Chapter 6 Part 2 The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict in a Regional Context Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi This chapter consists of 2 parts (1,2, and notes) Conflict in Abkhazia: Specific Dimensions The Abkazian population has suffered great losses in the last two centuries as a result of deportation and the artificial in-migration of other ethnic groups to its homeland. At the same time, the Soviet legacy included ingenious arrangements for maintaining the disproportionately large share of leadership offices held by the Abkhaz community. This legacy contributed to the conflagration and determined the form it would take. Specific factors which had a decisive influence on the outbreak of the war include the North Caucasian diaspora in the Near East, different evaluations of the legal aspects of the conflict (such as the right to self-determination versus the territorial integrity principle), the perception by both parties to the conflict of the righteousness of their actions, the role of regional and international organizations, the role of Cossacks in the conflict and the importance of the Russian language in Abkhazia. Post-Conflict Attitudes and Lack of Information The general atmosphere in Abkhazia still bears a number of immediate post-war characteristics. The population expects war to break out anew sooner or later, and consequently much discussion and public discourse concerns the prospect of the renewal of military operations. This keeps the population militarily mobilized and constitutes the strongest obstacle to constructive, development-oriented thinking, as well as to the building of civil society. In most parts of Georgia, however, the issue of Abkhazia shifted long ago to the periphery of political discussions. In spite of state propaganda, and the continual attempts by the political groups representing, or claiming to represent, the refugees (Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs) from Abkhazia, the problems of day-to-day survival or business interests preoccupy the general public far more than the prospect of war in Abkhazia. Apart from a few militants, mostly among the IDPs, the population would rather support a peaceful solution to the Abkhazian problem, although for the majority any solution that involved losing Abkhazia would be unacceptable.

Legal Status Most debates today revolve around the legal status of Abkhazia within/vis-à-vis Georgia. I doubt whether it is possible - or even very important - to resolve the question of political status in the short term. Problems other than status have to be resolved in order to reduce tension. But both sides' concerns and interests in the discussion on political status have to be properly analysed if there is to be a productive dialogue. The Abkhaz are concerned with how they will maintain control and who will guarantee their security after they have become a minority again, which will happen if the IDPs are allowed to return and take part in the political process through democratic procedures. The Abkhaz, who have won the war and - for the first time in a century - now have a favourable demographic percentage, have great difficulty in facing such prospects. The Abkhaz side insists on equal (confederative) status with Georgia, which is unacceptable to Tbilisi. In February 1996 the Abkhaz proposed to set up a federal union with Georgia. According to Anri Jergenia, the Abkhaz "President's" special envoy, these proposals contained "elements of both a federation and a confederation". The new arrangement would include common national borders, joint activities in specific spheres and the possibility of setting up joint authorities. According to the protocol, each of the two equal sides would keep its constitution and relations between them would be regulated by a special treaty which, with the agreement of both sides, could have the force of constitutional law. Both sides would co-ordinate their foreign policies and foreign economic relations, the operation of border and customs services, power engineering, transport and communications, the environment and the guaranteeing of human and civic rights and freedoms, as well as the rights of ethnic minorities. The protocol implied that, by mutual agreement, Georgia and Abkhazia could increase the number of "co-ordinated policies".[8]

"President" Ardzinba noted that the new structure would not amount to a "classical type of federation". One should bear in mind that the Abkhaz side regards the above proposals as a compromise. According to Vladislav Ardzinba (and this is also maintained by many experts), the vast majority of the current population of Abkhazia would, in virtually every circumstance, seek closer relations with Russia than with Georgia, and Abkhazia would ideally prefer to join a Russian Federation than any Georgian equivalent. During his inauguration speech as Georgian President (26 November 1995), Eduard Shevardnadze declared: We have always stated, and we are stating now, that time has determined that Georgia's state structure be shaped on a federal basis. Abkhazia will be a subject of the federation in Georgia with broad political status. It will have its own constitution, which will have to be in conformity with the constitution of a single united state. The Republic of Abkhazia will have its own parliament, supreme court, anthem, state emblem and other features of a state.[9] In 1997, notwithstanding the more active position adopted by the UN with regard to the resolution of the conflict, the Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations reached a deadlock, despite the fact that any further delay is detrimental to all parties. The absence of a clearly formulated and widely supported strategy for the resolution of ethno-territorial conflicts is still a problem. The general unwillingness to decentralize power in Georgia proper, as well as an extremely cautious attitude towards the repatriation of the Meskhetians (Meskhetian Turks), are causing increased suspicion among the negotiating partners as to the sincerity of the liberal and federalist statements made by the Georgian government, and have led to accusations of a double standard. Among the various options for the future status of Abkhazia that are being discussed - whether it should join Russia, Georgia or a Caucasian Confederation, or stay totally independent - for the time being there does not seem to be any alternative to finding some sort of compromise with the Tbilisi government, even if other options would be preferable to the vast majority of ethnic Abkhaz. There are unfortunately no signs that both sides are actually looking for specific arrangements in a constructive way (contrary to all their rhetoric about doing so). Russia's attitude reduces still further the chances of finding this kind of solution: its post-war policy on Chechnya demonstrates that it is ready to deploy its still formidable resources to maintain control over the North Caucasus, and it still seems to believe that a compromise that is mutually acceptable to the Georgians and the Abkhaz would not be beneficial for Russian control over the region. Russia is, however, unlikely to decide to incorporate Abkhazia formally, while it may be ready to assist it in maintaining its de facto independence for quite a long time.

For the Abkhaz, the issue of status used to be a pretext for blocking negotiations and thereby preventing the return of the IDPs/refugees, which could have endangered the demographic balance that emerged after the war. For the Georgians, the negotiation process was only a means of demonstrating their good intentions and readiness to solve the conflict on internationally favoured terms, while there was no real will to seek a compromise. Despite their rhetoric, neither side really wanted to get to the heart of the matter and solve the problem of legal status, preferring - if no explicit gain was possible immediately - to wait until better bargaining positions were secured. The only alternatives to a compromise between Tbilisi and Sukhumi are either military action, which would be detrimental to all and seems to be less probable, except perhaps on a limited scale (e.g. in Gali or the Kodori valley), or a further stalling of the negotiations - "neither peace nor war". This last scenario seemed to be the one preferred by all parties for several years, but it has now ceased to be so, in so far as both governments are beginning to lose control over the situation - a clear trend in 1997. Moreover, the deadlock in the negotiations is becoming more and more damaging to both parties. Finally, it could be argued that the opinion quoted in the document presented at the beginning of this chapter - that the final determination of the legal status should not be a precondition for any other progress in the peace process - makes a good deal of sense. Postponing such a solution until a time when the sides have a better basis for mutual understanding, designing provisional status on the basis of functional needs and approaches, and proceeding in the meantime with other important issues, is a viewpoint I would fully support. Georgian Refugees/IDPs and the Gali Region The Abkhaz side uses two main arguments to counter the Georgian demand for the refugees to return soon to Abkhazia. According to the Sochi protocols of April 1994,[10] any Georgians who took part in military action should be prohibited from returning - economic difficulties and the risk of spontaneous violence are used as a second argument against their return. Neither of these arguments is convincing. The first is incompatible with any respected legal tradition: of course, war criminals should be prosecuted notwithstanding their ethnic origin, but to instigate proceedings against all those who have carried weapons is a very different matter. It is not only unfair, as people should not be prosecuted for taking one side or another in a civil war, it is also technically impossible to have independent legal bodies check the behaviour of the entire Georgian population during the war. The argument that the economic situation is unfavourable is not a very strong one either: technical and financial terms can be agreed by both parties in order to make the return of the IDPs possible. Neither of the two arguments can be invoked in relation to the return of refugees to the Gali region, which has a homogeneous Georgian population and where the return of IDPs is already an irreversible process. According to various estimates, the number of Georgians in Gali is about as high as the number of Abkhaz in Abkhazia (the latter number continues to decrease, creating a further imbalance).

Although the Gali region has been owned alternately over the centuries by Megrelian/ Georgian and Abkhazian feudal lords, it has had almost no Abkhazian population in the 20th century. Whatever arguments the Abkhaz use regarding the Georgian presence in their homeland, there is no historical or other legitimization for discriminatory policies towards the Georgian population in this region. Nor would such policies receive any support from Abkhazia's North Caucasian allies. Abkhaz officials will therefore have great difficulty in coping with any eruptions of violence in Gali. The possibility of returning the Gali region to Georgian control, in exchange for peace and an acceptable political status, was discussed among the Abkhaz leadership. The opportunity for such an exchange has been lost, however, as the Georgian government no longer has to negotiate the future of Gali on the same terms as before - it just needs to wait for a more opportune moment. An attempt to create a separate Megrel nationality (out of a linguistically distinct Georgian sub-ethnic group) as a strategic alternative, which is proposed and strongly supported by a British scholar, George Hewitt, and is being implemented in practice by the Abkhaz leadership, has come too late, as the majority of the IDPs (predominantly Megrelians) have strengthened their Georgian identity after their exodus from Abkhazia. Specific measures concerning the Georgian IDPs and people who went missing during the war could promote dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz. A moratorium on changing the property rights of the IDPs and refugees from Abkhazia - which would in fact mean unilaterally depriving them of their property left behind in Abkhazia, until the achievement of a final solution or a special agreement - could be reciprocated on the Georgian side by long-term commitments regarding the economic development of Abkhazia. The mutual exchange of data concerning the persons reported missing during the war, as well as further collaboration in searching for them, is another area that is important for confidence-building.

Demographic Balance Demographic relations that may benefit one side or the other is a major concern of both parties, but especially the Abkhaz. No progress achieved on the question of political status would be of much value to the Abkhaz if the pre-war demographic balance were restored. Hence most discussions on political issues, even if they are not explicitly linked to demography, have a demographic dimension that should not be underestimated in efforts to understand the motives of both parties. The demographic position of the Abkhaz community has been progressively weakened, since the 1860s, through an immigration flow of Georgians (mainly of the Megrelian sub-ethnos), Russians and Armenians. Abkhazians felt particularly threatened by the massive immigration of Georgians that started in the 1930s, leading the proportion of Abkhazians in the total population to decline to 17 or 18% per cent by the 1980s, when their number was about the same as that of both the Russian and Armenian communities in Abkhazia, and less than half that of the Georgians (approximately 46%). The importance of this issue needs to be recognized in the negotiation process if real progress is to be achieved. The Abkhaz had hoped to win time after the war by slowing down the negotiations and postponing a final solution, in order to establish their position on the international scene and change the demographic balance in their favour by a massive repatriation of the diaspora Abkhaz. Their hope that these objectives would be achieved, thereby strengthening their negotiating position, has waned since then. According to E. Wesselink, the repatriation of Abkhazians from abroad should not be expected in the near future: The repatriation movement never gained momentum. The number of returnees are counted in hundreds rather than in thousands. A number of delegations visited the North Caucasus around 1990 to study the prospects for repatriation programmes. The visitors were disappointed at the low standard of living in the North Caucasus. Another problem was the fact that the Abkhaz in Abkhazia appeared to be Christians and that the other North West Caucasians showed no real interest in religious teachings.[11]

Nor is there any sign of international recognition for the Abkhazian State, and even leading Chechen politicians have withdrawn their support from the Abkhazian case.[12] But even more important is the fact that the permanent threat and dire economic prospects are worsening rather than improving the ethno-demographic balance of the Abkhaz. They are emigrating, thereby voting with their feet against current policies. Already there seem to be more Georgians and Armenians than Abkhaz in Abkhazia, and this trend may not change if the approach based on playing for time continues. While the importance of the ethno-demographic issue is at present an obstacle to reconciliation, it seems likely that it may eventually turn into a powerful stimulus in the search of compromise. One can imagine Georgians accepting or even encouraging the repatriation of diaspora Abkhaz in exchange for the gradual return of refugees, and thus a certain demographic balance could be negotiated and secured. Even if a significant repatriation process would require political stability and economic revival, the process of repatriation could start on more than a symbolic scale. But only compromises between Abkhaz and Georgians can promote such a process, and Tbilisi should be aware of this asset in the negotiations. At present, however, the Georgian political establishment is strongly opposed to the idea of Abkhazian repatriation. The Abkhazian Language and Cultural Security Cultural insecurity, or a national community's fear of losing its ethnic and cultural identity, is a vitally important factor in the Abkhaz attitude towards reconciliation prospects. The Abkhaz traditionally tend to lean more than the Georgians towards the Russian culture and language, and at the same time they stress their ethnic proximity to the North Caucasian groups of Adyghs and Circassians. These cultural attitudes conflict with those of the Georgians, who have a strong pro-Western bent. Such a cultural clash between the Abkhazians and Georgians was potentially exacerbated by the displacement of the strongly Russified Georgian (mostly Megrelian) population of Abkhazia to the more explicitly Georgian cultural environment.

The majority of Abkhazians, in particular the Christian population in the southern part of the region, are culturally very close to the neighbouring Megrelians, to the extent that until recently there were no clear borderlines of ethnic self-identification. Some members of a family might, for instance, consider themselves as being Georgian, while others in the same family regard themselves as Abkhaz. Pragmatic considerations play a role here. Georgians and Abkhaz share many family names. Paradoxically, some very patriotic people on both sides have the same family name. These facts generate additional mutual suspicion and lead to accusations of assimilatory policies. Georgians, formerly the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia, generally accept the Abkhazians' right to have their language recognized as a state language. Unlike in the past (in Gamsakhurdia's time particularly, this was not always the dominant opinion), now they also acknowledge that the Abkhazians are an "autochthonous" population, a status they do not ascribe to other ethnic groups in Abkhazia, such as Russians or Armenians. At the same time, Georgians believe that they themselves have the same right to be considered an autochthonous population there, a claim that is based on various historical arguments, such as the dominance of Georgian inscriptions on Abkhazian monasteries and other historic monuments. The Abkhaz are unwilling to accept such arguments, fearing that the re-establishment of the Georgian majority and culture in Abkhazia, without strong guarantees, could endanger the very survival of their own culture and the fate of the nation itself. The Abkhaz perceive the Russian cultural milieu as less dangerous for their own cultural survival, owing to the diversity and size of the Russian cultural arena. Many joint initiatives could be taken in the cultural field shared by Georgians and Abkhaz, to begin with, for instance, the recreation of the historic Abkhaz archives burnt in Sukhumi during the war, by providing copies of relevant documents and other materials; the restoration of libraries; co-operation in the field of education, for example in preparing text-books in the Abkhazian language, etc. Great caution, however, would be needed here on the Georgian side, due to the ever-present suspicion of Georgian cultural expansionism.

Armenians in Abkhazia The Armenian population, which already dominated some districts before the war, is at present considered by some experts to constitute the largest community in Abkhazia. They are, however, strongly under-represented on government bodies. In the past, they generally expressed their solidarity with the Abkhazians in their struggle for secession. Some Armenians from Armenia and Karabakh took part in military action on the Abkhazian side, while the majority of the few Armenians fighting on the Georgian side during the war came from other regions of Georgia. While the Armenian government in Yerevan explicitly states its neutrality in the conflict, favouring the search for a peaceful solution, and declares its support for Georgia's territorial integrity, there used to be great sympathy for the Abkhaz case among the Armenian population and nationalist political circles in Armenia proper. According to Michael Ochs,[13] Levon Ter-Petrossyan was considered, after the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, as a democrat, a legitimate president, and more generally "a rational guy with whom you can talk and with whom you can compromise, not a nationalist". Tbilisi was unhappy about Ter-Petrossyan's weakened position, and worried about political instability in Armenia. In June 1997, during an official visit by the Armenian president to Georgia, Ter-Petrossyan and Shevardnadze went together to Akhalkalaki, where the Armenian president declared that the last thing Armenia needed was to have problems with Georgia regarding Akhalkalaki, which has a large Armenian minority.[14] This concern is not shared by the Dashnaks (an opposition nationalist party in Armenia), who have territorial claims against Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. From the Georgian perspective, a weakening of Ter-Petrossyan's position in Armenia would reduce his leverage on the militant, nationalist Armenian groupings. Relations with North Caucasians/Adyghes The Abkhaz strive for closer relations with the North Caucasians, and particularly the Adyghs (including the Circassians and Kabardinians), who belong to the same linguistic group as the Abkhaz, unlike most of the other North Caucasian ethnic groups. Nevertheless, since the co-ordinated resistance to Russian conquest during the Great Caucasian War of the 19th century - in which the battle between the Russians and Abkhazians constituted the final episode - Abkhazians have developed a strong sense of a common fate and identity with the Northern Caucasus, further strengthened by their co-operative relationship with the descendants of Mohajirs (belonging to different North-Caucasian ethnic groups) in the Near East and Turkey, and also by their later attempts to join this fragile North Caucasian unity after the February Revolution of 1917. During perestroika, there was a new attempt at such a union with the creation of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus. This Confederation's first conference took place in August 1989 in Sukhumi, regarded as the future capital of the new union. The various nationalities represented in the Confederation have no fear of being dominated by any one group - a confidence which feels very different from what they experienced throughout their history with Russia or Georgia. This explains the attractiveness of the idea of creating a multiethnic union of Caucasians, even if such a union could be considered romantic and will certainly not be easy to achieve. The Abkhaz scholar Gueorgui Otyrba has formulated this perception as follows:[15]

The history and the destiny of Abkhazia are closely connected with those of all the peoples of the North Caucasus. Today they share a common history of suffering and oppression, of deportations and cultural destruction, and of fighting powerful enemies. They also share a determination to protect themselves against a repetition of history. They have seized the opportunity created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and by Russia's and Georgia's relative weakness, to assert their rights and bring about a situation that can provide better guarantees for their survival in the future. The Abkhaz will therefore strive - even if this is not at the moment explicitly expressed during the negotiations - for the creation of open borders to the North Caucasus, and in particular for unhindered cultural and economic exchange with the Adyghs. For the Georgians, transparent borders are still a sensitive issue, however, as are its borders with North Ossetia, Chechnya and Daghestan. In all these cases the Georgian government has to cope with the consequences of having national minorities of the same ethnic group inhabiting both sides of a state border. In conceiving the future of the Caucasus, Georgians stress their central - both advantageous and dangerous - position in the region and would like to secure a central role in regional politics. Georgia's relations with most of its northern neighbours have improved significantly since the end of the Chechen war, culminating in the official visit by the Chechen president, Maskhadov, to Georgia in autumn 1997. The Georgian leadership hopes that the Western Caucasian mountain peoples will follow the example of the Chechens, who have earned considerable respect in the region, and thus ensure more neutrality in the event of renewed conflict. The Russian Presence and Russian Border The Russians control their border with Abkhazia, its coastal zone and have military bases there. Russia is also the exclusive provider of peace-keeping forces, acting formally under the aegis of the CIS. It exercises significant control over the external and internal policies of the Sukhumi government. The economic blockade imposed by Russia under Georgian political pressure conforms to the traditional pattern of Russian politics: its aim is to weaken all the parties in conflict so that it can effectively continue to play the role of arbiter in the dispute.

Russia's policies in Abkhazia, as elsewhere in the Caucasus and in the "Near Abroad" regions, are in keeping with a "post-imperialist" value system, as described by Pavel Baev:[16] The most distinctive feature of Russia's policies towards the other fourteen states which emerged from the rubble of the USSR is inconsistency often bordering on incomprehensibility. (...) What makes the political complexities even more striking is the quite broad consensus among Russia's political élites on the main policy goals in the so-called "Near Abroad". This consensus had already emerged by late 1993 and survived all the turbulent election campaigns. (...) To my mind, if a definition of Russian policy is needed or indeed possible, it is rather 'post-imperialist'; this notion refers to a declining power which tries to compensate for inevitable retreats by some new engagements, feels the need to protect compatriots left "out there" but desperately lacks the resources to do so, and attempts to prevent spill-over from various violent conflicts while being itself a major source of instability. From the Abkhazian perspective, the Russian presence, notwithstanding all its vacillations, constitutes the only guarantee against a catastrophic renewal of the military operation, and against the risk of losing the gains from their previous victory. This enables the Russians to manipulate Abkhazian concerns to their own advantage, but the Abkhaz cannot fully rely on Russian support, which may be withdrawn as soon as the stakes change. The Georgians, while blaming the Russian presence for prolonging the stalemate in the conflict, nevertheless expect that the Russians will sooner or later take their side. Economic Development There is a low level of market economy in Abkhazia, with most food grown for domestic consumption. Many inhabitants possess some land which is enough for their subsistence. Those who are employed in the public sector and who have not been paid for months have been given plots of land instead of wages by the government. There is some small trade, for instance between Gali and Sukhumi. Due to the CIS blockade, the import of goods - some Turkish ships travel to Sukhumi - barely meets the population's needs.

Major export items are tangerines and other citrus fruit. The export of the surplus production of between 60,000 and 100,000 tons of citrus fruit to Russia is extremely difficult because of the semi-closure, by Russian officials, of the railway and road linking Abkhazia with Russia, while domestic industry lacks the capacity to process the crop into juice or concentrate. Other exports are nuts and scrap metal. The road system is very bad and there are few cars, though there is some public transport in the bigger towns. There is also some traffic between Gali and Zugdidi (on the Georgian side) - this has to be registered with the Gali authorities, where tax must be paid; there are also several unofficial (easier and cheaper) crossing points on the Georgian/Abkhaz border. Electric energy is more regular in Abkhazia than in most parts of Georgia, thanks to the power supply from the Inguri dam and from Russia. Widespread economic hardship, however, is driving more and more emigrants out of the region. In the meantime, the Georgian economy is reviving and is even arousing increasing interest among potential investors, even though the current situation should not be seen through rosy-tinted glasses. Co-operation on the economic rehabilitation and development of Abkhazia could, in the event of a lasting consensus between the two opposing sides, succeed in attracting significant international resources, as is currently happening in Tskhinvali. This could prove to be the best means for combining the interests of both sides and fostering mutual understanding. The areas of technical co-operation that serve the interests of both sides can easily be defined as soon as a framework for such discussion is created with the assistance of the UN and OSCE missions, and these may represent the best arena for the most important and difficult endeavour - building confidence between the former adversaries. Physical Security of Citizens and the Possibility of a New Wave of Violence Despite the current negotiations, the possibility of new outbursts of violence remains. The Georgian and Abkhaz governments, as well as the mediators, now have to define what their reaction would be in such a situation. Although there is much discussion of the possibility of a new war, no preventive action is being taken. It is far from clear how atrocities and violent actions against the civilian population would be prevented. A discussion needs to be started on how to design mechanisms for humanitarian intervention and on the types of intervention that would be helpful in de-escalating the conflict, in order to reduce casualties and other negative consequences for the peace process.

Prospects The strong interdependence of the conflicts in the region is another very important factor to be taken into account when designing peace initiatives for Abkhazia. A future settlement may change the balance of forces in the Caucasus region. Hence a holistic approach to the region's problems, one which takes into account its specific cultural and political features, is critical for drafting effective regional policies. It is interesting to notice that while the governments often refer to the Israeli-Palestinian experience, the NGO community and those involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian dialogue pay relatively little attention to the fruitful ideas that have been put forward in the Middle East conflict. This concerns initiatives such as the Oslo Declaration, signed initially by the Palestinian and Jewish partisans of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, which proposes certain steps for achieving this. Private initiatives may start attracting public opinion to positive ideas, for instance the collection of signatures in support of peace (with a third/Western party doing the collecting). Other lessons to be learnt include the vital importance of a proper (especially temporal) co-ordination of initiatives.[17] By the second half of 1997, the Sukhumi and Tbilisi governments seemed to be more open to real compromises. The obstacles are, however, great. One of the factors is external: Moscow's unwillingness to lose this very effective lever of control over Georgian policies, and its paradoxical desire to maintain such control notwithstanding great economic losses due to the blockade of transport and communications travelling from Russia to Turkey and passing through Abkhazian territory, as well as the other benefits of having a peaceful, prosperous neighbour in the south. Even more important is the unwillingness of the Abkhazians to risk a restoration of the status quo ante bellum, i.e., to return to a situation in which they would be a minority, unable to preserve the monopoly of power in a democratic scenario of development, regardless of the legal status they would acquire within the framework of Georgia. One of the scenarios being discussed at present is a territorial division of Abkhazia into a number of districts, in each of which either the Abkhazians or the Georgians would establish their political control. The Abkhazian government could not make such a decision, based on the "peace for territory" principle, without strong popular support. Detailed scenarios for such a process are lacking. The parties have defined no priorities or negotiable elements that could constitute a basis for a mutually acceptable compromise, and no creative approaches are being adopted in the search for such a compromise. This is partly due to the governments' lack of political will to achieve real results, and also partly to particular group interests linked to the suspended situation of "no war - no peace". Both governments are hostages to their own declarations and promises. Great courage and political inspiration are needed to break down stereotypes and secure popular support for innovative approaches. It is vitally necessary to develop a series of detailed scenarios that would be acceptable to each side, and then work on the gradual convergence of at least some of them - this may lead to the realization that the differences in viewpoint between the former adversaries are not as great as they previously appeared to be. The majority of these differences are, contrary to popular belief, not mutually exclusive - rather, they are symbolic or terminological in nature, and could be overcome if due effort were made.

As the two conflicting parties have different priorities - for instance concerning their legal status or the return of refugees - it is quite difficult to solve individual problems when they are negotiated as part of a whole package. Hence, one of the ways of proceeding with resolving the conflict is to try to narrow the focus temporarily, breaking down the problem into a list of individual issues which are closely linked to one another, certainly, but which may nevertheless be handled and discussed separately. Only after considering these issues and coming to some agreements, or at least reaching an understanding of one another's viewpoints, will it be possible to discuss the whole package again, in an integrated form. Time is working against the interests of the Abkhazians, but this does not mean that either the Georgians or Russians would benefit from a further postponement of a peace settlement. Russia has actually lost - and is continuing to lose - a great deal, having been cut off from her southern transportation routes, alienated Georgia and forfeited important levers of influence in the region. But Georgia too is a loser in this zero-sum game. Apart from the human suffering caused by a prolonged conflict, fewer and fewer Georgians may be inclined to return to Abkhazia, while the uncertain future of the IDPs is posing enormous problems for the weak Georgian State. At the same time, Georgia is losing the considerable economic benefits it would enjoy with an integrated economy and a north-south transportation route. One potential area for economic co-operation may be the prospect of transforming the Gali district into a free economic zone which would be put provisionally under an international security regime. This would create a safe buffer area, preventing open military action, but it could also serve as a pilot initiative for further balanced economic co-operation. Gali is important in this respect not only because of its border location or because of its Georgian population, but also thanks to its high economic - particularly agricultural - potential. It is worth noting that, even in the current strained situation, Gali is to a certain extent already performing the role of a clearing-house and exchange market for the two sides.

I am, of course, fully aware that no concrete settlement can be reached by individuals from the two communities that are not representing their respective governments, but their proposals can contribute to a spirit of compromise, which is essential to the negotiation process. If we are able to find common ground in at least some areas, this could serve as a starting point for broader discussions. I am quite sure that almost all of the contradictions discussed are resolvable, if innovative thinking is applied, and if we try to look at the problems through the eyes of other side as well. The existing problems have to be correlated to the real, basic needs and interests of both peoples, as distinct from populist slogans and wrongly perceived interests that only lead to further confrontation. It does seem that if the intellectuals of both sides, supported by international experts and mediators, were able to formulate at least a few concrete ideas in the form of a set of declarations, this could be instrumental in establishing a co-operative approach to conflict resolution, and would help all the sides involved to see the conflict and its consequences through other eyes, instead of just their own. A helpful instrument in proceeding further with the peace and negotiation processes could be the creation of a mixed discussion forum constituted by respected individuals from both sides. These would receive a mandate from their respective leaderships to discuss the possible terms of the conflict settlement, and would regularly inform their leaderships about progress, but would not have the authority to sign any documents or make decisions. Such a forum, moderated by international experts and assisted by the authority of organizations such as the UN or OSCE, could perform several important functions: generating and testing new ideas in a non-restrictive environment; maintaining a two-way exchange of information between the governments; working as an informal negotiating body, and as a public advocate of a peaceful solution.

Conclusions While it is important to speculate about how and when the solution to the Abkhazian conflict will be found, it may be of more immediate value to pose the question of where alternative ideas and influences that could shape the future solution will come from. In broad terms, one can identify three such sources: first, political and social currents within Abkhazia/Georgia, second, Russia, including the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, and third, international institutions. Both sides have been labouring under the illusion that time is on their side. Both are now losing, however, as a result of the deadlock in the conflict, and experiencing major economic, demographic and political losses. There can be no winners in the game they are currently playing. In the first few years after the war, the Abkhaz could hope that time would bring international recognition and the repatriation of the Abkhaz from the diaspora, but this seems less probable now. Even the support of the North Caucasians, which played an important role during the war, is not assured at present, especially that of the Vainakh peoples. In its turn, if the Georgian government too hoped to use time to strengthen its military forces decisively, secure Russian support for its case and see the impoverishment and weakening of the Sukhumi government, they must be disappointed, as there are no signs of such trends. Indeed, in the immediate post-war period the conflict helped Georgia to distance itself from Russian dominance, and develop an independent approach in its state-building. Today, when Russian strength is waning, and the Georgian State has already begun to overcome most of the difficulties besetting it at the start of independence, priorities need to be changed. The present situation cannot continue indefinitely. Pressures on the conflicting parties, both from without and from within, are mounting, while the leaderships (who until recently demonstrated a manifest lack of will to resolve the conflict) now seem to be becoming more flexible and open to compromise. There are several possible alternative solutions - the people of Abkhazia and Georgia will decide which of them shall prevail.

Continue or go back to the contents page. Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement © August 1998, Vrije Universiteit Brussel