- National Interests and International Organizations
The influence of national interests on UN and CSCE actions may be
analysed according to three different categories of players: the
warring parties; the neighbouring States and regional powers
(particularly Russia, Turkey, Iran and, subsidiarily,
Kazakhstan); and the Western States. The interests of the Western
States are threefold. Their first aim is to preserve their
historic ties and geopolitical alliances with the countries
involved. This motive was crucial to the French and Greek veto on
the use of the "consensus-minus-one" procedure by the CSCE for a
formal condemnation of Armenia's participation in the violation
of the integrity of Azeri territory. A second aim is to preserve
Western interests in energy supplies (oil and gas) coming from or
through the territories of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which
gave rise to fierce competition between Russia, Turkey and Iran.
A third Western concern stems from the perceived risk of a
strategic reinforcement of Russia and/or Iran, which are still
regarded (especially in the US) as potential threats to Western
interests.
Similar motives determine the policies of neighbouring
countries and regional powers. These States have specific
interests to defend. Firstly, they have to cope with the
consequences of the wars in Transcaucasia, such as the stream of
refugees or the risk of the war spilling over into areas close to
their borders, like Nakhichevan (near Turkey), or even right onto
their territory, like Iranian Azerbaijan or the Northern
Caucasus. Secondly, they may use wars as a tool in internal or
foreign policies: thus Russia is demonstrating its influence in
"near abroad" areas and the increasing role of the CIS as a
regional organization; the Turkish government is using its
initiatives in Transcaucasia and Central Asia to divert public
opinion at home from dissatisfaction with the social situation
and international protests against repression in Kurdistan; Iran
is trying to break its isolation on the world scene.
The conflicts in Transcaucasia are, in addition, creating
opportunities for neighbouring States and regional powers to
strengthen or develop alliances with other powers on the basis of
strategic aims (such as oil supply, arms procurement or
recognition as a regional power). The Turkish-US friendship, for
instance, has been clearly reinforced by common initiatives and
positions. Attempts to develop a Russian-Iranian axis(157) in the
peace process for Nagorno-Karabakh may be analysed in the same
way.
The warring parties have threefold interests to defend. The
development of the war and of international mediation is useful
for legitimacy purposes: it may stabilize fragile regimes
(Shevardnadze, Aliyev), and it may lead to a de facto recognition
by the international community of non-governmental parties (the
Abkhaz rebels, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh). Warring
parties may express preferences for mediation by one or another
organization or state: Armenia, for example, had more
reservations than Azerbaijan about the CSCE, because it did not
consider its political make-up to be as favourable. A conflict
may be internationalized in order to obtain international
condemnation of the violation of the integrity of the territory
involved (Azeri and Georgian governments), to prevent direct
Russian involvement (idem), to restrain military gains by
opposite side, to secure humanitarian aid, etc.
- Capabilities of the International Organizations in Crisis
Management
The conflicts in Transcaucasia constituted a test case for the
capacity of the UN and the CSCE to act as mediators and military
peacekeepers. Here, the United Nations Organization is confronted
in particular with the gap between the normative and operative
imperatives of its intervention. The operational means of the
United Nations are not adapted to the scope and far-reaching aims
of Security Council resolutions. This may be explained firstly by
the lack of financial and military means. The main powers have a
selective interest in such conflicts. Transcaucasia is not a
region of "vital interest" for the Western States, and public
opinion in the West would not readily accept the sending of
troops to the region. This limited interest of Western countries
in the conflicts in the Caucasus gives rise to a contradiction
between, on the one hand, the desire of the US government and
other Western powers to prevent Russian or Iranian unilateral
actions in the region and, on the other, their inability to
provide the UN or the CSCE with adequate resources for the
international management of the conflicts.
The UN and CSCE have come up against the specific interests
of one main regional and international power (Russia in
Transcaucasia, the European Union in the former Yugoslavia) which
is not ready to give up its hegemonic position in the mediation
process. In Abkhazia, for instance, under the Moscow Agreement of
3 September 1993 a trilateral peacekeeping force (similar to the
one set up in South Ossetia) was to be deployed. In the second
stage, the UN was to consolidate the peace plan negotiated by
Russia (Sochi Agreement of 27 July 1993), leading to the
following division of labour: peacekeeping for the UN,
peacemaking for the main regional power.(158) In the Abkhazian
case, only UN observers were deployed to supervise the
implementation of the peace agreement. When the Abkhaz attacks of
September 1993 called into question the validity of the Sochi
Agreement, the UN tried to assume the leading role in the
peacemaking process by promoting a global peace plan. The
negotiation of a comprehensive set of principles acceptable to
both sides was coupled with a peacekeeping operation. Since
spring 1994, the UN has had to accept that Russia is once more
leading the peacemaking process. The Security Council, noting the
recent peace agreement of 14 May 1994 - negotiated by Russia -
welcomed the new CIS peacekeeping operation agreed by the parties
and stressed the co-ordination necessary between the CIS
activities and the UN observation mission.(159) The main UN
objective at present is to keep Russian peace efforts around the
negotiation table and in the field under international
supervision and to monitor their conformity with international
standards.
Russia's views differed in a number of ways from the UN's.
Russia disagreed with proposals which were central to the UN
peace plan, such as the idea of an international peace conference
and a restriction on Russian participation in the peacekeeping
force. Nor did UN recognition of Russia's role as "facilitator"
give Russia full satisfaction.
We may conclude from this experience that, where a regional
power has an interest in using its own resources to mediate a
conflict, it is very difficult for the UN to promote another
strategy for managing the crisis, especially when the other
Permanent Members of the Security Council do not have vital
interests in the area.
Where the CSCE is concerned, other problems need to be
considered, such as interference with the national interests of
the Russian Federation. The conflicts in Transcaucasia
constituted a completely new experience in peacemaking for the
CSCE. Its efficiency in the case of South Ossetia was due to the
fact that its intervention followed an agreement between the
parties under the auspices of Moscow. The CSCE had merely to
supervise a process led by a major power. In the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh, the CSCE's leading role in the establishment of
the Minsk Group was partly accepted and partly contested by the
warring parties and, from July 1993 onwards, was disturbed by
Russian interference. The CSCE was able to prepare the monitoring
mission - a peacekeeping force of 600 men - with the help of the
Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, but was not able to put it
into operation in practice.
For the CSCE, the Transcaucasian experience led in the first
place to co-operation with the United Nations. After the decision
(at its Helsinki Summit of July 1992) to act as a regional
arrangement(160), the
CSCE submitted itself to the provisions of
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which states that in principle,
unless the Security Council decides otherwise, regional
organizations are empowered to deal with disputes of local
interest and to resolve them by peaceful means (UN Charter, Art.
52). Regional organizations are prohibited from undertaking any
"coercive actions" without the prior authorization of the
Security Council (UN Charter, art. 53).(161) The patterns for the
division of labour between the UN and the CSCE in
Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia (the UN were never involved in the
South Ossetian conflict) deserve more thorough analysis.
- Patterns for the Division of Labour between the UN and the
CSCE
- The Nagorno-Karabakh Pattern
"In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the UN has supported the work
of the CSCE as just one example of a new division of labour with
regional organizations", wrote Boutros Boutros-Ghali.(162) The
relationship described by Boutros-Ghali is quite similar to the
relationship between the UN and the EC in the second stage of the
international crisis management in the former Yugoslavia (from
late September 1991 to mid-July 1992), when the UN carried out
the functions delegated to it by the EC (prohibition of arms
transfers to Yugoslavia, negotiation of a cease-fire coupled with
a UN peacekeeping operation). But the scheme of UN-CSCE relations
regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh is more harmonious than the UN-EC
relationship:
- most of the UN fact-finding missions to Nagorno-Karabakh were
sent explicitly to back CSCE efforts to achieve a peaceful
settlement of the conflict(163);
- since the beginning of the CSCE's Minsk peace process, a UN
observer has always been present at the negotiating table(164);
- almost all Raffaelli's proposals were endorsed by the Security
Council.
By contrast, in the context of the former Yugoslavia, there were
a number of controversial points, like the EC's recognition
process or the EC proposal to ban oil trading with Yugoslavia.(165)
These differences may be explained by the fact that the EC is not
only an international organization, but also a state-like
political player. They may also be explained by the absence of
the US and Russia in the EC peacemaking process. The CSCE
political leadership visible in the international crisis
management in Nagorno-Karabakh is, however, not much in line with
the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter, which implies that
regional organizations should, in all circumstances, be at the
service of the Security Council, and not vice versa.
- The Abkhazian Pattern
In the peace process in Abkhazia, co-operation between the UN and
Russia was far more important than the co-operation between the
UN and the CSCE - despite the fact that most of the Security
Council resolutions relating to Georgia welcomed the CSCE's peace
efforts. The UN has always made a point of associating the CSCE
with its peacemaking process:
- if the UN called an international peace conference on Abkhazia,
it insisted that the CSCE should be invited(166);
- several meetings were organized between the UN special envoy,
Eduard Brunner, and the CSCE Chairwoman-in-Office, Margaretha af
Ugglas, or her personal representative for Georgia, Istvan
Gyarmati.(167)
These efforts do not, however, take from the fact that the
CSCE was playing only a secondary role in the settlement of the
Abkhaz conflict.
- Prospects for Co-operation
The Transcaucasian conflicts have shown the necessity to improve
co-operation between the two organizations in crisis situations.
Such co-operation would accord with the policies of both the CSCE
and the UN. The Rome Council of the CSCE has defined principles
for peacekeeping and for its co-operation with other
organizations.(168)
Although the UN Secretary-General is promoting
a case-by-case approach to the division of labour between the
universal organization and the regional ones, an agreement was
signed on 26 May 1993 between the UN Secretary-General and the
CSCE in order to establish a framework for co-operation and
co-ordination(169), and
the Budapest Summit of the CSCE has defined
procedures for the division of labour between the two
organizations.(170)
