".(147) "Maximum efficiency through a rational division of labour" with the United Nations was also requested by the CSCE Council in its Stockholm session of 14-15 December 1992. Here it reaffirmed its willingness to contribute to the political framework for a lasting peaceful solution to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, and it urged the parties to the Abkhazian conflict to co-operate with the CSCE mission for the same purpose.(148) The UN progressively took the lead in the management of the Abkhazian conflict, leaving the settlement of the South Ossetian crisis to the CSCE.

      3. Extension of the Mandate of the CSCE Mission and Progressive Merger with the UN-Sponsored Process

        The efforts of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in- Office and of the CSCE Mission to Georgia received continuous support from the CSO.(149) The latter endorsed the Personal Representative's proposal to hold two peace conferences, under the auspices of the UN and the CSCE(150), and adopted his "CSCE concept of a settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict" (August 1993), which implied closer co-operation with the UN.(151) Throughout this whole period, the CSCE participated in the UN-sponsored Geneva talks between the parties to the Abkhazian conflict and was involved in the work of the Joint Commission formed under the terms of the Georgian-Abkhazian cease-fire of 27 July 1993. It co-operated directly with UNOMiG through the attachment of CSCE liaison officers to it, and proposed to place two CSCE officers at the disposal of the UN Advance Team during the initial phase of the operations to monitor the Georgian-Abkhazian cease-fire.(152) An arrangement for CSCE monitoring of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia was also requested by the Rome Meeting of the CSCE Council on 30 November-1 December 1993.(153)

        After the visit to the region by the Chairwoman-in-Office of the CSCE Council, the Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha af Ugglas, on 24-25 October 1993, the CSO authorized the CSCE Mission to purchase humanitarian relief goods. This was the first humanitarian task given to the organization.(154) This extension of the mission's mandate was confirmed by the Rome Council, which also included in its responsibilities "the promotion of respect for human rights in the whole of Georgia and the rendering of assistance in the development of legal and democratic institutions and processes, including the drawing up of a new constitution for Georgia".(155)

        The creation of a joint UN/CSCE post of Personal Representative was also accepted in principle(156), but has not yet been implemented. The close co-operation with the UN and the partial merger of the UN and CSCE peace processes are the main lessons to be drawn from the involvement of the CSCE in Georgia.

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© 1996, VUB University Press