Caucasian Regional Studies The International Association For Caucasian Regional Studies
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Table2 Changes in the Proportion of Largest Ethnicities within the Entire Rural Population of the Republic (17). |
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The current ethnic composition of the migration flows was formed during the Soviet period. Seasonal migration, having dramatically fallen in the USSR during "collectivisation", revived after the abolition of the Stalin‰s passport system in early 1960s (Table 3). At present, it is of a selective nature (18) and is related to the ethnic factor. For example, every year, Lezgians, Tabassarans and Tsakhurs residing in the South of Dagestan seek employment in the villages and cities/towns of South Dagestan (before the drawing of the state border in 1993, they would travel to North Azerbaijan), where over 200 thousand of their countrymen reside. Migrants from the mountainous Avar, Dargwa and Lak regions move to the North - to the Nogai Plain, Stavropolye, Kalmikia, Kabardo and the Krasnodar region (krai). During the Soviet regime the Daghestani Diaspora, consisting of 170 thousand people of these nationalities, settled in this area.
Table 3 Growth of the Daghestani Diaspora in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (19). |
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During the Soviet period, along with the development of the "classical" rural/urban and seasonal migration, the foundation was laid for three other types of ethnic migration, unknown to Dagestanis before Soviet times. They were based on the complex of hurt national pride latently developed in the minds of the majority of the peoples in the Soviet East (20). Despite the proclaimed national equality, a covert ethnic hierarchy was established in the USSR. The Dagestan of the 1940s was led by mountain peoples: the Avar lobby had leading positions in the Soviet and party apparatus of the Republic. The migration of highlanders organised by them served the interests of predominantly mountain peoples and infringed the interests of the plain and deported peoples of Dagestan.
Dynamics of Ethnic Migration from 1990 to 1995
In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet regime, ethnic hierarchy and competition between the ethnic communities of highlanders and plain residents of Dagestan became overt. The Avars began losing their leading position in the ethnic pyramid. Under these circumstances the republican authorities lost control over internal ethnic migrations within the RD. Simultaneously, the political situation in the Republic and beyond its borders - in the entire North Caucasian region - was destabilised by the development of external ethnic migrations of Dagestanis from the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Practically all Dagestani nationalities were affected by them. (comp. Table 4). Table4 Ethnic Migrations in the Demographic Dynamics of post-Soviet Dagestan (21). |
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The first refugees, consisting of 1500 Avar, Dargwa and Lak households from Guryev oblast of Kazakhstan, came to Dagestan in 1989. Later, between 1991-1994, the hotbeds of ethnic clashes and civil wars in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Chechya forced part of the Lezgian, Avar, Tabassaran, Kumik and Lak Diasporas of these Republics to return to their historic land. Before 1992, for the first time in many decades, the number of immigrants to Dagestan exceeded the number of emigrants by 1439 (23). Before the beginning of 1996, immigration to the RD was significantly higher -by 43 961 persons - than emigration.
The outflow of Russian specialists from industrial centres became an acute problem in post-Soviet Dagestan. This process had already started in the 1960s and 70s; from 1992 to 1995 it became catastrophic (compare Table 2). During the past year and a half 10 Russians per day were emigrating from the Republic on average (24). This, as distinct from other regions of the CIS, was related not so much to the inflow of local rural migrants or to anti-Russian sentiments in the society and government, but to the growth of criminal activity and social instability in the RD (25). Alongside the above migration flows characterising Russia regional migrations have started playing a major role. For example, the separation of the ex-USSR republics from each other between 1992 and 1994 caused an inflow to Dagestan of the peoples separated by the Soviet borders of 1922-1957: Lezgians, Avars, Nogais and Chechens. The incessant flow of these migrants forced the Dagestani authorities to preserve "transparent" customs borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia even up to 1995-1996 (26). The basis for migration flows in Dagestan remains the "classical" rural-urban migration. There have been almost no changes in this type of ethnic migration. The slight decline in urban population growth since the 90s can be accounted for by rural migrants. With the deepening economic crisis and worsening living conditions, the share of the urban population fell from 43,2% to 42% between 1989 and 1995 (27). The group of seasonal migrants, as evidenced in the author‰s field research, continued to include 30% - 42% of Dagestani highlanders (28). Clashes occurring between Avars, Dargwas and Laks on one side and Kumiks and Ter Cossacks on the other, have not undermined the traditional seasonal migration.
The Adaptation of Migrants in Russia and Dagestan The development of ethnic migrations in Dagestan is largely determined by the fact that all the four groups of Dagestani migrants adapt to the new environment in the South Caucasus much quicker and better than in Russia. The results of the survey show that as many as 28% of Russian migrants from the RD have not yet been able to find permanent residence and employment in the regions (oblasts) of Southern Russia adjacent to the Republic. In Moscow and other cities of Central Russia the number of such people among the migrants surveyed is amounts to 44% (29). The financial conditions of 3/4 of non-Russian Dagestani refugees and vendors forced to settle in Russia are significantly better. However, they too complain about the inconveniences caused by the new and unaccustomed living conditions (30). The tradition of obligatory help given to each other by relatives and fellow-countrymen significantly helps migrants in Dagestan. Their psychological adaptation is facilitated by a common life-style and mentality unique to the entire muslim East. According to the recent statistical data of the RD government, over 69% of refugees and forced migrants have settled in the rural regions of Dagestan populated by people of the same ethnicity (31). The support given by fellow-countrymen ameliorates their economic and social hardship. Rural and seasonal migrants, as well as vendors who are accustomed to regular migration and return to their native land, adapt to the new environment in Dagestan better than others. As for Chechen and Avar repatriates, being in a hostile Lak, Kumik and Nogai environment, their adaptation is rather difficult. Recently the relations between indigenous Dagestanis and local Russians significantly worsened. It is noteworthy that 53% of Russians surveyed consider that this is directly linked to the increase of discrimination against Caucasian nationalities in Moscow and some other cities of Central Russia (32).
Ethnic Migrations and Security of the Person, Ethnicity and State
The different types of ethnic migrations have a different impact on the state of inter-ethnic relations in Dagestan and Russia. For example, the preservation of regular migration flows between Dagestani cities/town and villages as well as seasonal migration of highlanders to the plain (4.1 and 4.2 groups of migrants) in my view stabilise the economic situation in the RD. The groups of migrants 1.2 and 3 (the first flow of refugees and migrants) are relatively small and have not influenced the internal political and ethnic situation in the Republic. The growing flow of refugees and repatriated people (groups of migrants 1.2 and 2.1) is a more significant source of instability for the post-Soviet North Caucasian community of the first half of the 1990s. If in 1992-1994 the southern Lezgian lands of Republic were in the centre of internal political instability, after the Russian-Chechen war of 1994-1996 the problems that came to the forefront were related to refugees and the repatriation of Chechen-Akkins in North-West Dagestan. According to the RD Interior Ministry, the poliferation of refugees has significantly aggravated the criminal situation in the cities/towns of Dagestan. During the war large arsenals of arms and military equipment accumulated in rural regions populated by Chechens (33). Before peace was established, Akkins fought a real resistance war on the North-West borders of Dagestan. Although today military actions are over, the possibility of armed clashes in the regions densely populated with Akkins is still significant. All this primarily threatens the security of the person in Dagestan and the adjacent regions of South Russia. The events of the last five years have shown that the local republican forces are unable to cope with the growing criminality in the regions close to Chechnya and in big cities. Between 1993 and 1995 a drastic passport regime and administrative controls were imposed several times in Makhachkala, Caspiisk, Izberbash, Derbend and the Kizlyar region. However, even at present the cases of ethnic clashes, national discrimination and the ousting of Jews from their residences are evidenced (34). To protect themselves, highland Jews and Tats had to create self-defence units. These units are still active in Derbend (35). Economic security also suffered great losses in 1995. At the very beginning of the Russian-Chechen war hyperinflation substituted the slight decrease in prices of April-October 1994. Unemployment has grown rapidly to account for 7% of Dagestan‰s population at present (36). All this primarily affects migrants. Those who have suffered most are refugees of whom only 1195 managed to get tangible financial assistance before 1995-1996. The remaining tens of thousands have still not received the official status of refugees. Table 5 Official Statistical Data on Refugees and Forced Migrants in Post-Soviet Dagestan (37). |
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The security of all the ethnicities suffered greatly between 1991 and 1995. The mass emigration of Russian repatriates of XIX-XX centuries, notably Jews and Tats, puts the existence of these ethnic groups in jeopardy. In the present circumstances these groups are destined for cultural assimilation. It should also be noted that there are unresolved problems concerning the ethnic security of Chechen-Akkins, Lezgians and Nogais who at any minute may be separated by the state border between the Caucasian republics which have gained independence. The deep crisis experienced by law enforcement bodies have forced many of the Dagestani peoples to take responsibility for defending their national interests in their lands. These interests are being served by a number of national parties and associations of fellow-countrymen that emerged in Makhachkala and other cities/towns of Dagestan between 1989-1995. The largest of them are The Avar Popular Front named after Imam Shamil, the Dargwa movement "Tsadesh" (Unity), the Kumik "Tenglik" (Equality), the Lak :Kazi Kumukh", the Lezgian "Sadval" (Unity), the Nogai: Birlik"(Unity), the Kizlyar community of the Ter Cossacks army and the movement "Russia" (38).
Organisations serving the national interests of Dagestanis and their ethnic security can be found outside the borders of the Republic. In Azerbaijan, for example, the representatives of the Avar Diaspora set up a Society which actively cooperates with Avar organisations in Dagestan. Lezgians in Azerbaijan are grouped around the "Samur" society and the Lezgian Democratic Party established in 1992. According to strategic documents of these organisations, their objective is to achieve firm guarantees for cultural and ethnic autonomy for the Lezgian Diaspora in Azerbaijan. There are over 10 Dagestani fellow-countrymen associations in the Russian Federation. The most active of them is the Cultural Centre for the Peoples of Dagestan set up in April 1994 in Stavropol and protecting the interests of the 90 thousand strong Dargwa Diaspora of this region (oblast) (39). It is only in the recent period that the national security of Dagestanis has been given consideration by GosComNat and the Migration Service of the RD government. In December 1993 the Co-ordination Council for the Northern Region at the RD Council of Ministers was formed with a view to resolving the acute problems of Northern Dagestan and preventing the emigration of Russians from this region. A local sub-system of the Russian Service for Notification and Action in Emergency has been active in the Republic since August 1994. Its objective is to observe the resolution of national problems in the regions of the RD. To find a peaceful solution for the Lezgian problem, simultaneous with retaining "transparent" borders with Azerbaijan, the economic programme "South" was implemented (40) in 1994-1995. The above measures, however, have not brought tangible results. The reasons for that are the incompetence and weakness of the regional and republican authorities of post-Soviet Dagestan. These very circumstances continue to jeopardise the security of the statehood itself. At present, when the current state machinery is being transformed, the protection of Dagestan‰s territorial integrity is becoming more and more difficult. Representatives of repatriated peoples call for the ethnic-territorial division of the Republic. For the last 6-7 years Lezgian repatriates residing in the South of Dagestan have been cherishing the idea of building a united sovereign Lezgistan on the lands of Dagestan and Azerbaijan (41). In the 1990s Ter Cossacks and Nogais residing in the South of Dagestan created national organisations beyond the control of the regional and republican authorities. They demand that the Kislyar district (okrug) abolished in 1957 is restored on Nogai and Cossack lands alongside the left bank of the Terek and is separated from Dagestan (42). Finally, since the victory of the Chechen republic in the Russian-Chechen war of 1994-1996, Akkins ignore the Dagestani government authority (43). Summing up the above, the author would like to highlight the complicated and diverse nature of ethnic migrations in Dagestan. Along with purely destructive tendencies, they contain a number of positive aspects. However, the possibility of using the traditions characteristic of the fourth type of ethnic migrations to destabilise the economic and internal political situation in the region, cannot be ignored. Today the phenomenon of post-Soviet ethnic migrations deserves closer consideration by the Dagestani and Russian authorities. It also deserves to become the subject of meticulous research by Russian and foreign specialists.
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