Between Civic and Ethnic

The Transformation of Taiwanese Nationalist Ideologies

(1895 – 2000)
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Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

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The idea for this dissertation was conceived during several rounds of stimulating discussion at the international conference entitled “Social Sciences and Secession” held on 27 and 28 November 1998 in Brussels and organised by the Department of Political Science of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel in co-operation with the Institute for European Policy of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The related research project received generous four-year support from the Onderzoeksraad of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) from 2000 to 2004, and the dissertation was successfully defended in its present form on 30 June 2004.

The dissertation explores the historical evolution of nationalist ideologies in contemporary Taiwan. Given the relevance of the topic to a world that has yet to move out of the orbit of the nation-state system, I decided to publish it. Even without further updating, the analysis done in this dissertation may prove interesting for those readers and researchers who are interested in deciphering the profound impact exerted by nationalism on identity (trans)formation in contemporary Taiwan and in gaining a better understanding of the many controversies raging over the ongoing cross-Strait integration.

For the completion of the research I owe a debt to many. First of all I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Patrick Stouthuysen, who has encouraged and guided me all the way. I also want to thank the other two members of my doctoral committee, Professor Ann Heylen and Professor Stéphane Corcuff. Young but established experts in Taiwan studies, both have provided me with valuable research materials and shared with me their keen insights into various aspects of Taiwanese society. For the final version of this dissertation, Professor Michael Waller has provided me with invaluable comments. I would also like to thank Professor Ye Haiyan of Soochow University (Taiwan) and my dear friend, Michael Cai, for their great help in collecting material for this research. The staff of the VUB library have provided me with top quality service in interlibrary loan throughout all these years. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Bruno Coppieters. Without his support and continuous ‘pushing’ I would never have completed and published this dissertation.

Xiaokun Song
Brussels/Guangzhou, 2 May 2009
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Guomindang</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mainland Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NICT</td>
<td>National Institute of Compilation and Translation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>New Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUC</td>
<td>National Unification Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>People First Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROCOT</td>
<td>Republic of China on Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEF</td>
<td>Straits Exchange Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIP</td>
<td>Taiwan Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWMB</td>
<td>Taiwan Minbao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>Taiwan Independence Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUFI</td>
<td>World United Formosans for Independence</td>
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NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION

In Taiwan a number of romanising systems are in use, including (1) the older Wade-Giles system, the most predominant one, (2) pinyin and (3) some conventional terms such as Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen. To avoid confusing combination of different systems, pinyin, is adopted as the main romanisation system for transcribing Chinese characters in the titles of all references, terms and concepts, names of persons and places in Chinese throughout the whole text. A glossary of the romanised characters is provided at the end of the book. Unless specified, all translations of quotations in Chinese are provided by the author.
Part One

Introduction
Chapter One

Introduction

With the democratisation of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime in the late 1980s, identity politics has become one of the most salient political phenomena on the island. In every election campaign the complex and sensitive question of national identity surfaces and intensifies in almost all political debates. During the Republic of China (ROC)’s first Taiwan-wide direct presidential election campaign in 1996, national identity was one important issue separating the four running candidates. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Peng Mingmin claimed himself to be Taiwanese. In his view, being Taiwanese had nothing to do with being Chinese. While affirming his Taiwanese identity, the Guomindang (GMD) candidate, Li Denghui hastened to add that “I am also Chinese”, or, on another occasion, that “Taiwanese is equally Chinese”. Another GMD candidate, Lin Yanggang considered himself a Chinese in the first place but below his Chinese identity, he had also Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese identity found no place in the national identity of the independent candidate, Chen Lüan, whose self-identification was exclusively Chinese. However, what the candidates meant by ‘Taiwanese’ or ‘Chinese’ was never clearly defined in their election campaigns (Shi Zhengfeng 2000: 4-5).

In the 2000’s presidential election campaign, all candidates avoided elaboration on the issue of national identity with only Li Ao from the New Party (NP) as an exception. Nevertheless, labels such as ‘new Taiwanese’, ‘fake Taiwanese’, and ‘half Taiwanese’ were frequently used either to lend support to or to criticise the candidates. The question of national identity concerns not only the competing views on the cross-Strait relations, i.e. relations between Taiwan and Mainland China, it also reveals Taiwan’s internal political alignments and social mobilisation formed mainly on an ethnic (or rather, sub-ethnic) basis. With political allegiance by and large determined by a person’s place of birth, creation and reification of different ethnic categories become part of the winning electoral marketing tactics. Despite attempts to transcend these cleavages, Taiwanese society remains deeply divided.

In the opinion of most contemporary scholars of Taiwan studies, nationalism is central to the understanding of politics in Taiwan. It is not only a key factor
determining the dynamics of the cross-Strait relations but also a crucial force in shaping the political landscape in Taiwan as it touches upon a number of sensitive but significant issues such as the status of Taiwan as a polity, ethnic relationship, and language, education and cultural policies. Outside the political arena nationalism also influences how people understand their past and foresee their future. Despite the centrality of nationalism in Taiwan studies, it remains a relatively recent research field that started to develop only in the 1990s.

In the most recent and comprehensive overview of the state of the art in the study of Taiwanese nationalism, Lin Jialong (2001) has summed up the key research topics relevant to the subject. As Lin sees it, broadly speaking, research on Taiwanese nationalism should uncover its nature and content analytically, to trace its origin and evolution historically, to look for the explanation of its development, to reflect upon its impact on other social and political aspects of contemporary Taiwanese society, and to forecast its future development (Lin 2001a: 3-5). Clearly, no single study can address all these questions. The primary concern of the present research is the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. So, the purpose of this work is not to provide a full account of the origin and evolution of national consciousness or nationalist movements in Taiwan. Rather, it examines how nationalist ideologies in Taiwan have been articulated over time. In this study nationalist ideology is treated not as a mere reflection of the social and historical reality, but as a manifestation of contesting representations and interpretations of that reality. Given the fluidity of the social and historical reality, different agents in Taiwan engaging in such a contest provide alternative conceptions of their nation, some in political terms while others in cultural terms.

What is relevant to the central research question in this present work is the investigation of Taiwanese nationalism conducted so far. When studying and analysing the diverse contents of the discourses on national identity, contemporary scholarship of Taiwanese nationalism applies extensively the theoretical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism to the case study. But the application of the same theoretical conceptual tools by different scholars has led to different conclusions. Some scholars, both in Taiwan and in the West, have made the observation that a certain civic nationalism is emerging in Taiwan. In the view of these scholars, Taiwanese nationalism entails the construction of a political community based on inclusive and civic political values and the principle of territoriality. Some other
scholars, though relatively few in number, hold the view that Taiwanese nationalism is characterised by either ethnicity or a sense of cultural particularity. Between these two opposing views yet another group of scholars consider that the nature of Taiwanese nationalism has over time become transformed from an ethnic type of nationalism to a more civic type.

In Western theories of nationalism the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is used to categorise different types of nationalism. For civic nationalism, the key referents of national identification are territory, a common history, and common political values while ethnic nationalism tends to base national identification on a mythical common descent and common cultural traits such as language and/or religion. There is also a general tendency to place civic nationalism above ethnic nationalism at a normative level. Civic nationalism in this view is considered to be morally superior to ethnic nationalism. In fact, such a distinction is so deeply entrenched in Western theories of nationalism that scholars tend to place the two types of nationalism as dichotomous and opposed to each other in rather exclusive terms. Contemporary scholarship on Taiwanese nationalism has employed amply this theoretical distinction. Often, the academic discussion of the nature of Taiwanese nationalism interacts with the political discourse in reshaping the nation-building project with a clear preference for the civic vision of the nation-in-the making.

However, in recent years the theoretical distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism has come under heavy criticism among Western scholars of nationalism. There are mainly three kinds of criticism: (1) the dichotomous account of nationalism cannot encompass the whole complex phenomenon of nationalism; (2) the distinction lacks explanatory value; and (3) the opposition between the two types of nationalism at the normative level is problematic. Critics either suggest the total rejection of the distinction or propose various alternatives to replace the binary distinction for meaningful analytical practices.

Whilst acknowledging the force of these criticisms, I argue that the concepts of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism can usefully be viewed as ideal-type concepts in the Weberian sense. Ideal types as defined by Max Weber are meant primarily for descriptive analyses of social phenomenon. Their analytical validity cannot be judged prior to their application to empirical cases. Two dangers in applying ideal-type concepts to empirical analysis are the conflation of ideal-types
with reality and the conflation of ideal-type analysis with normative analysis. Concepts such as civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism and the distinction between the two are ideal in the sense that they are purely mental constructs which cannot be found in reality. It would be wrong to expect the ideal-type concepts to be faithful representations of the complex reality, nor should we categorise reality accordingly. The distinction provides no moral criterion for making value judgements about various nationalist movements. That said, the conflation of reality and ideal-type, of ideal-type analysis and normative assessment are present in the contemporary scholarship of Taiwanese nationalism.

Thus, the misuse of the concept should not render the two concepts theoretically invalid, and the present study departs from the assumption that as ideal-types the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism remains central to the descriptive analysis and understanding of the political tensions and dynamics of contemporary Taiwanese nationalism. Both as an ideology and a movement, nationalism is multi-dimensional and its nature evolves under different historical circumstances over time. The modern nation is by its nature a social construct imagined into being by human agents. It is in this sense we can say that the nation is never a finished product. It is always and constantly in the making. Various individuals throughout time contribute to the process of imagining and defining the nation-in-the-making. The dynamics of nationalism lie precisely in the elusiveness of the conceptualisation of the nation.

On the theoretical level, I argue that the notion of a nation should be treated as a conceptual variable that has been shaped and reshaped by competing nationalist ideas. This makes nationalist ideologies the central subject of my investigation. Ideologies here are not understood rigidly as a set of political doctrines, but rather as various articulations, ideas, and reflections produced by nationalist-minded individuals. The ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is assumed useful for the understanding of nationalist ideologies because the binary typology captures the interplay and opposition between two different accounts of the nation, the civic one and the ethnic one. Departing from their different understandings of the nature of the nation, each account tends to provide different interpretations of the nation’s yesterday, today and tomorrow. When applied to a concrete case study, the reality cannot be fitted rigidly into a stark opposition between two types of nationalism. Both understandings of the nation exist side by side.
throughout the whole process of nation making. It is my aim to demonstrate through my descriptive analysis of the historical evolution of Taiwanese nationalist ideologies the tension and interaction between two different conceptualisations of the nation.

The body text of this study is divided into three parts. The main purpose of Part One is to work out the theoretical platform for the descriptive analysis of contemporary Taiwanese nationalism against an examination of the theoretical explanations of the origin and substance of nationalism. Special emphasis will be put on the theoretical distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. As nationalism is the central concept in this analysis, Part One will begin with defining the subject matter. Following the definitional exercise the second section will elaborate on the key typology of nationalism built primarily upon the binary distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. To do so I first go back to Max Weber’s theory of ideal-type concept and argue that understood as a distinction between two ideal-types civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism remain valid conceptual tools for descriptive analysis. While applying the ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism to empirical study, the task at hand is not to fit the reality rigidly into an either-or typology. The analysis of the concrete case should be a nuanced historical description unveiling how the two idealised conceptions of nationhood compete against and intertwine with each other in historical constructions of the nation.

Then in Section Two I will trace the origin of the distinction in Hans Kohn’s seminal work, and in Section Three I will make an overview of the usage of this distinction in later day theories of nationalism. Against the centrality of the distinction between the two accounts of nation, in Section Four I will enumerate a number of recent criticisms that challenge the distinction’s validity as useful analytical concepts. However, my critical reading of these criticisms finds that they either fail to move beyond the distinction or are unable to come up with feasible alternatives. Agreeing with some points made in the criticisms and an example of the meaningful application of the distinction by Rogers Brubaker (1992) in Section Five, this thesis argues that the distinction remains still a valid analytical tool but it needs to be taken as one between two idealised accounts of the nation.

In Part Two, I will endeavour to demonstrate through the empirical case study of contemporary Taiwanese nationalism the analytical validity of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. To do so the analysis will look into the
historical evolution of Taiwanese nationalist ideologies to decipher whether civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood exist and how they have entangled throughout the whole historical process of nation-building. This part comprises five chapters. The first chapter will first familiarise the readers with the background of the case under examination. Hence, a brief account of Taiwan’s geography, demography, population composition, political system, and socio-history. The aim is to highlight the fact that the socio-political context within which Taiwanese nationalism emerges and evolves over time has undergone significant changes.

Against the theoretical discussion in Part One, the second chapter of Part Two will give a critical overview of contemporary scholarship on Taiwanese nationalism. The overview begins by pointing out that owing to the ambiguity embedded in both the term ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘nationalism’, it is no easy enterprise to reach a consensus on the definition of Taiwanese nationalism. In the case of Taiwan, Benedict Anderson’s (1991) notion of the nation as an ‘imagined political community’ remains relevant. As Partha Chatterjee rightly points out, by suggesting that a nation is socially constructed, Anderson managed to “emphatically pose the ideological creation of the nation as a central problem in the study of national movement” (Chatterjee 1986: 21).

A significant number of contemporary scholars of Taiwan studies apply the theoretical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism in their analysis of the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. Some scholars define the nature of Taiwanese nationalism in exclusive civic or ethnic terms. Taking civic nationalism as justification for the political cause of Taiwan independence or regarding civic nation as the model for nation-building in Taiwan, some scholars equally take the moral superiority of civic nationalism for granted. Drawing on the position defended in Part one, that we should treat the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism as an ideal-type construct, I argue against such an application of the distinction to the analysis of Taiwanese nationalism. I further argue that the understanding of the dynamic nature of Taiwanese nationalism should be revealed by

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1 At the same time we should take note of Chatterjee’s criticism of Anderson. In his view, Anderson had failed to pursue the central theme of nation imagination but instead sealed up his social constructive account of the modern nation with a sociological determinism like Ernest Gellner (Chatterjee 1986: 21-22).
the exploration of the historical process where different cultural and political elements play into the construction of the Taiwanese nation.

The following three chapters form the major part of my own descriptive analysis on the changing nature of Taiwanese nationalism over time. Chronologically, each chapter is devoted to the examination of the development of Taiwanese nationalism against its respective historical context. The imagination of the Taiwanese nation by the elites in different periods is subject to the variation of the ‘us – them’ opposition under the different historical circumstances. First, during the period of Japanese colonisation (1895 - 1945), the confrontation was set between the Japanese and the native Taiwanese. Chapter Five analyses the various political, literary and linguistic reforms advocated by members of the native Taiwanese elite under the Japanese. Between the moderate autonomist approach to political reform and the radical supporters of Taiwan independence, between the promotion of a new literature written in vernacular Mandarin Chinese and the advocacy of the ‘xiangtu literature’ (the nativist literature) and a ‘vernacular Taiwanese writing system’, the native Taiwanese elite’s debates on these issues reflect their efforts in search of self-definition and identity. Caught between the coloniser’s push for them to become Japanese subjects and their rather desperate desire to remain Chinese, the native Taiwanese elite began to develop a new sense of identification with the island both politically and culturally.

Chapter Six covers four decades in the post-war period (1945 – 1987). This chapter begins with a discussion of the early contact between the Mainlander-dominated GMD government and native Taiwanese society immediately after World War Two (WWII) when the island was returned to China. Political and cultural discrimination of the GMD administration against the native Taiwanese combined with the post-war economic crisis led to the eruption of the February 28 Incident. The interaction between the two communities in the unfolding of the incident and GMD’s subsequent repressive authoritarian rule pushed the native Taiwanese elite to question their Chineseness. The chapter also examines how the establishment of the GMD authoritarian rule induced as well as restricted the development of the post-war Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). Although oppositions and challenges against the GMD could be found both inside and outside of Taiwan, the repressive authoritarian rule in Taiwan proper prohibited advocacy of Taiwanese nationalism. The opposition movement inside Taiwan only took a nationalist turn after the political
oppression in the Gaoxiong Incident in 1979. In the greater part of the period 1945-1986, the nation-building discourse was formulated by the elites in the overseas TIM. The analysis of the Taiwanese nationalist ideologies will thus deal primarily with the elite discourse in the overseas TIM.

Chapter Seven studies the transformation of the elite discourses of Taiwanese nationalism in the post-martial law Taiwan (1987 – 2000). The chapter will highlight the interaction between the politics of nationalism and democratisation. The first two sections of this chapter will give an explanatory account of the profound regime change in Taiwan. Democratisation apart, other factors, the cross-Strait conflict in particular, further complicate the context within which Taiwanese people define themselves. As democratisation opens up space for Taiwanese society to reassess its identity problem this period witnesses a multiplication of identity related discourses by actors in different domains. For analytical clarity, I will distinguish the examination of the elite’s discussion of Taiwanese identity in two different arenas, namely, the political and the cultural arena. Within the political arena, the construction of a Taiwanese nation intertwines closely with the process of state-building; the affirmation and cultivation of a distinctive Taiwanese national identity is only possible with a clear definition of the state boundary. The understanding of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the definition of the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China constitute the two key themes in the political elite’s nationalist discourse of the two main political parties’, i.e. the GMD and the DPP. The analysis of the transformation of Taiwan’s two main political parties’ nationalist discourses in this chapter will also exemplify the reciprocal impact of identity politics on party politics in the context of democratisation.

Democratisation and the process of state-building have given impetus to the Taiwanisation of various social science disciplines and cultural practices. The analysis of Taiwan’s junior high-school textbook reform in 1997 reveals that with Taiwanese nationalism gaining the upper hand in the political arena, research in social sciences and education becomes increasingly politicised for the creation of a Taiwan-centred national culture.

As Eric Hobsbawm rightly points out, while nations are constructed essentially from above, they cannot be fully understood unless also analysed from below, i.e. “in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist” (1990:
10). But given its focus on the formation and transformation of Taiwanese nationalism instead of a Taiwanese nation, the present study is undertaken from an elite perspective. Regarding the question to what extent the elite imagination shapes the collective consciousness, I am of the opinion that it is legitimate in social science to study selectively a group’s thinking and behaviour without taking the whole-societal perspective. The influence of the nationalist elite’s practice of ideological construction upon the masses can be studied in its own right.

In terms of its sources, the empirical part of the work is based on the analysis of textual materials. Discourses, or language statements, are considered central to understanding the construction of Taiwanese nation. This is exemplified by Chapters Five, Six and Seven, where I rely mainly on various original textual materials that appeared in the respective historical periods for the reconstruction of the formation of Taiwanese nationalism. These texts range from magazine and newspaper articles, autobiographies, governmental documents, to pamphlets. Situating these texts and their authors in the specific historical contexts where they appeared, I try to make a faithful interpretation of each and its relevance to the process of Taiwanese nation-building without pretending that such interpretation is one hundred percent accurate.
Part Two

Theoretical Framework

Contemporary Theories of Nationalism:

Definition and Typology
Chapter Two

Contemporary Theories of Nationalism: Definition and Typology

Contrary to predictions about the end of sovereignty and the demise of the nation-state under the impact of regional integration and globalisation, mankind is far from moving beyond the Age of Nationalism. The drastic collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has resulted in the dissolution of three multinational federations (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). As a consequence, Europe has witnessed a proliferation of new states that are attempting to consolidate their nationhood amidst ethnic conflicts, secessionist movements and irredentist struggles. That the developed Western world is not immune to the resurgence of ethnic conflict and ethno-nationalism is further evidenced by various conflicts and secessionist movements in countries and areas such as Belgium, Canada and Northern Ireland. Instead of running out of steam, nationalism continues to play an essential role in shaping world politics as one of the dominating political forces. As Eric Hobsbawm points out in the science fiction type opening of his book, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, one of the keys to understanding the cause of an imaginary nuclear war which would bring upon mankind its total destruction lies in the understanding of the term ‘nation’ and its derivative vocabulary (1990: 1).

2.1 Defining Nationalism

For a student of nationalism, the first question that springs to mind would be ‘what is a nation?’ With this question in mind, the student embarks on the reading of the existing body of literature only to be frustrated in not being able to find a definition. He/she will discover that the word ‘nation’ has been given different meanings in politics, law, or in the social sciences and that it would be utterly futile to look for any common denominator. When historian Walter Bagehot looked into the history of nation-building, his humorous response to the very same question was: “We know

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2 But it is worth noting that Hobsbawm is hopeful that nationalism will decline with the decline of the nation state. See the last chapter of his book, “Nationalism in the Late Twentieth Century”, pp. 163 - 83.
what it is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it.” (op.cit. Hobsbawm 1990: 1) It is so because the real ‘nation’ as a social phenomenon can only be recognised *a posteriori*. Any attempts to draw a set of either objective or subjective criteria *a priori* so as to guide our nation watching are fruitless. Consequently, Hobsbawm holds the viewpoint that to understand the real ‘nation’ it is more fruitful to begin with the understanding of nationalism because it is nationalism that makes nation, and not the other way around (Hobsbawm 1990: 9-10).

The situation does not improve much when our student moves to the large body of literature on ‘nationalism’. Like many other key concepts in political science, nationalism is equally surrounded by ambiguity. The ambiguity of the terms can perhaps be explained by the fact that ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are primarily political concepts. And for a political concept, ‘vagueness and ambiguity are its virtues: it should appeal to diverse interests and be applicable to many different situations’ (Francis 1976: 69). The ambiguity of the concept ‘nationalism’ should not, nevertheless, be considered as a hindrance to the scientific analysis of the phenomenon of nationalism. What we need to do before undertaking any research is to clarify precisely the object under investigation.

Taken as an object of social science analysis, the complex phenomenon of nationalism can be analysed from three different perspectives. (1) In the first type of analysis, nationalism is taken to denote a modern ideology that helps to resolve an individual’s feelings of isolation in the process of modernisation through defining himself/herself as a member of one distinct community, i.e. the ‘nation’. Nationalism is thus the ideational driving force behind the creation and consolidation of the nation, and it often justifies the nation-state on a normative level as the best form of political organisation for the community. This type of analysis usually takes ideological discourses related to the project of nation-building as its focal unit.

(2) In the second type of analysis, studies of nationalism examine the object as a special form of group consciousness, i.e., consciousness of membership in, or attachment to, a nation. Nationalism understood in this sense is also called a matter of national identity, which identifies the fortunes of group members with that of a

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3 Ernst Gellner also expresses a similar view when he points out that “it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round” (1983: 55). As Anthony Smith sees it, this view marks the zenith of the post-war reaction by the modernists against the ‘evolutionary determinism’ which regards the emergence of the nation as a necessary process of historical development. (1983: 10).
specific nation, desired or achieved.\footnote{Ross Poole's \textit{Nation and Identity} (1999) is one example of equating national identity with nationalism.} Survey studies and sample interview are useful methodological approaches for the measurement of the extent and intensity of national identity in concrete cases.

(3) In the third type of analysis, nationalism is treated as a movement or process which aims at the realisation of the national ideas. Like any other social movement, it has its origin in a vague dissatisfaction with existing conditions. The general unrest that results from disenchantment may express itself in grouping attempts to relieve frustration, vexation and misery; to redress particular grievances of immediate concern; and even to design an entirely new and better social order. As leaders and action groups stir up passions, mobilise support, and induce ever wider sections of population to cooperate in attaining definite goals, unrest turns into a social movement with a revolutionary potential. Studies of nationalist movements usually take a historical approach in analysing the process.

Admittedly, in concrete case studies, these three different aspects cannot be isolated from one another and they form a reciprocal interactive pattern. Nevertheless, for analytical clarity it is possible to treat each aspect separately. Nationalist ideology investigated in the first type of analysis is undoubtedly the most decisive aspect of the three as ideas are guides of human behaviour. Nationalism as an ideology provides pseudoscientific and seemingly rational arguments for a variety of motives and intentions that are not stated openly but are actually obscured by rhetoric. Its purpose is to offer spurious proofs of the righteousness of a cause and the ultimate success of a proposed course of action. It is based on this belief that the present study takes the analysis of the expression of the ideas of nation as the focal point for understanding the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. In this light, Taiwanese nationalism is understood primarily as a political ideology.

Ideology here is not understood narrowly as a political doctrine formulated and articulated by specific political organisations or political movements. The present study does not intend to investigate national ideology with a big ‘I’. Rather it adopts the “total conception of ideology” as defined by Karl Mannheim. For Mannheim, this stands for “the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics of and composition of the total
structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group” (Mannheim 1972: 49-50). The investigation of ideology thus defined essentially calls for an interpretation and representation of “the sociological history of thought” (Mannheim 1972: 69). In the study of nationalism, the subject of analysis comprises political ideologies defended by nationalist movements and action groups as well as different representations and interpretations of the nation by various individuals. In this broader sense of ideology, my aim is to give a historical exposé of the various conceptualisations of the nation in contemporary Taiwan. Such conceptualisations address two key questions, namely, what constitutes the nation and how the national boundaries are drawn.

Moreover, an analysis of the nationalist ideology thus understood justifies the focus on the role of elites as historically the elites have been the innovators of nationalist ideologies as well as the organisers and leaders of nationalist movements. The elites usually include a wide range of better-educated, urbanised people such as the bourgeois middle class, the nobility, clergy and intellectuals. With their economic and/or educational comparative advantages, they often enjoy a high level of mobility, both spatially and intellectually, and occupy positions of power and influence in the society (Hroch 1985).

### 2.2 Typologies of Nationalism

In many theoretical works on nationalism one can see that the prevalent understandings of the nature of nationalist ideology have been explicitly or implicitly built upon a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. The distinction presupposes two conceptualisations of nation, an ethnic one and a civic one. Other terms have been used to capture the same distinction, such as ‘political versus cultural nationalisms’, ‘Western versus Eastern nationalisms’, or ‘the voluntaristic versus the organicist nationalisms’, but the distinction between ethnic and civic forms of nationalism remains the most widely used one. Studies of Taiwanese nationalism have also used extensively the theoretical concepts of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

Stemming from early historical studies of the nation-formation in Europe, this theoretical distinction purports to account for two central questions in the studies of nationalism. The first question concerns the substance of nation, that is, what a nation
actually is, and the second one addresses the origin of the phenomenon known as
‘nation’, that is, when and how modern nation came into existence. At the theoretical
level, civic and ethnic types of nationalism are believed to be analytically distinct and
antithetical in nature. As the abstraction of the historical analysis of individual cases
of nation-formation, civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism are in their essence
‘ideal type’ concepts as defined by Max Weber.

2.2.1 ‘Ideal Type’ Concept

Ideal type analysis is a method of sociological analysis developed by Max Weber
(1949) in his major methodological and sociological works, which has been partially
translated into English in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. With the aim of
making sociology an empirical science, Weber is convinced that sound
methodological principles comparable to those used in natural science are
indispensable. To begin with, Weber differentiates conceptual schemes used in natural
science and in social science. For natural science, conceptual schemes usually find
their basis on the principle of ‘genus proximum, differentia specifica’. According to
this principle, concepts for classifying objects are ranked hierarchically. So, one
concept pertaining to a particular rank differentiates similar objects at this level from
each other by a number of specific characteristics (differentia specifica) ascribed to
this concept; but this concept is subsumed to a more general concept of a higher rank
(genus proximum) which uses more general and abstract characteristics to
differentiate objects. The classification of ‘animal, mammal, dog, etc.’ is one simple
example of such hierarchical conceptual schemes. There is an objective
correspondence between the defining characteristics of a certain object and the object
itself.

Unlike in natural science, the object of analysis in social science is the infinite
complexity of historico-social reality. In Weber’s view, the general, abstract laws of
natural science would not work in the study of society as the objects under
investigation contain both material and ideational elements. For the social scientists to
bring order in their analysis of the chaotic socio-historical reality, Weber suggests a
synthetic conceptual scheme labelled ‘ideal type’. As he defines it, “an ideal type is
formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the thesis
of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct” (Weber 1949: 90).

It is in Weber’s discussion of ideal type analysis by means of negation that we can understand more clearly his notion of an ideal type. For Weber, first of all, an ideal type is not to be found as such in reality. Constructed out of certain elements of reality and forming a logically precise and coherent whole, an ideal type never corresponds to concrete reality. An ideal type is a utopia, which means that it is not a description of reality but only facilitates our understanding of the reality. If one were to subsume reality under ideal types, one would be guilty of conceptual realism. In Weber’s view, nothing appears more hazardous than “the intermingling of history and theory arising from ‘naturalistic’ prejudices, whether one believes that the ‘real’ substance, the ‘essence’, of historical reality has been fixed in those theoretical, conceptual representations, or one uses them as a Procrustean bed into which history is to be squeezed, or one hypostatizes the ‘concepts’ as ‘genuine’ reality standing behind the flux of phenomena as real ‘forces’ which work themselves out in history” (Weber 1949: 94) Given the ideal type’s nature of theoretical abstraction, an ideal type does not correspond to an ‘average’ type either in a statistical sense or in the sense of a common denominator of a number of empirical phenomena. An ‘average bureaucrat’ in a given polity or at a given time may be quite different from an ‘ideal typical bureaucrat’ because the ideal type involves an accentuation of typical courses of conduct.

When we apply an ideal-type concept to case studies, our task is then to determine in every single case “the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality” (ibid). It is thus the “measuring rod” which enables the investigator to “ascertain similarities as well as deviations in concrete cases” (Lewis 1971: 223) Although ideal types are not hypotheses about concrete reality, they enable us to formulate hypotheses about the subject matter under investigation. Guided by such hypothese, the investigation should follow a contextualised approach, thus linking the subject matter with the conditions that brought it into prominence, and/or with consequences that follow from its emergence.

Another important point to bear in mind is that an ideal type is not ideal in an ethical sense. We need to carefully distinguish the idea of ‘an ethical imperative’, of a ‘model’ of what ‘ought to exist’, from the analytical construct. Differentiating the
ideal type concept of ‘Christianity’ from the ideal in the doctrine of Christianity, Weber notes that scholars tend to consciously, or unconsciously, use ideal-types not only for logical devices with which reality is compared, but also as model types by which reality is evaluated and judged. The confusion of the idea in ideal-types and ideal in an ethical sense is not uncommon in historical writings. It is, therefore, necessary to make ‘a sharp and precise distinction between the logically comparative analysis of reality by ideal-types in the logical sense and the value-judgement of reality on the basis of ideals’ (Weber 1949: 97-99) An ideal type is not ideal in an ethical sense. It has nothing to do with value judgements. As we shall see later, this point assumes special importance in the ideal typical distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.

Interpreting Weber’s notion of ideal type, Alexander von Schelting has drawn attention to a confusion arising from Weber’s inconsistent usage of ideal type. He notices that over time Weber has used the term ideal type in connection with quite different concepts such as ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘mittelalterliche Stadtwirtschaft’ (city economy in the middle ages). As von Schelting sees it, there are in fact two different usages of ideal type in Weber’s theory, a generalising ideal concept, as in ‘bureaucracy’, and an individualising concept, as in ‘mittelalterliche Stadtwirtschaft’ (Parsons 1967: 604-605). While the generalising concept involves (1) a one-sided accentuation of the elements of a phenomenon and (2) an abstract general conceptualisation, the individualising concept lacks the abstract general quality. To the extent that the individualising concept captures the characteristics of the historical phenomenon, it is not a genuine ideal type. The generalising concepts are “supra-historical types in the sense that they refer to phenomena which recur in a variety of historical contexts” while the individualising ideal types are simplified statements in outline form of the characteristics of historical individuals (Gould & Kolb 1964: 321). This distinction is particularly interesting for the investigation of nationalism (Coppieters 2003). In fact, we could state that the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is first conceived as a distinction between two individualising concepts found in the specific historical setting of 19th century Europe. Later, by means of generalisation and theoretical abstraction, the distinction is transformed into one between two models of nation which would help facilitate our understanding of nationalism in different cultural and historical contexts.
2.2.2 Kohn’s Historical Typology

In the literature on nationalism the conceptual distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is to be found first in the historical enquiry of the emergence of the modern nation in Europe. Like many other elements in contemporary works on nationalism, this conventional distinction is also derived from the seminal work of Hans Kohn, published in 1944, *The Idea of Nationalism; A Study in Its Origins and Background*; it reflects, and was originally intended to capture, certain conspicuous differences in the historical record of the nations whose development Kohn describes.

Documenting extensively the nationalist debates by intellectuals throughout the formation period of the modern nation-state, Kohn maintains that nationalism in its contemporary sense emerged in the second half of the 18th century and drew its momentum from the revolutionary ideas of the time. The contribution of the French Revolution to the rise of nationalism was the idea of popular sovereignty. In the birth of the idea of a nation, France and Britain experienced a parallel history. In the Age of Absolutism, territorial states with relatively stable borders and strong political structures were created in both France and Britain. Although the territorial state offered individuals a new focus of identification, this on its own could not arouse strong sentiments of solidarity. Within the state boundaries, the idea of a nation was conceived as a new interpretation of societal unity expressing a sense of solidarity and providing the state with moral legitimacy. In Kohn’s words, “the growth of nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of the people into a common political form” (Kohn 1964: 4). The creation of the modern nation in France and Britain was informed by three major intellectual trends: republicanism, liberalism, and nationalism. Early nationalism in France was a freedom movement aimed at challenging the traditional relationship between the ruler and the ruled. The sovereignty of the prince was replaced by the sovereignty of the people. Absolutist statecraft had created the people while nationalism continued to transform the state population into a self-conscious political community with a common sense of belonging.

Observing the fact that nationalism was primarily a modern phenomenon, Kohn stresses that the historical movement fuelled by nationalism had its roots deep in the past. It took centuries of political, economic and intellectual development for the conditions responsible for the emergence of nationalist ideology to mature. In
countries such as France and Britain, commercialisation and industrialisation in the preceding centuries had transformed fundamentally the mode of production. As a consequence of the changes in the whole socio-economic pattern, demands from the emergent Third Estate for more political power led to the transformation of the notion of sovereignty in absolute monarchies. The divine right of a king derived its legitimacy from serving the entity within his sovereign territorial unit.

Different from the development in Western Europe where nationalism was “preceded by the formation of a future national state, or as in the case of the United States, coincided with it”, the growth of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe came about before the necessary social, political and economic transformation. The case of Germany, which Kohn dealt with in great detail, was at the time still largely an agrarian society with a weak bourgeoisie, its political structure characterised by a multitude of small territorial states and city-states after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. The modern notion of a nation, which originated in France, was taken up by German patriots to defend their land against French political-military expansion and cultural domination. Nationalism there developed “in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern” (Kohn 1944: 329). The modern concept of the nation, when transplanted in Germany, retained its symbolic and moral appeal, but its content had undergone significant reinterpretation and modification. The German nation, according to this new type of rising nationalism, found its expression primarily in the cultural field. Assertions in support of the construction of a German nation were couched in linguistic and ethnic terms. The German nation found its basis on the thesis which argued for the existence of an ethnic community sharing the same ancestry, the same culture and the same past. The German nation thus conceptualised also envisaged the formation of a German state whose functions were mainly for the preservation and maintenance of the wellbeing of the national community.

Based on his extensive historical comparison of the process of nation formation in Europe, Kohn makes a descriptive distinction between a Western nationalism and an Eastern nationalism. In his words, Western nationalism was “a predominantly political occurrence” following from the state formation (ibid 329). Flourishing in “a new society” arising from the Reformation and characterised by the growth of middle classes and a secular learning, Western nationalism “was connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism” (ibid 330). In contrast, the nationalism that developed in such countries as Germany “looked for its
justification and its differentiation to the heritage of its own past, and extolled the primitive and ancient depth and peculiarities of its traditions in contrast to Western rationalism and to universal standards (...) [It was] dependent upon, and opposed to, influences from without (...) [It] lacked self-assurance; its inferiority complex was often compensated by overemphasis and overconfidence” (ibid 330). While the Western concept of nation and fatherland was “basically a rational and universal concept of political liberty and rights of man, looking towards the city of the future”, the Eastern concept stressed the past and was “basically founded on history, on monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal solidarity” (ibid 574).5

For Kohn, such a descriptive distinction remains a difference of degree, not a difference in type. More specifically, this descriptive distinction was drawn on the basis of a lengthy comparative study of the essential elements and understanding of nationhood in France and Germany given their respective different social, political, economic and intellectual historical settings. The sharp distinction between the French universalistic and political idea of a nation and the German organicist and cultural concept of a nation can only be sustained in the embryonic stage of the Age of Nationalism. At the end of his historical exploration of the origins and background of the idea of nationalism, Kohn concludes that after its initial emergent stage in countries such as England, the US, France and Germany the rise and spread of nationalism elsewhere had combined both Western nationalism, typical as in the French experience and Eastern nationalism, unique in the German case. In the unfolding of the politics of nationalism, the Western and Eastern modes of nation “emerged in the intertwining of influences and conditions; conflicting and fusing, they became embodied in currents of thoughts in all nations and, to a varying degree, in entire nations” (ibid).

5 The word ‘Eastern nationalism’ never appears explicitly in Kohn’s book. But he differentiated principally between the rise of nationalism in the West, including England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and the British dominions, and that developed outside the Western world, including Central and Eastern Europe and Asia.
2.2.3 Civic Nationalism versus Ethnic Nationalism: Ideal Type Analytical Distinction

Kohn’s historical differentiation between an Eastern and a Western nationalism was later adopted and adapted for the development of theories of nationalism. In contemporary theories of nationalism the descriptive historical distinction between Eastern nationalism and Western nationalism is elevated to the theoretical level to serve analytical purposes (Brown 2001; Brubaker 1992; Ignatieff 1993; Keating 1996; Nielsen 1996-6; Smith 1991). Based on the abstraction of a number of ideas of a nation in the modern European history of state and nation formation, the binary analytical typology generalises that theoretically, there are two types of nationalism, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism, the two being analytically distinct and antithetical in nature.

In the perception of ethnic nationalism, the ‘nation’ is a community defined according to some pre-existing objective traits, such as language, religion, customs and tradition, and common descent. Membership of the national community is ascribed on the basis of these ascriptive criteria. In the extreme case, it is defined solely in terms of common ancestry. Germany is often given as an illustration of ethnic nationalism where citizenship was exclusively granted on the basis of descent. Traditionally the fact that descendants from foreigners were born in Germany or the fact that foreigners were well integrated into German society and culture were not a decisive factor to grant them German citizenship. It was therefore difficult to change citizenship laws so that individuals of non-German ethnic origin could become German citizens. Contemporary scholars often consider the works of Johann Gottfried Herder and the prevalent ideas in the period of German Romanticism as the intellectual source of the ethnic conceptualisation of the modern nation.

The theoretical conceptualisation of civic nationalism, by contrast, presents the ‘nation’ primarily as a community founded by the will of individuals. Originating in the social contract theories in the period of the Enlightenment, defenders of this type of nationalism regard the nation as an agency of democratic power that is able to challenge and replace the old oppressive order of the ‘ancien régime’. French and American nationalisms have traditionally been regarded as the epitome of civic nationalism. Revolutions in both countries were fought for the sovereignty of the
people. Membership of the nation is thus defined primarily in political and subjective terms. Members of the community are bound together by common rational/secular values, historical memories related to the political transformation, and the state-defined institutions and patterns of social interaction. What makes one a member of the national community is not one’s ethnicity but one’s commitment to the common political institutions, norms, and values. The famous phrase of Ernst Renan, that the nation is a ‘daily plebiscite’ is often referred to as the motto of civic nationalism (Renan 1992: 5). The willing individuals together constitute the nation within the pre-defined state boundaries, which in turn provides them with a sense of belonging.

Explicit or implicit views of the distinction as ideal type conceptual tools can be found in theoretical literature on nationalism. For instance, Michael Keating stresses explicitly that the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is one between two ‘ideal types’ as “any given movement may contain both civic and ethnic elements in its origins and use both types of appeal in its doctrine” (Keating 1996: 7-8). In his comparative study of contemporary nationalist movements in Catalonia, Scotland and Quebec, Keating refers to the distinction in the introduction. Making the point clear that the book is about ‘nation-building’ in a comparative perspective, Keating bases his theoretical framework primarily on the civic-ethnic distinction. In his view, there exist two theories of nation building and two different nationalist doctrines, one civic and the other ethnic:

“The ethnic theory of nation-building holds that nations are constituted by ethnic groups. In ethnic nationalist doctrine, membership of the national community is accorded on the basis of ascriptive criteria. The nation in turn is the basis for individual rights, liberties and duties.”

(Keating 1996: 3)

For Keating, civic nationalism suggests a different mode of nation building. It is a collective enterprise of its members but is rooted in individual assent rather than ascriptive identity. It is based upon common values and institutions, and patterns of social interaction. The vectors of national identity are institutions, customs, historical memories and rational/secular values. Anyone can join the nation irrespective of birth or ethnic origins, though the cost of adaptation varies. There is no myth of common ancestry. Civic nationalism is based upon territorially defined community, not upon a social boundary among groups within a territory” (Keating 1996: 5-6)
In *National Identity*, Anthony Smith (1991) spells out the distinction between the Western, or ‘civic’ conception of the nation and the non-Western, or ‘ethnic’ one in great detail.\(^6\) For Smith, three components, historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology are elements of the standard Western model of the nation. As he argues, the civic model of the nation is a conception based predominantly on spatial or territorial criteria. The nation is in possession of compact, well-defined territories. The human community called nation is thus defined by territorial boundaries. This stretch of land is historic in the sense that, though not necessarily the land of origin, the people living there have over several generations exerted mutual and beneficial influence. The self-sufficient territory is thus sacred and symbolic for national identification. The nation is linked to the idea of a *patria*, where legal equality of the members of the community is guaranteed and safeguarded by laws and institutions. The common experience and practice in the given legal-political institution provide the population with a measure of common values and traditions and bind them together with their homeland into a nation-state.

For Smith, the non-Western or ‘ethnic’ conception of nation emphasises a community of birth and native culture. According to this view, a nation is “first and foremost a community of common descent” (Smith 1991: 11). In contrast with the civic model of nation, the ethnic model of nation stresses descent in place of territory, vernacular culture in place of law. The individual’s national identity according to this model of nation is given and ascriptive. Having maintained that there are two types of nationalism, Smith immediately states that “in fact every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms” (ibid 13) and that “conceptually, the nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases” (ibid 15). The emphasis shifts between the two elements over time and the two elements change in their predominance in the conception of nation accordingly.

We can see that the concepts of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism as defined by contemporary theorists of nationalism fit the definition of ideal type

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\(^6\) As Smith wants to avoid the geographic and spatial opposition that might be suggested by the ‘Western’ type of nationalism versus the ‘Eastern’ one, he chooses to use ‘Western’ versus ‘non-Western’, or ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ instead.
concepts in the Weberian sense. They fulfil the two conditions required for the
construction of an ideal type concept, namely, the one-sided exaggeration of certain
elements of a social phenomenon, in this case, nationalism, and an abstract general
conceptualisation. For Smith, the conceptual distinction is useful in linking up the
overall situation wherein a particular movement finds itself and the political goals of
the movement. As he sees it, “civic and territorial models of the nation tend to
produce (...) ‘anti-colonial’ movements before independence has been attained and
‘integration’ movements after independence. Ethnic and genealogical models of the
nation, on the other hand, tend to give rise to secessionist or diaspora movements
before independence and irredentist or ‘pan’ movements thereafter” (ibid 82).

The ideal typical binary distinction also informs the development of other
more elaborated typologies of nationalism. As early as 1976, Emerich K. Francis
developed a five category typology of nationalism, differentiating between demotic
nationalism, integral nationalism, ethnic nationalism, restorative nationalism and
risorgimento nationalism (Francis 1976: 79-82). A closer examination of his
explanation of the typology reveals that it is built on the distinction between civic
nationalism and ethnic nationalism. For Francis, demotic nationalism is equivalent to
civic nationalism. The advocates of demotic nationalism take the state, i.e. its
administrative structure and territorial extension, as something given. In this case, the
state precedes the nation and is thus similar to Meinecke’s Staatnation. The central
concern of demotic nationalism is the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

Popular sovereignty and the principle of self-determination lay the basis for
integrating the people living within the state boundaries into a nation.

Ethnic nationalism holds that the nation is constituted by common descent, a
common culture and a common history, though not necessarily a common state. But
given the fact that the nation-state is the most prevalent, if not the only, mode for
organising political life territorially in the modern world, ethnic nationalism strives
for a single nation-state by arousing members’ sense of belonging to the ethnic nation.
Often, linguistic and cultural affinities, and belief in a common descent, to a less
extent, are evoked as symbols of common ethnicity.

The other three types of nationalism are all hybrid types incorporating ideas
and guidelines for political actions from both demotic (civic) and ethnic nationalism.
A deviant form of demotic nationalism as defined by Francis, integral nationalism
comes to play a role in the demotic nation when the nation is confronted with a crisis
such as external pressure or a challenge to the national legitimacy. Ethnic elements are thus incorporated into the originally demotic nature of the nationalism to construct the myth of the existence of a primordial and perennial nation. By *restorative nationalism* Francis is referring to the ideology of the nationalist movement which aims at the restoration of a formerly independent political unit after it has been submerged in the political power structure of a super-nation type of empire. *Risorgimento nationalism* is the most comprehensive type of nationalism where the ideas and principles of political action of the other types of nationalism can be found. The term *risorgimento* is derived from *risorgere* meaning ‘to rise again’ and its origin is closely linked to the Italian national movement in the late 19th century. For nation building in most countries one can see the strong influence of risorgimento nationalism.

Francis further designs a multidimensional matrix of variables to enable us to explain diverging national tendencies and to predict behaviour under specified conditions. The dependent variables are the five types of nationalism elaborated above. The adoption of a specific type of nationalist ideology or a combination of more than one type by national movement depend upon two sets of independent variables, on the one hand, three situational variables, economic, demographic and political, and, on the other hand, class interests. In conclusion, he comes up with five general hypotheses.\(^7\) Regarding the strategy used in the most comprehensive type of

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7 Francis' five hypothesis are as follows:

1. Any elite that actually exercises political power in a given state, or that can hope to attain power within the existing framework, will tend to interpret the situation in terms of demotic nationalism, and to identify itself with the nation or its active core.

2. Given an economically viable state, the middle classes that are in ascendancy, although frustrated in their ambitions, can be expected to advocate the ideas of demotic nationalism. They are likely to promote the unitarian nation-state in which the middle classes assume power in the name of the nation.

3. If the state in question, however, is not economically viable, or if the economic and military resources can be increased by adopting other principles of nationalism, and if the middle classes are not strong enough to attain their ambitions without cooperating with the traditional elite, the middle classes will be inclined to advocate risorgimento nationalism.

4. Whenever different power elites, including sectional interest groups in the middle classes, compete for supremacy, it is likely that they will adopt different types of nationalism; the minority or otherwise weaker groups are liable to choose ethnic nationalism.
nationalism, i.e. risorgimento nationalism, Francis makes one interesting hypothesis: a resorgimento nationalist movement in its initial stage usually adopts ethnic arguments but shifts to demotic arguments in the period of consolidation. The process of nation building is thus a dynamic process where both ethnic and civic elements and ideas intertwine with a possible shift between their dominance in the nationalist discourse.

Based on her earlier historical investigation of the origins of the nation, Greenfeld (2001) has made a theoretical abstraction of the typology of nationalism with some modification to the binary distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. She identifies three, instead of two, types of nationalism, namely, the ‘individualistic-civic’ type, the ‘collective-civic’ type, and the ‘collective-ethnic’ type. The typology addresses the two elements comprising the initial conception of the nation, the nature of the nation as a collectivity, on the one hand, and the nature of the human part composing the nation, on the other. Greenfeld’s improvised typology built on the civic/ethnic distinction can be viewed as a reformulation in the ‘ideal type’ sense. This is evidenced by her own words as she points out that:

“These models should be regarded as models which can be approximated, but are unlikely to be realised fully. They serve to pinpoint certain characteristic tendencies within different, specific nationalisms. In reality, the most common type is the mixed one. But the compositions of the existing mixtures vary significantly enough to justify their classification in the above terms and render these terms analytically useful” (Greenfeld 2001: 261)

Elsewhere Greenfeld has presented her typology in a table as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>civic</th>
<th>ethnic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualistic-libertarian</td>
<td>Type I</td>
<td>Void</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivistic-authoritarian</td>
<td>Type II</td>
<td>Type III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Types of nationalism (Greenfeld 1992: 11)

5. Restorative nationalism is likely to be embraced by traditional elites, including nobility and clergy, when they feel that their position is being threatened. The liberation of their country from the dominance of an alien elite promises a restoration and improvement of their prestige, power, and economic situation. (pp. 87-88)
The first element in the conception of nation – the nature of the nation as a whole – has been conceived in two ways in the early stage of nationalism. Essentially it is related to two different perceptions of the relationship between the individual and the nation as a whole. One perception holds that a nation is ‘a composite entity’ made up of free-willed individuals. The principles behind it are those of liberal democracy. In an individualistic nation, the individual comes before the nation, and the nation as a sovereign community is an association of free-willed individuals by social contract. The collectivistic view perceives the nation as a collective whole that precedes and gives meaning to the existence of its individual members. Sovereignty for a collectivistic nation means independence from foreign domination. The unitary definition of the nation, as Greenfeld sees it, tends to lead to authoritarian politics and inequality in social life.

According to Greenfeld, the civic and ethnic differentiation in the diagram is closely linked to the second element in the conception of nation, that is, how the criteria for membership of a nation – also known as the principle of nationality – is defined. In civic terms, nationality equals citizenship and is an essentially political and legal category. Theoretically, an individual has a free choice of nationality by a commitment to a certain set of civic values. In ethnic terms, an individual’s nationality and acquisition of citizenship is determined by their ethnic origin and, more strictly, by their blood.

The combination of the two elements of the conception of the nation gives us three different types of nationalism as shown in the table. Greenfeld emphasises that “this typology is analytical, rather than descriptive” (2001: 259). By this she means that the typology is useful for explanatory analysis. The explanatory value of such a typology lies in the fact that each of the three types has distinctive implications for the ways of thinking and behaviour within societies they help to define. In line with Smith’s view that the choice of the model of a nation is related to the context of the nationalist movement, Greenfeld also considers structural factors have a bearing on the character of nationalism. More importantly, she contends that the character of nationalism is determined by the character of the particular class and status groups who are its architects.

More specifically, “to understand how any particular nationalism acquired its specific form”, one has to look at three sets of variables, these being structural,
cultural and psychological. In Greenfeld’s understanding, structural factors refer mainly to the social and political orders, cultural factors involve elements of indigenous traditions, and the psychological factor refers to the mental state of *ressentiment*. While the specificity of the change in the structural factors informs as well as conditions how the nationalists conceptualise their ideas, their image of the nation can only be successful in so far as they interpret their nationalist ideas in terms of indigenous traditions. The individualistic-civic type of nationalism is essentially determined by structural factors; the collectivistic-civic type of nationalism is influenced by structural and cultural variables in approximately equal measure; and the psychological variable, ‘*ressentiment*’, plays a crucial formative role in the collectivistic-ethnic type of nationalism.⁸ Although all three sets of variables can be present in all nationalism, the predominance of a different set of variables in each case determines the type of nationalism.

Moreover, Greenfeld argues that the type to which a particular nationalism belongs has significant implications for the social, political, and even economic character of the nation. Individualistic-civic nationalism is necessarily liberal while collective-ethnic nationalism tends to lead to authoritarian politics. In the collectivistic-civic type of nationalism, one can always detect a built-in tension between liberalism and authoritarianism. For Greenfeld, as for many scholars, the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is an ideal type conceptual scheme useful for analytical purposes.

Based on the above discussion, the following table is drawn to illustrate the ideal type distinction. Such a distinction is conceptualised for the analysis of identity-related discourses. Each characteristic of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism corresponds to a defining criterion of a nation to be found in such discourses. A civic conceptualisation defines the nation according to the principle of territoriality and perceives the nation as a community based on the individual’s will. The binding force for the solidarity in such a community is generated through the experiences of and

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⁸ In his work, Kohn argues that German nationalism arose from its “dependence on the West [which] often wounded the pride of the native educated class” and therefore when the German nationalists borrowed the language of nationalism from the West they tended to develop their own understanding of the nation in opposition to the ‘alien’ example. This “wounded pride” of the educated class is the equivalent of the mental state of *ressentiment* as defined by Greenfeld (Kohn 1949: 330).
participation in common institutions as well as the upholding of certain political norms and culture. Such a vision of the nation reflects a strong belief in rationalism.

Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, ascribes membership of a nation to shared blood ties and common descent. An ethnic nationalist view would also argue that the existence of the nation can be traced back in history and as such would somehow survive into the future. It is believed that every nation is differentiated from all the others by its distinct culture, such as language, religion and customs, and that an individual’s well-being depends in an organic way upon the preservation and development of such a culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of nationalism</th>
<th>Civic nationalism</th>
<th>Ethnic nationalism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>● Territoriality</td>
<td>● Common descent, blood ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Individual’s voluntary choice</td>
<td>● Historicity of the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Common institutions, political norms and culture</td>
<td>● A common ethnic culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Political rationalism</td>
<td>● Political romanticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Inclusiveness</td>
<td>● Exclusiveness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism

Three points need emphasising. First, as the ideal type distinction does not reproduce the reality, we cannot expect all characteristics to be present in a concrete nationalist discourse. Second, the characteristics of these two types of nationalism are based on selective one-sided accentuation. For instance, territory also matters in a typical ethnic conception of the nation, but it is mainly understood as a geographical setting for the nation. And history may also have an important place in a civic conception of the nation, but so far as historical experiences may shape the identity formation to a certain extent, civic nationalism entertains no historical determinism. Individuals retain their right to choose to which nation they belong. Third, as far as the distinction helps to characterise the ways the nation is constructed it does not make value judgements on such a construction.
2.2.4 Civic Nationalism versus Ethnic Nationalism: Guidelines for Application

Both in theoretical discussions and empirical application contemporary scholars of nationalism repeatedly stress the ideal type nature of the theoretical distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism derived from Kohn’s historical comparison. Some contemporary research on the emergence of nationalism follows the binary distinction. One example is the historical distinction made by the Marxist historian Hobsbawm (1990) between European and non-European nationalism. According to Hobsbawm, European nationalism flourished between 1830 and 1870. It was a democratic mass political nationalism of the ‘great nations’ stemming from the citizenship ideals of the French Revolution. The non-European version of nationalism dominated the period from 1870 to 1914. This type of nationalism was defined narrowly along either ethnic or linguistic lines by some small nationalities often located in backward and peripheral areas as a reaction to the obsolete policies of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Tsarist empires.

In her historical enquiry into the modern nation formation, Greenfeld (1992) followed in Kohn’s footsteps by providing a nuanced historical account in which she compares the formation of four proto-typical nation-states, namely, England, France, United States and Germany. Her work distinguishes itself from that of Kohn by focusing on the different understandings of the principle of self-determination. As demonstrated in Greenfeld’s work, there is indeed a sharp contrast between the French and the German notions of a nation rallied round the principle of national self-determination. In the French view, the right of self-determination pertains to a people formed by individuals acting according to their own free will. The nation as such is a compound of individuals thus transformed into a single political community. Such a nation has the right to self-rule internally and to independence externally. The establishment of common political and legal institutions and their day-to-day practice further cultivate a common political culture and reinforce the sense of belonging within the existing state boundaries. According to the German view, the right to self-determination pertains primarily to the ethnic community that makes up the nation. Individuals are bound to the nation by some innate primordial ties such as language and common ancestry.
The difference is vividly exemplified by the German historian Friedrich Meinecke in his distinction between the Staatnation, which “centres on the idea of individual and collective self-determination and derives from the individual’s free will and subjective commitment to the nation”, and the Kulturnation, which “is founded upon seemingly objective criteria such as common heritage and language, a distinct area of settlement, religion, custom and history, and does not need to be mediated by a national state or any other political form. Consciousness of unity, the sense of belonging together, develop independently of the state. (…) It leaves individuals little scope to choose to which nation they belong” (Alter 1989: 14)

Reviewing the intellectual debates in Western and Eastern Europe immediately before and during the formation of the modern nation-state, Dominique Schnapper (1996) also identifies two general accounts of the modern nation by comparing primarily France and Germany. As she sees it, the history of nation formation in Europe is a history of two competing nationalist ideologies. Conflicts between France and Germany, particularly the annexation of Alsace by the German Reich in 1870, have generated heated debates on the notion of ‘nation’ to which famous scholars from both countries have made important contributions. Their arguments, primarily of a militant nature, were later transformed into ideas. A dichotomy between a civic conceptualisation of nation and an ethnic one can indeed be identified in the competing nationalist ideologies articulated in the historical formation of the modern nation-state in Europe. But such a dichotomy remains valid only in the historical description of the fundamental and insurmountable ideological opposition specific to this particular period of time.

Schnapper cautions against the confusion of contending views of nation as articulated in such historical debates with the concept of “nation” used in sociological analysis since the former are means used by social actors to achieve specific political goals. “Binary oppositions are an analytical procedure, but their usefulness does not guarantee that reality can thus be divided. We must be suspicious vis-à-vis anyone asserting there are two kinds of people, two kinds of reality or process” (Schnapper 1996: 229). This is clearly an echoing of Weber’s view of the relationship between ideal types and reality. Ideal types created in the process of sociological analysis are mental constructs designed for bettering our understanding of concrete historical
individuals. Although they are conceived by emphasising some ideas present in history, they are not a mirror reflection of reality.

Another example *par excellence* of the fruitful application of the ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism to descriptive analysis is a major work by Rogers Brubaker in his comparative study of the underpinnings of citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany (Brubaker 1992). One needs to point out that Brubaker does not use explicitly the concepts of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Rather he distinguishes two distinct understandings of nationhood, or two sets of “idiom of nationalism” (Brubaker 1992: 162-163). The analysis leads to the finding that in France citizenship is, in principle, based on *jus soli* – the law of soil – that is, on territorial jurisdiction. Whatever one’s ethnic or geographical origins, all persons born on French soil could in principle be citizens of the French state. By contrast, in Germany where the unitary state was not established until the 1870s, citizenship laws have been based traditionally on descent, on *jus sanguinis* – the law of blood. In other words, a child received German citizenship only if the parent had it, and not on account of his/her birth on German soil. The difference between the two countries’ conceptions of citizenship is embedded in their different historical understandings of nationhood. The French model was traditionally state-centred and assimilationist whereas the German one volk-centred and differentialist (Brubaker 1992: 14-16).

Throughout the whole book Brubaker is at pains to avoid simplistic and value-laden generalisations. As he sees it, “The temptation to treat differences of degree as differences of kind, differences of contextual expression as differences of inner principle, is endemic to bipolar comparison (…) To characterise French and German traditions of citizenship and nationhood in terms of ready-made conceptual pairs such as universalism and particularism, cosmopolitanism and ethnocentrism, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic irrationalism, is to pass from characterization to caricature” (Brubaker 1992: 2). Consequently, when he examines more closely the French and German cases, he recognises the profound differences between the two without categorising them as representative of ‘pure’ and diametrically opposed notions of citizenship. In the traditions of nationhood in both countries, political (civic) and cultural (ethnic) components were present. In France, “political unity has been understood as constitutive, cultural unity as expressive of
nationhood” whereas in Germany “political and ethnocultural aspects of nationhood have stood in tension with one another, serving as the basis for competing notions of nationhood” (Brubaker 1992: 10).

However, a few years later Brubaker criticises the validity of the distinction as a meaningful analytical tool. His main criticism is that both terms, ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’, are inherently ambiguous, which renders such a typology a problematic analytical tool (Brubaker 2001: 55-71). Apart from the distinction’s usefulness for descriptive analysis, Brubaker questions whether the distinction can be of any use for explanatory analysis. The argument he gives is that the terms, ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’, are in themselves deeply ambiguous and he demonstrates clearly how their ambiguity renders the distinction analytically useless. Brubaker contends that if ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ is defined narrowly, the two categories are so constricted that most concrete cases would be left out. If both terms are defined broadly, there is a large middle ground with many overlapping instances. The civic-ethnic distinction can no longer be mutually exclusive.

As far as ethnic nationalism is concerned, the ambiguity is linked to the elusive central term ‘ethnicity’ which is believed to be the basis of nation-membership in ethnic nationalism. One might adopt either a narrow or a broad definition of ‘ethnicity’ but none is satisfactory because if one takes the narrow definition of ethnicity as referring to ‘common descent’ or the belief in the common ancestor, one finds very few cases of ethnic nationalism in reality. Here we might recall a similar observation made by Anthony Smith, namely, that although nationalist discourse does involve ‘imputed common descent,’ this is ‘usually a minor claim’ (Smith 1991: 180). But if one defines ethnicity broadly as ‘ethnoculture’ without specifying the meaning of ‘culture’, almost all nations and national movements appeal to some cultural aspects such as language, religion and history. An example of such a broad definition of ethnicity can be found in Walker Connor’s work on nationalism where he makes a correlation between all nationalisms and ethnicity. He even coins a new word, ‘ethnonationalism’ (Connor 1994).

Brubaker sees the same problem when one tries to define the term ‘civic’. One can interpret Renan’s metaphor of the civic nation, ‘a daily plebiscite’, narrowly in the sense that the civic nation is purely a political association resulting from the rational choice of free-willed individuals. Civic nation is thus ahistorical and
acultural. Nowhere can one expect to find one nation or national movement making a purely political discourse regarding the nation. Brubaker further suggests that a careful reading of Renan reveals that his understanding of nationhood is a ‘thick’, not a ‘thin’ understanding (Brubaker 2001: 61). That is to say, though emphasising the importance of subjective will in constituting the nation, Renan also points to the significance of ‘a rich legacy of memories’. The nation is ‘given’ as well as ‘chosen’. But if one defines ‘civic’ broadly as Keating does where the bearers of national identity include ‘institutions, customs, historical memories and rational secular values’, it is not very different from ethnic nationalism defined broadly.

For Brubaker, given the conceptual ambiguity of the two concepts and the negative potential of conflating empirical analysis with normative analysis, one should seek for other meaningful alternative conceptual tools. He mentions the distinction between state-framed and counter-state understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism as one possible example of such an alternative (Brubaker 2001: 67-69). In a way and as Brubaker himself points out, this moderate alternative is similar to Meinecke’s notion of the Staaten nation versus Kultur nation. But as Brubaker gives this distinction mainly as an example, he does not work out the details of such a distinction and the way to apply it to empirical study. Despite his criticism, Brubaker is not of the opinion that the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism should be abandoned completely. When the distinction is used in a more nuanced way, it “certainly has some analytical and normative merit” (Brubaker 2001: 257). What Brubaker is against is the dichotomous view that the processes of state- and nation-building could be thus classified, both analytically and normatively.

Elsewhere in the growing body of theories of nationalism other scholars have voiced similar critical warnings regarding the application of the binary distinction to empirical research. A key cautionary note is that, given the complexity of nationalist politics, the application of such a binary opposition runs the risk of oversimplification. In the contemporary international arena, there is a whole variety of nationalist movements. Conceptually, it is difficult to fit the complex reality into either one or the other of the two accounts. Such is the view of Kai Nielsen. He argues that it is impossible to find a pure civic nation with a commitment to democracy and freedom. Similarly, the account of an ethnic nation is false (Nielsen 1996-7: 47-48). In an article in collaboration with Michel Seymour and Jocelyne Couture, Nielsen
cautions again the use of a dichotomy between the exclusively civic and ethnic account of the nation as “these two opposition views describe two extreme positions: absolute universalism and absolute particularism” (Seymour et al. 1996: 56) Yet out of his great caution, Nielsen arrives at the proposal that the theoretical distinction should be rejected. He subsequently adopts the definition of nation given by Will Kymlicka and conceptualises the nation uniformly in cultural terms. As he sees it, “All nationalisms are cultural nationalisms of one kind or another. There is no purely political conception of the nation, liberal or otherwise” (Nielsen 1996-7: 50).⁹

However, as the literature review so far has demonstrated, contemporary scholars, Nielsen included, treat civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism as ideal type conceptual constructs. And recalling Weber’s definition, ideal types are not meant to reflect the reality as such but only serve our understanding of such a complex phenomenon as nationalism by stressing one-sidedly certain characteristics of two different understandings of the nation. While Nielsen is right to argue that pure civic nations or pure ethnic conceptions of the nation do not exist, such an argument is sufficient to reject the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. As far as the ideal type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism helps to highlight two contrasting conceptualisations of the nation, it does not suggest that the world of nations or of various nationalist movements can be thus neatly divided.

For Weber, treating ideal types as being empirically true is a sign of the immaturity of a particular scientific discipline. Although the conceptual distinction is ‘unreal’, this is not a reason for replacing it with other conceptual schemes (Coppieters 2003: 11). As ideal types, the distinction remains a useful descriptive conceptual tool in differentiating two typical ways of thinking or strategies in concrete nationalist movements. It may increase our understanding of the driving ideological forces behind the construction of a nation. It may even generate empirically verifiable hypotheses. But we need to be wary of the danger of turning the application of these two ideal typical concepts to the empirical analysis of concrete nationalist movements and nation-building processes into nothing more than a labelling exercise. Application of the distinction to concrete case study “presupposes relatively ‘thick’ understanding of the local contexts in which it is to apply” (Brubaker 2001: 240).

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⁹ Italicise original.
Besides the danger of obscuring ideal type mental constructs with reality, an even greater problem with the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is the conflation of the ideal types with ideals in a moral sense. In the preceding review of Kohn’s work we see that Kohn associates Western nationalism with rationalism and liberalism, and Eastern nationalism with emotion and authoritarianism. Yet such an association is only proven valid by Kohn’s detailed research in specific individual historical cases. However, in contemporary theories of nationalism we do find that some scholars take Kohn’s normative assessment of concrete nationalisms within specific historical contexts as universally true and thus regard the ideal type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism more as a normative distinction than as an idealised analytical tool.

Attaching normative importance to these two concepts, there is an obvious preference among scholars of nationalism for the civic variety rather than for the ethnic one. Contemporary liberals distinguish civic from ethnic understandings of nationhood in an effort to channel national sentiments in the direction of civic nationalism. The notion ‘civic’ per se suggests an inherent normative prestige. When used to describe the expressions or political doctrines of a nationalist movement, the accounts of its civicness are sometimes more political than analytical in the sense that they refer more to the putative international respectability and legitimacy of the movement in question than to its empirical characteristics. The adjectives used to describe the two types of nationalism, usually in the form of antonyms, mark clearly the normative values attached to them: rational – irrational, liberal – illiberal, inclusive – exclusive, universalistic – particularistic. For instance, Tom Nairn sees civic nationalism as developing out of the institutions of an inherently liberal civil society, whereas ethnic nationalism is “perceived as inherently (…) divisive, inward- and backward-looking, atavistic, aggressive and probably not too good for business either” (Nairn 1997: 86).

Although there is at present no real debate regarding the normative superiority of civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism among theorists, the triumph of the defenders of civic nationalism is obvious. Civic nationalism is believed to be consistent with the liberal principle of self-determination and pluralism conducive to a decent political order. Michael Ignatieff is representative of the use of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism as a normative conceptual construct. Having
made six journeys of enquiry into the ‘new nationalism’, Ignatieff drew the following conclusion:

“What’s wrong with the world is not nationalism itself. (…) What’s wrong is the kind of nation, the kind of home that nationalists want to create and the means they use to seek their ends. A struggle is going on wherever I went between those who still believe that a nation should be a home to all, and that race, colour, religion and creed should be no bar to belonging, and those who want their nation to be home only to their own. It’s the battle between the civic and the ethnic nation. I know which side I’m on. I also know which side, right now, happens to be winning.”

(Ignatieff 1993: 189)

With his Russian-born father, English-born mother, American education, and professional career in Canada, Great Britain and France, Ignatieff claims to be cosmopolitan. For him, the Enlightenment vision of a cosmopolitan world society made up of rational individuals is the ideal world, even though he realises that such an ideal is not to be realised, at least not in the near future. Modern individuals have a psychological need of a sense of belonging. National community offers such a sense of belonging. But for Ignatieff, only the civic form of national community can at the same time fulfil the individual’s psychological need for belonging and remain compatible with the Enlightenment rationalism and individualism. A civic nation, as he conceives it, is “a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values” (Ignatieff 1993: 3-4). As perceived by Ignatieff, the civic nation is created by individuals out of free choice and as such it turns national belonging into “a form of rational attachment” (ibid: 4) In contrast, ethnic nationalism goes against the spirit of Enlightenment, i.e. rationalism and individualism, by its insistence that “an individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen” and that “it is the national community that defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community” (ibid 4-5)

Viewing this close association between civic nationalism and rationalism, individualism and liberalism in Ignatieff’s account, it is no wonder that, although students of nationalism recognise the prevailing force of ethnic nationalism in the current upsurge of nationalist movements worldwide, few, if any, would support it theoretically. Behind the derogatory adjectives attached to ethnic nationalism, there is
implicitly the inkling of a link between ethnic nationalism and authoritarianism, though such a suggestion is more often asserted than argued. At the normative level, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is elevated to the level of dichotomous opposition with the former being benign and the latter malign. Due to the normative value attached to the civic-ethnic opposition many separatist movements tend to employ the language of civic nationalism to legitimise their respective nationalist causes.\(^\text{10}\)

However, as Michael Hechter argues, this kind of definitional strategy is problematic as “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so” (Hechter 2001: 7). For Nielsen the characteristic view that good nationalisms are civic and bad ones are ethnic should be rejected as such a view is empirically unfounded. Nielsen contends that such a distinction is problematic since “both civic and ethnic conceptions must themselves be understood as a compound of subjective and objective features” (Seymour et al. 1996: 5). Regarding the question of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, Brubaker argues that both exclusion and inclusion exist simultaneously in all forms of nationalism. There is no inner logic to support the argument that the civic form of nationalism is based on citizenship and the ethnic form based on ethnicity, or that the former is necessarily inclusive and the later exclusive. “What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion” (Brubaker 2001: 64).

Current political discourse does feature a predominant tendency to speak in theoretical terms. Theoretical typology is turned into value-laden political labels where “civic” is praised and “ethnic” condemned. In such politically charged discourses, it is argued that a nation founded on civic nationalism is superior to one founded on ethnic nationalism. It is assumed that advocacy of a certain conception of the nation guarantees the adoption of certain behaviours or a set of attitudes toward the nationals and the non-nationals. Civic accounts of the nation are often used to justify the existence or the quest of a nation.

There is always the danger that findings of scientific research are turned into political tools. The risk is real when the ideal type distinction between civic

\(^{10}\) Typically, instances of the usages of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism either to justify or to criticise a particular nationalist movement can be found in the case of Quebec nationalism.
nationalism and ethnic nationalism is misused to draw lines between people, based on the most articulate views voiced. The temptation is great for scholars to take the different expressions of nationalist ideas in reality to arrive at a similar categorisation. The danger is even greater if analysts treat the ideal type distinction as a difference between two ideals. There are important moral consequences that follow from ‘scientific’ works endorsing a particular account.

2.3 Summary

Taking into account the various definitions as well as criticisms of the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, this chapter acknowledges the prevalence of such a distinction in theories of nationalism and argues that civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism are generalising ideal-type constructs in the Weberian sense. The distinction can be applied to analysis of the phenomenon of nationalism in various historical contexts. The distinction is based on a one-sided exaggeration of certain features of two different conceptualisations of a nation. The ethnic conceptualisation of a nation perceives it through a mythical lens. The nation is constructed on the basis of common descent and historically shaped ethnic and cultural markers. In the civic account, the nation is regarded primarily as a political community delimited by territoriality and the individual’s voluntary adherence to common political institutions and a common political culture. With the help of the conceptualisation at the centre of the ideal-type distinction, the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism can shed light on the analysis of identity-formation by differentiating and comparing various identity-related discourses. Employing the ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism in concrete case studies is thus considered helpful in determining the extent to which in concrete cases various conceptualisations of a nation approximate to or diverge from the civic or ethnic conception of the nation.

As a theoretical construct for descriptive analysis, first of all, the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism does not imply that the concrete phenomenon of nationalism cannot be categorised otherwise. When it comes to concrete case studies, to label the understandings of nationhood and the political process of nation building in one country or in one national movement as either civic or ethnic nationalism risks indeed to ‘pass from characterisation to caricature’
(Brubaker 1992: 2). The distinction may help us to decipher and understand the body of thinking, which is not necessarily coherent and consistent, involved in the creation of a nation. But it would be wrong to assume that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism should mirror the reality or that the distinction may subsume reality, for such an assumption mistakes ideal type concepts as the unequivocal expressions of reality. Nor is the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism descriptive in the sense that it fully reproduces reality. It is descriptive in the sense that “its application to the concrete reality explains nothing as such, but only states what is to be explained” (Parson 1975: 604). In reality, both civic and ethnic characteristics can be found in all nationalisms, though to varying degrees. As ideal type, ethnic nationalism is the antithesis of civic nationalism.

In fact, as shown by this theoretical review, mainstream scholars of nationalism implicitly treat the distinction between the two types of nationalism as one between two ideal-type concepts. The general consensus is that nationalism has many dimensions and different civic and ethnic elements are selectively emphasised at different times and under different economic, social and political conditions throughout the forever on-going formation of national consciousness. Applying Weber’s methodology of ideal type analysis, I reinterpret explicitly the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism as follows: ideal-typically, there are two distinct conceptions of the nation. The distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation is useful in understanding the competing elements in the course of nation-building in concrete cases. More specifically it offers a useful analytical typology for the analysis of nationalist discourses. Case studies should look into the discourses on how the two accounts of nation are mixed and on their respective proportions in the nation-building ideologies.

Another important point that emerged from the theoretical review is that concepts used in ideal-type analysis meant for descriptive analysis are to be differentiated from those used for normative analysis. Descriptive analysis belongs to the sphere of empirical science and should consequently be value-free. The ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is not a normative distinction between two ideals or two different moral standings. That is, from an empirical point of view, there is nothing inherently bad or good in civic or ethnic nationalism. Each state or sub-state nationalism has many facets and dimensions at
different times and within different contexts. As far as this study is concerned, the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ do not carry with them inherently a moral prejudgement. They are used descriptively in the analysis of various typical arguments advanced in Taiwanese national discourse.

By way of conclusion, I argue that the ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism may in principle remain a meaningful analytical tool for the analysis of the Taiwanese nationalist ideology. Applying the distinction to the case of Taiwan, I shall seek to determine the relative significance of two idealised conceptions of the nation, either civic or ethnic, in the historical process of an ideological nation construction. This attempt is in line with the existing literature on the subject: a significant number of studies of Taiwanese nationalism have used extensively either the binary distinction or one of the two concepts in order to capture the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. In the political discourse politicians also use the terms civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism for either justification or criticism. My intention is not to put a label at the conclusion of my analysis of Taiwanese nationalism, nor will I be trying to determine whether Taiwanese nationalism is normatively legitimate. A normative assessment of Taiwanese nationalism would be part of a different study (Song 2003). Applying the ideal-type distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism in a nuanced manner can help us to understand the process of the identity formation and transformation in Taiwan in the past century.
Part Three

The Transformation of Taiwanese Nationalist Ideologies

(1895 – 2000)
Chapter Three

General Background of Taiwan: Land, History, and People

3.1 Land

Our understanding of Taiwan today includes the island of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands (the Pescadores) (numbering 64 in all), the Offshore Islands (the Jinmen and Matsu groups, also known as the Quemoy and Matsu groups in English), and a handful of islands in the South China Sea. The island of Taiwan is geographically separated from Mainland China by 100 miles of water. Its shape is roughly that of a long oval, resembling a sweet potato. The island is approximately 240 miles long from north to south and 98 miles wide from west to east at the broadest point, covering an area of 13,884 square miles, equalling the size of the Netherlands. With the equator running across the centre of the island, the climate is predominately sub-tropical and tropical. On this mountainous island abundant plantations make it forever green. Many history books tell the story when the Portuguese sailors first spotted the island in the 16th century, the Portuguese being the first Westerners to set foot on the island, they could not help but exclaim ‘Ilha Formosa!’ meaning ‘beautiful island’ in their language. And this is the origin of the name ‘Formosa’ which has been used for a long time in the West to refer to the Taiwan Island. Apart from that, Nationalist China, the Republic of China (ROC), and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT), several other names are also used for Taiwan. Throughout the text ‘Taiwan’ will be used to

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11 Advocates of Taiwan independence often use symbolically the physical resemblance between the shape of the Taiwan Island and that of a sweet potato. Not only is sweet potato edible, both its leaves and root, it is also easy to cultivate regardless of harsh conditions. Advocates of Taiwan independence thus claim the Taiwanese to be the sons and daughters of sweet potato to symbolise their resistance and strength.

12 In fact, during their sailing search for the new world, the Portuguese had named a dozen islands ‘Ilha Formosa’ in their admiration of the beauty of the nature. But ‘Formosa’ as a name did not stay long for other islands except Taiwan. In the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement after WWII, the choice between ‘Taiwan’ and ‘Formosa’ to be the appropriate signifier for the territory became an act of significance. ‘Formosa’ was often preferred to ‘Taiwan’ in an effort to minimise the link between the Island and China.

13 The title, the Republic of China on Taiwan, was coined by Li Denghui and was propagated briefly during his presidency.
refer to the area under investigation. But when ‘Formosa’ is used in the sources analysed or cited, it will be kept so. ‘Taiwan Island’ and ‘Taiwan’ will be used interchangeably.

3.2 Brief History of Taiwan

From existing historical records, we know that it was around the late 3rd century AD that Taiwan first appeared in Chinese historical documents. Nevertheless, the earlier contacts across the Taiwan Strait before the late 16th century had been largely discontinuous. On the administrative level, between 1264 and 1294, during the Yuan dynasty, the Penghu Islands were incorporated into Fujian province. From 1372 onwards, the succeeding Ming dynasty also continued to exercise judicial powers of inspection over Penghu Islands. Taiwan Island, however, was not on the map of the Chinese Empire at the time. Since the 17th century, the number of migrants from mainland China to Taiwan began to grow vigorously while at the same time Western powers – Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain – set their eyes on Taiwan.

In 1622, the Dutch occupied the Penghu Islands, using the place as a base for the transit trade of its East India Company. Following several confrontations between the Chinese Empire and the Netherlands, the Dutch retreated to the south of Taiwan Island, centring around Tainan city, in exchange for non-interference in Chinese affairs. And for the next 38 years the Dutch turned the south of Taiwan into a base for their colonial expansion. To open up virgin soil in the south of Taiwan the Dutch had recruited many Han Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong provinces on the mainland. In the same period of time, the Spanish tried to rival the Dutch in this part of Asia. In 1626 they occupied the northwest part of Taiwan Island and started their 16-year-long commercial transaction and missionary work before the Dutch took over.

When the Ming dynasty was destroyed by the Manchu from the North and replaced by the Qing dynasty, Zheng Chenggong (also known as Koxinga), the devoted loyalist of the Ming Dynasty, and his troops defeated the Dutch and, in 1662, drove them out of Taiwan Island. Zheng and his followers then used it as their base, in order to fight against the Manchus and to restore the Ming dynasty. The rule of Zheng’s family over Taiwan Island was ended in 1683 by the Qing dynasty. From then on, the whole of Taiwan was officially included on the map of the Chinese
Empire. First Taiwan was included as part of Fujian province and after 1887 Taiwan was upgraded to the status of province.

Between 1894 and 1895, the Sino-Japanese War broke out, resulting in the total defeat of the Qing Court. Taiwan Island and the Penghu Islands were subsequently ceded to Japan under the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (also named the Shimonoseki Treaty), signed in 1895. Japan ruled Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. In the first two decades of Japanese colonial rule, Taiwanese people put up continuous armed resistance. Faced with severe military suppression from the Japanese coloniser, non-violent anti-colonialism replaced armed resistance in the 1920s. Social and political movements were influenced by such modern political concepts as democracy, socialism, and national self-determination. However, all Taiwanese organisations and movements that demanded radical and complete emancipation of the Taiwanese from colonialism were crushed. Only the moderate reformists continued to demand home rule and some degree of autonomy within the colonial system. The 50 years of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan Island was brought to an end with the surrender of Japan in WWII. At the end of the war, Taiwan was turned over to the GMD according to the Cairo agreement, a decision reached between Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the Anglo-American leaders. Then, under the San Francisco Treaty of September 1951, Japan gave up its claim to Taiwan.\(^\text{14}\)

As its defeat in the Chinese civil war was clearly imminent, between 1947 and 1949 the GMD gradually retreated from the mainland to Taiwan. With the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, China was divided across the Taiwan Strait with two regimes competing to be the sole legitimate government of China. The GMD government took exile in Taiwan and intended the island to be the military base for their return to mainland China. In order to consolidate its rule on Taiwan and to fulfil its sacred mission of nation recovery, the GMD suspended the practice of constitutional democracy with the ‘ad

\(^{14}\) In the San Francisco Treaty Japan only stated that it gave up its claim to Taiwan without specifying to whom the sovereignty over Taiwan should belong. Such a fact is often evoked by pro-Taiwan independence activists and scholars as a proof that Taiwan’s international status was undetermined after WWII, and therefore its future should be determined by the Taiwanese people (Song 2003:238-240).
hoc clauses’, notably the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobilisation against Communist Rebellion (Temporary Provisions hereafter). That the GMD still engaged in the combat against the insurgent communists was seen to justify the establishment of its ruthless authoritarian rule on Taiwan. Taiwan was turned into a police state.

The confrontation between Beijing and Taibei across the Taiwan Strait has gone through different phases. Between 1949 and the late 1970s, the two sides were openly hostile. The slogan of the Communist PRC was to ‘liberate Taiwan’, while the Nationalist ROC swore to ‘recover the mainland’. Internationally the GMD regime was recognised by most countries to be the legitimate Chinese government. But the decisive external guarantee for the survival of the GMD regime came from the United States. In response to the crisis in the Korean peninsula in June 1950, President Harry Truman decided to order the 7th Fleet to ‘neutralise’ the Taiwan Strait. The US military presence may have saved the GMD government on the island from an impending Communist takeover, but it perpetuated the confrontation between the two sides into the bi-polar Cold War confrontation, with one in the Communist bloc and the other siding with the West.

The continuing stationing of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait from 1953 contributed to the stalemate of the Chinese Civil War. Although the US had lent Taiwan its protection and made it one of its strategic bases in the Pacific, it did not support the GMD government’s plan to take over the mainland by force. That the GMD government failed to get full support from its American ‘big brother’ was best illustrated by the loss of its seat in both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC in 1971, and the normalisation of Sino-American relations in 1979.

The change of China’s representative in the UN and the normalisation between Washington and Beijing corresponded to the change of international climate in favour of the Beijing government. The loss of external legitimacy decisively pushed the GMD to initiate political reform from above in the late 1980s. The GMD government dropped its hostile ‘three Nos’ policy towards the mainland (i.e., no compromise, no contact and no negotiation), and renounced its claims to mainland China in May 1991 with the lifting of the Temporary Provisions. With the deepening of the process of democratisation, in 1995 Taiwan held its first direct presidential
election. While renouncing its sovereign claim to the mainland, Taiwan increasingly asserts itself internationally as a sovereign state.

On the mainland side, emerging out of the disastrous Cultural Revolution, the Beijing government proceeded to reform. Regarding Taiwan a new strategy was designed to bring about reunification, this being the famous ‘one country, two systems’ policy later applied to the former British colony, Hong Kong, from 1997 and the former Portuguese colony, Macao, from 1999. Meanwhile, informal exchanges, such as trade, investment and tourism, have taken place across the Strait since the mid 1980s. No official talks on unification have yet been held, as the two sides cannot agree the basis on which such talks should be conducted. There is still no agreement as to the precise objectives, conditions or formal status of these negotiations – they are still at the stage of ‘negotiations about negotiations’. The Beijing government welcomes negotiation with Taibei under the One China Principle, while Taibei insists this should be a negotiation between two equal governments or political entities and the question of the unity of China should not be a principle but an issue among many in the negotiations.

In all regards, Taiwan enjoys de facto independence with a vigorous democratic system. But it is not an independent state and its international status remains ambiguous for other states as well as for the Taiwanese people (Song 2001).15 Taiwan is caught in a dilemma between two possible statehoods: unification with the PRC, on the one hand, or an independent Taiwan, on the other. In terms of national identity, the population in Taiwan is also divided on the issue of unification versus independence. One scholar described the ambiguous status of Taiwan as that of an ‘intermediate state’ (Hughes 1997: 129). The eventual determination of Taiwan’s international status depends on the development of cross-Strait relations. One important development in this regard is that since the mid 1980s, the nature of cross-

15 From a purely academic point of view, whether Taiwan constitutes an independent and sovereign state is an issue of contention. Such a contention is linked to the theoretical debate on the constitutive components of statehood in both international law and international relations. More specifically, the debate involves whether international recognition should count as one criterion of statehood or not. Various opinions can be generally divided into two camps, the declaratory camp and the constitutive camp. For the declaratory camp, recognition is not a necessary condition for statehood while the constitutive camp emphasises the importance of recognition. But the reality is that when a political entity’s international status is in doubt, international recognition does play a decisive role.
Strait relations has undergone fundamental changes where the conflict evolved from an inter-regime contention to one over sovereignty and national identity. The rise of sovereignty contention in cross-Strait relations is closely related to the emergence and evolution of Taiwanese nationalism.

3.3 People: Population and Ethnic Composition

Today’s Taiwan has a population of nearly 23 million. With 592 people per square kilometre, it is the second most densely populated area per square kilometre in the world, exceeded only by Bangladesh (828/per square kilometre). Regarding the ethnic composition of the Taiwanese population, different categorisations have been used at different times. About ninety-nine per cent of the whole population are of Han Chinese origin whose ancestors emigrated intermittently over a period of five centuries from mainland China.\textsuperscript{16} The original inhabitants of Taiwan, today counting a little over 1 per cent, are of Malay-Polynesian origin. One simple way to differentiate the ethnic composition of the population is to divide them into the Han Chinese and the non-Chinese indigenous people. Up till the 1980s such differentiation had prevailed in the official and academic definition on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Not only did such a categorisation celebrate the common Han Chinese origin of the Taiwanese society but it also lent support to the claim that Taiwan was part of China.

However, contemporary studies of ethnicity increasingly treat the subject from the subjective perspective. While using objective factors such as genealogy, kinship and common cultural traits to categorise mankind into different ethnic groups, students of ethnicity take ethnic identity as something fluid in constant formation and transformation rather than as some fixed given. The objective ethnic traits can be hereditary in the sense that they are maintained and manifested by some cultural practices and traditions which pass down from generation to generation. But the objectivity of these ethnic traits is only relative in the sense that they remain

\textsuperscript{16} It is true that the Han Chinese migrants to Taiwan between the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries were predominantly males and most subsequently married female aborigines in Taiwan. But, according to the traditional Chinese practice, a person’s ethnic or regional origin is determined in paternal linear fashion. Therefore, the descendents of mixed marriages continue to regard themselves as Han Chinese.
ultimately human constructs. Ethnic characteristics and the identity stemming from them can also be ‘acquired’ where stimulus from the environment external to a certain group plays an important role in the maintenance or transformation of the group members’ ethnic identification (Parson 1975: 53-83; Horowitz 1975: 111-140; Francis 1976: 86). Taking such a view of ethnicity, contemporary scholarship on ethnic relations in Taiwan considers it problematic to categorise the majority of the population (around ninety-nine per cent) into one common ethnic bloc and label them simply as Han Chinese. For one thing, despite the same ancestry, these ‘Chinese’ or their ancestors arrived in Taiwan at different times in history. For another, this population does not necessarily have common collective historical memories owing to the different historical trajectories they had followed before their current co-existence in Taiwan. Since WWII the ethnic stratification in Taiwan has undergone significant transformation rendering the oversimplified distinction between Han Chinese and non-Chinese aborigines problematic (Wu Naide 1993: 27-35).

Thus, the real line of demarcation affecting people’s identity is not their racial or provincial origin, although those are relevant, but their distinctive historical memories which are closely related to the time of their arrival on Taiwan. Regarding the date of arrival, about 85 per cent of the Han Chinese are descendents of Chinese migrants arriving in Taiwan between the mid-16th and 17th centuries. This early wave of migrants came mainly from Fujian province, particularly its southern part, and Guangdong province on the Mainland. The minnan dialect spoken by the people from Fujian (the Hokklos) and the Hakka dialect spoken by those from Guangdong are mutually intelligible to each community.

Ethnic conflicts throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries arose mainly between the indigenous people and the Han migrants. And amongst the Han Chinese whose primary social structure was based on clan and kinship conflicts over control of the natural resources also occurred (Lamley 1981: 282-318). Over time, particularly during the 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, these Han Chinese gradually integrated into one loosely connected community while maintaining the minnan and Hakka differentiation. In this study we will follow the common practice in most current publications on Taiwan in Western languages and refer to this portion of the population as native Taiwanese.
The last important wave of immigration from Mainland China came after World War Two. The new population were mainly soldiers, government officials and their dependents that followed the GMD government to the island after its defeat in the Chinese civil war. Although sharing with the native Taiwanese the same Han Chinese ancestry, these newcomers came to constitute a relatively coherent group distinct from the native Taiwanese who had lived for generations on the island (Corcuff 2000). In the English literature, this group of people are often referred to as the Mainlanders.

Before the 1990s, depending on the date of arrival on Taiwan, a bi-polar distinction, though not recognised and discussed by the then ruling government, the GMD, divided the whole population into Benshengren (people of Taiwan province) versus Waishengren (people from other provinces), or, in another pair of terms, native Taiwanese versus Mainlanders. Benshengren refers to the native Taiwanese as defined above while Waishengren is made up of the newcomers after WWII and their offspring. In recent years, the population ratio of the native Taiwanese to the Mainlanders has stabilised at about 86% to 14% (Zhang Maogui 1994: 94).

In the early 1980s, American anthropologist Hill Gates noted the existence of two major ethnic blocs in Taiwan, namely, the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders (1981: 241-281). As her analysis demonstrates, the predominately bi-ethnic organisation was created and maintained by specific structures and interests among which some result from historical accident and others from the ongoing process of political interaction within the state structure. The ethnic differentiation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders at the time when Gates did her research,

17 In China a traditional practice to differentiate individuals is by their place of origin defined in terms of one’s paternal ancestral origin. Such form of identification is called ‘jiguan’, meaning ‘place of origin’. In the PRC it had been a common practice up till the 1990s. The GMD regime conducted the same categorising exercise in Taiwan until the early 1990s. The aborigines aside, the Han Chinese population on Taiwan were categorised according to each individual’s shengji (province of origin) as defined by the person’s father’s ancestral origin. All the native Taiwanese had Taiwan as their province of origin, while the Mainlanders should retain their own province of origin, or that of his/her father as an entry. The province of origin appeared as an obligatory registry on the identity card of anyone older than fifteen. The registration contributed to and reinforced objectively the distinction between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. In the long term, it also led to an identity problem, especially for a second generation when the father was a Mainlander and the mother a native Taiwanese.
though an obvious phenomenon, was not discussed openly. In Taiwan’s academic circles it was a taboo subject of research.

However, following the process of democratisation since the mid-1980s, the differentiation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders became a salient issue in public debates as well as for social mobilisation. The conflict between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders came into the open. Ethnicity as a phenomenon caught more and more attention in academic research. To differentiate people according to their provincial origins is a rather common practice in Chinese society, but the issue in Taiwan is not simply the conflicts between people of different province of origin, in Chinese, the so-called shengji wenti (literally meaning: the problem of provincial origin). It is actually perceived by the elites engaged in the debates regarding the problem of province of origin as essentially conflicts between two ethnic groups. Such debates should be perceived as one facet of the ‘making’ of an ethnic problem that actually forms one stage in the evolving process of “the rediscovery (or for some, discovery) of a new ethnic identity” in Taiwan today (Zhang Maogui 1993: 94)

The process of searching for a new ethnic identity (or identities) in Taiwan continued well into the 1990s. The bi-ethnic differentiation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders as Gates observed in the 1980s came under critical scrutiny and challenges from different fronts. It has been supplanted by a rediscovery of Taiwanese ethnicity that became possible only with the development of a more liberal society. The celebration of ethnic difference is in fashion. On the one hand, the term Benshengren came under fire. Several different movements were initiated and carried out by different groups of people within the thus labelled Waishengren group as they consider such a label denied their distinct ethnic identity. There is first the emergence and transformation of aboriginal rights movements. The aboriginal rights movements emerging in the early 1980s formed part of the opposition movement in their common effort to democratise Taiwan. In the 1990s the demand for rights in this movement changed from individual rights to collective rights. When the collective (group) rights of the aborigines, which include a number of separate and distinct groups, were written into the 1997 constitution, the aborigines had successfully established their status as one distinct ethnic group in Taiwan (Ku 2000). The Hakka community at the same time demanded their distinct ethnic and linguistic identity to
be recognised and respected by promoting the ‘return us our mother tongue’ campaign.

On the other hand, the designative ‘Waishengren’ for the Mainlanders was also criticised, particularly by some second generation Mainlanders, for its implied exclusion of the community from Taiwan as the Chinese word ‘wat’ means ‘outside of’ or ‘external to’. At the academic level, French scholar, Stéphane Corcuff (2002: 165) even suggests a new label, Xinzhumin, meaning ‘new inhabitants’ in replacement of Waishengren so as to bypass the impression that this group of people do not belong to or identify with Taiwan (ibid 189). Out of extensive debates, both academic and public, and social movements, a general consensus was reached on the ethnic categorisation in Taiwan. According to the self-assertion of the various ethnic groups in Taiwan today, academic circles, the media, politicians and social forces have now taken to referring to four main ethnic groups jointly present in Taiwan: indigenous Austronesians or the Aborigines (yuanzhumin, literally meaning the original inhabitants) (1.7%), the Hoklo (73.3%), the Hakka (12%), and the New Inhabitants (13%) (Allio 2000: 44).

One needs to bear in mind that although the ethnographic difference is significant, the four ethnic groups cannot be easily differentiated in terms of territorial settlements, economic well being, social prestige, and political power in today’s Taiwan. The ethnic boundaries between them are fuzzy in the sense that they are partially products of specific different social, political and historical circumstances and partially results of deliberate social construct. From a bi-ethnic division between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders to the present day’s four ethnic groups, from ‘people from outside of this province’ to ‘new residents’, ethnic identity in Taiwan changes its forms and content. As far as our subject matter, Taiwanese nationalism, is concerned, the emergence and evolution of a Taiwanese national identity are closely related to the (re)discovery and reconfiguration of the ethnic boundaries in Taiwan.

18 Out of respect for the people’s self identification, the label of Hoklo instead of minnauren is used here to refer to the earlier migrants from Fujian province before 1945 and their offspring. By the same token, their spoken language is labelled Hokkien instead of minnan dialect.
Chapter Four

Contemporary Scholarship of Taiwanese Nationalism

A Critical Review

Taiwan is an interesting case study regarding the theories of nationalism due to its unique standing within the international system. In the increasingly liberal and pluralistic Taiwanese society, nationalism and national identity emerge as key research topics for the understanding of its political development. Although identity politics has always been an important facet of political life in Taiwan, it did not acquire its salience as a topic of interest in academic research until the commencement of the process of democratisation in the late 1980s. Prior to the lifting of martial law in 1987, research on Taiwanese nationalism and national identity was forbidden on the island. For most Western scholars of social science Taiwan was studied mainly as if it were Chinese society on a smaller scale, because of its accessibility. On its own, Taiwan rarely constituted the subject of their academic investigation. But ever since the lifting of the martial law and the end of the authoritarian rule, academic interest in Taiwanese society per se has been on the increase and the number of publications multiplied.\(^\text{19}\) In the field of political science, democratisation and nationalism make up the two key phenomena under investigation.

Similar to other case studies in nationalism, researchers on Taiwanese nationalism aim to uncover its nature and content analytically, to trace its origin and evolution historically, to look for the explanation of its evolution or transformation, to reflect upon its impact on other social and political aspects of Taiwanese society, and

\(^{19}\) The 1990s witnessed the emergence of Taiwan studies as a new inter-disciplinary research field. Besides its rapid development in Taiwan proper, Taiwan studies have attracted an increasing attention from the international academic community: in 1994, the North American Taiwan Studies Association was founded in 1994 and has organized annually international conferences since then; in 1999, the Japan Taiwan Studies Association organised its first annual conference; in 2004, the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London supported the creation of a European Association of Taiwan Studies with its own annual conference sequence. Overseas Taiwanese students play an active role in promoting Taiwan studies.
to forecast its future development. This study has no intention of covering and cannot cover the full range of topics pertaining to Taiwanese nationalism. As pointed out in the introduction, our research interest and focus are on the evolution of Taiwanese nationalist ideologies over time.

In this chapter I will give a critical overview of the present state of the art in contemporary scholarship on Taiwanese nationalism. As nations and nationalism are European inventions, theories of nationalism were developed predominantly in Western literature. Case studies on nationalism in other continents adopt the Western theoretical terminologies and approaches. This is no exception for the scholarship of Taiwanese nationalism. On the theoretical level, scholars hold the general consensus that Taiwanese nationalism, both as a movement and an ideology, is multi-dimensional and fluid, and that the way the Taiwanese nation is imagined is manifested by both the actions of organised movements and ideas expressed by individuals. But when it comes to defining the nature of Taiwanese nationalism, the general theoretical consensus dissolves into disagreement and debate. The disagreement on the nature of Taiwanese nationalism makes it extremely difficult for the scholars in the field to come up with one common working definition. Moreover, individual scholars adopt different approaches in their efforts to capture the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. In a way, despite the specificity of Taiwanese nationalism, the scholarly debates on the nature of Taiwanese nationalism mirror the theoretical debate on that of nationalism in general.

Lin Jialong (2001: 3-5) has given a comprehensive summary of issues relevant to research on Taiwanese nationalism. As he sums it up, to understand the nature and content of Taiwanese nationalism, one needs to answer the following questions: (1) Is Taiwan a nation? A state? (2) Is Taiwanese identity a kind of national identity, state identity, or nation-state identity? (3) Does the Taiwan Independence Movement aim to establish an ethnic nation-state or a civic nation-state? (4) What is the definition of Taiwanese? Is it a racial, cultural, psychological, territorial, or political definition? (5) What is the relationship between native Taiwanese, the Mainlanders, the residents of the PRC, and Han Chinese? Is it an inclusive relationship or an exclusive one? (6) What is the self-identified image of the Taiwanese? What are their common historical memories and future imagination (image? perception?)? (7) What are the similarities and differences between the elite and the mass in terms of their nation/state imagination?
4.1 Defining Taiwanese Nationalism

It is no easy task to define the term ‘Taiwanese nationalism’ since both components of the term, ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘nationalism’, have multiple meanings and are subject to ambiguity. Firstly, to different users, the meaning of ‘Taiwanese’ varies in time and space. On Taiwan itself, there are four different interpretations of who the Taiwanese are. First, used in a common way, the population of Hokklo origin often regard themselves as the native Taiwanese, and their dialect is labelled *taiyu* (Taiwanese) in Mandarin Chinese.21

Second, some advocates of Taiwan independence claim that the Taiwanese are a nation made up of the *Benshengren*, namely, the Hokklos, the Hakkas and the Aborigines. They regard the GMD as an alien ruler, and the *Waishengren* (the Mainlanders) who migrated to Taiwan after 1945 are excluded from the Taiwanese nation thus defined. Thus national self-determination is meant only for the *Benshengren*.22

A third view identifies the Taiwanese as a nation defined by territoriality, including all residents within Taiwan, and urges greater social integration. This is the so-called ‘wu chabie rentonglun (thesis of non-differential identity)’, first advocated by the overseas TIM activists. According to this view, regardless of the date when one (or one’s ancestors) settled down on Taiwan, and regardless of one’s ethnic origin, as long as a person subjectively identifies himself/herself with the Taiwanese nation, he/she will be a true member of the nation (Huang Shaotang 1994: 214-8).

Fourth, the official view in Taiwan before the 1990s was that the Taiwanese – the local population on Taiwan before 1945 and their offspring – constituted a part of the Chinese nation (the ROC). Since the 1990s, the third definition of Taiwanese – that the Taiwanese are a nation on a territorial and political basis – has become the dominant view among Taiwan’s political elites.23 The issue of national identity that used to divide the two main political parties, the GMD and the DPP, gradually

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21 *Taiyu* is also called *Minnanyu*, literally meaning the dialect of the south of Fujian province.

22 Objective criteria – such as historical (native Taiwanese’s, i.e. *Benshengren’s* centuries of frontier experience and the 50 years of common colonial experience), racial (mixed blood), and linguistic ones (two dialects) – were employed to demonstrate the distinctness of the Taiwan nation.

23 The second and fourth views still remain valid for advocates of either radical independence or immediate unification, respectively.
disappears as both parties move closer to the third definition of Taiwanese. The notion of ‘new Taiwanese’ was coined to encompass individuals from different social backgrounds.

Across the Taiwan Strait, to the Beijing government, Taiwanese refers simply to the residents of the breakaway province, and they are Chinese by nationality as indicated by various objective criteria such as anthropological findings and historical documentation. In official discourses they are referred to as the Taiwanese compatriots. That the people in Taiwan constitute a part of the Chinese nation implicitly denies them the status of a self-defined national community as well as their right to external self-determination. When it is claimed otherwise, such a claim is perceived by the Beijing government as an illegitimate separatist attempt. Any attempts to claim sovereignty or independence from the Taiwanese side are labelled as ‘fenlie zhuyi (separatism)’.

The second difficult part in defining ‘Taiwanese nationalism’ is the ambiguity inherent in the term ‘nationalism’. Already in Western literature on nationalism scholars find no consensus on one single definition of nationalism. This has much to do with the impossibility of finding one common definition of the nation as it lies at the juncture of two vast and vague domains, culture and politics. In many Western languages ‘nation’ is an elusive term with multiple meanings. The discussion of the appropriate Chinese translation of the word ‘nationalism’ by a number of Taiwanese political elites and intellectuals reflects exactly the contention between the cultural and political dimensions of the concepts of nation and nationalism. Chinese nationalists introduced the concept ‘nation’ into China in the late 19th century and they based their choice of Chinese equivalent of nation, minzu, on the Japanese translation of the concept. As at the time of the introduction of Western nationalist ideology into China, social Darwinism was still prevalent, the early usage of the term nation in Chinese, minzu thus had a connotation of pertaining to race. Literally speaking, the first character min is close to Volk in German and the second character zu means ‘clan, tribe, race, community’. Nation equals people from the same lineage.

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24 It is a linguistic truism that one can never find the exact equivalence between two languages. But a surplus problem with the Chinese language is that it is replete with terms that describe like phenomena or objects that are closely related but not identical. This tends to lead to ambiguity when concepts of foreign origins are translated into Chinese. The term ‘minzu’ in Chinese is such an example as it can refer to both ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’.
(or zhongzu (race). One can still find such primordial perceptions of nation in present day Chinese political discussions, particularly when it comes to the issue of reunification between mainland China and Taiwan.

Some intellectuals and political elites in Taiwan reject minzu as the appropriate Chinese equivalence for ‘nation’. They base their rejection precisely on the criticism of the strong cultural or genealogical connotations conveyed by this Chinese term. A new term, ‘guozu’, literally meaning ‘the state community’, is proposed to replace ‘minzu’ so as to capture more precisely the political essence and the subjectivity of the entity called ‘nation’. In his autobiography, Taiwan’s former president, Li Denghui, translates ‘nationalism’ as ‘guojia zhuyi’, literally meaning ‘state-ism’ (Li Denghui 1999: 76). The long time advocate and elite of the overseas TIM, Huang Shaotang simply adopts the Japanese common practice of treating words of foreign origin by transcribing them phonetically and coins two new Chinese words, naxiang for ‘nation’ and naxiangnalisiwen for ‘nationalism’ (Huang Shaotang 1998).

That the emphasis of the political aspect of nation and its link with state has obviously gained popularity in Taiwan’s academic circles is evidenced by the replacement of min (volk) in minzu (volk’s community) by guo (state) in guozu (state community). ‘National identity’ is frequently translated as either guozu rentong (state community identity) or guojia rentong (state identity).25

However, in some scholars’ definition of Taiwanese nationalism the individual’s choice of statehood and sovereignty are not taken as indicators of his/her national identity. Analysing the conflicting identity-related discourses in Taiwan, the Taiwanese scholar Chiang Yi-huah identifies five different identity positions in today’s Taiwanese society, these being Taiwanese nationalist, Taiwanese independentist, pragmatic unionist, Chinese nationalist, and realist. (Chiang Yi-huah 2001: 181-216). Chiang takes the five positions as five points on one spectrum, locating at one end the Taiwanese nationalist whose main point of departure is that Taiwan is not a part of China. At the other far end Chiang locates the Chinese nationalist who advocates immediate unification. For the Taiwanese nationalist,

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Taiwan is a distinct nation that deserves its own statehood. For the Taiwanese independentist, the key goal is the acknowledgement of Taiwan as a sovereign state comprising the four major ethnic groups. What Taiwan needs is, in this view, state building instead of nation building. A pragmatic unionist still regards the unification of mainland China and Taiwan to be a sacred mission. However, out of pragmatic considerations rather than for a (Chinese) nationalist cause, this group of people are in favour of a gradual cross-Strait integration rather than hasty unification. For a pragmatic unionist, before the unification eventually takes place, it is necessary for the residents on Taiwan to cultivate a sense of belonging to Taiwan. Chiang’s analysis reveals that between the Taiwanese independentist and the pragmatic unionist there is actually an overlapping consensus.

Apart from these four positions, Chiang considers that the majority of people in Taiwan fall into the category that he labels as ‘realist’ when it comes to the issue of national identity. This group is also called the ‘status-quoist’ in the media or by other researchers due to their lack of a strong preference as far as their national identity is concerned. It is labelled ‘status-quoist’ precisely because people in this group hope to maintain the cross-Strait relation as it is now, no matter whether one calls it a ‘stalemate’ or a ‘dilemma’. As revealed by Chiang’s study, the realist position dominates the central part of the identity spectrum.

From Chiang, we can derive a narrow definition of ‘Taiwanese nationalism’: it is the ideology and movement that aims at setting Taiwan apart from China, denouncing both the GMD’s rule of Taiwan and the PRC’s sovereign claim to Taiwan and achieving Taiwan independence as a distinct nation-state immediately. In this nationalist view, the Taiwanese nation is made up of native Taiwanese, excluding the Mainlanders. It is a distinct nation that is culturally different from China and hence deserves its own statehood. Put differently, Taiwanese nationalism as Chiang defines it, delimits the national boundaries on strict cultural and ethnic markers which are believed to set the native Taiwanese apart from other nations, especially the Chinese. This version of Taiwanese nationalism stands in sharp contrast with the Chinese ethno-nationalism which defines the Chinese nation in terms of blood, race and culture.

Combining such a definition with the results from other empirical studies on identity composition in Taiwan, which show the small number of supporters of either Taiwanese or Chinese ethno-nationalism, Chiang arrives easily at the conclusion that
the importance of Taiwanese nationalism as both an ideology and a movement has been greatly exaggerated. For him, the issue under heated discussion in Taiwan is an issue of statehood rather than nationality. Taiwan is not a nation but a political community where the divided political and national identities of Taiwanese people seem to be moving to ‘a head-on collision’ (Chiang 1996: 20).

A further point Chiang uses to support his argument that nationalism matters little to Taiwan’s identity politics is his theoretical separation of the concept ‘state’ and ‘nation’. Based on his reading of some contemporary Western theories of nationalism and his analysis of the situation regarding Taiwan, Chiang argues that nation does not equal state, nor is national identity tantamount to the political loyalty one has towards his/her state. The identity problem in Taiwan concerns more the difficulty for the Taiwanese to define Taiwan politically as a state and to draw the boundaries for their political identification than to make a choice between different national identities. The crucial issue, he argues, lies in Taiwanese’s ambiguous self-understanding of the political community to which they belong. Taiwan’s problem, as he sees it, arises from ‘people’s different perceptions of statehood instead of a clash of opposite views of nationality’ (Chiang 1996: 10). What confronts the Taiwanese is a problem of ‘state identity’, not one of ‘national identity’, a problem of defining the political status of Taiwan and its statehood rather than that of the making of a nation-state.

The American scholar Shelley Rigger agrees with Chiang’s narrow definition of Taiwanese nationalism and echoes Chiang’s argument of the insignificance of nationalism to Taiwan’s identity politics (Rigger 1999). The option for radical and immediate Taiwan independence remains, for Rigger, the criterion for identifying Taiwanese nationalists. Rigger maintains that Taiwanese nationalism has transformed its basis from ethnicity and culture at its early stage to a more territorial-political one later on. She is of the opinion that, given the little support of the public for immediate independence (less than 10 per cent) as shown by surveys, Taiwanese nationalism (meaning immediate independence for Taiwan) remains ‘a road not taken’ (Rigger 1999: 17). As Rigger sees it, contemporary discourse on democracy and national identity in Taiwan reveals “a growing consensus favouring a post-nationalist vision of the state, a vision consistent with Habermas’ notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’” (Rigger 1999: 2). In her view, the concept of nation-state has no relevance as an organising principle for the ROC on Taiwan. Taiwan has entered into the era of post-
nationalism and by post-nationalism is meant such an idea and the movement of state-building that “avoids identification with a nation, but emphasizes instead its political virtues” (Rigger 1999: 3) For Rigger, the core of the ‘political virtues’ on Taiwan today is the idea and institution of citizenship.

Indeed, in the theoretical literature on nationalism, a differentiation has been made between patriotism and national identity. The former is the identification with the state machine, political system, or a common set of values and symbols. But as the American theorist Liah Greenfeld points out, in the mid 17th century France, when the meaning of the state as an attribute and embodiment of the royal authority and its virtual identity with the person of the king lost its legitimacy, together with the emergence of the idea of the people as the bearer of sovereignty and a fundamentally positive entity, the French state was consistently redefined as the native population of France, or the French nation (Greenfeld 1992: 154-155). Later, with the emergence and spread of the principle of national self-determination, the nation, alias state, has become the new and sacred focus of loyalty. Often, when a people demands to be recognised as a nation, they are demanding at the same time the right to their own state (Greenfeld 1992: 154). In other words, a state cannot exist legitimately without the identification with a nation, and a nation is always in the pursuit of its own state, or at least some degree of political autonomy. State and nation are two inseparable components of the dominant political system in today’s world.

Elsewhere, Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber also equate the state’s identity with that of the nation (Biersteker & Weber 1996: 1-21). The construction of state sovereignty and the territorial boundaries intertwines with the construction of national boundaries. The political importance of nationalism to state building is evident as in the contemporary state system, “(s)overeign recognition is granted to states that are organised (or hold the promise of becoming organised) in accordance with the principles of nationalism” (Biersteker & Weber 1996: 14). As both state and nation centre on the nationalist ideas, it is difficult to sustain either Chiang’s clear-cut differentiation between ‘state identity’ and ‘national identity’ or Rigger’s sharp distinction between citizenship and nationality.

So, to correct Chiang, I argue that Taiwanese nationalism lies in the clashes between different national identities and one important manifestation of the clashes of national identities is precisely people’s conflicting perceptions of statehood. Within any nationalist movements, there are always radical nationalists who pursue outright
independence through violent means and the moderates who put self-determination of the people short of independence at higher priority. To categorise Taiwanese nationalists, simply as those in favour of immediate independence, as Chiang does in his analysis, is to reduce the scope of analysis to the radical supporters of immediate Taiwan independence. There will be very few cases of nationalism in today’s world if we are to equate nationalism with the striving for radical independence.

Indeed, the majority of people on Taiwan, when asked to choose between Taiwan independence and unification with Mainland China, prefer to maintain the status quo in the cross-Strait relations. Their realistic choice does not necessarily mean that none of the status-quoists might identify themselves with the Taiwanese or the Chinese nation. With the likelihood of the Beijing government using force if Taiwan declares its independence, individuals tend to put aside their national identity and make the choice of maintaining the status quo out of logical cost-and-benefit calculations. When taken alone, survey studies on the individual’s choice between the three variables, namely, Taiwan independence, maintenance of status-quo, and unification with mainland China, provide an imprecise indicator of the individual’s national identity although they can indicate the intensity of one’s national identity. As I see it, the supporters of immediate independence should be considered as the radical camp within the Taiwanese nationalist group.

In fact, while being sensitive to the difference between an individual’s political choices and his/her national identity, most scholars working on Taiwanese nationalism do not set the issue of sovereignty and state building apart from that of nationalism as Chiang and Rigger do. For instance, in the mid 1990s, the Japanese scholar Masahiro Wakabayashi identified two nationalisms in Taiwan, Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism (Wakabayashi 1995: 170-192). As he defines it, Taiwanese nationalism is the ideology that holds that “with the proceeding democratisation, people of Taiwan constitute a sovereign community to which a state should be given” (Wakabayashi 1995: 170).

Similar to Wakabayashi’s view, Lin Jialong (Lin Chia-lung) makes the observation that in Taiwan itself there is a tug-of-war between two competing nation-building movements, Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism. Furthermore, there is the external factor that complicates the surfacing identity conflict on Taiwan, namely, the PRC’s nationalist aim to reunify Taiwan with mainland China (Lin 1999). In Lin’s words, “Taiwan’s identity politics is characterised by a triadic relation,
namely, the effort of the society’s ethnic majority (Ben Sheng Jen) to establish a new and independent nation-state is contested by a national minority (Wai Sheng Jen), whose desire to unify with its national homeland (mainland China) is echoed by the motherland’s readiness to end the society’s dispute with force” (Lin 1999: 1). Although nowhere does Lin define explicitly what he means by ‘Taiwanese nationalism’ and ‘Chinese nationalism’, we can discern from the quotation above that for him Taiwanese nationalism encompasses the project of establishing a new and independent nation-state in Taiwan.

Elsewhere in a joint paper with Chu Yun-han (Zhu Yunhan), Lin elaborates in fuller detail the congruence between nationhood and statehood in nationalism (Lin & Chu 1998). These two authors point out that despite the vagueness of the concept of nationalism, as a political principle, nationalism involves both the issue of nationhood and statehood. For them nationalism implies both the demand of ‘a nation to have its political state’ and of ‘a state to be comprised of a homogeneous national or ethnic group’ (ibid 4). The identification of the existence of nationalism in Taiwan should be based simultaneously on people’s choice of nationhood and statehood. Consequently, for Lin and Chu, in Taiwan we can first see that the nationalist and the non-nationalist. Taiwanese nationalists include both people manifesting a strong national identity and those supporting Taiwan independence or its status as a sovereign state without an expressed identification with the Taiwanese nation. By the same token, the part of the Taiwanese population who have some degree of Taiwanese identity and yet support unification with Mainland China should be identified as Chinese nationalists. The nuanced categorisation is illustrated in the table below (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stateness preference/ National Identity</th>
<th>Taiwan Independence</th>
<th>Status Quo</th>
<th>Chinese Unification</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese&amp;Chinese</td>
<td>Taiwanese Nationalist</td>
<td>Realist</td>
<td>Unificationist</td>
<td>Passivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Independentist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Nationalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Typology for Distinguishing Nationalists and Non-Nationalists
(Lin 2002: 221)
The viewpoint of Lin and Chu further confirms my argument that given the specific political context in which Taiwan finds itself, the issue of sovereignty, the debate on independence and unification, and the discussion of Taiwan or ROC’s statehood should be considered inherent components of Taiwanese nationalism. Studies of Taiwanese nationalism should cover various political forces ranging from the radical pro-independentists who seek outright Taiwan independence to mainstream moderates who assert sovereignty of the ROC on Taiwan. At this point, however, I consider it unnecessary to give Taiwanese nationalism any fixed and explicit definition because, both as an ideology and a movement, Taiwanese nationalism is multi-dimensional and fluid, and because over that time its content changes constantly. The strength of nationalism lies precisely in its elusiveness. Given its multi-dimensionality and fluidity, it is difficult to pin down an all encompassing working definition. Taiwanese nationalism as a political phenomenon is the on-going process of defining Taiwan’s political and national boundaries. The investigation of its nature therefore necessitates a historical representation and re-interpretation of the various definitions of the political and cultural community in Taiwan, both synchronically and diachronically.

4.2 Capturing the Nature of Taiwanese Nationalism: Civic or Ethnic?

Recent years have seen the blooming of both elite-oriented and survey-based research conducted in Taiwan. The survey data is interpreted by many scholars as evidence testifying to a general consensus in Taiwan by the year 2000, among both mass and elite, on Taiwan’s statehood. Such a consensus defines Taiwan as a state (Lin Jialong 2002; Lin Congji 2002; Marsh 2002). However, when it comes to defining the Taiwanese nation, the intellectuals are as confused as the public. Generally speaking, Taiwanese intellectuals agree that the Taiwanese nation is still in its formative stage. However, regarding its nature and its final form in the future, scholars disagree, largely due to their different theoretical understandings of nationalism. In turn, scholars disagree on their interpretations of the nature of Taiwanese nationalism. Notably, in the emerging body of literature on Taiwanese nationalism a considerable number of scholars apply the concepts of civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism or the theoretical distinction between the two in their attempts to capture the nature of Taiwanese nationalism.
In two articles analysing Taiwan-related identity discourses, Rigger presents a competition between two dichotomous accounts regarding Taiwan’s identity (Rigger 1997; 1999). On the one hand, she argues that the pro-unification discourses in both mainland China and Taiwan are based primarily on a primordial and ethnic understanding of the nation, as illustrated by the textual analysis of both Sun Zhongshan’s nationalist ideology and the work of the mainland scholar, Jia Yibin. On the other hand, although she identifies similar use of ethnic and cultural arguments by the Taiwanese nationalists, such arguments remain a minor claim. For Rigger, Taiwan’s mainstream nationalist intellectuals “have come a very long way from their original belief that Taiwan is a distinct nation in the ethno-cultural sense. (…) Thus, instead of searching for a new, non-nationalist basis for the state, these authors look for a new, non-ethnic basis for the nation” (Rigger 1999: 19). As a result, she concludes that a post-nationalist and civic identity is under construction in today’s Taiwan.

Adopting Benedict Anderson’s modernist definition of nation as an imagined community, Shi Zhengfeng considers subjective self-identification to be the binding force for nation formation. Shi’s analysis of Taiwanese nationalism is based clearly on a positive use of the concept of civic nationalism. This can be seen from his definition of the Taiwanese nation, that it is made up of anyone who is willing to identify himself/herself with Taiwan as their motherland and to devote themselves to her (Shi 2000: 16). What binds the nation together is its members’ political commitment to create a common future within one political state (ibid 32-33). National identity envisaged and striven for by Taiwanese nationalism will base itself on the principle of territoriality and the institution of citizenship. For Shi (1998: 198), the construction of a civic national identity has its moral imperatives as he firmly believes that such a common identity will transcend ethnicity and is forward looking.

Studying the relationship between nationalism and democracy, Carl Shaw and Lin Chia-lung make a similar observation, namely, that since the late 1980s, the newly emerged Taiwanese nationalism has undergone rapid transformation and that by the 1990s it was characterised by an increasing emphasis on the territorial, political and subjective criteria for delimiting the national boundary. Such a transformation is directly related to the impact of the process of democratisation (Shaw 2002; Lin 2002). Lin observes that on the elite level there has been a significant convergence in terms of their national discourses. For him, the core of this newly converged
Taiwanese nationalism is civic and its civicness will be conducive to the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan (Lin 2002).

For Shaw, Li Denghui, the first directly elected ROC President, played a significant role in crafting a civic Taiwanese nation. Through a number of interrelated ‘political concepts’, Li Denghui aimed at “re-establishing the communal solidarity in Taiwan, forging a national identity through democratic participation, reconstructing a historical self-understanding, and juristically redefining Taiwan’s status” (Shaw 2002: 135). By contrasting Taiwan’s civic nationalism with China’s cultural nationalism, Shaw attaches normative superiority to the former and considers that, in the long run, China should also transform its ‘ecumenical cultural identity’ and ‘dynastic consciousness’ to civic consciousness (Shaw 2002: 137-144).

By the same token, despite his rejection of the applicability of nationalism to the case of Taiwan, Chiang Yi-huah’s notion of ‘state identity’ comes close to the voluntaristic or civic nationalism as defined by Shi Zhengfeng and Lin Jia-lung. In fact, the usage of the notion of ‘state identity’ for Chiang is intended more for the rejection of the ethnonationalist version of a Taiwanese nation than anything else. This is evidenced by his words:

“(…) Taiwan is not a nation – if by nation we mean a people with common descent, language, tradition or historical narratives. Yet Taiwan could also be counted as a ‘nation’ if by ‘nation’ we mean a political community with legitimate authority to arbitrate conflict among citizens and to defend its people from external invasion. The national identity of Taiwan is best understood as the sense of belonging to a political community which exists in the island called Taiwan (…)”

(Chiang 1996: 25-6)

Thus, for Chiang, the construction of such a state (read national) identity will strengthen Taiwan’s internal cohesiveness by promoting democratic constitutionalism and equal citizenship. Externally, it will help Taiwan’s pursuit of self-definition vis-à-vis the PRC and within the international community.

Quite a number of Taiwanese scholars equally argue that Taiwanese nationalism today is characterised by its inclusiveness, civicness, and its emphasis on political values and territoriality. Looking at the historical evolution of Taiwanese
nationalism, these authors emphasise the fluidity of the nationalist discourse and identity politics in Taiwan. Unlike the analyses of Shi Zhengfeng, Lin Chia-lung and Chiang Yi-huah, which are based on the single concept of civic nationalism, these authors employ the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism and identify over time a shift from ethnic basis to civic basis in the Taiwanese nationalist discourse.

In his chronological analysis of the nationalist discourses in the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement after WWII, Huang Shaotang points out that, at the earlier stage of the movement, primordial traits such as blood ties and genealogy were put forward to define the Taiwanese nation. Unlike Lin Jialong who places the emergence of civic Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s, Huang claims that towards the late 1970s within the overseas TIM a new definition of the Taiwanese nation, based on residency and individual subjective identification, had come to dominate over the previous ethnic definition of the Taiwanese nation, and he labels such an identification the ‘non-differential identity’ (Huang Shaotang 1994).

Also enquiring into the transformation of the social characteristics of the Taiwanese nation, Li Guangjun (2001) divides the evolution of Taiwanese national identity into three stages. He echoes Huang Shaotang’s view of the shift in Taiwanese nationalist discourse from an earlier primordial stand to the ‘non-differential identity’. However, he questions the success of the ‘non-differential identity’ in binding all residents in Taiwan into one nation, claiming that the arguments given in the first two stages still tend to base themselves on historical grievances of the native Taiwanese. He considers that the emergence of yet another new type of nationalist discourse in the 1990s, the third stage of Taiwanese national identity, is more promising for a successful nation-building. As he sees it, the present discourse envisages the Taiwanese nation as a new rising nation that embraces modernity and an open culture. Such a culture is determined by the fact that Taiwan is an island country and thus has extensive exchanges with the world. Li Guangjun borrows the term ‘oceanic culture’ from the existing literature to characterise its distinctiveness. The economic and political successes evidenced by the so-called ‘Taiwan miracle’ clearly demonstrate the modernity of Taiwanese society and the progressivity of its oceanic culture. From his choice of adjectives in describing the evolutionary characteristics of the Taiwanese nation, such as ‘from exclusive to inclusive, negative to positive, backward looking to forward looking’, Li Guangjun implicitly goes beyond the historical
analysis and upholds a positive and progressive evolution in Taiwan’s nation-building on a normative level.

While the above-mentioned scholars attach importance to territorality, political values and subjective will, and take them as the defining features of a civic Taiwanese nationalism, some scholars nevertheless caution that Taiwanese society today exhibits a problem of ethnicity which would most likely be a major dynamic but disruptive factor in the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan and the construction of a civic Taiwanese nation. For instance, Huang Chung-hsian (1997) argues that Taiwanese nationalism at this stage cannot be put under the category of civic nationalism. As he sees it, ethnicity remains the hard core or the deep structure of the newly emergent Taiwanese nationalism. The Taiwanese ethnic consciousness (here ‘Taiwanese’ meaning native Taiwanese), unleashed by the process of democratisation in the 1980s, is the driving force behind the surge of Taiwanese nationalism. The entanglement of the so-called ‘provincial conflict’ and national identity entails the negative potential of evolving into Holko chauvinism by defining the nation solely according to ethnic criteria.

Huang Chung-hsian is not against civic nationalism. For him, civic nationalism, given its moral superiority, should be the future configuration for Taiwanese nationalism. He envisages a possible shift from an ethnic configuration of nationalism to a civic one by reinventing the concept of social citizenship. The development of the welfare state will, in his view, provide the institutional incubator for the gradual nurturing and strengthening of a civic Taiwanese national consciousness. What Huang Chung-hsian recommends for Taiwan is the process of state-nation building, instead of one of nation-state building. He is confident that the Taiwanese nation emerging after the implementation of the citizenship-centred state-building process will be “a brave new political community” (1997: 30).

The scholars whose work I have reviewed so far are mainly political scientists and sociologists by training. Civic nationalism is the central concept in their analysis of Taiwanese nationalism. As the above analysis demonstrates, apart from the disagreement upon ‘since when Taiwanese nationalism civic’ most of these scholars present civicness as the nature of today’s Taiwanese nationalism. Behind their empirical analysis is their normative appraisal of the civic nationalism as they entertain such optimism that the promotion of civic Taiwanese nationalism would inevitably create a harmonious and unified Taiwanese society.
And yet discordant voices exist. For instance, the account of a civic Taiwanese nationalism encounters severe criticism from Hsiau A-chin (2001: 9) who points out that many investigations of the historical development of Taiwanese nationalism are dominated by and reflect their authors’ political convictions and ideologies. Hsiau A-chin has a point in his criticism. Although contemporary theories of nationalism generally treat nationalist movements as top-down movements engineered by the nationalist elites, students of nationalism are constantly warned against the danger of treating the elites’ advocacy and self-perception as the general tendency in the society which they are addressing. And we can see from the above literature overview, some authors, for instance, Carl Shaw and Li Guangjun, tend to equate the elite conceptualisation of the nation with the actual outcome of the process of nation-building in the 1990s. Moreover, by ascribing Taiwanese civic nationalism a moral superiority in comparison to Chinese ethno-cultural nationalism, these analyses are no longer value-free empirical studies.

Besides his questioning of the objectivity of the civic account of Taiwanese nationalism by the majority of Taiwanese scholars, Hsiau A-chin also brings culture back as a key element into the discussion of Taiwanese nationalism. Acknowledging the important role of the political dynamics in the emergence and evolution of Taiwanese nationalism, Hsiau disagrees with the view that Taiwanese nationalism can be defined categorically as either a political or civic type of nationalism. Examining primarily the cultural version of Taiwanese nationalism that has been articulated mainly by humanist intellectuals who constitute the hardcore Taiwanese nationalists in the fields of literature, language, and history, Hsiau argues that the study of Taiwanese cultural nationalism is an indispensable enterprise for understanding nation-building in Taiwan (2001: 1-28). In his nuanced analysis and reconstruction, Hsiau A-chin shows how the concept of “Taiwanese nation” has been crafted discursively by pro-independence humanist intellectuals. The nationalistic ideology expressed within the so-called ‘fundamentalist’ intellectual discourses of Taiwan independence and nation-building reveals a “concern, if not an obsession, with the uniqueness of ‘Taiwanese culture’ against ‘Chinese culture’” (Hsiau 2001: 2). The essence of Taiwanese nationalism viewed from this perspective is a “politics of cultural uniqueness.” It endeavours to construct a new national identity which ‘involves considerable symbolism and rhetoric concerning Taiwanese cultural distinctiveness and includes various political manoeuvres to institutionalise these ideas’ (ibid).
Regarding the relationship between nationalism, the state-building process and the sovereignty issue, Hsiau has a different viewpoint from that of the authors who define Taiwanese nationalism in strictly political terms. For him, although state-building forms an integral part of the nationalist project, it is more a means to achieve a nationalist goal than an end in itself. For the nationalists, the backbone of their nation-building project is the assertion and creation of a unique Taiwanese culture while they pursue the establishment of a new state capable of representing and reproducing institutionally such cultural uniqueness. In his work he analyses in great detail a cultural version of Taiwanese nationalism which he believes to have evolved in parallel with the political version of Taiwanese nationalism.

4.3 Summary

To sum up, we can see that in defining the nature of Taiwanese nationalism, contemporary scholars in the field base themselves extensively on the existing Western theories of nationalism. Civic nationalism to a large extent and ethnic nationalism (or cultural nationalism) to a lesser extent are used as the key conceptual tools. A number of scholars argue that Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s is characterised by its civicness. Only a few scholars such as Hsiau A-Chin take civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation as complementary and intertwining patterns of thought in the process of nation-building. Most scholars tend to base their analysis on an exclusively civic conception of the nation. For them, ethnic nationalism finds no expression in contemporary Taiwanese nationalist discourse. Such reductive application of the ideal type concepts indeed risks passing from 'characterisation to caricature'.

Another observation emerging from the above literature overview is that in their analyses of Taiwanese nationalism most scholars do not make a distinction between an empirical analysis and a normative assessment and they tend to use the concepts of civic nation and civic nationalism both for descriptive purposes as well as for making moral judgements. The Taiwanese nation imagined by some political elites is not only taken as a true representation of the national configuration in Taiwan but is also put forward as a utopian blueprint for the nation-building project. In the overview presented above one can clearly identify a predominance of and preference for the civic conceptualisation of the Taiwanese nation in the literature. Civic
Taiwanese nationalism is considered to be capable of transcending ethnicity and conducive to the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan. The obvious approval of this civic nation in Taiwan is often set in contrast to an implicitly derogatory account of the Chinese ethno-cultural nationalism, and is consequently a powerful justification for Taiwan independence. The conflation of empirical studies and normative assessment, though not necessarily intended by the authors, cuts into the scientific value of some of the studies.
Chapter Five

Taiwanese Nationalism under Japanese Colonial Rule

(1895 – 1945)

Since the Meiji Reform (1868), Japan’s policy orientation had been economic enrichment and military empowerment of the country, laying ground for its ambition of territorial expansion. In 1894 using an internal political conflict in Korea as pretext, Japan sent troops to intervene and came into confrontation with Korea’s protector state, the Qing Empire. This ushered in the first Sino-Japan War (1894 – 1895), also known in Chinese history as the Jiawu War. Qing Court’s defeat in the war proved most crucial in Taiwan’s historical development. In 1895, out of pragmatic diplomatic considerations, the defeated Qing Empire opted for trading land for peace and ceded Taiwan Island and the Penghu Islands to the Japanese Empire according to the Shimonoseki Treaty (C. Y. Hsu 1978-1980: 70-141). The formal transfer took place on June 2nd aboard on a Japanese ship anchored in Keelung harbour. Taiwan remained a part of the Japanese Empire until the end of WWII in 1945, when it was restored to China.

In retrospect, it is generally assumed that contemporary Taiwanese nationalism emerged in the 1920s under the Japanese colonial rule. Abandoned by the Qing Court and facing the reality of Japanese colonial rule, Taiwanese elites developed nationalist ideology in their anti-colonial struggles. This chapter will focus on the historical emergence and development of Taiwanese nationalism within the colonial context from an elitist perspective. The main thrust of this chapter is to reveal how Taiwanese nationalist discourses developed on both the political and the cultural dimension.

This chapter consists of four parts. The first part will describe briefly the policy and structure of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan between 1895 and 1945, which provides the broad socio-political context for the emergence and evolution of contemporary Taiwanese nationalism. Given up by the Qing Court, the native Taiwanese were caught between the difficulty of maintaining their Han Chinese identity and the impossibility of becoming true Japanese. It is precisely against the
colonial settings that the native Taiwanese elites fostered for the first time a Taiwanese identity.

The second part will present chronologically the various forms of anti-colonial resistance put up by the native Taiwanese elites. Prior to 1915, the opposition to Japanese rule took primarily the form of armed resistance. Traditional type of elites such as Qing Empire officialdom and local nobles played the leading role. The objective of their opposition was restricted to the deterrence of alien rule while the Qing Court remained the object of political loyalty. But the consolidation of the colonial rule through military means suppressed the armed resistance. After World War One (WWI), inspired by modern Western notions such as ‘national self-determination’ a new generation of Taiwanese elites replaced the traditional elites to engage in a series of political and cultural movements on behalf of the Taiwanese people.

In the third and the fourth parts of this chapter I will analyse the political and the cultural dimensions of the emerging nationalist discourses put forward by the Taiwanese elites in their anti-colonial struggles. The analysis of the Taiwanese elites’ nationalist discourse will be based on the examination of a number of texts published by the leading political and cultural figures in the anti-colonial movements, including declarations, petitions, journal and newspaper articles, and defence speeches in court.

5.1 Policy and Structure of the Japanese Colonial Rule on Taiwan

Generally speaking, all forms of modern colonialism have shared one fundamental feature, that is, the rule by force of a people by an external power. Despite the similarity in their nature, historical cases of colonialism showed differences in their methods and strategies. Typically, two ways of implementing colonial rule can be distinguished, namely, association and assimilation (Ching 2001: 15-50). The British was an exemplar of the colonial policy of association where the coloniser recognised the particularity of the colony and encouraged the colony to develop its autonomy through self-government. In contrast to the British type of colonial dependency, French colonial rule insisted on the absolute authority of the central governments over the colonial administrations. Through assimilation the native cultural and social practices in the colony were expected to transform in the image of the metropolis.
Although being the only non-white colonising power, Japanese colonial rule was not fundamentally different from that of the Western colonisers. More specifically, it shared many similarities with the French assimilative model.26

Japan’s guiding ideology on its first overseas colony, Taiwan, was that of dōka (assimilation). The central purpose of dōka ideology was the ‘Nipponisation’ of the colonial subjects and their eventual transformation into diligent, loyal and law-abiding komin (imperial peoples). The ideology of assimilation laid the basis for the so-called ‘policy of discriminatory assimilation’ where “political rights and economic privileges are constantly withheld from the colonised, assimilation asserts itself exclusively as a function of cultural ideology” (Ching 2001: 105-6). The policy of discriminatory assimilation can be illustrated by a closer analysis of the political, economical and cultural policy of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan.

The tone of the initial Japanese rule over Taiwan was set by the circumstances under which the original takeover of the island from the Chinese took place. Upon their arrival, the Japanese encountered stiff armed opposition from the native Taiwanese. It took several years of military and police action before the Japanese government could consider the island subdued.27 Therefore, the Japanese had very good reason to believe from the beginning of their occupation of Taiwan that the paramount problem was the enforcement of obedience to the new authority. It was no coincidence that until the end of WWI the system of military rule over Taiwan

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26 Initially when Japan acquired its first colony, Taiwan, it was hardly prepared for the colonial venture. A Taiwan Affairs Bureau was organised to handle the relation between Taiwan and the Japanese home country. To come up with a consistent policy to administrate Taiwan, members of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau debated over the merits of the French assimilationist approach and the British model of associative rule. For Harry Lamley (1999: 204), while the colonial administrative system resembled in form the British system of separate governance, Japanese colonial rule was in fact closer in its nature to the French assimilationist model. With the Governor-General enjoying extraordinary legislative power provided by Law 63, assimilation remained the ultimate goal and the declared policy by the Governor-General. Taiwanese scholar, Wu Ruiren (2000: 2-6) on the other hand considers that between 1895 and 1918, Japanese colonial practices in Taiwan followed the British model, and changed to French type of assimilationist colonialism after 1918.

27 The last armed rising was the so-called Xilaian Incident in 1915. The uprising was led by a secret society formed by the former supporters of Zheng Chenggong. About 6000 people were killed during the Japanese repression. Xilaian Incident marked the end of the armed anti-Japanese opposition.
prevailed. Until then, all the senior administrative officials were high-ranking officers on the active list.

Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan was characterised by a highly centralised hierarchy. At the apex of the colonial government in Taiwan was the Governor-General who was appointed by the Emperor himself. This official possessed an awesome authority. Often the function of Governor-General was combined with his powers as commander of the military forces on Taiwan, which made him in effect one of the most powerful functionaries in the Japanese Empire (Kublin 1973: 318-319).

When Taiwan was annexed to Japan, it became a part of Japanese territory. It should thus be ruled according to the Japanese Constitution. However, in 1896, the first Government-General on Taiwan proposed to the Japan Diet that Taiwan be ruled under a different set of laws. The reasons given for the special rule included Taiwan’s status of newcomer in the Japanese Empire, the constant armed uprisings, the geographical distance between Taiwan and Japan, and the difference in terms of custom and culture. Whether the Constitution should be applied to Taiwan was heatedly debated in the parliament. After two debate sessions, on June 30th 1896, the Diet finally adopted a special law, the so-called Law No. 6.3 which provided a legal basis for the colonial governance. But a three-year validity limit was put to the application of the special law (Wu et al. 1990: 53).

Law 6.3 stipulated the implementation of the so-called ‘system of legislation by mandate’ on Taiwan, which provided a solid legal basis for the Japanese authoritarian rule on Taiwan. The Governor-General was placed at the top of the hierarchy. Law 6.3 effectively gave the Governor-General the legislative power on Taiwan. He could, within his jurisdiction, issue executive ordinances which bore the same force as law. And when the necessity of the application of all or part of Japanese laws to Taiwan arose, they were to be executed in the form of imperial decree. Besides legislative and executive powers, the Governor-General also had absolute juridical powers, and the power to supervise the implementation of law. When Law 6.3 reached its limit of validity, it was prolonged three times (1899, 1902, and 1905). In 1906 the Diet Passed another law, Law 3.1, which stipulated that except for the direct order from the Emperor no resolution from the Diet could abolish Law 6.3 (Wu et al. 1990: 53-60).
Japanese colonial rule regulated all aspects of colonial life. The Governor’s Office relied heavily on the police system to maintain absolute control over the native Taiwanese. When confronted with the Taiwanese armed resistance the Japanese conducted military rule on Taiwan during the earlier years. In 1897 the modern police system was implemented to replace military rule. This was one of many initiatives of the then chief of the Civil Administration Bureau (1898-1906), Dr. Gotô Shinpei, to modernise Taiwan (Lamley 1999: 209-210; Ka 1995: 51-57). Police organisation was established on all administrative levels. The power of the police covered a wide scope of activities, including security, residence control, tax collection, surveillance of speech, confiscation of land, the forced purchase of insurance policy by Japanese companies.

Gotô initiated many reforms according to the so-called ‘principle of biology’, meaning a gradual introduction of the Japanese political system and culture to Taiwan. The colonial government first carried out an extensive investigation of traditional Taiwanese customs. Based on the results of these investigations some old Taiwanese laws and regulation were revised and new ones enacted to pave the way for a smooth Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. The police system was reinforced by the household registration system to tighten social control. The household registration was devised on the base of traditional Chinese baojia system, a security system based on mutual household surveillance. It comprised two levels of household units, these being the bigger unit, bao and the smaller, jia. Every person was required to register with the police as a member of one, and only one, family (jia), while ten families formed one bigger unit, bao. The heads of household were selected within each family, usually from among the senior male members. Each constituent household in one bao was held mutually responsible for the actions and obligations of their respective members and for the implementation of services assigned by the police (Heylen 2001: 80-81; M. Brown 2001: 156). The baojia system complemented the police force in bringing Taiwan under strict social control without increasing the number of policemen. The tight Japanese rule regimented the Taiwanese populace into law-abiding citizens.

Contrary to other Western colonising powers, Japan’s colonial enterprise did not develop as a logical outgrowth of domestic capitalist development but in parallel with its capitalist development. Tadao Yanaiharo (1985: 10-11) rightly argued that
Japan, despite its lack of such characteristics as export of financial capital, formation of monopolies, or patterns of overproduction, was ideologically already a credible imperialist nation. It is in this sense that some scholars characterised Japan as “imperialism without capital” (Ching 2001: 16). Initially, the operation of colonialism proved financially difficult for the new imperialist power in Asia: the heavy subsidies imposed a weighty burden on the finances of the Japanese government. Japanese public opinion at a certain moment was even in favour of selling Taiwan to any available buyer, including China.

The situation was rescued by the implementation of a special accounting system on Taiwan (1897-1945) which separated completely the financial affairs of the colonial government from that of Japan proper. The main purpose of this special system was to prevent Taiwan from being a financial drain on the central government. In such a system, the Taiwan Governor’s Office would single-handedly decide the financial and fiscal system on Taiwan without any interference from the central government. The main sources of revenue income of the colonial government were land tax, monopolised enterprises, governmental bonds for the infrastructure enterprises equally monopolised by the government, local taxes and sugar consumption tax. With the taxes in various forms in 1904 the colonial government was able to reach a financial balance between revenue and expenditure. Under Gotô’s direction three major infrastructure projects were also implemented: (1) scientific survey of flat lands for tax collection purpose; (2) railroad construction to connect the west coast formerly separated by east-west rivers; and (3) modernisation of Keelung and Gaoxiong harbours with railroad terminals. The lucrative revenue by all means of exploitation had turned Taiwan into an important financial resource and agricultural base of the Japanese Empire (Tadao 1985: 66-84).

Although legally speaking the Taiwanese were all Japanese by nationality, the colonial government held the opinion that total assimilation would take a long time to accomplish (Lamley 1999: 208). The cultural superiority of the Japanese justified

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28 By 1944, there were about 10 monopolised commodities such as opium, camphor, salt, cigarette, liquor, and petrol. Infrastructure enterprises monopolised by the government included railway, telecommunication, post, harbour, forestry, land, etc.

29 After the signing of Shimonosek Treaty, Japanese government had set May 8th 1897 as the deadline before which the residents on Taiwan could choose between returning to China and becoming Japanese
their political dominance: one estimation indicated that during the entire 50-year Japanese rule, native Taiwanese serving in civil office above the level of section chief counted no more than 11 people (Fang Xiaoqian 1994: 188). For the same work, whether as a civil servant, teacher or technician, not only the priority for employment was given to Japanese, but they also received 60% higher salaries than the Taiwanese. This was justified by a special kind of compensating payment to each Japanese working in the colony (Tadao 1985: 84-100).

In the making of its Taiwan policy, Japan had followed the example of the French rule in Algeria with the cultural assimilation of the local residents as the ultimate goal. One of the measures was to encourage emigration of the Japanese to Taiwan. Another important expression of the policy of cultural assimilation was the colonial education (Tsurumi 1997; Lamley 1999). The teaching of the Japanese language formed the core of the colonial curriculum. One needs to give the Japanese credit for the rise in literacy level in their first colony. In other words, the vast majority of Taiwanese enjoyed full literacy at the latter stage of Japan’s colonial rule. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Japanese colonisers had the best interests of the Taiwanese in mind when they implemented their educational policy. Their intention was rather to train a more productive colonial workforce.

Despite the achievement in raising the Taiwanese literacy rate, the Japanese coloniser continued treating the Taiwanese in a discriminatory way, evidenced by the racial segregation in the elementary educational system. Up till 1922, strict segregation was practised in terms of the content of the curriculum, facility and opportunity of secondary education. For primary education, most Japanese and Taiwanese pupils in Taiwan attended schools in racially segregated settings. Japanese pupils attended the so-called shōōgekkō (primary school) while the Taiwanese pupils went to the kōōgakkôō (public school). In 1922, Governor-General Den Kenjirô introduced the integrated education system which made it legal for Taiwanese pupils citizens by remaining in Taiwan. About 23 percent of the population were estimated to have departed for China during this two-year period. However, the remaining population, though officially turned into Japanese citizens, were treated differently from the Japanese. The Japanese nation and its people were believed to be both racially and culturally superior to other peoples, which justified their military and political dominance. Gotô Shimpei, for instance, considered a minimum of eighty years required before cultural assimilation could elevate Taiwanese to the level of the Japanese (Ching 2001: 25).
to enrol in *shōōgekkō* (primary schools). Nonetheless, in the years to come, the segregation continued. Only a few privileged Taiwanese pupils entered the primary schools.

One of the major differences between the two systems was curriculum compilation. The textbooks for the Taiwanese pupils in the common schools were compiled by the colonial government with the focus on the promotion of Japanese language and the cultivation of loyalty as Japanese subjects whereas the primary schools used textbooks compiled by the Ministry of Education for students in Japan proper.\(^{30}\) The promotion of Japanese language through the educational system was implemented with high efficiency. It was estimated that before the end of WWII over seventy-five percent of the Taiwanese population became literate in Japanese (Xu Xueji 1991: 158).

Apart from ethnic segregation in the system of primary school, before 1915 secondary education was not available for the Taiwanese. When it became possible for Taiwanese to take entrance exam for secondary school, few would succeed sitting in the exam designed for Japanese students due to the language barrier and the differences in curriculum. If successful, Taiwanese students were encouraged to pursue vocational training such as medicine, agriculture and mechanics.

The policy of assimilation was also evidenced by the colonial government’s tight control on native Taiwanese freedom of speech and press. The regulations of press and news on the island issued by the Governor-General’s Office subjected Taiwanese’s artistic creativity to severe censorship. Journals and books published in Japan proper were also censored before entering Taiwan. The control was particularly heavy regarding the issuing of newspapers. The opening of a newspaper office needed direct approval from the Governor-General himself. During the half-century Japanese colonial rule out of a total of twenty-odd newspaper offices in Taiwan there was only

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\(^{30}\) For the Taiwanese pupils attending common schools, the subjects of school curriculum included the national language (Japanese), ethics, arithmetic, Japanese history, geography, science, painting, music, physical education, classical Chinese, and some vocational training courses. Among all subjects, Japanese language was the most important one and took up from 10 to 14 class hours per week. Japanese language, ethics, history and geography were the four subjects deemed essential for cultivating loyalty towards the Japan Empire. Only towards the very end of Japanese rule did common schools start using the same textbooks as those used in Japan proper.
one run by the Taiwanese. This was *Taiwan Minbao* (*TWMB, Taiwan People’s News*) founded first by Taiwanese students in Japan in the early 1920s. And it was not until 1927 before the branch office was opened in Taiwan proper. Before its forced merger with other newspapers by the colonial authority into *Taiwan Xinbao* (*Taiwan News*) in 1944 *Taiwan Minbao* was the ‘only mouthpiece of the Taiwanese’, providing the forum for the propagation of ideas of democracy and self-determination (Wu et al. 1990: 543-571; Heylen 2001: 217-225).

A collective sense of being Taiwanese did not exist prior to the process of colonialism. It was precisely the process of colonialism that set the process of identity formation on Taiwan in motion. Colonial rule and the policy of discriminatory assimilation led to the objectification of the colonised as one collectivity, a ‘self’. Within the historical context of colonial experience, the colonised Taiwanese internally colluded with or resisted such objectification imposed by the colonisers. Yet over time, the completion of a colonial administrative sphere with a singular centre and the imposed Japanese official nationalism led to the “birth of the ‘Taiwan-wide’ pilgrimage sphere” (Wakabayashi 1995: 190).

In Leo Ching’s view, “colonialism constructs and constricts, structures and deconstructs, the ways contradictory and contestatory colonial identities are imagined and represented” (2001: 11). He further argues that not only the identities of the colonised but also those of the colonisers are “enabled” by the “temporality and spatiality of colonial modernity” (ibid). While colonialism conditioned and fostered an emergent Taiwanese self-consciousness as one collective community in a passive way, ultimately it was the reaction and interaction of the colonised Taiwanese people to the colonial rule that played an active role in shaping the Taiwanese self-consciousness. It was in the process where the Taiwanese defended their land and interests, first in the form of armed resistance, then through political movements, that a collective Taiwanese identity began to take shape.

**5.2 A Brief Overview of Taiwanese Anti-Colonial Movements**

The historical phase of Taiwanese anti-Japanese movements is generally divided into two chronological periods according to their methods and natures. The first period covered the period from 1895 to 1915, characterised by anti-colonial resistance, both
organised and individual, by military means. The second period, starting from 1915, the end of WWI, ending around 1937 with the outbreak of the second Sino-Japan War, witnessed non-violent Taiwanese anti-colonial struggles which encompassed simultaneously the emergent modern Taiwanese nationalist movements. Developed through various organised political, cultural and social movements, Taiwanese students studying in Japan at the time formed the core group in the advocacy of Taiwanese nationalism.

5.2.1 Violent Armed Resistance (1895 - 1915)

Japan acquired Taiwan through a peace treaty, but its occupation of Taiwan did not go smoothly. It took more than four months before Japanese troops were able to push down from Taibei to the Tainan area and be certain of an island-wide takeover. Japanese colonisers had encountered fierce armed opposition from the Taiwanese populace. The Japanese colonisers had to made tremendous military and policing efforts to combat armed resistance and uprisings. The anti-Japanese fighting forces consisted of Qing troops, militia, and civilians. The leadership of these armed oppositions were made up mainly of Qing officials and local low-class gentry. The military resistance movements were crushed one after the other by the militarily superior and well organised Japanese colonisers. By 1915 all forms of armed opposition vanished under the severe Japanese military operation.

At close examination, one can discern a number of different mentalities at work behind the armed opposition undertaken by Taiwanese populace. Many Taiwanese fought to protect their own land locally and lacked a wider vision of defending Taiwan as a whole. In many instances, people from one village would resist Japanese as vehemently as they would any unwelcome invaders such as bandits. The actions undertaken by these villagers were a far cry from those of modern

31 With the signing of the peace treaty, the Qing Court issued an imperial order for its officials to retreat. However, some of the Qing officials stationed in Taiwan stayed behind and fought against the Japanese occupation. In Qing Empire, the literary elites at the local level were commonly referred as ‘gentry’ (jinshen jieji). The member of this group can be further classified into upper gentry and lower gentry according to the different degrees they held in the imperial civil service examination system. During the first two years of Japanese occupation of Taiwan, most members of the upper gentry and wealthy merchants had fled to Mainland China (Cen QingZhi 1998: 28-31).
nationalists. It is in the cases of the members of the lower gentry and the Qing officials that we find the organised defence of Taiwan against the Japanese occupation. However, underlining such actions was a sense of political and cultural loyalty to the Qing Empire, and not to Taiwan itself. In other words, at the ideological level many native Taiwanese fought for their ‘jiayuan’ (native place) while others fought to remain within their ‘zuguo’ (country) (here country read as the ‘Qing Court’). Therefore, this sense of political and cultural loyalty that drove the low-gentry in Taiwan to resist the Japanese occupation in the first place should not be mistaken for the manifestation of modern nationalist aspirations. Within the Han Chinese context at this particular historical juncture, it is more meaningful to understand the sense of loyalty of the local gentry in Taiwan by the concept of ‘proto-nationalism’ as defined by Hobsbawm (1990: 46-79).^32

Nowadays it is common to use the term ‘nationalism’ strictly in its modern sense, especially in the field of political science. Mainstream theorists consider that the era of nationalism was ushered in by the process of modernity. Nationalism in its modern form became a worldwide phenomenon in the last two centuries, though it emerged in different regions at different times. Gellner’s observation of the rare coexistence of a bureaucracy with a state in agrarian China leads him to suggest that China in the pre-modern time “did display a certain kind of nationalism” (1993: 15-16). What he meant is the fact that the Chinese elites had relied on a shared homogeneous culture in delimiting China from other polities. Throughout the past two millennia there had been some kind of congruence of political and cultural boundaries in China, though discontinuous at times. Before 1911, the cultural homogeneity was maintained through the monopoly of the class versed in Chinese high culture, contrary to modern nationalism where the national culture is by definition embraced by all classes. When Gellner talks about the existence of “a certain kind of nationalism” in pre-1911 China, it should be better understood as the manifestation of ‘proto-nationalism’ as defined by Hobsbawm. For modern nationalism, it is the nation

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^32 Proto-nationalism as defined by Hobsbawm refers to “certain variants of feelings of collective belonging” that existed before the Age of Modern Nation. Such emotional bonds can be created by experience of common political institution or shared ethnic and cultural features. Where proto-nationalism exists, the chance of successful nationalist mobilisation is high.
But the Taiwan’s gentry – a weak social class – had not yet fully embraced Chinese proto-nationalism in 1895. Most upper-level gentry had fled the island upon Japanese occupation (Chen Ching-Chih 1998: 27-29). Only some of the lower-gentry rose up against Japan out of loyalty for the Qing Court while many folks fought out of a more inchoate idea of defending one’s home against invaders. It may thus be concluded that when Japan took over the island as its first colony, the Taiwanese population in general did not have any notion of modern nation, let alone any national identity. In the next fifty years the Japanese colonisers had endeavoured to inject Japan-oriented official nationalism into the minds of the islanders. But on the elite level, Japanese official nationalism came into confrontation with the China-oriented proto-nationalism. Moreover, the common colonial experience and the anti-colonial movement led to the emergence of a Taiwanese consciousness among the Taiwanese elites, which in a way can also be regarded as a proto type of Taiwanese national identity. But before entering into the analysis of the modern Taiwanese nationalist movement and its ideology, a brief analysis of the Republic of Taiwan is helpful for illustrating the dominating China-oriented proto-nationalism among the Taiwanese elite in the first phase of the anti-colonial movement.

Before Japan officially took over the island, on 23 May 1895, with the proclamation of ‘Declaration of the Independence of the Republic of Taiwan’, the province of Taiwan was declared a republic. The Declaration was translated into several foreign languages and distributed to various consulates stationed in Taiwan. On the 25th May, the Independence Ceremony was held. The founders of the republic were principally the acting Qing officials, middle and high-class gentry and merchants (Lamley 1989: 748-749). The acting Governor Tang Jingsong also participated in the preparatory meetings and was selected to be the president of the republic. In their efforts to resist the Japanese take-over, the founders borrowed ideas from the West and made use of concepts concerning international law, popular rule and parliamentary government. After some token resistance put up by the ill-trained defence units, the head of the state, Tang Jingsong, and his recently installed
government took flight to Mainland China eight days following the landing of the Japanese troops. The young republic vanished after its 12 days brief existence.\footnote{Although vestiges of the republic lingered on in various parts of the island even after Tainan city was occupied by the Japanese as late in October, later day researches tend to take Tang and his ministry’s embarkment for Mainland China as the end of the republic.}

Some post WWII pro-Taiwan independence activists tend to take the republic as the historical proof of the existence of independent state in Taiwan. (Wu Rwei-ren 2001: 49). But most scholars consider it wrong to regard the foundation of the republic as an active pursuit of Taiwan independence by the islanders (Huang Shaotang 1993: 218-221; Lamely 1968: 752; Li Xiaofeng 1996: 277). The republic was more of a strategic move initiated by the local elite to fend off the Japanese occupation when abandoned by the Qing Empire. The loyalty of the founders of the republic remained pointed to the Qing Court. Several official documents maintained that the establishment was a temporary measure in the extreme situation and that the republic remained loyal to the Qing Court. ‘Yong Qing’ was decided as the name of the new era, meaning ‘Qing forever’ (Huang Shaotang 1993: 153). Although the Republic of Taiwan had its historical significance given it was the first republic in Asia, in its essence it was not the manifestation of Taiwanese national consciousness.

As we argued in the preceding section, for the emergence of an embryonic Taiwanese national consciousness one prerequisite was the common colonial experience within the ‘pilgrimage sphere’ of the colonial structure. Moreover, it required a new generation of Taiwanese elites inspired by Western modern thoughts such as human rights, notion of self-determination through their education in Japan proper, in the West and in continental China. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed a growing number of organisations and movements initiated by a younger generation of Taiwanese intellectuals to counter the Japanese colonial rule on the island. This generation of educated Taiwanese were born and raised near the end of Qing rule in Taiwan and its members had received some or most of their schooling under Japanese governance. Susceptible to modernisation and new ideologies, this educated generation participated in community affairs and actively sought a fair position for the Taiwanese people in their relation with the colonial government and in the world community.
5.2.2 Modern Taiwanese Nationalist Movements: Non-Violent Political-Social Movements (1920 – 1945)

The suppression of the last large-scale uprising on the southern part of Taiwan in August 1915 marked the end of the traditional type of armed anti-colonial struggle. Since WWI a modern political ideology prompted a different type of resistance and the 1920s celebrated the heyday of non-violent anti-colonial movements put up by the Taiwanese. The emergence of the first generation of modern Taiwanese intelligentsia in the 1920s came to play a pivotal role in the anti-colonial struggle. This new generation of intellectuals were the products of colonial modernisation, most of whom received higher education in Japan. Through their colonial education in Taiwan and the experience and knowledge acquired though overseas study (mainly in Japan, and some in mainland China), these Taiwanese intellectuals were the first to encounter and absorb modern Western political, social and cultural thinking (Chen Ching-chih 1998: 35).\(^{34}\) Rallying the support of the liberal-minded landlords and professionals in Taiwan, this younger generation of educated Taiwanese became the leaders and advocates of anti-colonial movements.

The Taiwanese anti-colonial movement in this period should not be considered as an isolated struggle. On the contrary, in ideological as well as organisational terms the Taiwanese anti-colonial movement was “one link in the global trend of anti-imperialism” (Wakabayashi 1987: 288). 1920s’ Japanese society flourished with various Western liberal thinking. The actual and theoretical political alternatives and social goals heatedly debated in Japan proper nourished these Taiwanese university students. The principle of national self-determination was popularised on a global scale by a wave of nationalistic anti-colonial movements. The May 4th Movement in Mainland China and the Mansei Movement in Korea (also known as the March First Independent Movement) in 1919 further inspired these Taiwanese students.\(^ {35}\) At a

\(^{34}\) In 1915 there were about 300 Taiwanese, mainly sons of wealthy Taiwanese families, studying in Japan. By 1922 the number had grown rapidly to 2,400 with over half enrolled in colleges and universities. Most of this younger generation of educated Taiwanese were born around the time when Japan occupied Taiwan.

\(^{35}\) Indeed, key student leaders of the nationalist movement such as Cai Pei-hou and Lin Chenglu maintained close contact with their counterparts in student-led Korean nationalist movement based in Tokyo at the time.
minimum, the Taiwanese students in Japan came to be aware of the constitutional and parliamentary system prevailing in Japan and that a large majority of Japanese citizens enjoyed liberal rights such as the suffrage. The historical context at the time constituted a powerful magnetic force that led the Taiwanese intellectuals to question the arbitrary and discriminatory Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan and to strive for self-rule (Wakabayashi 1987: 288).

In 1918 a number of Taiwanese students in Tokyo secured police permission to form an association named the Society of Enlightenment to advocate reforms in their homeland. The association had received financial and moral support from the wealthy Taiwanese landlord and businessman, Lin Xiantang, who devoted his entire life to the course of Taiwanese political reform. In 1920 the association was reorganised and renamed Shinminkai (the New People’s Society). As for its goal, the society set itself three major tasks: (1) to launch a political movement to press for reforms in Taiwan; (2) to publish a society organ in order to promote their ideas and enlighten Taiwanese populace; and (3) to effect closer liaison with friends in mainland China (Lan Bozhou 1993: 86-88).

The New People’s Society applied lawful tactics to achieve its goal. To accomplish the first task the society launched two successive political campaigns, the Petition Movement for the Abolishment of Law 6.3 (1920) and the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament (1921 – 1934). The second Petition Movement in a way can be regarded as the extension of the first one. The principal organisers of the petition movement changed their appeal when they realised that the mere abolition of Law 6.3 was insufficient and might lead to the denial of Taiwan as a distinctive society and eventually provide justification for the Japanese coloniser to intensify the assimilation policy. Consequently, when the Imperial Diet made it clear the Law 6.3 would be retained with only minor revisions, the Society changed its agenda and called for the establishment of a parliament in Taiwan. The Taiwanese parliament would consist of publicly elected parliamentary members who would have the power to participate in the making of the special laws to be implemented in Taiwan and the enactment of a budget (Lan Bozhou 1993: 107-109).

A more significant achievement of the Society was the initiative to create a literary forum for the Taiwanese. In 1920, a monthly magazine, Formosan Youth was
issued which devoted mainly to Taiwan’s history, poetry, essays and folklore. In 1922, Formosa succeeded Formosan Youth and was then reorganised and merged with Taiwan Minbao (TWMB, Taiwan People’s Journal).\textsuperscript{36} Taiwan Minbao started in 1923 as a Chinese bi-monthly (as a weekly since 1925) by the same publishers of Formosa and continued to be published in Tokyo in 1927. After an approval was granted in 1927, Taiwan Minbao began to publish in Taiwan and became the first and only newspaper owned and operated by native Taiwanese during the fifty-year Japanese rule in Taiwan (Robinson 1984: 323). After yet another change of name to Taiwan Hsin Minpo (Taiwan New People’s News) in 1930 the weekly issue was approved by the Governor-General of Taiwan to be published as a daily newspaper in 1932.

The New People’s Society was joined force by Taiwan Cultural Association founded in Taiwan by Dr. Jiang Weishui\textsuperscript{37} and Cai Peihuo\textsuperscript{38} with the support of Lin

\textsuperscript{36} Since its first issue in 1920, Taiwan Minbao became the only forum for Taiwanese intellectuals active in the anti-colonial movement to publicise their criticism of the Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan, to advocate the idea of Taiwanese self-rule, and to educate and mobilise the Taiwanese populace. In its twenty-five years existence, the same publication had changed five different titles, chronologically being Formosan Youth (1920.7 – 1922.3), Formosa (1922.4 – 1923.6), Taiwan People’s News (1923.4 – 1930.3), Taiwan New People’s News (1930.3 – 1937.6, and Xingnan News (1941.2 – 1944.3). Despite the change in title, the same publication had retained more or less the same position, style and editors. Contemporary scholars tend to cluster these publications under the same title, Taiwan Minbao (Taiwan People’s News), for the purpose of analysis. In effect, Taiwan Minbao provided the theoretical legitimisation for the anti-colonial rule. Tadao Yanaihara (1985:177) even regarded Taiwan Minbao as the “core of the Taiwanese political movement”.

\textsuperscript{37} Chiang Weishui (1891-1931), graduated from Taipei Medical School in 1915, was one of the many Taiwanese physicians involved in the anti-colonial nationalist movement. He was one of the founders of the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1921. Apart from his active participation in the political movement, he had made numerous publications in Taiwan Minbao on the topics of nation and political reform.

\textsuperscript{38} Cai Peihuo (1889 –1983), graduated from the Government Taiwan Language School in 1910 and worked initially as a school teacher. Cai Peihuo started his career as a political activist and later professional politician after his forced resignation as a punishment for his political involvement in the Assimilation Society in 1915. During his study in Japan he participated in the student-led Taiwanese anti-colonial activities. He was one of the founders of the New People’s Society. After his return to Taiwan in the 1920s, he founded the Taiwan Cultural Association together with Jiang Weishui. After 1945 Cai Peihuo joined the GMD and assumed various official posts such as legislator, political commissary, and councillor for the president.
Xiantang in 1921 and a number of other civil organisations in the Petition Movement. The political campaign by these reformist organisations pioneered Taiwanese anti-colonial movements throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. From 1921 to 1934, a total of fifteen petitions signed by hundreds of influential Taiwanese personalities requesting the creation of a parliament in Taiwan were submitted to the Imperial Diet but with no success.

Up till 1927, the Taiwan Cultural Association functioned as a united front in rallying support from various groups and individuals. However, the ideological difference among the leaders of the Association gradually diverged between liberalism and socialism. For the methods to bring about Taiwanese self-rule, radical calls for independence through revolutionary means became stronger as the Petition Movement bore little fruit. Factionalism began to undermine the Association. Subsequently, in 1927 it split along the left-right line. The Association was taken over by left-wing younger and radical Taiwanese activists. After losing control of the Taiwan Cultural Association, the right-wing moderate and conservative leaders such as Lin Xiantang, Chiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo withdrew from the Association and founded the Taiwan People’s Party in the same year. It was the first political party in Taiwan history that coordinated their political activities, including the annual petition campaign to the Japanese Diet for the establishment of a separate legislature in Taiwan.

Prior to 1927, the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, the Taiwan Cultural Association, and TWMB formed the three pillars of the modern Taiwanese non-violent anti-colonial movement. The three organisations shared the same political goal and comprised the same group of Taiwanese elites. The anti-colonial movement gained its momentum through the diplomatic manoeuvre carried out by the annual Petition Movement in Tokyo, the mass agitation and

39 Publicly, the Taiwan Culture Association disclaimed any political aim and called for harmony in Japanese-Taiwanese relations. This was how it managed to secure police permission to carry on its activities in Taiwan. The Association advocated preservation and cultivation of the distinctive Taiwanese-Chinese heritage and promoted education and popular interest in a broad spectrum of subjects such as Chinese literature and Western studies. In practical effect it was a thinly disguised front for rallying support among Taiwanese for the Petition Movement in Tokyo.
mobilisation by the Taiwan Cultural Association, and the establishment and spreading of the anti-colonial thinking through TWMB.

From 1927 onwards leftist and rightist camps led the anti-colonial movement in Taiwan separately. The Taiwanese Communist Party established in Shanghai in 1928 was the leading left-wing anti-colonial organisation that advocated the use of radical revolutionary means to achieve political independence of the island. In the competition between the rightist camp and the leftist camp in rallying popular support, the colonial police exerted a critical counterweight to the leftist camp. In February 1929 the colonial police arrested all the major leftists associated with the Peasant Union, the peasant affiliation of the reorganised Cultural Association led by the radical camp. In the ensuing six to eight months, the left wing of the resistance movement was completely paralysed (Chen Fangming 1998).

The Taiwan People’s Party led by the right-wing leaders scored a big victory in early 1930 against the colonial government regarding the regulations governing the sale and use of opium. However, the Taiwan People's Party was a loose partnership of two political factions in opposing a mutual foe, the moderate led by Chiang Weishui and the conservative guided by Lin Xiantang, each with its own ideology and constituency. Shortly before the forced disbanding of Taiwan People’s Party by the colonial authorities in February 1931, the conservatives formed a united-front affiliation, the League for Local Self Rule in Taiwan in August 1930. In the early 1930s it became the only legal base for Taiwanese opposition to colonial rule. However, the League was equally plagued by factionalism, its decentralised organisation and the lack of ideological unity. When in 1935 the Governor-General implemented limited reform to the local administration system, the leaders of the League changed their role of political activists to election campaign managers and lobbyists. In August 1937, the branch chairmen and delegates of the League met to formally disband the League.

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40 For a detailed analysis of the political ideology, the organisational structure and the activism strategies of the League for Local Self Government, see Douglas Fix, Taiwanese Nationalism and Its Late Colonial Context, Ph.D. dissertation, (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), pp. 26-116.

41 The reform for “self government” in Taiwan included the reorganisation of the administrative division, the upgrading of the advisory councils at the prefecture and city to deliberative assemblies
The disbanding of the League for Local Self Government marked the end of the Taiwanese anti-colonial movement on the political front. With the breakout of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the colonial authorities further tightened political control of the island. Under such circumstances, from the second half of the 1930s till the end of the Japanese rule, the anti-colonial resistance could only be carried out in the cultural arena. The literary movement, known as Taiwan New Literature Movement, emerged in the 1920s among Taiwanese literary circles as the cultural wing of the anti-colonial movement. Opposed to the assimilation policy, the New Literature Movement aimed to promote a distinct Taiwanese culture through reforms of the forms and content of literary work as well as linguistic reform. But as the analysis of the literary movement made in the fourth section of this chapter will show, in terms of content, participants to the literary movement had different ideas as to the means to preserve a distinct Taiwanese identity.

The preceding overview of modern Taiwanese anti-colonial movements reveals that the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness was not a mere passive product of the Japanese colonial institutionalisation. More importantly, it was the crystallisation of the ideas developed by the Taiwanese elites in their opposition against the Japanese colonial rule and the official nationalism. In the process of anti-colonial struggle, the Taiwanese were imagined into a suppressed weak nation with its own distinctive ethnical and cultural particularities which is entitled to political right of self-determination, or even full sovereignty. Through this discourse, the Taiwanese elites gradually constructed the notion of a Taiwanese nation. In the ensuing parts of this chapter we will look concretely at the some important texts during the period of modern Taiwanese anti-colonial movements, including declarations, petitions, journal and newspaper articles, and defence speeches in court.

### 5.3 The Political Dimension of Taiwanese Nationalism

As argued in the preceding section, the anti-colonial armed resistance movements before 1915 were not modern nationalist movements. A modern Taiwanese nationalist movement did not emerge until 1919 after the consolidation of the authoritarian

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with expanded powers, and the implementation of general election for one half of the assembly and advisory council members.
Japanese colonial rule and with the emergence of the first generation of modern Taiwanese elites trained by modern Japanese education. As former frontier-residents of a province within the Qing Empire, the descendants of the Chinese migrants in Taiwan (the majority of the island population) did not identify themselves with the territory as Taiwanese. If they had some notion of nation, the object of identification pointed to the Qing Court and Chinese high culture. At the time of Japanese annexation, at least among the local elites a certain proto-type Chinese nationalism can be identified. But the Japanese colonial rule did not tolerate Taiwanese political loyalty to the Chinese polity. The assimilation policy implemented by the Japanese coloniser further pushed the Taiwanese to redefine themselves. Between the impossibility of retaining their Chinese identity in terms of ethnic origin and history and their status of second-class imperial subjects, the Han Chinese on Taiwan went through a process of searching and redefining their own identity in political terms through their demand for self-government and respect for their local culture. Taiwanese nationalism was the resultant product of such a process.

In the process of identity search, Taiwanese elites of different ideological backgrounds and with different political visions for the island contributed to redefining the islanders’ identity. Among the various movements and organisations, the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament was by far the most significant in terms of scale and duration. The idea of Taiwanese self-rule was put forward by the Petition Movement and became the principal goal rallying most anti-colonial organisations and individuals. In this section we will make a textual analysis of the theoretical legitimisation of Taiwanese self-rule advanced by the leaders in the Petition Movement. We will look mainly at these Taiwanese elites’ arguments on two themes, on the one hand, arguments for the rejection of the policy of discriminatory assimilation implemented by the Japanese coloniser, and arguments justifying the right of the Taiwanese to self-rule, on the other hand.

5.3.1 Anti-Assimilation Policy Discourse

Dôka, or assimilation, was not the initial policy Japan adopted upon its occupation of its first colony, Taiwan. As shown above, from 1895 to 1918, the colonial system was still in the process of formation. Confronted with armed resistances, military
pacification was the primary task of the colonial authorities. The realisation of Taiwan’s economic self-reliance was also high on the agenda. Besides efforts to promote the Japanese language, the colonial authority still tolerated the colonial subjects’ local culture. The Japanese colonial policy orientation in Taiwan before WWI focused on “security, the development of industrial capitalism in Taiwan, the establishment of Japanese bureaucracy and capitalist framework” while the education system was neglected (Tadao 1985: 173). So the initial goals after the Japanese occupation of Taiwan emphasised political power and economic interest.

But the colonial government’s tolerance in the cultural domain did not really intend encouragement. It was only an expedient measure, given the priorities of the consolidation of political control and economic exploitation. After 1919, with the rising popularity of the principle of national self-determination and the rise of Taiwanese consciousness among the residents on the island, the colonial government adopted assimilation as its guiding policy. The basic idea behind this was to turn Taiwanese into Japanese subjects through assimilation. The first civilian Governor-General, Den Kenjirô, was the first to put the assimilation policy into practice. Seven successive Governors after him all followed the same policy. From the administrative guideline issued by Governor-General Den we can gain some understanding of what assimilation meant for the colonial government. According to Governor Den:

“Since Taiwan constitutes a part of Japanese territory, it is logical that it falls within the realm of the territory governed by Japanese Constitution. One should not compare Taiwan to the English or French colonies… (T)he administrative policy therefore aims to turn the Taiwanese populace into complete Imperial people, loyal to the Japanese Emperor. And (we) should give (them) education and guidance so as to cultivate their sense of responsibility to the State.”

(op.cit. Tadao 1985: 172)

From the above quotation we can see that assimilation policy was based on the integrationist view that Taiwan was no Japanese colony but part of Japan. Nevertheless, Taiwanese people were at this stage not yet ‘complete Imperial people’ and it was only through the process of assimilation that Taiwanese people would be educated and transformed into Japanese citizens. The logical outcome of the process of assimilation was an eventual merger and the extension of the Japanese homeland to
the island colony. Although the policy envisaged an eventual application of all institutions and cultural practices in metropolitan Japan to Taiwan, before that would happen, Taiwanese population should be treated in a different way from the Japanese in the home country.

Indeed, the assimilation policy thus framed, envisaging an eventual complete merger of Taiwan with the Japanese homeland, served only to cover up Japanese colonial practices in Taiwan. In reality, only limited Japanese laws came into practice in Taiwan, the ordinances issued by the Governor-General remained dominating legal rules; the Japanese language was promoted in all education program but Taiwanese students were banned from receiving advanced study.\(^42\) Most importantly, the right of the Taiwanese to political participation was nil. Due to the colonialist nature of the Japanese rule on Taiwan, the practice of assimilation inevitably ran contrary to its original idea (Tadao 1985: 175).

Among the younger generation of Taiwanese intellectuals, Cai Peihuo gave one of the most thorough accounts shedding insight on the hypocritical nature of the colonial government’s assimilation policy. In “Our View on Assimilation” Cai (1920/08/15) elaborated extensively his own understanding of the concept of assimilation and in turn rejected the assimilation policy implemented by the Japanese colonial government on Taiwan. Some other Taiwanese intellectuals at the time also shared Cai’s views on the issue of assimilation.\(^43\) We can summarise the key arguments of this article as follows:

First, Cai argued that the phenomenon of assimilation existed extensively in nature as well as in human society. But he differentiated two kinds of assimilation, natural assimilation on the one hand and artificial assimilation, on the other hand. As Cai saw it, not unlike the biological evolution process in the animal kingdom, the socio-cultural development in human society evolved in a similar fashion: throughout

\(^42\) And when the small number of Taiwanese students did get the chance to pursue advanced study, they were usually encouraged to specialise in practical disciplines such as medical science.

\(^43\) For instance, Cai Shigu, a law student, also wrote a contribution where he expounded similar views on the assimilation policy. Somewhat different from that of Cai Peihuo, Cai Shigu made a distinction between two forms of assimilation, spiritual assimilation and material assimilation. Another Taiwanese student, Guo Dewei argued that the colonial authorities in Taiwan had focused more on the assimilation on the material level than on the spiritual level. See Heylen, *Language Reform Movements in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule*, p. 200.
time, the culture of each individual, society and nation came into contact with other individuals, societies and nations. Such cultural encounters led man to compare the advantages and disadvantages in each culture. The customs in each human society, as Cai seemed to believe, could be subject to normative evaluation by such universal criteria as truth, virtue, and beauty. Natural assimilation in this sense referred to the natural tendency of cultural adaptation and acquisition in the process of cross-cultural interaction. Contrary to natural assimilation, some cultures tended to take their own customs and practices as the criterion against which other cultures should measure themselves. Artificial assimilation would occur when this culture in question tried to impose itself on to others in order to achieve conformity. For Cai Peihuo, natural assimilation would most likely be successful since it accorded with natural tendency whereas artificial assimilation would most likely fail.

Secondly, Cai Peihuo saw the origin of artificial assimilation in the territorial expansion of the modern state. Assimilation policy was often adopted by the state to administrate the population in the newly annexed territory. Given the lack of free acceptance in the case of territorial annexation, if one imposed artificial assimilation by force to erase the cultural differences, one would achieve nothing but failure. Diplomatically, Cai Peihuo did not exclude outright the possibility of a successful artificial assimilation. Under four conditions, he argued, assimilation policy might work on a colony: one, the newly annexed territory must be small-sized and isolated from its original mother country; two, the colonising state should respect the particularity of its new citizens and protect the good part of the culture in the colony; three, assimilation policy should base itself on universal values; and four, the policy should not be named ‘assimilation’, but should follow the natural tendency as the simple use of the word ‘assimilation’ already implied the existence of differences. In a roundabout way, Cai Peihuo had, in effect, rejected artificial assimilation either as a goal or as a policy.

Following the normative distinction of the two types of assimilation, Cai Peihuo examined critically the assimilation policy implemented in Taiwan. Referring to the discriminatory educational policy implemented in Taiwan as well as the career

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44 In this article, Cai Peihuo portrayed a future world with one unified culture as the positive result of natural assimilation. This could very well be his personal conviction. It might also be read as necessary glorification of the idea of assimilation so that the article would not risk censorship.
barrier for Taiwanese to join the public administrative service, Cai (1920/08/15: 16) argued that “we only hear assimilation in word, but never see it in practice.” For him, the assimilation policy as such could only stimulate opposition. In conclusion, Cai considered the authorities on Taiwan’s policy up to date was based on Japan centrism. Such irresponsible policy would only fail.

It is likely that Cai Peihuo drew inspiration for his idea of natural assimilation from the brief existence of Taiwan Assimilation Movement between 1914 and 1915 (Wu et al. 1990: 14-34). The movement was initiated by Itagaki Taisuke, a liberal-minded venerable Japanese statesman at the time. The understanding of assimilation in this movement envisaged the integration of Taiwanese with Japanese home country on an equal basis, that Taiwanese would gain equal treatment and acquire the full constitutional rights enjoyed by Japanese citizens in the home country. Evidenced by Taiwanese enthusiastic endorsements of this idealistic version of assimilation in the foundation of Assimilation Society in 1915, such an idea appealed to many Taiwanese at the time. However, the forced disband of the Society in 1915 by the Governor-General showed that the equation of assimilation with the integration on an egalitarian basis was simply not tolerated. Following a debate among the educated Taiwanese in Tokyo between 1918 and 1920, young Taiwanese students studying in Japan succeeded in persuading the leaders in the Assimilation Movement to give up the idea of natural assimilation. They argued that although natural assimilation might work for people living in remote and barbarous areas whose cultural development was primitive, it was not suitable for people or nation which had already its own culture, thinking, customs, institution and religious traditions (Lin Chenglu op.cit. Zhou Wanyao 1989: 41-42). In this view, the Taiwanese constituted a people with its distinct culture. Given its particularity, self-rule was perceived as the logical and preferred solution in the best interest of Taiwanese people.

45 Within a week after its foundation the Assimilation Society had attracted a membership of more than three thousand Taiwanese from communities all over the island.
5.3.2 Self-Determination: the Theoretical Basis of the Petition Movement

At the yearend of 1920, the view of the advocates for self-rule among the Taiwanese students in Japan proper began to dominate the discussion of the future of political movement. In 1921, the leadership of the political movement decided to appeal to the Imperial Diet for the establishment of the Taiwanese Parliament according to the right to petition stipulated in the Japanese Constitution. The key theorist in advancing the idea of self-rule was Lin Chenglu.\(^{46}\) Not only was Lin Chenglu the first to advocate the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament in his writings, he was also the writer of all the documents for the Petition Movement for the Establishment of A Taiwanese Parliament. In a series of articles published in *Formosan Youth* Lin Chenglu constructed systematically the ideology of the movement and its appeal to self-rule (1920; 1921; 1922).

Lin’s article, “Conclusion on the Question of Law 6.3” (1920) outlined the preliminary argument that justified the establishment of the Taiwanese parliament while putting an end to the debate on whether to continue the Petition Movement for the Abolishment of Law 6.3.\(^ {47}\) In this article, Lin Chenglu pointed out that between the special administrative system based on Law 6.3 and assimilation a third option was the establishment of a ‘special legislative institution’ in the colony. This option would effectively take into consideration Taiwan’s specificity while at the same time preventing the dictatorship of the Governor-General. As Lin argued, given their ethnic

\(^{46}\) Lin Chenglu (1886–1968), graduated from the Government Taiwan Language School in 1908. During his study as a law student in Meiji University in Tokyo, he joined the anti-colonial movement. For 25 years Lin Chenglu worked successively as the editor-in-chief of *Taiwan, Taiwan Minbao, Taiwan Xinminpo*, and *Xingnan News*. After 1945 Lin Chenglu withdrew from political activities and continued his career in the publishing profession.

\(^{47}\) In the same issue of *Formosan Youth* where Lin Chenglu’s “Liusan wenti guizhuo dian” (The Conclusion on the Question of Law 6.3) was published, there was another article inn Chinese titled “The Evolution of the Issue Law No. 6.3” under the penname “journalist”. It served as an informative introduction to Lin Chenglu’s argument for the establishment of Taiwanese Parliament. Based on the minutes of the Imperial Diet, this long article described to the point the debates among the Japanese parliamentary members on the making of Law No. 6.3 and on each prolongation of Law 6.3. Recent study suggests that it is highly possible that Lin Chenglu was also the author of this article. See Chou Wan-yao, *Riju shidai de Taiwan yihui shezhi qingyuan yundong (The Petition Movement for the Establishment of Taiwanese Parliament under the Japanese Rule)*, p. 50.
origin, history, specific customs, culture, traditions and mind-set, the three and a half million Taiwanese simply could not be assimilated by the Japanese.

Then Lin compared Great Britain, France and Germany in terms of their colonial policy and considered the British style of colonial self-rule to be “the most progressive colonial rule” in accordance with the Act 22 in the Charter of the League of Nations as it included the colonised into the administrative ruling on the colony (1920: 35). Basing himself on the above reasoning, Lin advocated the practice of partial self-rule in Taiwan at a minimum. This implied the establishment of some kind of special legislative branch constituted of representatives of both the Taiwanese community and the Japanese community on Taiwan produced through general election. Lin emphasised that for laws to be enacted in a special region, the consultation of local people was essential. So the abolishment of Law 6.3 could not resolve the legal, political and social problems caused by it. It was more fruitful to respect the existing special rule on Taiwan, but establish a special legislative branch with the participation of the residents of Taiwan.

In this article, Lin only raised the idea of the establishment of a special legislative branch in Taiwan without specifying its function, nature and structure. Underlying the proposal for the establishment of a generally elected parliament of Taiwan was a demand for political autonomy according to liberal democratic principles. Later in the Petition Letter and especially in the Reasoning, Lin Chenglu elaborated in greater detail the justification for the choice of self-rule for Taiwan and the positive outcomes to be expected with the establishment of the Taiwanese parliament.

“The Petition Letter for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament” was a short and concise document which made four main points briefly. First, it acknowledged Taiwan’s specificity, hence the necessity for special legislation. Second, it pointed out that as Taiwan was ruled by Japanese constitutional rules, it should also enjoy constitutional politics. Third, it was a violation of constitutional practice that the Governor-General in Taiwan controlled legislative and executive power. And fourth, it recommended the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament to facilitate the special legislation and budget making in Taiwan. In other word, Law 6.3 and the Governor-General’s legislative power should be taken over by the Taiwanese parliament.
It is in “Reasons for Petitioning for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament”, written in 1922, that Lin Chenglu expounded an in-depth justification for the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament. In this well-structured article, Lin pointed out in the opening section “the Origin of Special Legislation on Taiwan” that the cultural uniqueness of the majority Han Chinese in Taiwan could not be eliminated by the assimilation policy. Taiwan’s cultural specificity should not hinder the implementation of constitutional politics in Taiwan. Lin’s criticism of the assimilation policy bore much resemblance of that made by Cai Peihuo. In the second section Lin argued for “the Necessity to Grant Taiwanese Residents Special Right to Political Participation”. The bases for such a special right lay in the universality of constitutionalism in Western countries and the new principles for civilised countries’ colonial rule provided in the Charter of the League of Nations. Given Taiwan’s crucial geographical location and its historical specificity, Lin argued that it could contribute much to the expansion of the Japanese Empire southwards and to the improvement of Sino-Japan relations. A special right to political participation could motivate the Taiwanese to shoulder such responsibilities.

In the third section, Lin spelled out that the concrete expression of the Taiwanese special right to political participation had to be seen in a Taiwanese parliament with only partial legislative power. The Taiwanese parliament would only substitute for the Imperial Diet in making laws relating to matters specific of Taiwan. For matters common to both Japan proper and Taiwan, Japanese law would prevail. The establishment of a Taiwanese parliament did not amount to the implementation of complete self-rule as found in such British colonies as Australia and New Zealand, which showed Taiwanese moderation and self-restraint.

Throughout the whole text Lin chose his wording tactfully. Nowhere can we find words like ‘nationalism’ or ‘national self-determination’. But the idea of national self-determination was clearly implied in Lin’s proposition of granting Taiwanese their ‘special right to political participation’. His rejection of the assimilation policy was based on the argument that the Taiwanese were a unique people with their own history and culture. This amounted to an assertion that the Taiwanese had the moral right to maintain their distinct identity. Towards the end of the article Lin clearly stated that “the new compatriots, Taiwanese, (have) the legitimate right to their language, customs” (1922: 11).
From an analytical point of view, a particular community’s quest for national self-determination could be broken down into two components: the right to self-rule in political affairs and in the cultural sphere. In reality, however, a community’s demands for the right to its own “culturally defined public sphere” (Tamir 1993: 70) are not only highly emotionally charged but also, frequently, politicised. Furthermore, demands for the right to self-determination in the cultural spheres can sometimes be used as tools for furthering political agendas whose primary concerns have little to do with cultural matters. This is what happened in the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. Although the cultural differences were given as the primary reason for establishing a Taiwanese parliament, the movement’s ultimate aim had less to do with cultural preservation than with elevating Taiwanese’s political status in the state apparatus. In both the anti-assimilation discourse and the reasoning for the establishment of the Taiwanese Parliament, the idea of Taiwanese national self-determination for the majority Han Chinese on Taiwan began to take shape. On this stage, the criteria used to define the Taiwanese as a distinct society that merited political self-rule were based largely on the population’s Han Chinese ethnic origin and their Chinese cultural heritage. In this regard, the leadership of the Petition Movement did not differentiate between the Taiwanese and the Chinese. But before turning to an examination of the cultural dimension of the Taiwanese nationalist discourse in the colonial period, we will analyse the public trial in the case of the violation of the Peace Police Law in 1924 where the leading figures of the anti-colonial movement publicly defended their anti-assimilation position and justified the demand for self-rule.

5.3.3 The Court Defence of the Peace Police Law Violation Incident

In February 1923, in order to counter the increasing pressure from the Governor Office on the Petition Movement, leading figures of the movement such as Jiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo, organised the League for Promoting the Taiwanese Parliament in Taiwan to mobilise the movement. Shortly afterwards the organisation was banned by the Governor’s Office. The same leaders immediately established the same organisation in Tokyo with the same name, same purpose and same membership. On December 16th 1923, the Governor’s Office mobilised all police
forces and arrested the people involved with the Taiwan Cultural Association and with the Petition for the Taiwanese Parliament Movement on suspicion of violating the Peace Police Law. In this so-called ‘Peace Police Law Violation Incident’, ninety-nine individuals were summoned and their houses searched, of whom forty-one had then been retained, and eighteen, including Lin Xiantang and Jiang Weishui, were indicted on the charge of ‘subversive activity’ in January 1924 (Wu et al. 1990: 201-209).

The significance of the incident lies in the fact that it was the first time the colonial government used legal measures to deal with the first generation of Taiwanese elites with Japanese training. Four trials were held publicly. In the courtroom, the prosecutor (coloniser) and the defendants (the colonised) elaborated in Japanese their respective ideas about Japanese rule on Taiwan. In the first trial, all defendants were acquitted for ‘lack of evidence’. However, in the second trial, eight of the accused, including Jiang Weishui, were sentenced to three to four months’ imprisonment, and five were punished with a fine of one hundred Japanese yen. All punishments were in proportion to the role each defendant had played in the Petition Movement. TWMB had made a detailed report on the debate on the fourth public trial. Based ourselves on the report, we will analyse the debate between the assimilation policy promoted by the coloniser and the idea of self-rule advocated by the Taiwanese elites so as to discern the specific nationalist message transmitted by the Taiwanese elites.

At the final speech in the court, the chief prosecutor, Moyoshi, emphasised the rebellious character of the Taiwanese residents by quoting Li Hongzhang, the Qing ambassador plenipotentiary at the time of the first Sino-Japan War in 1894, “the Taiwanese are used to launching one minor rebellion every three years, and one major rebellion every five years.” Moyoshi referred to the numerous ‘rebellions of bandits’ between 1895 and 1915 as examples. As he argued, the rebellious character of the Taiwanese made them ineligible to the right of freedom. Against the Taiwanese’s rebellious acts, the policy implemented on Taiwan had amply demonstrated the Japanese capacity for mercy. It was ungrateful on the part of the Taiwanese to demand national emancipation or liberal equality and to reject the assimilation policy. If any Taiwanese did not like the assimilation policy, they should simply leave Taiwan at once (TWMB 1924: 2).
Moyoshi gave the following reasoning in the justification of the colonial government’s assimilation policy:

“From the perspective of physical anthropology, the Japanese and residents of Taiwan are of the same race with only differences in terms of language and customs. The ancestors of the Japanese and the Taiwanese residents all originated from the south of China. And the Japanese share many similarities with the Taiwanese residents in terms of literature, ethics, religion, moral codes, thinking and etc. Therefore, the assimilation policy is of great value…”

(op.cit. TWMB 1924: 3)

Moyoshi also argued that as the Taiwanese had been given the opportunity to choose their nationality during the first two years of Japanese rule, whoever stayed behind had logically chosen to be Japanese citizens and should thus be loyal to the Emperor. Once the assimilation had been accomplished, there would be neither the need for a special law for Taiwan, nor for a Taiwanese parliament. The establishment of a Taiwanese parliament as advocated by the defendants violated the Japanese Constitution and constituted an attempt for independence. Moyoshi condemned the Petition Movement as inciting criminal acts (TWMB 1924: 3). Moyoshi’s accusations had in fact gone beyond the charge of the single incident of the violation of peace police law by the defendants but targeted upon the whole spectrum of the Taiwanese political movements. Such accusations had aroused heated objection from the defendants. Lin Youchun, Lin Chenglu, Chen Fengyuan, Jiang Weishui and Cai Peihuo were chosen to represent all the defendants, and point by point they refuted the accusations of Moyoshi.

Against Moyoshi’s accusation of the Taiwanese rebellious character, Lin Youchun argued that this was untrue as “all previous Governors-General have said that the Taiwanese people are gentle” (TWMB 1924: 14). He argued that according to his observation, upon early contacts, two nations (peoples) tended to have misunderstandings, which could not prove that these peoples were rebellious by nature. Should the government be wise enough to recognise and work on the misunderstanding, everything would turn out fine. Following this line of argument, Lin Youchun then turned to argue that if there were resistance, it was caused by the wrong governmental policy rather than by the nature of the people being governed.
Lin Chenglu’s discourse reproduced the type of arguments to be found in his writings that we have analysed above. He spent over two hours to state the basic ideas of the establishment of the Taiwanese parliament. Chen Fengyuan and Cai Pei-huo both focused on the de-legitimisation and the rejection of the assimilation policy. For Cai Pei-huo, assimilation detached one from one’s soul. While for Chen Fengyuan, the colonial assimilation policy stemmed out of the sense of superiority of the coloniser. But as culture could not be forced, assimilation was futile. To resolve the problem in Taiwan, he proposed federalism (TWMB 1924: 16).

Regarding assimilation, Jiang Weishui held the same viewpoint as the one expressed in Cai Pei-huo’s article, “Our View on Assimilation”, that assimilation should be a natural process instead of an artificial one. For him, assimilation was determined by the relationship between the quality of the culture and the size of the nation, not by the power relationship between the two parties. More importantly, Jiang Weishui made an interesting distinction between ‘nation’, ‘citizen’ and ‘race’. As he defined it, citizenship was a political and legal concept, nation was a concrete issue in anthropology, and race was based on the different physique, appearance and skin colour. Distinguished from one another on the basis of genealogy, history and culture, nation for Jiang was a perennial phenomenon. A nation included such elements as “the same blood tie, historical and spiritual consistence, a common culture, the same language and customs, and the same sentiments” (TWMB 1924: 19).

Although the Taiwanese could become Japanese citizens, no one could deny that they remained part of the Chinese nation, i.e. the Han nation.

Jiang further distinguished the relationship between nation and citizenship. In his words:

“In terms of relationship between nation and citizenship in today’s world, there are four types. (1) One nation, one citizenship: Germany, Italy; (2) Different nations, one citizenship: Switzerland; (3) Same nation, several citizenships: USA; and (4) one nation assimilating other nation: such as the Mongols of the Yuan Dynasty being assimilated by Han Chinese, or the barbarian (reads aborigines) being assimilated by the Taiwanese.” (ibid)

For Jiang the key binding force of a nation was common interest. He cited American independence from the British as example of one nation splitting into two states due
to interest conflict, and Switzerland as example of several nations joining one state for the common interest. The assimilation policy in this regard had no value. The priority was to find out the common interest for different nations in one country.

In my opinion, Jiang’s differentiation between nation and citizenship would be better captured in terms of the relationship between nation and state. Some of his arguments seem illogical and contradictory, for instance his categorisation of the US as one nation, several citizenships. But discerning from his argument about common interest being the binding force, he seemed to suggest that the Americans were part of the British nation, but had their own state and citizenship. Another problem is that the fourth type of nation assimilation seems out of the place to count as one type of relationship between nation and state (or nation and citizenship, as Jiang called it). Also the example of the assimilation of the aborigines by the Taiwanese might mislead the readers to think that he regarded the Taiwanese as one nation.

Jiang Weishui’s testimony shows that for him the nation-state was a mixture of ethnic and civic elements. While blood ties, ethnicity and culture are used to draw the boundary of a national community, nation-state for him remains primarily a political construct determined by common interest. In other words, to the extent that a common culture helps to define a nation, it is up to the people to seek the suitable political organisation to maximise their common interests. Jiang’s conceptualisation of the nation-state in effect rejects the ‘one nation, one state’ organic determinism entailed in the primordialist view of the nation and comes close to a more constructive and voluntaristic understanding of the nation-state. Based on his view of the nation-state Jiang Weishui denied the necessity of assimilation policy in colonial Taiwan: since common culture was no prerequisite for a nation-state, in a multi-nation empire like Japan, assimilation was not necessary for Taiwanese to become a good Japanese citizen.

As demonstrated by the speeches made in the public trial, the journal articles and documents, in their process of criticising and opposing Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese elites gradually developed a politicised Taiwanese identity. The Han Chinese ethnic consciousness of the majority of the Taiwanese served as a base for a ‘we-group’ identification. Given the colonial reality, the majority of Taiwanese elites could not envisage political connections with Mainland China and thus in turn strove for some kind of political self-rule on Taiwan. In the anti-colonial struggle, the
particularity and uniqueness of the Taiwanese was emphasised from the cultural perspective to justify the rejection of assimilation and the establishment of Taiwanese parliament. The political practice of the home rule movement pushed the Taiwanese elites to contemplate what made up of this unique subjectivity named Taiwanese.

5.4 The Cultural Dimension of Taiwanese Nationalism

When the Japanese finally pacified Taiwan in 1915, the only possible way for the Taiwanese traditional literati to put up some passive resistance was in the gathering of poetry societies. For these traditional literati, the writing of poems and verses in classical Chinese helped at least conserving Chinese culture in the face of Japanese cultural assimilation (Huang Junjie 2000: 14). The poems often expressed reverence towards the home country, China, suggesting the traditional literati’s strong Chinese identity. Whereas the literary practices in classical Chinese tradition persisted, the early 1920s also witnessed the emergence of a new form of modern Taiwanese literature with the unfolding of the Taiwanese New Literature Movement. Like cultural movements in other colonies, the Taiwanese New Literature Movement featured multilingualism and espoused a politically *engagé* spirit. Writers participating in this movement produced literary works in Chinese, Japanese and vernacular Taiwanese. Furthermore, the promotion of Taiwanese New Literature constituted, from the beginning, an integral part of the anti-colonial socio-political movement (Y. Chang 1999: 262).

Inspired by the May Fourth Movement in mainland China, in its early stage the development of Taiwanese New Literature largely copied its counterpart in

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48 Indeed, the elevation of Taiwanese cultural level also received attention from the leadership in their anti-colonial struggles. As our analysis of the elite’s political discourse in the preceding pages shows, one essential justification of the Petition Movement for the Establishment for A Taiwanese Parliament, was Taiwan’s cultural distinctiveness. Therefore, at the early stage of the home rule movement, the promotion of Taiwanese culture constituted one of the main goals. In the Charter of the New People’s Society founded in 1920 it is stated clearly that the goals of the society were “to study issues in Taiwan needing reform”, and “to promote Taiwanese culture” (Wu et al. 1995:83). The promotion of Taiwanese culture was also the key goal for the establishment of the Taiwan Cultural Association.
Mainland China. Although the first two issues of Formosan Youth already contained articles calling for language reform and the rejuvenation of contemporary Taiwanese literature, the literary movement really attracted attention from the whole literary community with the heated New Literature versus Old Literature Debate between 1924 and 1926. The younger generation of writers borrowed from their counterparts in Mainland China the ideas of adopting vernacular Chinese as the literary medium and the social function of literature in modern age. However, the promotion of Nativist Literature (Nativist literally meaning ‘village’, ‘rural area’, or ‘grassroots’) and vernacular Taiwanese in the 1930s signified an important change of the literary movement as well as a shift from the Chinese culture to an indigenous culture in the intellectual community’s cultural identification.

5.4.1 Taiwanese New Literature Movement in the 1920s: New Versus Old Literature

Before the 1920s, literary circles in Taiwan were dominated by the traditional type of literati. The major literary genre written and appreciated was traditional-style poetry written in classical Chinese. Inspired by the New Culture Movement in Mainland China (starting around 1917), the new generation of Taiwanese intellectuals agreed that Taiwan was in urgent need of a similar new culture movement, especially given the cultural assimilation and discrimination of the Japanese coloniser. In the inaugural issue of Formosan Youth published in 1920, an article titled “Literature and Its Function” written by Chen Xin (1920) raised the necessity of literary and linguistic reform in Taiwan.

49 The modern Chinese literary tradition was established in the New Literature Movement, also called the vernacular language movement between 1917 and 1919. Similarly, Literature Movement in Taiwan started with language reform. Intellectuals in both movements lashed criticism upon the traditional literary creation in classical Chinese, considering it a hindrance to the modernisation of China. Vernacular Chinese was considered to be the effective carrier of a new and modern culture that would enlighten the population and strengthen the nation. For an analysis on the relation between the two literary movements see Yiou Sheng-kuan, “Taiwan wenxue bentu lun de xingqi yu fazhan” (The Rise and Development of Nativism in Taiwanese Literature), M.A. thesis, (Taipei: Soochow University, 1991).
For Chen Xin, as literature was “the vanguard of a culture”, its development indicated the rise or fall of a nation. The key function of literature was to “advance further national culture and facilitate the survival of a nation” and this could be achieved through “disseminating enlightened ideas, awakening the masses, and promoting humane feeling and social reform” (1920: 41-42). Chen Xin criticised that the literary works written in Taiwan at the time only pursued stylistic refinement in difficult classical Chinese and thus failed to accomplish the *raison d’être* of literature. Consequently, Chen Xin advocated the development of vernacular literature where written language should be in identification with spoken language in order to fulfil its noble function. Chen Xin’s interest in vernacular literature disclosed Taiwanese intellectuals’ concern with the promotion of Taiwanese culture for the purposes of popular enlightenment and social-political reform.

Chen Xin’s criticism and proposal of the development of a new literature ushered in the public debate about literary reform in Taiwan in the 1920s. The discussion in this period focused on linguistic issues. As Chen Xin pointed out in his article the difficulty for the development of a vernacular literature in Taiwan was that Hoklo, spoken by the majority Taiwanese lacked its own writing system and it could not be completely signified by traditional Chinese characters. How to enlighten the masses by means of written vernacular became the major issue in Taiwan’s literary reforms. Language reform in Taiwan during this period was confronted with the reality of colonial rule. Under the colonial educational system, the promotion of Japanese language was intense and efficient. Some Taiwanese who were educated within the colonial educational system, commanded better Japanese than classical Chinese. But for nationalistic reasons, many Taiwanese intellectuals opposed the use of the Japanese language (Huang Zhaqin 1923a; 1923b; Huang Chengcong 1923). Vernacular Chinese, or Mandarin, in their opinion, was the ideal medium of communication and of literary expression for it was not only relatively easier than classical Chinese, but also a symbol of cultural ties with the mother country.\(^5\) The fact that *Formosan Youth*, and the later *TWMB*, had used Mandarin vernacular since it started publication in 1923 expressed the Taiwanese elites’ view on the linguistic

\(^5\) These intellectuals promoted the use of Mandarin vernacular rather than classical Chinese or Japanese. But they were ready to accept a compromised version of Mandarin which would incorporate components of local languages, namely, Hoklo and Hakka.
reform. As the single “mouthpiece of the Taiwanese people”, the journal provided the forum for the promotion of literary and linguistic reforms in Taiwan.

The leading figure in promoting Mandarin Chinese in the New Literature Movement was Zhang Wojun. A Taiwanese student studying in Beijing Normal University at the time, Zhang Wojun was a fervent admirer of Hu Shi, one of the initiators of the New Cultural Movement in Mainland China. In 1924, Zhang Wojun published two consecutive articles in Taiwan Minbao addressing the literary reform in Taiwan. In these two articles, Zhang Wojun expressed his view that Taiwan literature was an offshoot of Chinese literature and that the former should follow the development of the latter. He warned the literati in Taiwan that Taiwan literature would become an outcast of world literary circles if it persisted in its obsession with a time-honoured classicism and failed to keep pace with the revolutionary changes in the literary circles in China and Japan. For the New Literature Movement in Taiwan, Zhang Wojun set two tasks: “to develop a vernacular literature and to reform tai-oan-oe (vernacular Taiwanese)” (1924b: 6). Chang argued clearly that for him the vernacular language to be used was vernacular Chinese. The necessity of the linguistic reform and the way to carry it out were spelt out in details:

“Some people who claim to be radical argue: ‘Classical Chinese no longer works. We must use the vernacular. We must utilise the tai-oan-oe we use everyday.’ (…) In fact, ninety per cent of tai-oan-oe we use everyday cannot be transcribed. The reason is that our language is a patois, an inferior language without a written system, and a language whose most components are defective. No doubt it is of no literary worth. So our new literature movement has a task to perform: to reform tai-oan-oe. We plan to change our patois into a decent language that can be written down. We decide to draw on the Chinese national language to reform the Taiwanese patois. In other words, we plan to construct tai-oan-oe according to the Chinese national language. (…) If we can achieve this goal, our culture would not be separated from Chinese culture, the foundation of vernacular literature can be built up, and tai-oan-oe can be changed into a reasonable one. (...)” (ibid)

Here we see clearly that the importance of the linguistic reform went beyond the improvement of Taiwanese literature. The promotion of vernacular Chinese was also
about the preservation of ties between Taiwan and mainland China. It would be fair to assume that at this stage of the literary movement the cultural identity of Taiwanese intellectuals was still predominantly Chinese despite the fact that Taiwan had been a Japanese colony for more than two decades.

However, considering the fact that the majority of the population in Taiwan in the 1920s were either illiterate or barely educated in classical Chinese, Zhang Wojun’s ideal of adopting vernacular Chinese as a means of communication in Taiwan was not very realistic. Vernacular Chinese to the illiterate masses in Taiwan was nearly a new language as many words in spoken Taiwanese found no equivalent Chinese characters. Moreover, the colonial authorities’ intensification of the assimilation policy in the cultural front had to be taken into account. Therefore, disagreeing with the promotion of vernacular Chinese, Cai Pei-huo gave the priority to the construction of a written system of spoken Taiwanese. Instead of the ideographic scripts as the embodiment of Chinese culture, Cai Pei-huo suggested the use of alphabetic Roman script to create the written system for Taiwanese.51 Cai drew his inspiration largely from the practice of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church who used roman script to record spoken Taiwanese and to compile its dictionary. For Cai, based on the phonetic transliteration of the spoken language, the romanised Taiwanese written system would be easier for the population to learn.

Different from the advocates of vernacular Chinese, Cai Pei-huo did not see the necessity to enhance the link between Taiwan and Mainland China as he inclined to regard the Taiwanese as a community distinct from the Chinese. In two articles published in Formosan Youth, Cai (1920/10/15; 1921/03/21) discussed the Taiwanese ‘distinct national characteristics’ from such angles as geography, history, race and culture and came close to the conclusion that the Taiwanese was a distinct Han Chinese ethnic group shaped by their specific historical trajectory and geographic conditions. Despite his efforts, Cai Pei-huo found little support for his ideas of a romanised Taiwanese. This was evidenced by the fact that in the discussion of the creation of written vernacular Taiwanese in the 1930s the majority of the intellectuals preferred using existing Chinese characters in their efforts to reform Taiwanese.

51 For a detailed and in-depth analysis of Cai Pei-huo’s ideas and activities in the Romanization Movement, see Heylen, “Chapter VII. The Romanization Movement: the Other Perspective”, in Language Reform Movements in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, pp. 312-373.
5.4.2 Taiwanese New Literature Movement in the 1930s: Nativist Literature and Taiwanese Writing System

The term ‘nativist literature’ was first introduced into Taiwan’s literary circles by Zheng Kunwu in the early 1930s. Zheng (1931) stressed the importance of literary writing in vernacular Taiwanese but he failed to present any sound arguments for promoting xiangtu literature at the time. The term ‘xiangtu literature’ and his thinking behind it thus received little response. But when Huang Shihui (1930) expressed his view on literature in the same year the notion of xiangtu literature took on a crucial meaning. Convincingly and eloquently, Huang Shihui contended that:

“You are a Taiwanese; above your head is the Taiwanese sky; underneath your feet the Taiwanese soil; what your eyes see are the conditions of Taiwan; what your ears hear are news about Taiwan; the time that is passed is also Taiwanese experience; what you speak is the Taiwanese language. Thus that powerful and gifted pen of yours, that budding and productive, brilliant pen, should also write Taiwanese literature.”


By such a statement, Huang Shihui clearly expressed his fundamental identification with Taiwan as a geographic region and with Taiwanese history as a collective experience. Addressed primarily to writers, Huang Shihui further proposed that Taiwanese writers should “use the Taiwanese language to compose essays, poetry, fiction, folk songs, and describe things and events in Taiwan” (ibid). Neither classical Chinese nor vernacular Chinese could be used as both were, in Huang’s view, aristocratic languages accessible only to a minority of highly educated individuals in Taiwan. It was also a choice determined by the colonial constraints imposed upon the Taiwanese people. Huang was well aware of the fact that “people

[^52]: Huang Shihui’s article, “Zhenyang hu tichuang xiangtu wenxue?” (How Could One Not Advocate Xiangtu Literature) was published in the leftist journal, Wuren bao (Wuren News), Issue 9-11, August 1930. The journal was short-life due to its leftist stand and its circulation in 1930 counted around 3,000. The quotations used here in the text are taken from Lin Zaijue, Taiwan wenxue de liangzhong jingshen (Two Spirits of Taiwaese Literature), 1996:181-3.
in Taiwan are unable to use the Chinese language for political reasons and unwilling to use the Japanese language for nationalistic reasons” (ibid 182). Therefore, taking into account the practical social conditions of Taiwan, the establishment of a unique Taiwanese culture and the promotion of nativist literature became unavoidable.

Important for our understanding of Huang Shihui’s position was his active participation in the anti-colonial movement during the late 1920s. In 1927, Huang participated in the leftist ‘takeover’ of the Taiwan Cultural Association and was appointed afterwards to manage propaganda activities for the reorganised Association. However, Huang’s participation in the leftist and working class liberation movement did not lead him to call for a didactic literature, written to promote the class struggle. Rather, he placed native identity above a cross-cultural class affiliation “because what we write is to give to those closest to us to read and not specifically to people from far away, we want to depict events and use language that are the closest to us” (ibid 183). As Huang saw it, for writers to turn the labouring masses into an audience of their art, they must “stand up and promote nativist literature; stand up and construct nativist literature” (ibid 182).

Two years later, in response to another writer’s doubts that he was limiting the New Literature to only one class, Huang (1931) argued with even more vigour that the project of promoting nativist literature or written Taiwanese vernacular were beyond class distinction. For him, language was the foundation for the construction of nativist literature. Concretely, he urged writers to employ words in spoken Taiwanese, to increase the use of local idiom and slang, and to read the text with the local pronunciation.

The concrete task of promoting a written form of vernacular Taiwanese – Hokkien as it was spoken in Taiwan – was carried out by another helmsman of the nativist literature movement in the 1930s, Guo Qiusheng. In a series of articles Guo Qiusheng (1931a; 1931b; 1931c) justified the project of creating a written Taiwanese vernacular and the methods. Essentially, Guo shared the basic arguments of Huang Shihui regarding the necessity to promote nativist literature written in vernacular Taiwanese. He proposed to create written vernacular Taiwanese by two ways: (1) by using Chinese characters from both the classical Chinese and vernacular Mandarin;

53 That is, the minnan yu.
(2) by coining new words. For Guo, one source of the construction of written Taiwanese vernacular came from existing languages. So no matter whether it was classical Chinese, vernacular Mandarin, Japanese, or even Esperanto, as long as it helped expressing the spoken Taiwanese, it would be useful. Another source for the construction of the written form of vernacular Taiwanese was the rich body of folk songs and tales.

Guo’s accommodation of the Chinese language, both classical and vernacular, indicated his sympathy to Chinese culture. But the Chinese language meant for him in the first place an instrument for the construction of a vernacular language in Taiwan proper, which would stand on equal footing with the Chinese language. Such an attitude was common to most advocates of nativist literature: while acknowledging their Chinese cultural heritage they asserted the uniqueness of Taiwanese culture. Their deep concern over the development of Taiwanese distinctive culture under the Japanese colonial rule indicated the emergence of a novel sense of identity on the island.

The articles by Huang Shihui and Guo Qiusheng provoked heated debates among the Taiwanese cultural elites. Similar to the discussion on literary reform in the 1920s, the debate focused on linguistic aspects of the New Literature. The difference was that in the 1920s, the debate concerned the alternative between classical Chinese and vernacular Chinese whereas in the 1930s the alternative was between vernacular Chinese and the promotion of nativist literature in vernacular Taiwanese. The arguments of the opponents of a written vernacular Taiwanese remained similar to those presented in the 1920s by intellectuals such as Zhang Wojun (Liao Hanchen 1931/08/31; 1931/09/08). In brief, the criticisms of Guo Qiusheng’s endeavour to construct vernacular Taiwanese contended that from the linguistic perspective Taiwanese was not a qualified instrument for literary expression as on the one hand spoken Taiwanese was coarse and unformed, and on the other

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54 At the time, one of the leading socialist activists in the anti-colonial movement, Lian Wen-ching advocated and promoted the use of Esperanto in Taiwan in the belief that the spread of such a common language would lead to integration of the whole population. See Chang Yan-hsian, “shehuizhuyizhe: Lian Wen-ching (1895-1957)” (The Socialist: Lian Wen-ching), in Chang Yan-hsian, Li Xiaofeng and Chuang Yiong-ming (eds), Taizqn jindai mingren zhi (Biographies of Contemporary Taiwanese Celebrities), (Taipei: Zili wanbao, 1987), pp. 104-5.
hand, there existed such distinctive dialects as Hoklo and Hakka in Taiwan, and even the Hoklo dialect contained discernible Chaozhou and Zhangzhou accents. In a word, even on the level of spoken language there was no such thing as a uniformed and standard Taiwanese. Moreover, Chinese people would not understand written Taiwanese vernacular, and this would lead to the alienation of Taiwan from China. It would be logic, as the opponents to the vernacular Taiwanese argued, to carry on with the basic ideas of the New Literature Movement in the early 1920s, advocating the popularisation of spoken and written Mandarin in order to retain connections with China. Their views obviously testified to their distinct Han/Chinese cultural identity.

With the breakout of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the colonial authorities speeded up the process of assimilation and banned the Chinese section in newspapers and magazines. The number of Taiwanese writers writing in either Chinese or vernacular Taiwanese decreased substantially. Individual intellectuals' endeavours to create a standardised written form of vernacular Taiwanese in such a short interval had proven futile.

In the post-war Martial Law period, the legacy of the Taiwanese New Literature Movement was suppressed with the installation of Chinese cultural hegemony by the GMD. But some individual native Taiwanese writers carried on the tradition of the nativist literature in their literary creation. This paved the way for the revival of the nativist literature in the late 1970s. Given the peculiar context within which the Taiwanese anti-colonial movement operated – taking into account the Chinese cultural heritage and the imposition of Japanese culture – Taiwanese intellectuals’ nationalism under the Japanese colonial rule was “plagued with a sense of indeterminacy (Chinese or Taiwanese?)” (Y. Chang 1999: 264). Indeed, such indeterminacy would continue to affect the formation of national identity in post-war Taiwanese society.

5.5 Summary

In this chapter I have examined the historical emergence and development of Taiwanese nationalism under Japanese colonial rule. It was both the product of and the reaction against Japanese colonialism. On the one hand, Taiwanese nationalism
fell into the category of the ‘colonial nationalism’ as defined by Benedict Anderson (1991), which resulted from the colonial expansion of the imperial powers. From an external and material perspective, half a century of Japanese colonial rule acted as the passive force pushing for the formation of an in-group consciousness among the previously scattered Taiwanese population. Exerting a tremendous impact on Taiwanese society, Japanese colonialism led to a fundamental transformation of various aspects of Taiwanese society: economically, Taiwan entered into a process of modernisation; politically, Japanese colonial rule brought Taiwanese the first experience of a modern state apparatus; mentally, the imbalanced distribution of political power between the Taiwanese and the Japanese together with the assimilation policy cast the Taiwanese population into a collective whole opposed to the Japanese colonisers.

On the other hand, Taiwanese anti-colonial struggles and especially the discursive actions taking place within such struggles generated modern Taiwanese nationalism. And as argued in the theoretical part, the context of the nationalist movement had a determining influence on the choice of the model of a nation. Between 1895 and WWI, the Taiwanese population pursued their anti-colonial struggles largely through military means. However, as the leadership in this period were mainly Qing officials and some local nobility who retained their political loyalty primarily towards the Qing Court, these armed resistances were instances of proto-Chinese nationalism. Faced with the Japanese occupation, this traditional type of elites tried to fend off the alien threat and restore Chinese dynastic rule on Taiwan. A clear example is the short-lived Republic of Taiwan. The emergence of modern Taiwanese nationalism had to wait till the end of WWI with the rise of a new generation of Taiwanese intellectuals influenced by Western ideologies such as communism, liberalism, and nationalism.

While a new generation of Taiwanese elites with modern education emerged in the 1920s, their political ambition and chances to move upwards in the social ladder were restrained by the Japanese colonial structure. The colonial context also limited the prospect for the Taiwanese to become again part of the Chinese state. It was under these specific historical conditions that the new generation of Taiwanese elites began to perceive the whole Taiwanese population as a collective which deserved equal treatment with the Japanese according to the principle of self-
determination. As the analysis of the anti-colonial movement since WWI shows, the Petition Movement for the Establishment of A Taiwanese Parliament and the New Literature Movement were the two most significant campaigns initiated by the Taiwanese elites. While the Petition Movement addressed mainly the imbalanced power structure in Taiwan between the Japanese coloniser and Taiwanese population, the Literature Movement aimed to put Taiwanese culture on equal footing with the Japanese culture. Through their participation and reflection in these non-violent anti-colonial resistances, Taiwanese intellectuals came to the view that the people they stood to represent constituted a nation.

In the analysis of the Taiwanese intellectuals’ articulation and assertion of a common sense of Taiwaneseness from the perspective of nationalism, we can see that they had incorporated both civic and ethnic conceptualisations of the nation. On the one hand, ethnic and cultural differences between the Taiwanese and Japanese were used to testify that the Taiwanese constituted a distinct community. As the above analyses of the arguments given by Cai Pei-huo and Lin Chenglu show, the definition of a distinct Taiwanese people based primarily on cultural differences justified their rejection of Japan’s assimilation policy and the demand of political self-rule.

On the other hand, if we look at the concrete aim of the Petition Movement, although the Taiwanese elites held an ethnic understanding of nationhood and stressed cultural and historical links with China, they did not call for a full realisation of national self-determination according to the strict ethnic nationalist principle, i.e. one nation, one state when it came to the political configuration of the nation. While the Japanese high-handed oppression might be an explanation for this limited nationalist agenda, Jiang Weishui’s view on the relationship between nation and state indicated a civic dimension of the Taiwanese nationalist movement in this period. Although Jiang defined the nation by criteria such as ethnicity and culture, he did not hold an exclusive view of the nation, that is, the view that the cultural boundary of the ethnic nation should coincide with its political boundary. Through his differentiation of nation, citizenship, and race, and his understanding of nation-state as primarily a community bound together by common interests, Jiang seemed to defend a voluntaristic and civic understanding of nationalism.

What was more central to the construction of the Taiwanese as a distinctive people with its own unique culture and entitled to political self-determination was the
relation between Taiwan and mainland China. Looking at the divergent political tendencies of anti-colonial struggles in Taiwan from the early 1920s to the late 1930s, contemporary scholarship concludes that although a distinct Taiwanese consciousness began to take shape, there was not yet “a singular nationalist, anti-imperialist self-awareness” (Ching 2001: 56; Hsiau A-chin 2001: 46-47; Wakabayashi 1987: 289). We are also cautioned against viewing the formation of Taiwanese consciousness simply as a result of the interaction between the coloniser and the colonised as “the specifically historical and political character of Taiwanese neo-nationalist thought is truncated and complicated not only by its colonial relationship to Japanese colonial power, but also by its historical and cultural relationship to semi-colonized mainland China” (Ching 2001: 52).

In his nuanced analysis of the Taiwanese modern anti-colonial movements, Misahiro Wakabayashi points out that the emergence and evolution of Taiwanese anti-colonial movements were informed and influenced by various factors. On the one hand, on the ideological dimension, liberalism and Marxism were the two dominant tendencies that intersected with the movements. The ideological difference between these currents manifested itself through the elites’ different anti-colonial strategies. While the liberals opted for a gradual reformist approach, the Marxists favoured a revolutionary approach. On the other hand, Taiwanese consciousness was conditioned within the limits of Japanese colonialism and Chinese nationalism. In their ambitions for the future of Taiwan, Taiwanese elites diverged between unification with and independence from China. Looking into the different strategies adopted and the different visions of Taiwan’s future, Wakabayashi (1987: 291) develops the following typology (Table Four).\(^5\)

Type I includes mainly the anti-Japanese groups organised by the Taiwanese intellectuals residing in Mainland China. Not only did this group link the future of Taiwan with Mainland China, they also urged the revolutionaries in the Mainland to assist Taiwan in its anti-colonial struggles. Then Wakabayashi situates the right wing Taiwanese intellectuals engaged in the Petition Movement in Type II. Through moderate strategies such as political reforms these intellectuals fought against colonial discrimination and hoped for Taiwan’s eventual return to its motherland. The left

\(^5\) I have adapted this scheme by presenting only the structure of the typology without putting the different political groups, organisations and movements in each category as in the original table.
wing of the anti-Colonial movement, particularly the Taiwan Communist Party advocating revolutionary means to liberate Taiwan from Japanese colonial rule belongs to Type III as they perceived their liberation movement in parallel to that taking place in Mainland China. Finally, Wakabayashi puts the intellectuals engaged in the Nativist Literature Movement in Type IV as he considers that in their construction of a Taiwanese culture these intellectuals displayed a tendency to distinguish Taiwan from Mainland China.

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<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Revolution</th>
<th>Reform</th>
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<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reunification with China</td>
<td>Type I</td>
<td>Type II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Separation from China</td>
<td>Type III</td>
<td>Type IV</td>
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Table 4 Typology of Propositions of Taiwan Liberation

(Wakabayashi 1987: 291)

Multiplicity was inherent in Taiwanese nationalist discourse developed during this period of anti-colonial movements. In a similar way, Ching (2001: 54-56) has presented the following scheme (Table 5) for the classification of Taiwanese anti-colonial movements.

Liberalism

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<td>China</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td></td>
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Table 5 Classification of Taiwanese Anti-Colonial Movements

(Ching 2000: 54)
Liberalism/Marxism, Mainland China/Japan are the respective ideological and geographical coordinates structuring the development of Taiwanese anti-colonial movements. Within such a scheme different types of nationalist thought are located.\(^5^6\) Both Wakabayashi and Ching emphasise the fluidity of the relationship between the different types of nationalist thought. Over time individuals or groups might shift their strategies and vision for the future of Taiwan. Ching points out that the so-called Taiwanese consciousness emerging at the time was necessarily “a relational one drawing on a plurality of identifications that do not necessarily form antagonistic relationships with one another” (2001: 55).

It would be safe to argue that in the period of Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese intellectuals’ articulation of a unique Taiwanese consciousness was not a denial of Taiwanese’s Chinese identity. In fact, the Chinese identity “loomed large in the whole process of Taiwanese anti-colonial resistance” (Ching 2001: 7). But under the specific colonial setting, the construction of Taiwanese unique culture had veered towards a more Taiwan-centred view. This was evidenced by the construction of a written vernacular Taiwanese and the rise of native literature in the New Literature Movement. When we talk about the Japanese legacy, we should take into consideration the multiple factors shaping the Taiwanese identity in this period. Although from the 1930s onwards some Taiwanese intellectuals developed a more Taiwan-centred view, their endeavours to elevate Taiwanese culture to the same level of what was perceived as modern Chinese culture did not suggest any political or cultural antagonism to China.

\(^5^6\) Here Ching uses the term “neo-nationalist” instead of nationalist.
Chapter Six
Taiwanese Nationalism in the Martial Law Era
(1945 – 1987)

At the Cairo conference in November 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt promised Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi that “all the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China” (Su 1998: 24). In 1944, anticipating victory over Japan, the GMD government created a special Taiwan Investigation Committee to plan the takeover of the island and its future political structure. The committee favoured a provincial government with joint administration by the GMD and the military. The implication was that, once restored to China, Taiwan would be a special province governed by rules different from those implemented in other provinces (Lai et al 1991: 57). The GMD general Chen Yi was appointed as the Administrator-General of the Taiwan province and concurrently the chief of Garrison Command. With military and civilian authority centralised in his hands, Chen had more power than the governors in other Mainland provinces. His status was comparable to that of the previous Japanese Governor-General in colonial Taiwan.

In September 1945 Japan signed the document of unconditional surrender. On October 24, the management team of Administrator’s Office and Garrison Command headed by Chen Yi arrived in Taipei, shortly after the earlier arrival of two regiments of GMD troops including over 12,000 soldiers transported by US military. The next day, a ceremony and celebration took place to celebrate the return of Taiwan to the motherland. October 25 was set as the ‘Retrocession Day’ and has been celebrated as a national holiday in Taiwan ever since.

During the half-century prior to 1945, Taiwan and Mainland China had followed different historical trajectories: while the native Taiwanese struggled against Japanese colonial rule for self-determination, in Mainland China the GMD led by Dr. Sun Zhongshan overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and founded the first modern Chinese state, the Republic of China (ROC). In the ensuing decades, the GMD government fought hard to unify China, first pacifying warlords, then fending off the Japanese, and finally facing the challenge from the Communist Party. Despite half a century of separation from China, the Taiwanese welcomed the return to their
motherland. One should naturally expect the Taiwanese nationalist consciousness that had emerged under the Japanese rule to diminish since majority of the residents in Taiwan celebrated their inherent Han Chinese identity and the political reunification with the motherland.

However, in less than two years’ time, the local residents in Taiwan rose up in protest against the policies of the GMD-run provincial administration. The Home Rule Movement demanded in 1947 the right to political self-determination. The uprising was the so-called February 28 Incident. Immediately afterwards, martial law was implemented in Taiwan. This was to last for 38 years. The February 28 Incident marked the beginning of the post-war Taiwanese Independence Movement (TIM). Different from the colonial period when the emergent Taiwanese nationalism stood in the ‘us – them’ relationship with the Japanese colonial rule, this time Taiwanese nationalism came into open confrontation with the GMD’s version of Chinese nationalism.

The central aim of this chapter is to examine the resurgence and development of Taiwanese nationalism during the martial law period (1947-1987) with the focus on the nationalist ideologies from the perspective of the native Taiwanese. The chapter consists of six parts. Following this introduction, section 2 will focus on the disruption of the February 28 Incident and its impact on the rise of the post-war TIM. The central question in this section is as follows: considering the local Taiwanese positive attitude towards their reunion with the motherland, how are we to understand the resurgence of post-war Taiwanese nationalism in opposition with China in such a relatively short period of time? Contentious events are considered crucial in the sudden crystallisation of identity conflict between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Regarding the relevance of the February 28 Incident to Taiwanese nationalism I will investigate, on the one hand, the explanatory causes of the Incident, focusing mainly on the structural conditions in post-war Taiwan under the new GMD administration, and on the other hand, the process of the Incident and the subsequent chain of interaction between native Taiwanese population and the government, which ultimately triggered off the post-war overseas TIM.

Section three will describe the subsequent GMD rule on Taiwan during the martial law period from the perspective of nationalism. The promotion of GMD’s version of Chinese nationalism through authoritarian rule led to the polarisation of
post-war Taiwanese society along a new ethnic fault line dividing the Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese. Instead of erasing the Taiwanese consciousness that emerged under the Japanese colonial rule, the GMD’s efforts to re-sinicise local Taiwanese reinforced the native Taiwanese we-group awareness.

Section four will give a brief overview of the development of the opposition movements both within and without Taiwan. As the GMD exerted a more severe political control rule on Taiwan throughout the martial law period than the Japanese in the colonial period, it was therefore impossible for any organised opposition activities to exist in Taiwan proper. In this period the GMD’s principal challenger was the overseas TIM whose primary concern was to create an independent Taiwan. Inside Taiwan following some previous individual political opposition activities a more organised political opposition movement, the Dangwai movement, emerged and developed in the 1970s.

Although the Dangwai and its successor, the DPP, gradually developed its Taiwanese nationalist line in the 1980s, before the lifting of the martial law in 1987 the overseas TIM was the main carrier of post-war Taiwanese nationalism. In section five I will analyse in detail the nationalist discourse developed in the overseas TIM. Such a discourse includes the various arguments formulated by the leading dissidents in the TIM in their attempts to construct a Taiwanese nation.

6.1 The February 28 Incident and the Resurgence of Post-war Taiwanese Nationalism

Upon the arrival of the provincial government headed by Chen Yi in summer 1945, in Taipei alone some 30,000 local Taiwanese welcomed the GMD’s takeover and celebrated their return to the motherland (Rigger 1999: 55; Xu Xueji 1991: 160-161). But the situation changed dramatically in less than two years. On the evening of February 27 1947, the Monopoly Bureau agents beat a woman selling cigarettes on the black market and shot a protesting bystander. This small incident triggered off an island-wide anti-GMD revulsion. Riots broke out in the main cities of Taiwan in

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57 Local Taiwanese’s enthusiasm towards their return to the motherland finds was manifested by Taiwanese “zeal for national language” and the spontaneous boom of various Mandarin learning programs after the retrocession.
protest of the GMD rule and demanding the right to self-determination. In this study we adopt the term ‘February 28 Incident’ in referring to the incident and the ensuing chain of events as it is the common term used today. But as Lai et al. (1991: 6-8) rightly pointed out in their well-documented historical study, the violence perpetrated for nearly two weeks in this episode constituted rather an uprising or rebellion than an ‘incident’.

In the unfolding of the events after the February 28 Incident the antagonism and violent protests of the local Taiwanese towards the GMD administration and Mainlanders arriving in Taiwan after WWII contrasted sharply with their earlier enthusiasm. In 1945, the sudden emergence of Taiwanese nationalism was highly unlikely, if not impossible, in the minds of native Taiwanese elites. In retrospect, however, within a compressed period of time, that is, less than two years, the seemingly unlikely confrontation between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity came to be widely viewed by the native Taiwanese as being seemingly inevitable. The explanations are to be found on the one hand in the institutional, economic and social structural conditions that led to the February 28 Incident where Taiwanese identity came into conflict with Chinese identity, and on the other hand, the interactions between native Taiwanese and the GMD government in the unfolding of the Incident.

6.1.1 Initial GMD Rule on Taiwan (1945 – 1947)

At the time of the GMD’s takeover of Taiwan in summer 1945, the island enjoyed a much more advanced industrial level and higher living standard than mainland China. While mainland China lurched from crisis to crisis, Taiwan had experienced fifty years of relatively stable economic and social development despite the repressive Japanese colonial rule. The lack of mutual understanding and the ensuing confrontation were related to the vastly different experiences of the Chinese on the Mainland and those on Taiwan. The Taiwanese expected from the Mainlanders respect for their achievements and sympathy for their sufferings under the Japanese rule. But the GMD administration posed as the liberator of Taiwan and expected gratitude from the Taiwanese. It was also stated that having being enslaved by the
Japanese the Taiwanese needed re-education. With the history of Home Rule Movement behind them, the Taiwanese might have expected self-rule and democracy upon the return to their motherland. But having barely moved to the stage of constitutional rule, the GMD who just came out of the eight-year-long anti-Japanese war understood democracy as a gradual process that was contingent upon the elimination of their communist rivals. At the start, the contradictions between all these expectations made it difficult for the two groups to reach any consensus.

First, according to the guidelines for the Taiwan Provincial Administration, Administrator-General, Chen Yi was given the power to make laws to be implemented and enacted in Taiwan. The high-degree of concentration of legislative, executive and military power in the hand of Administrator-General bore much resemblance to the Japanese colonial rule according to Law No 6.3. Understandably, this had caused considerable resentment from the native Taiwanese (Tang 1997: 127-8). Concerning the distribution of positions in the Provincial Administration, the Mainlanders enjoyed a clear advantage over the native Taiwanese. Mainlanders occupied almost all top-level jobs in the administration. Compared to the Japanese colonial government, the Taiwanese share of official positions had declined dramatically, both in absolute and in relative terms (Tang 1997: 141-2; Lai et al 1991: 65-67; Phillips 1998: 297).

While the political tension deepened between the local Taiwanese and the new administration, particularly on the elite level, an economic crisis further shook the local population’s confidence in the new administration. Initially Taiwan’s economy suffered a setback after the Allied Force’s bombings of the island in 1945, which levelled various sections of some cities, devastated transportation facilities, and brought some manufacturing industry to a halt (Phillips 1998: 283). The planned economic policy under Chen Yi’s administration with its focus on strong state intervention in all economic activities failed to bring about a successful economic recovery. In addition, the establishment of the Monopoly Bureau controlled the supply and marketing of essential commodities such as salt, camphor, matches, liquor, and tobacco. Much Japanese property, public and private, was confiscated to the state

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58 The Administrator-General, Chen Yi, for instance, was alleged to have stated, “the Taiwanese had been ‘slaves’ of the Japanese, and would therefore have to [undergone] complete resinicisation before exercising full political-cultural rights” (op.cit. Fairbank et al. 1973:902).

59 Out of the 34 department heads and deputy heads, only 3 were native Taiwanese.
economic sector built by Chen Yi. As state intervention in the economy inhibited production and commerce, inflation increased, and living standards declined. Corruption of the GMD officials further aggravated the economic crisis, which in turn deepened the gap between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders (Lai et al. 1991: 71-87).

On the cultural front, the new administration discouraged the use of Japanese while promoting the use of Mandarin Chinese. It was expected that Mandarin Chinese would soon replace the Japanese as the language of instruction and education. The use of local languages was discouraged. The result of such an official language policy was the exclusion of the majority of Taiwanese elites, who were educated in Japanese, from the government positions. Such a policy led to further alienation of the Taiwanese elites and discontent of the populace. Within a year of the GMD’s taking over, inflation disrupted Taiwan’s economy, and famine occurred in Taiwan, which was then unprecedented. The disillusion felt by the Taiwanese was best illustrated by a popular saying at the time: “the dogs (the Japanese) left but the pigs (the GMD) come”. Many Taiwanese considered the GMD’s rule to be worse than that of the Japanese (Wakabayashi 1994: 68-70).

Economic and political tensions led to the divide of post-war Taiwanese society along new a social cleavage – the Mainlanders versus the local Taiwanese. Language differences served as the cultural marks to differentiate the two groups (Xu Xueji 1991: 175). This was when the terms ‘benshengren’ and ‘waishengren’ came to be used as the labels to designate the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders respectively. This social cleavage caused by political, economic and linguistic discrimination generated a new us-them identification pattern in post-war Taiwanese society and facilitated the crystallisation of a (sub-) ethnic division. This division was further reinforced by other factors such as the inefficiency of the understaffed new administration, the economic crisis, corruption, the military misbehaviour and the

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60 Mandarin Chinese in Taiwan is called guo-yu, literally meaning ‘national language’ while in the PRC is called putonghua, meaning ‘common speech’.

61 This saying first appeared in a poster. The Taiwanese complained that compared to dog (Japanese) which could at least safeguard the house (good social security under the Japanese rule), the pig (the Mainlanders) did nothing but eating and sleeping.

62 During the February 28 Incident, the local population used the knowledge of Taiwanese or Japanese as criterion to differentiate the Mainlanders from the native Taiwanese.
continuing influx of refugees from the Mainland. In just one-and-a-half years after the GMD took control of Taiwan, disappointment and disillusion prevailed in the Taiwanese society.

6.1.2 Interaction between the GMD Administration and Native Taiwanese in the February 28 Incident

Immediately after the incident on February 27th, local Taiwanese intellectuals, businessmen and gentries mobilised and organised various groups according to their ideological preferences. In their reaction to the incident, the Taiwanese elite made clear from very early on that their general political orientation was the demand of self-determination in the form of autonomy for local Taiwanese. The various political or social groups which sprang up after the incident can, as a whole, be divided into two camps, the radicals and the moderates, mirroring the situation of the pre-WWII anti-colonial movements. Comprised of many local-oriented organizations, the moderate camp sought a high degree of autonomy for the Taiwanese through institutional reforms. The more radical camp, championed by the People’s Alliance in Taizhong, was led by the former chairwoman of the Taiwanese Communist Party, Xie Xuehong. With the expansion of the anti-GMD movements, many members of the Alliance joined force in the February 27th Troops that were voluntarily organized by young students. Although military means were favoured in the struggle, the public statement maintained by Xie Xuehong made it clear that the aim of the armed uprising was to pressurise the GMD militarily to grant the Taiwanese self rule. It was not part of the communist revolution to overthrow the GMD rule by force (Chen Fangming 1991: 158).

The demands of autonomy and self-rule put forward by both camps revealed that the nature of the island-wide uprising was a Home Rule movement. Whatever means used, the ultimate aim was to change the political system so as to take care of the political and economic interests of the Taiwanese people. Mobilisation was carried out in local versus centre terms. The economic, political and cultural differences between local Taiwanese and the new migrants from Mainland China were not depicted in a nationalist tone. Hence, at this stage, for local Taiwanese national identity was not an issue. The best illustration could be found in the Forty-two
Demands of the Taiwanese put forward by the February 28 Incident Resolution Committee organised by the moderate native Taiwanese elites in March 1947.

The February 28 Incident Resolution Committee was organised on March 1, 1947, made up of delegates from the Taiwan Provincial Council, the Taibei City Council and other organisations. Chen Yi’s Administration not only tolerated the establishment of the Committee but also sent several officials to participate in negotiations. The Committee soon organised branches in other major cities in Taiwan to control street violence and restore social order. Most importantly, it provided the forum where the native Taiwanese elites organised themselves and formulated concrete demands for political reform on the island. On March 7, the Committee put forward its proposal to the Taiwan Administrator-General’s Executive Office and the GMD’s central government in Nanjing. At the same time, the proposal was made public in Mandarin, Hoklo, Hakka, English and Japanese. In sum, forty-two demands were included in the proposal (Li Xiaofeng 1992: 167-194). The Committee hoped to negotiate with the GMD’s Nanjing government on the terms of reform that would grant Taiwan the status of an autonomous region within the ROC. Up to this point, the Taiwanese elites unanimously strove for the realisation of Taiwanese self-rule under the GMD rule. Despite the conflict between local Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, the differences were not conceived in nationalist but in local versus centre terms, which might be resolved by autonomous rule.

Initially Chen Yi’s Administration responded to the situation with an expressed willingness to negotiate. This was evidenced by the Administrator-Office’s approval of and participation in the establishment of the Resolution Committee. However, the Resolution Committee was unable to control effectively the evolution of the events and violent conflicts continued to escalate. The GMD Nanjing government was also worried about the dangerous potential of communist influence in the revolt and decided to use force.

On March 9th reinforcement troops were sent from mainland China to suppress the uprising with military means. The Resolution Committee was ordered to disband. In a few days time, the GMD troops occupied every district of the island. Terror was followed with numerous arrests and killing in order to regain control over the island.
Martial law was implemented which was to last for the ensuing four decades. A large number of native Taiwanese elites were eliminated during the military repression. Up to today the exact number of people killed remains unknown. The calculations vary widely, ranging from 1,000 up to 100,000 (Lai et al 1991: 155-164; Li Qiao 1992: 214-218; 225-227). Lai et al. (1991: 164) find figures at both extreme ends unrealistic and suggest between 6,000 and 8,000. Taiwan witnessed a heavy loss of its elite during the repression. Nevertheless the claim that all or most of the Taiwanese elite were eliminated could not be qualified.

Whatever the exact figure of casualty was, there is no denial in retrospective view that the February 28 Incident had exerted tremendous impact on the identity formation on Taiwan. It was the kind of event – in the words of William H. Sewell – that yields a “transformative power that goes beyond such obvious political effects as redistribution of power or shaping of political strategies” (op.cit. Beissinger 2002: 15). As a consequence, it had the effect of changing “the cultural meanings or significations [of] political and social categories” and to “fundamentally shape people’s collective loyalties and actions” (ibid). After the February 28 Incident, the seemingly impossible idea of Taiwan independence became seemingly inevitable to many native Taiwanese elites who fled from Taiwan. The February 28 Incident marked the beginning of the post-war TIM. The significance of the tragedy only increased when discussions about it became a political taboo in Taiwan during the subsequent martial law period. Overtime it transformed into one important symbol of grievance of the native Taiwanese in the nationalist discourses.

As long as such identity-related issues as the February 28 Incident could not be discussed in the open in Taiwan proper, it was only possible for the emergent Taiwanese nationalism to challenge the GMD version of Chinese nationalism from outside Taiwan throughout the next four decades. The loosely organised overseas TIM was the manifestation of the rise of Taiwanese nationalism coming into

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63 On May 16 1947, Wei Daoming replaced Chen Yi as the Taiwan Provincial Governor. Before he was removed from his post in December 1948, Wei had suspended the martial law and called off the arrest of people involved in the February 28 Incident. However, the killings and arrests kept on. When the GMD’s defeat in Mainland China became imminent towards the end of 1948, Wei was removed from his post and Chiang Kai-shek’s confident, General Chen Cheng and Chiang’s eldest son, Jiang Jingguo, took charge of the island anticipating safe retreat of the GMD regime to Taiwan. On May 20 1949, martial law was enforced again, only to be lifted by Jiang Jingguo as late as 1987.
confrontation with Chinese nationalism. The change in the political and social structures in Taiwan with the arrival of the GMD regime after its defeat by the CCP in Mainland China in 1949 accounted largely for the impossibility of a post-war Taiwanese nationalism to develop in Taiwan proper.

6.1.3 GMD Rule between 1950 and 1986: Creating the Chinese Hegemony in Taiwan

On October 1, 1949, the Chinese communists declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the defeat of the GMD regime came to a decisive stage. The then acting president, Li Zongren, fled to the US and the GMD regime, under the tight rule of Jiang Jieshi, made an announcement of relocating its government to Taiwan. On December 7 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) moved its temporary capital to Taibei. Between 1949 and 1950 together with the exiled GMD regime another influx of an approximate 1 and half million Chinese arrived in Taiwan, amounting to one sixth of the total population of Taiwan in 1945. Until the organisation of the first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in 1986 and the lifting of the martial law in the following year, the GMD had maintained a strong and consistent rule on Taiwan. Contemporary scholarship generally adopts the concept of an ‘authoritarian regime’ as defined by Spanish scholar, Juan J. Linz, to describe and analyse the political regime on Taiwan between 1949 and 1987.

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64 The exact number of the population arriving in Taiwan between 1945 and 1955 varies in official sources and academic research. For example, Chen Yongshan and Chen Bishen (1990: 163-164) counted 1.02 million. Christopher Hughes (1997:27) took simply the official statistics which counted an influx of 2.5 million migrants from Mainland after 1945. In his analysis of the Mainlander’s national identity in post martial law Taiwan, Stéphane Corcuff (2000:47-55) studies in depth the number, origin and profession of the Mainlander and his estimation counts 1 and half million. As he rightly argues, the lack of exact estimation of the Mainlander population is not simply due to pure statistic problem but is complicated by political considerations.

65 In 1999 with the aim of promoting Taiwan studies, Academia Sinica, the highest research institute in Taiwan, organised in Taipei an international conference titled “Change of an Authoritarian Regime: Taiwan in the Post-Martial Law Era”. Juan J. Linz was invited as the guest of honour to give the keynote speech. All scholars presenting a paper in this conference used Linz’ work on authoritarianism as the theoretical framework to analyse the various aspects of the regime change in Taiwan. The
Legally speaking, Taiwan after December 1949 was still a province of China as the ruling GMD claimed itself to be the sole legitimate Chinese government and regarded Taiwan as the base for its campaign to ‘strive against Communism and recover the country’. The administrative structure developed by the GMD on Taiwan was thus limited by its constitutional claim to legitimacy. In reality the entire ROC state administrated no more than Taiwan Island, Penghu, and the offshore islands. The central government nearly overlapped with the Taiwan provincial government. The GMD used various legal, political and cultural arguments to legitimise its claim to represent China and to rule Taiwan.

In 1947 the GMD organised the last nationwide elections of the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan before the communist takeover. As a part of the state apparatus these representatives retreated to Taiwan together with the GMD regime after 1949. The National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were used to justify the GMD’s self-proclaimed legitimacy. Another legal justification was the ROC constitution. Originally devised for the whole of China, the constitution was drafted and adopted in Mainland China in 1947. The constitution further legalised the claim that the GMD was the only fitting party to rule China.

But at the time when the GMD engaged in the civil war with the CCP, in 1948 the First National Assembly added to the constitution a number of additional clauses, called the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (Temporary Provisions hereafter). Together with the imposition of martial law in Taiwan in May 1949, the Temporary Provisions and other ad hoc measures justified the postponement of the implementation of full democratic procedures stipulated in the Constitution, turning Taiwanese society into a police state overseen by a strong party dictatorship over the coming decades (Chiu 1993: 17-47). Most noticeably, the Temporary Provisions froze conference proceedings were later published later in an edited book titled Change of an Authoritarian Regime: Taiwan in the Post-Martial Law Era. Taiwan Studies Promotion Committee of Academia Sinica, Weiquan tizhi de bianqian: jieyan hou de Taiwan (Change of an Authoritarian Regime: Taiwan in the Post-Martial Law Era), (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History (Preparatory Office), Academia Sinica, 1999).

66 That is, based on the ROC’s constitution.

67 The ROC in reality administrates only two provinces, Taiwan province and Fujian province. The latter is made up with Penghu, and the offshore Jinmen and Mazu islands.
the democratic election on the general level as enshrined in the constitution, except for the representatives of the Taiwan province itself. The composition of the First National Assembly elected in Mainland China in 1948 was not to be changed. New nation-wide general elections were postponed till the elimination of the communist rebellion and the recovery of Mainland China.\textsuperscript{68}

Equally justified by the national crisis of the ongoing civil war with the communists, most constitutional constraints on the president were suspended including the limitation on presidential terms.\textsuperscript{69} The declaration of Taiwan as a war zone by the Legislative Yuan in 1949 further enhanced the president’s powers. As the central government overlapped the provincial government, the Provincial Governor of Taiwan and mayors of important cities such as Taibei and Gaoxiong remained appointed by the president (Gold 1986: 59-64).

However, political contestation on the sub-national level was permitted and institutionalised: Since 1950, direct elections for both executive and council positions at the county, township, and village levels have been held regularly. And in 1959, the provincial senate was replaced by the provincial assembly. Ever since then its representatives originally composed of delegates elected by country councils were produced by periodic direct election. Local elections served different purposes (Rigger 1999: 81-102; Liu Fei-lung 1992; Dickson 1997). On the one hand, Local level elections were used to demonstrate the GMD’s adherence to Sun Zhongshan’s Three Principles of the People and the practice of constitutionalism. However limited democracy this may be, it lent support to the claim that, ideologically, the GMD regime belonged to the ‘free world’ siding with other democratic nations and opposed to Mainland China under communist rule. It was also a strategic necessity for the GMD to lure support from Western countries.

On the other hand, as pointed out by many scholars, local elections in the 1950s’ Taiwan provided the GMD with a mechanism to co-opt local elites (Wakabayashi 1994: 125-146; Wang 1989; Winckler 1981). For the GMD, which originally had no social bases in Taiwan, the creation of an electoral system was the

\textsuperscript{68} National level supplementary election started in 1969.

\textsuperscript{69} In 1960 when Chiang Kai-shek was confronted with the constitutional requirement to retire from the presidency of the ROC after two terms’ service, he amended the Temporary Provisions so that the original constitutional limit would not apply as the regime was still engaged in the emergency stage of striving against the communists and recovering the country.
only way to win the support of local elites and to justify its legitimacy. Due to the GMD’s monopoly over the social and financial resources, the Taiwanese local elites had no choice but to join the GMD and cooperate with it. The GMD’s domination of local politics was obvious (Zheng Muxin 1987). However, local level elections did exert some positive impact on the later political development in Taiwan in the sense that they contributed to the cultivation of a participatory political culture favourable to the emergence of democracy.

Culturally, the GMD posed itself as the defender of the traditional Chinese culture. The GMD’s nationalist cry was to save the Chinese national heritage from the communists whose revolutionary rational aimed as the destruction of the old order. One measure to epitomise the GMD’s version of Chinese nationalism was the language policy. At the time of retrocession, Japanese was the language for administration and education. For the majority of educated Taiwanese in 1945, apart from their own respective dialects, Japanese was the common language for communication while Mandarin was only accessible to a few. In an effort to eliminate the Japanese influence on the local Taiwanese population and to re-cultivate their Chinese identity, the new provincial government in Taiwan launched in 1945 the Promotion of the National Language Campaign and demanded the phasing out of the use of Japanese by late 1946. Schooling began to be conducted in Mandarin. In October 1946, the Japanese language was banned from newspapers and magazines. Native Taiwanese writers were forbidden to write in Japanese. Fluency in Mandarin also became a primary requirement for attaining a position in the government (Chen & Chen 1989: 49-54).

The educational system was used effectively to cultivate the younger generation’s loyalty to the GMD regime and the Chinese state it claimed to represent. Dr. Sun Zhongshan’s Three Principles of the People became an essential part of the curriculum at both the primary and secondary levels. They were compounded with the teaching of traditional Chinese culture. The education of traditional Chinese culture was necessitated by the need for a strategic contrast with the CCP’s radical vision of a new Chinese nation according to its communist ideology. Representing itself as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture, the GMD further legitimised its claim of sovereignty over China. The compilation of curricula of such subjects as history and
geography presented a ‘national’ image of China. With its status as one single province in the vast China, the geography and history of Taiwan remained peripheral. More specifically, Taiwan’s colonial history was rewritten as part of the Chinese nationalist revolution. The GMD regime devised and engineered various cultural policies and movements, namely, the policy of Cultural Reunification between 1945 and 1960, the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement from the 1960s onwards, and the Campaign of Cultural Reconstruction from 1977 onwards. With the party’s effective control over the mass media, Chinese cultural hegemony was established firm and steady in post-war Taiwanese society (Chun 1994).

So far we have discussed the establishment of the GMD’s rule on post-war Taiwan from the perspective of nationalism. But considering the huge disparity in terms of territory and population between Mainland China and Taiwan, how did the GMD manage to fend off the communist takeover, consolidate its authoritarian rule in Taiwan, and even achieve an economic miracle by the 1980s? The explanation is to be found both in the geopolitical context and the economic reforms that had been pursued by the GMD since 1950.

When the GMD government moved to Taipei in 1949, it faced an antagonistic Taiwanese society after the February 28 Incident. The GMD owed much to the US for a rather smooth establishment and consolidation of its authoritarian party-state in the 1950s. Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, the US and the GMD-led ROC had formed a military alliance. The US had provided the GMD with military as well as financial support (Su 1998: 33-34). However, by the time the GMD and the CCP engaged in civil war in 1948, the Truman administration was fed up with the GMD’s corrupt and inefficient governance and withdrew most of its support to it. Washington awaited the end of the civil war to resolve the competition between two Chinese governments. The US government also sent overtures to the CCP to develop relations.71 By 1949, most foreign governments anticipated an imminent downfall of the GMD government and the CCP’s takeover of Taiwan militarily.

However, the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 changed the importance of Taiwan in the complex balance of power that evolved between the newly founded PRC, the Soviet Union and the US in the Cold War. The Truman

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71 As the US policy at the time strived for dual recognition of two Chinese governments, Mao Zedong rejected the establishment of relations with the US.
administration reversed its previous ‘waiting for the dust to settle’ position and regarded Taiwan afresh to be essential to the security of the Pacific and the US forces in that area. The US Seventh Fleet was dispatched to patrol the Taiwan Strait to prevent any attack on Taiwan from Mainland China. The re-evaluation of the strategic significance of Taiwan to the American national defence interests ensured the chances of survival of the GMD regime. As a consequence, the unfinished Chinese civil war was effectively dragged into the Cold War confrontation between the communist bloc and the West. A ‘no war, no peace’ stalemate set in, separating the two sides of the Taiwan Strait up till today.

Between the 1950s and the early 1970s, the US directly provided economic, political and military supports to the GMD regime on Taiwan. Militarily, the US Seventh Fleet was stationed in Taiwan Strait to provide protection. The GMD regime received from the US a total of over 2.5 billion dollars military aid and other technical support according to the Sino-American Mutual Security Agreement signed in 1954; economically, the US provided over 1.5 billion dollars in aid and opened its market for Taiwanese imports; last but not least, on the political front, the US lent support to the GMD’s claim to be the legitimate Chinese government so that it could keep its seat at the UN Security Council. International recognition, especially the holding of the China seat in the UN, helped the GMD regime to maintain the myth of being the legitimate government of the whole of China while it administrated only Taiwan (Su Ge 1998: 158 – 169; Wakayabashi 1994: 125 – 146).

One lesson the GMD leadership learned from its loss of Mainland China to the Communist revolution was the importance of sound economic management to the regime’s legitimacy and stability. After its retreat to Taiwan, the GMD initiated a series of economic reforms. The drive behind the development of Taiwan’s post-war economy has come from the expansion of manufactured exports that came after the 1960s. But the first stage of Taiwan’s dramatic economic transformation took place from the early 1950s to the early 1960s. Despite the advance of industry and urbanisation during the colonial period, the Taiwanese society remained predominantly rural (Zhang Fengrong 1995). 72 Consequently, the GMD’s initial

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72 For example, in 1952 more than half (56.1%) of Taiwan labour force was in the agricultural section and the agricultural production made up 35.9% of the total GDP.
economic politics in Taiwan after 1949 targeted the agricultural sector with the implementation of a land reform.

Between 1949 and 1951, the government imposed a rent ceiling and redistributed land confiscated from the Japanese to tenant farmers. Then in 1953, the Land-to-the-Tiller Act was promulgated limiting land holdings to about 3 hectares. Landlords whose property exceeded this limit were required to convert their landholdings into industrial holdings in governmental enterprises. The money and advisors provided by the U.S. contributed significantly to the success of the land reform. Its completion improved agricultural productivity, which laid ground for further industrialisation. Between 1949 and 1953, land reforms successfully altered the production mode of the Taiwanese society: the traditional structure of landlord-tenant division in rural areas was transformed into a land of small and independent farmers integrated in modern commercial networks. Landlords as a class disappeared entirely. From the political perspective, land reforms not only eliminated the only class in the Taiwanese society that could compete with the GMD, it also won the GMD the support of the farmers.

With the accomplishment of the land reform, throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the government continued economic reforms in other domains. With the economic and technological aid of the US, the government reconstructed the island-wide infrastructure and devised the development of an export-oriented economy based on the labour-intensive processing industries as the main economic strategy. Foreign investment, cheap labour, and export-orientation formed the three key elements that led to two decades of continuous economic growth. This resulted in the transformation of the agrarian Taiwanese society into an industrial one. The growth of the private economy created the sources of power independent of government

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73 The farm rent was limited to a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the total main crop yield.
74 The U.S. assistance to agricultural and land reform was made largely through the program of economic aid in the Sino-American Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction. For the years 1951-1961 the Commission appropriated US$6.8 million for all its major projects.
75 Between 1960 and 1970, Taiwan’s average annual growth rate of GNP was 9.7 per cent while that of per capita income was 6.6 per cent.
76 By 1980 the agricultural contribution took up only 10 percent of the total GNP while the labour force in the agricultural sector had dropped to 20 percent.
control.\textsuperscript{77} The continuous economic growth had transformed Taiwan into one of the four ‘tigers’ in South-East Asia in the 1980s (Gold 1998: 74-90 & 97-111; Wakabayashi 1994: 148-162). At the same time as a result of nine years of compulsory schooling and the expansion of higher education, there had been a rise in the general level of knowledge. The socio-economic conditions favourable to the shoots of democracy were clearly present.

As the GMD’s nation-imagination was highly contingent upon external legitimacy, mainly American support, the change in its international environment in the 1970s, especially with the Beijing-Washington rapprochement, created a legitimacy crisis for the GMD’s authoritarian rule. The loss of the UN seat to the PRC in 1971 and the eventual establishment of formal US-PRC diplomatic relations in 1979 not only refuted the credibility of the ROC claim to be the government of China but also undermined the myth of the GMD’s Chinese nationalism in the eyes of many native Taiwanese. As we will see in the analysis in the next section, the change of international environment and the GMD’s loss of external source of legitimacy stood in a causal relationship with the development of the opposition movement inside Taiwan in the 1970s.

6.2 Challenging the GMD’s Rule: the Overseas TIM and the Opposition Movements in Taiwan

6.2.1 A Brief History of the Overseas TIM

As noted, the genesis of the post-war TIM can be traced back to the February 28 Incident in 1947. After 1947, during the 38-year long martial law rule the advocacy of Taiwan independence, or, ‘separatism’, as the GMD regarded it, was strictly prohibited in Taiwanese society together with the ban on opposition parties and a free press. Pro-independence activities could only be carried out clandestinely or abroad after the February 28 Incident, some native Taiwanese elites escaped abroad and began to advocate Taiwan independence in exile. Due to historical links, in the immediate post-war period Japan hosted more native Taiwanese émigrés than any other country and it was in Japan that we witnessed the beginnings of the

\textsuperscript{77} In 1952, the ROC government controlled over half of Taiwan’s industrial production. Economic liberalisation in the following decades had reduced the figure below 10 percent by the early 1990s.
independence movement led by native Taiwanese elites.\textsuperscript{78} Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Japan remained the main intellectual and political centre for overseas Taiwan independence activities in the 1950s and the 1960s.

Prior to and during the February 28 Incident, some native Taiwanese advocated the idea that with the withdrawal of Japanese colonial rule Taiwan should be put under the temporary trusteeship of the United Nations before the Taiwanese people decided their future. Small sized organisations were founded to pursue the realisation of such an idea, including the Formosan Youth Alliance organised in 1946 and the Formosan Independence Alliance in 1947. The founder of Formosan Youth Alliance, Huang Jinnan, claimed himself to be the first advocate of Taiwan independence. After the February 28 Incident, these organisations considered the idea of UN trusteeship no longer feasible and decided to appeal for Taiwan independence. To achieve independence, international support, especially that from the US, was considered valuable. Upon Huang Jinnan’s persuasion, Liao Wenyi, one of the principal organisers of the Hong Kong based Formosan League for Re-emancipation, decided to join in the independence movement.\textsuperscript{79}

Together with other pro-independence activists Liao Wenyi founded in Japan the Formosan Democratic Independence Party in 1950 and in 1956 the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa with Liao elected President of the

\textsuperscript{78} According to Douglas Mendel (1970:147), in the 1960s approximately 25,000 native Taiwanese lived in Japan, most of who emigrated from Taiwan before 1945 for economic reasons. Around 1,000 Taiwanese elites escaped to Japan after 1947, including almost all the pro-independence activists over the age of 45.

\textsuperscript{79} As both Liao Wenyi and his brother, Liao Wenkui received their doctoral degrees in American universities (Liao Wenyi obtained a doctorate in engineering from Ohio University and Liao Wenkui a doctorate in sociology from University of Chicago), activists in the independence movement, especially Huang Jinnan, considered their participation in the movement to be highly valuable, particularly in lobbying the US support for their course. Till mid-1948, despite his active involvement in politics, Liao Wenyi did not aspire to Taiwan independence. This was evidenced by the so-called ‘guiding principle’ of the Taiwan People’s Alliance organised by Liao Wenyi in May 1948. This ‘guiding principle’ advocated the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek’s rule on Taiwan and the establishment of a democratic and independent government representing all people’s interests. Once democracy was well established in the whole of China, Taiwanese people should hold a referendum to decide on Taiwan’s joining the Chinese democratic federation as one federated state. See Huang Shaotang (1994:198).
Republic. The party organ was *Taiwan Minbao*, taking after the newspaper published by the activists in the Taiwan Home-Rule Movement under the Japanese colonial rule. Liao Wenyi dominated the Provisional Government after its foundation for a decade and was long regarded as the leading expatriate pro-independence Taiwanese by the GMD, Japanese and Americans. But similar to the Home Rule Movement in the colonial period, factionalism plagued the post-war overseas TIM. Before Liao Wenyi’s defection to the GMD government and his renouncement of Taiwan independence in 1965, several other activists resigned from the movement or created splinter parties.

Another important splinter independence organisation was the Formosan Youth Association organised in 1960 by the native Taiwanese scholar Wang Yude. The Association published the periodical *Formosan Youth* in Japanese. The periodical took after the spirit and tradition of *Formosan Youth* established by overseas Taiwanese students such as Lin Chenglu in the 1920s to advocate Taiwan independence and the notion of self-determination (Mendel 1970: 157). In 1966, the

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80 In the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement, ‘Formosa’, ‘Formosan’ were often preferred to ‘Taiwan’ and ‘Taiwanese’ as the signifiers of the area and the people respectively when expressed in English. Such a preference, as explained by some advocates of Taiwan independence, is intended to draw a distance between Taiwan and China as these two words are not Chinese but of Portuguese origin. In the word of one scholar: “the ‘I am a Formosan’ self-identification often carried the connotation ‘therefore I am not Chinese’” (Tu Weiming 1998: 79). Such a symbolic choice of words exemplified the efforts made by the pro independence activists to differentiate themselves from the Chinese.

81 There were various reasons for Liao Wenyi’s defection in 1965. Apart from the lack of international support and factionalism among the independence movement, the GMD’s repression played a decisive role. Liao Wenyi renounced his activities in the independence movement in order to save his nephew from the death sentence. After defection, Liao Wenyi was appointed to the post of deputy chairman of the Commission supervising the new Zengwen Dam, for which his engineering background ideally suited. He died in Taipei in 1986.

82 It is the opinions of some experts on Taiwan that disunity and factionalism are inherent in Taiwanese due to the long tradition of inter-village and inter-clan conflict throughout history (e.g. Mendel 1970: 149).

83 Originally, Wang Yude joined the Provisional Government led by Liao Wenyi upon his flight to Japan in 1949. But as Wang Yude and Liao Wenyi had very different understandings regarding the history of Taiwan and the independence movement, Wang went his own way because of these “honest differences”.
Association was renamed United Young Formosans for Independence to differentiate itself from a similar student organisation in the US.

In the late 1950s, the number of Taiwanese students studying in the US increased significantly, due to the cooperation between the US government and the GMD. Influenced by the idea of Taiwan independence, some of these students also joined the movement. Up to 1965, there existed only a limited number of pro-independence student groups active in various parts of the US, with little coordination. Among these local groups, Formosans’ Free Formosa (3Fs) founded in 1956 in Philadelphia was the first as well as the most significant (Chen Mingcheng 1992: 80-89). In 1970, a majority of such student organizations all over the world united under the banner of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), with its headquarters in New York, an underground Taiwan branch in Taipei, an American branch in Los Angeles, a Japanese branch in Tokyo, a European branch in Paris, and a South American branch in São Paulo. WUFI sought to promote the idea of independence for Taiwan on an international platform through various means, such as journals, demonstrations and seminars. The overseas TIM activists consisted mainly of native Taiwanese and most of them had a high level of education. In retrospect, overseas TIM remained essentially an elitist movement and had only very limited impact on the development of the Taiwanese society.

6.2.2 Political Opposition Movements in Taiwan

Before 1970, although severe repression made it impossible for an organized opposition movement to be active in Taiwan proper, a number of intellectuals continued an individual struggle for democracy despite the threat of imprisonment.

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84 In the 1950s over 2000 Taiwanese students went to study in the US annually. The number only increased over time.

85 These organizations include the Young Formosans’ Free Formosa (Japan, 1950s), the United Formosans in America for Independence (the US, 1966), the United Free Formosa (Taiwan, 1964), the United Formosans for Independence in Europe (Europe, 1967) and the Canadian Committee Supporting Formosan Human Rights (Canada, 1964).

86 In his case study of the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement activists, Shu Wei-der (2002) concludes that typically the activists are native Taiwanese, and seventy-five percent of them were awarded at least a master’s degree.
and the death penalty. The strong moral revolt expressed by their resistance was very much in line with what was being done at the same time by dissidents under other authoritarian regimes, for instance, in Eastern Europe. In the 1950s, the challenge to the GMD’s authoritarian rule came first from some liberal-minded Mainlander elites whose strong belief in liberalism led them to question the highly authoritarian and personality-oriented political order. The Mainlander intellectuals advocated political reform and constitutional democracy. Most notable was the group epitomised by Lei Zhen, editor of the journal *Free China Semi-Monthly*. Individual dissidents made their voices heard and strove to reform the authoritarian nature of the state apparatus through an active political participation. These Mainlander intellectuals had different grievances than the native Taiwanese political elites, but both groups shared common concerns in their aspiration for democracy. And in 1960, these two groups joined forces in an attempt to form the China Democratic Party. This attempt failed after Lei Zhen’s arrest and imprisonment.  

In the late 1960s the debate on the political order in Taiwan entered a new phase. A new generation, whose political and social orientations were moulded by the conditions prevailing in post-war Taiwan and by experiences of rapid economic and social development, entered the political scene (M. Huang 1976). Although in terms of their social positions and political strategies, this young generation of critics shared some similarities with the dissidents of the 1950s, the two generations differed considerably in their political aims. Like their predecessors, the key members of the 1960s were intellectuals, organised around a magazine, in this case *The Intellectual*. While criticising the existing political order, they advocated political reforms which would lead to the full representation of Taiwan’s inhabitants in the national parliamentary bodies (i.e. the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan). Taiwan’s international position was another concern for these intellectuals. As revealed by their motto ‘Reform and protect Taiwan’, political reforms had in their view also to strengthen the ROC’s position *vis-à-vis* the PRC. Although at the time these young intellectuals were able to exert limited influence on the political course, the topics they introduced into the political debate became part

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87 Before the proposal of forming the opposition party got off the ground, Lei Zhen was arrested under the charge of association with communist agents and was given a ten-year prison sentence after a military court trial.
and parcel of the political programme of the opposition movement which developed during the 1970s.

In the 1970s, the drastic changes in the international environment and the diplomatic setbacks compelled the GMD elite to initiate political changes. In order to increase internal support and legitimacy, the GMD under Jiang Jingguo initiated two processes: the indigenisation of the GMD and the liberalisation of the regime. The process of indigenisation of the GMD was also called the process of Taiwanisation.\(^{88}\)

The process of Taiwanisation took place both at the party’s top level and at the grass-root level. Between 1972 and 1976 as a result of the active recruitment of new blood from the native Taiwanese the GMD gradually transformed from a Mainlander-majority party into a Taiwanese-majority one with over half of its members being native Taiwanese. The percentage of native Taiwanese elites in the Central Standing Committee – the power core of the GMD – also increased significantly. The recruitment and incorporation of native Taiwanese elites in political life was not only a strategic move to gain internal legitimacy but also a necessity with the aging of many parliamentary members elected in 1948.\(^{89}\)

In 1969, the GMD conducted supplementary elections to fill vacancies among the representatives of Taiwan in the three national parliamentary bodies. After 1972 these supplementary elections were held at regular intervals. Although the supplementary elections only opened up a small number of seats for contention, the electoral campaigns were intense. Some non-GMD politicians came to realise the necessity of coordination and the eventual creation of some sort of organisation in their competition against the GMD for resources and supports. In 1977’s local elections, a handful of non-GMD candidates made efforts to coordinate their campaigns. Subsequently, the term ‘Dangwai’, meaning ‘outside of the party’ was introduced by the media to refer to these candidates. The result of the election proved the positive effect of coordination on Dangwai’s performance.\(^{90}\) In 1978, the non-

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\(^{88}\) For a definition of Taiwanisation, see Bruce Dickson (1997: 122).

\(^{89}\) For the statistics and analysis on the process of Taiwanisation of the GMD, see Dickson (1997: 113-130) and Wang Zhenhuan (1989: 91-92).

\(^{90}\) In that year’s elections, Dangwai won twenty-two seats in the seventy-seven-member Taiwan Provincial Assembly and four out of twenty mayor or country magistrate posts, an impressive increase as compared to the previous elections.
GMD candidates formed the *Dangwai* Campaign Corps to coordinate the campaigns in the supplementary election of that year.

In May 1979, *Dangwai* politicians decided to launch a new party in defiance of the party ban. To achieve this objective, they founded the magazine, *Formosa*, both as an instrument to propagate their political ideas and as an organisational core for a new party.\(^91\) The organisation of the opposition forces into an embryo party exerted growing pressure on the GMD (Wang Zhenhuan 1989:97). On December 10, 1979, following the outbreak of violent clashes between the police and the oppositions in a large demonstration sponsored by *Formosa* in Gaoxiong, more than 100 *Dangwai* leaders were arrested and sentenced from several years to life imprisonment for sedition or inciting the crowd to riot. This event came to know as Gaoxiong Incident, or Formosa Incident.

As a reaction, the opposition movement took a nationalist turn in its ideology. As Wang Fuchang’s analysis of the two principal *Dangwai* magazines, *Taiwan Political Review* (1975), *Fomosa* (1977), shows, up to 1979 the opposition followed the same approach as the dissident activists in the preceding two decades and appealed primarily to democratisation and Taiwanisation of the political system through electoral participation. When the opposition elites touched upon the issue of discrimination between the native Taiwanese and Mainlanders, they did not yet perceive the issue in nationalist terms (Wang Fuchang 1996: 155-165).\(^92\) But the advocacy of Taiwanese nationalism was introduced as a key theme in the post-1979

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\(^91\) In the 1970s, several *Dangwai* magazines were founded and owned by different *Dangwai* figures and reflected the owners’ personal views on issues, for instance, *Taiwan Political Review* founded by Huang Xinjie and Zhang Junhong and *The Eighties* by Kang Ningxiang. When *Formosa* was founded in 1979, with the exception of Kang Ningxiang almost all important *Dangwai* figures were included in its editorial board. In addition to its main office in Taibei, the *Formosa* set up various branch offices in many cities and small towns. Throughout 1979, the *Formosa* organised mass protest activities all over Taiwan.

\(^92\) Elsewhere, the interview with former DPP chairman, Xu Xinliang also proves that prior to Kaohsiung Incident national identity was not a priority issue for the opposition. As Xu explains, at the time, “we were basically opposition activists, opposing together the GMD’s one party authoritarian rule. The issue of national unification and independence was not the central theme at the time, thus it found no place in the opposition’s agenda.” (Quoted in Editing Group of the Oral History of Kaohsiung Incident (eds), *Meiyou dangmin de dang: koushushi (A Party Without a Name: Oral History)*, (1999: 83).
emerging body of opposition magazines and intertwined with the demand for democracy. As an opposition strategy, the radicals in the dissident movement opted for mass mobilisation and street protests (Zhang Yanxian 2001).

The coupling of democratic legitimacy and Taiwanese identity led the Dangwai to increase their confrontations with the regime over the sensitive issues of provincial origins and Taiwan’s relations with the Mainland China. For the Dangwai leaders, democratisation implied the redistribution of power between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, on the one hand, and the redefinition of Taiwan’s international status according to the principle of self-determination. The evidence of the radicalisation of the opposition’s ideology can be found in the common campaign platform put forward by Dangwai before the 1983 supplementary election to the Legislative Yuan. The principle of self-determination was highlighted in the platform, stating that “the future of Taiwan should be determined by all inhabitants in Taiwan.”93 Despite the fact that some Dangwai elites might have had their reservations over the notion of self-determination,94 the incorporation of this principle in the election platform signified the challenge to the GMD’s official nationalism and its idea of national unification from the perspective of Taiwanese nationalism (Wang Fuchang 2001: 171-172). From then on, the opposition moved from the previous challenge to the GMD’s undemocratic practices and system to challenging the fundamental ideological base and legitimacy of the ROC.

However, one should not consider that a new Taiwanese identity was suddenly ignited by the conflict in the Gaoxiong Incident. As argued earlier in this chapter, the February 28 Incident in 1947 had resulted in a polarisation of the Taiwan society along the native Taiwanese-Mainlander cleavage. Although the active articulation of the Taiwanese identity, let alone the advocacy of the idea of Taiwanese independence, was strictly forbidden, the suppression itself in turn could only intensify the sense of difference. That a certain Taiwanese consciousness developed overtime like an undercurrent in post-war Taiwanese society can be found in the emergence of the Xiangtu Literature in the 1970s whose root can be

93 For the full list of the common political views put forward as Taiwan’s election platform for 1983’s Legislative Yuan supplementary election, see Annex 1 in Wang Fuchang (2001: 203-204).

94 One of the key Dangwai leaders, Kang Ningxiang, expressed openly and on several occasions his reservation towards the advocacy of the principle of self-determination.
traced back to the New Literature Movement in the Japanese colonial period. While acknowledging the tenuous links between literary practices and the formation of Taiwanese national identity, opposition movements in Taiwan did not formulate explicit nationalist claims in this period. Unequivocal nationalist discourses in the period existed predominantly in the overseas TIM. As nationalist ideologies form the central subject under investigation in this work, in the following analysis I will focus on the nationalist discourses of the overseas TIM.

In 1986, Dangwai broke the GMD’s ban on parties and founded the first opposition party in Taiwan, the DPP. The GMD’s tolerance of such a move and its.

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95 From a macro perspective, anti-communism and nostalgic longing for the Mainland formed the two central themes in Taiwan’s literary writings in the 1950s; in the 1960s the domination of Modernism imported from the West in the literary circle was a consequence as well as the reflection of Taiwan’s economic and political dependency on the US. The emergence of the Xiangtu Literature Movement in the 1970s should be viewed as a reaction to the two previous tendencies and the socio-political background they represented. The rapid growth of the body of Xiangtu literature works in the 1970s not only ran parallel to but interwoven with the political movement during the same period. The fact that two prominent Xiangtu writers, Wang Tuo and Yang Qingzhu participated actively in the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 and were sentenced to jail terms signifies the heavy political connotation of Xiangtu literature. The literary journal, China Tide, was the main forum where the theoretical underpinning of political opposition as well as of Xiangtu literature was developed. Its articles criticised the government’s social and economic policy and called for more attention to be paid to the well-being of the working class and peasants. Consisting mostly of works of fiction, the emergent Xiangtu literature depicted typically the reality of insignificant nobodies in both rural and metropolitan Taiwan. Since most characters portrayed in Xiangtu literature are native Taiwanese in poor and hopeless situation, the use of dialectal expressions became one of its inevitable traits. ‘Xiangtu’ and ‘reality’ were the two key words in this group of writers’ literary discourse. Although Taiwanese nationalists often argue in retrospect that the Debate on Xiangtu Literature taking place in 1977-1978 contributed significantly to the formation of Taiwanese consciousness, more objective analysis on the literary development and the Debate suggest that national identity was not the primary concern in the debate. So far as the Xiangtu literary works helped forming the identification with the place and the reality of Taiwan, the principal Xiangtu theoreticians at the time intended mainly to defend a new variant of literary writing which could be labelled as ‘social realism’. The focus on the reality of Taiwan was both the rejection of imported modernism from the West and the China-oriented nostalgic literature. Due to its lack of explicit discussion on identity, I choose here not to take the Debate on Xiangtu Literature as part of the discourse analysis. For detailed analysis of the Xiangtu Literature and the 1977-8 Debate, see Chen Ai-li (1991), The Search for Cultural Identity: Taiwan’s “Hsiang-t’u” Literature in the Seventies; Zhang Wenzhi (1993: 17-26), Dangdai wensue de Taiwan yishi ( Taiwanese Consciousness in Contemporary Literature).
decision to lift martial law the following year marked a new phase in Taiwan’s process of democratisation and the development of Taiwanese nationalism. In the ensuing years, pro-independence organizations sprang up throughout Taiwan\textsuperscript{96} while at the same time activists in the WUFI gradually returned. The process of democratisation made it possible for political parties and civil organizations to promote the idea of Taiwan independence. The nationalist ideas were disseminated through all forms of media, such as radio, television, newspapers, journals and the internet, and other legal activities such as mass rallies, demonstrations and election campaigns. National identity became a central issue in the electoral mobilisation. TIM moved from the underground out into the open, from overseas to Taiwan, and from the illegal to the legal. It was during the martial law period that the native Taiwanese dissidents in both the overseas TIM and Taiwan’s opposition movement established and developed the intellectual and theoretical base of the Taiwanese nationalist discourse. In the section below I will elaborate in detail the evolution of Taiwanese nationalist thinking by various political and cultural elites throughout this period.

6.3 Diverging Conceptualisations of the Taiwanese Nation in the Overseas TIM: People, History and Language

As mentioned above, between the 1950s and 1970s, the promotion of Taiwanese nationalism was most visible and active amongst overseas pro-independence activists. Through their writing and political activities, these activists advanced their view of the Taiwanese nation. The idea of Taiwan independence was mainly justified by the historical (re-)interpretation of Taiwan’s development, the formation of its people and language.

\textsuperscript{96} Besides the DPP, another political party, the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), which made the establishment of an independent Taiwan State its political priority, came into being in 1996. Numerous civil organisations promoting independence emerged. Apart from WUFI, the emerging influential pro-independence organizations included the Taiwan Association of University Professors (founded in December 1990) and the Mainlanders’ Association for Taiwan Independence (founded in August 1995).
6.3.1 The Liao Brothers: Nation by Blood and/or Nation by Historical Formation?

Today’s scholars of Taiwanese nationalism generally believe that in the 1950s, the various organisations and individuals affiliated with the Provisional Government of the Republic of Formosa made little theoretical contribution on the subject of Taiwanese nationalism. At most, they would count only Liao Wenyi’s *Taiwan Democracy* published in 1956 as the single evidence of the attempted construction of some theoretical basis for Taiwan independence (Huang Shaotang 1994: 200). In this work, Liao Wenyi gave his definition of the Taiwanese nation. As he understood it, the Taiwanese had formed a Formosan nation distinct from the Chinese nation. Liao did not deny the fact that the ancestors of the Taiwanese emigrated from Mainland China. But throughout time, these Chinese émigrés had evolved into a nation of mixed blood as a result of intermarriage with members of other races and nations. In his own words, Liao Wenyi argued that:

“Today’s Taiwanese have their inheritance from the Indonesian, Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, Fujianese, Cantonese and Japanese; in other words, Taiwanese blood is a mixture of the Aboriginal, Han Chinese, Japanese, Latin and Teutonic races” (op.cit. Huang Shaotang 1994: 200).

In this book Liao Wenyi also tried to give some historicity to the newly founded Republic of Formosa over which he presided. In his interpretation, following the regime of Zheng Chenggong (1661-1683) and the Republic of Taiwan (1895), the founding of the Republic in 1956 was the third wave of the state building movement by the Taiwanese nation (Zhang Yanxian 2000). 

Considering the fact that up to 1948 Liao Wenyi did not question his own identity as a Chinese while advocating political autonomy for Taiwan, it would be hard to believe that he truly accepted the theoretical validity for distinguishing Taiwanese nation on the base of mixed blood. In fact Liao Wenyi’s idea of

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97 This part of the text by Liao is also available online, http://www.twcenter.org.tw/wu02/wu022/08/0801_2.html, accessed on 21/09/2002.
98 As Li Xiaofeng (1994) demonstrated in his analysis, the change of Liao Wenyi’s national identity was caused partly by the negative experience of the post-war GMD rule and partly by his personal setbacks in political career.
nationhood was much influenced by the thinking of his brother, Liao Wenkui who had experienced a similar shift in national identity, changing from being an ardent Chinese nationalist to a dissident in the TIM. According to Wu Rwei-ren, *Formosa Speaks* written by Liao Wenkui in 1950 was “the key matrix from which the post-war Taiwanese nationalist discourses originated” (1999: 49). A compilation of four articles, *Formosa Speaks* systematically justified – from the perspectives of history, economics, political situation and international law, the Taiwanese claim to self-determination and independence. The Formosan League for Re-emancipation in Hong Kong published the book and submitted it to the UN as the memo for the petition to put Taiwan under UN’s temporary trusteeship.

Liao Wenyi’s often-quoted mix-blood thesis resembled strikingly one argument made in the last chapter of *Formosa Speaks*. To justify the proposition that Taiwanese people enjoyed the right to national self-determination, Liao Wenkui set out in this book to prove that the Taiwanese constituted a ‘nation’. But a careful reading of the rest of the text against an understanding of the evolution of Liao Wenkui’s philosophical and political thinking shows that such an argument based on the primordial view of the nation was put forward by Liao Wenkui more as a strategic move for an easy and clear differentiation of the Taiwanese from the Chinese.

Looking at Liao Wenkui’s past publications and his education formation, Wu Rwei-ren demonstrates that for Liao Wenkui, nation formation was determined first and foremost by the environment, both geographical and political (54-77). Thus, in his evolutionary historical narrative Liao Wenkui depicted Taiwanese history as a

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99 Liao Wenkui (1905-1952), graduated from Nanjing University in 1928. In 1931, he obtained the doctoral degree in philosophy from University of Chicago. After graduation he took up the teaching profession and made several important publications in philosophy. Due to his participation in the Home Rule Movement during the February 28 Incident, Liao Wenkui was arrested. After release he joined the TIM and pleaded for the UN trusteeship over Taiwan and the implementation of referendum over Taiwan independence. The role of Liao Wenkui in the overseas TIM and the impact of his ideas on the development of later days’ Taiwanese nationalist ideologies have received little scholarly attention. This is probably due to (1) he was overshadowed by his younger brother, Liao Wenyi who was the president of the Republic of Taiwan founded by the TIM, (2) the fact that he died when the TIM was still in its early stage, in 1952. Nevertheless, in an in-depth and excellent analysis of the evolution and changes of Liao Wenkui’s thinking, Wu Ruiren (1999) argues that Liao Wenkui was the first theorist in the TIM and his *Formosa Speaks* (1950) was the source of inspiration for later days’ Taiwanese nationalist thinking.
history of confrontation between the Han migrants in Taiwan and various alien groups. Between the Dutch occupation in the 17th century and 1950, the Taiwanese resisted successively imposed rule by different outside powers such as the Dutch, the Manchurian and the Japanese. As Liao Wenkui saw it, in spite of the adherence to the modern notion of national self-determination during the Japanese colonial period, the Taiwanese identity did not exclude their Chinese identity. This was evidenced by their optimism and high hope upon Taiwan’s return to China in 1945. The post-war TIM was a reaction against the GMD’s despotic rule and as such was morally defendable (87-92).

Apparently, Taiwanese nationhood as understood by the brothers Liao comprised only the native Taiwanese residing on Taiwan prior to the GMD takeover in 1945. Although most activists in the overseas TIM before the 1970s agreed with the national boundary thus drawn, few would agree with their argument that the Taiwanese were not Chinese but a people of mixed blood. For instance, another key leader of the overseas TIM, Wang Yude rejected the use of biological criteria such as blood in defining a national community.100 Given the difficulty in denying the objective fact that most of the native Taiwanese were descendants of Han Chinese, Liao Wenkui’s approach of historical narrative to construct a distinct Taiwanese nation was taken up by other pro-independence intellectuals. In the 1960s, intellectuals in the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement began the search for a Taiwan nation by tracing its formation in history. Historiography became the main intellectual tool for most pro-independence scholars to justify their political aspiration for an independent Taiwan.

6.3.2 Shi Ming and Wang Yude: Crafting a National History

The relation between history as a social science discipline and nation formation has been one central topic in the theories of nationalism (Smith 1999: 29-55). Throughout the whole process of nation formation in modern time, historical narrative has been one major facet of identity formation. The narration of history is constantly contested

because of its central importance to the formation, maintenance, and redefinition of collective memories. The construction of a distinct collective identity depends in part on the specific construction of a collective memory. Historical narrative interprets who “we” are, what it is “we” have experienced, and what, therefore, “we” share. The constructive power of historical narratives in the process of nation building lies not only in the maintenance and transmission of certain collective memories but also in the deliberate obliteration of a certain past. As Renan (1992: 42) points out: “l’essence d’une nation est que tous les individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses.”

Since its retreat to Taiwan, the GMD government had systematically endeavoured to ‘re-sinicise’ the Taiwanese population both politically and culturally (Chun 1994). History had played a prominent role in the construction of GMD’s version of Chinese nationalism. The official historical narrative was disseminated to the population in various forms such as school curricula, monuments and media, focusing on the close relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland, highlighting common historical experiences. According to the official historical narrative, Taiwan was historically an integral part of China. It was a Chinese frontier developed by the early Han Chinese immigrants. One case in point is that the GMD’s anti-Japanese war on the Mainland was interpreted as part of the efforts to liberate the Taiwanese from Japanese colonialism (Heylen 2000). The historical links between Mainland China and Taiwan thus interpreted rendered the reunification of China historically inevitable. Being the loyal envoy of Dr Sun Zhongshan’s *Three Principles of the People* and the resolute defender of orthodox traditional Chinese culture, the GMD was said to be destined to accomplish the mission of national reunification. In its efforts to de-legitimise the CCP, the GMD portrayed it as a ‘usurper’ whose challenge to the legitimacy of the GMD necessitated the implementation of martial law. The political situation thus portrayed effectively legitimised the GMD’s tight control and authoritarian practices.

By contrast, intellectuals in the overseas TIM basically endeavoured to reinterpret and reconstruct Taiwanese history, substituting the official ‘China-centred historical perspective’ with a ‘Taiwan-centred historical perspective’. Their endeavours involved a de-sinicisation and Taiwanisation of the narrative of the past of the island. These efforts were two sides of the same nationalist coin: the suppression or erasure of an old collective memory and the construction of a new one in order to
contribute to the formation of a new national identity. The Taiwan-centred historical perspective took Taiwan and its people (here, read Benshengren) as its core subjects and not as peripheral subjects in the Chinese history. Taiwan was thus constructed as the Taiwanese Taiwan, no longer as the Chinese Taiwan. Today Shi Ming’s *Four Hundred Years of Taiwanese History* (1962) and Wang Yude’s *Taiwan - A Sad History* (1964) are generally regarded by Taiwanese nationalists as the two pioneering systematic classics on Taiwan history from a ‘Taiwan-centred historical perspective’. In Taiwan today, notions such as ‘four hundred years history of Taiwan’ and ‘Taiwanese history of four hundred years’ appear frequently in the media, political discourses and academic discussions.

Shi Ming first self-financed and published *Four Hundred Years of Taiwanese History* in Japanese in 1962. The Chinese version came out in 1979. The purpose of the compilation of such an enormous history (approximately 2000 pages and 1.2 million characters in the Chinese version) was made clear from the beginning: the exploration of the historical development of ‘Taiwanese nation’. In the first paragraph in the Preface to the Japanese version, by way of explaining the choice of the book’s title Shi Ming gave the readership his motive in writing this book:

“(…) the author wants to explore the historical development of the ‘Taiwanese nation’ and the process of the formation of Taiwanese consciousness from the standpoint of the Taiwanese people who have, since four hundred years, engaged in the reclamation and construction of Taiwan and who, at the same time, have been subject to successive alien rules. By way of studying the historical development of the Taiwanese nation, the author equally hopes to find out the path for the survival for our 10 million Taiwanese fellow countrymen” (1980 Preface).

In the Preface to the Japanese version Shi Ming also lamented the Taiwanese lack of understanding of its own history. This was caused, in his view, by the domination of various alien rulers of Taiwan in the historical narrations about Taiwan. The lack of knowledge of their own history had necessarily caused the fragility of the Taiwanese consciousness, especially in the mind of Taiwanese intellectuals. The weak we-group consciousness in turn resulted in the tragic fact that
for four hundred years the Taiwanese were never able to get rid of the colonial rule imposed on them by alien rulers. Hence, for Shi Ming, the urgent need to write a history of Taiwan’s development from the viewpoint of the colonised Taiwanese. The implication of Shi Ming’s nationalist motivation behind the writing of such a historiography was further made explicit in the preface to the Chinese version of the book. Here Shi Ming stated clearly that his aim was to use his book as a base “to search for the origin of Taiwan’s national strength, to awaken Taiwanese national consciousness, and to clarify our historical responsibility” (Preface).

Methodologically, the book was based largely on the compilation and analysis of the existing second-hand literature on Taiwan. However, Shi Ming was of the opinion that this body of literature was written by the successive alien rulers and therefore did not reflect the perceptions and identity of the Taiwanese people. What he set out to achieve, as he believed, was a historical interpretation of various facts and events from the perspective of the suppressed Taiwanese. The four hundred years of Taiwanese history for Shi Ming was in its essence a colonial history of Taiwan. With only a brief description of Taiwan in ancient times, Taiwan’s four-hundred-year-long history started with the Dutch colonial rule in the 17th century. Following the same logic, the Zheng family rule in Taiwan (1661-1683), the Qing rule (1683-1895), the Japanese rule (1895-1945) and the GMD rule (1945-) were all defined as successive alien rules.

Evidently, from the very beginning, Shi Ming took the existence of the Taiwanese, or the Taiwanese nation, for granted, as something given. For him, the Taiwanese nation comprised the Aborigines and the Han Chinese immigrants to Taiwan in the 16th and 17th centuries and their offspring. Given the factor that the majority of the members of the Taiwanese nation as defined by Shi Ming shared the same ancestors with the Han Chinese in Mainland China, one imperative for Shi Ming was to differentiate the Taiwanese from the Chinese. He made the differentiation by looking at two factors: time and space. As Shi Ming argued both factors were considered essential and original in the nation formation. By space Shi Ming meant the natural environment. Implicitly, he considered that natural environment not only constrained or facilitated human activities but also exerted significant influence on the formation of the group (national) character (5-6). Therefore Chapter 1 of the book was devoted to the description of Taiwan’s natural environment.
environment. More specifically, the description was done in contrast to that of Mainland China.

Shi Ming argued that as Taiwan was a tropical island where monsoons and earthquakes were frequent, Taiwanese had the specific temperament and characteristics of islanders: the good qualities being their openness and simple-mindedness, while the negative ones their subservience and lack of persistence. By contrast, the Chinese in Mainland China lived in an entirely different continental environment and had therefore characteristics different from the Taiwanese. For Shi Ming, a history of Taiwan from the point of view of natural environment was a history of social development wherein the ‘Mainlanders’ were transformed into the ‘islanders’. Today’s Taiwanese were originally Han Chinese emigrated from the Mainland. But in order to survive in a new environment they had to abandon their previous characteristics and at the same time to overcome the constraints exerted by the new environment. Such a history was the formation process of a different nation (6-10). So as early as in Chapter 1, by way of comparing the interaction between the human collective and natural environment Shi Ming had made it explicit that the Han people in Taiwan was a different people from those in Mainland China.

But for Shi Ming, not all Han people residing in Taiwan belonged to the Taiwanese nation. Invoking the Marxist theory of class he categorised the Hans who arrived in Taiwan before the end of the Qing Dynasty into two camps: on the one hand, the ruling class, including the officials, wealthy businessmen, and landlords, and on the other hand the ruled class, making up of the tenants, fish men, city-dweller, small businessmen and handicraftsmen. While the ruled class emigrated to Taiwan for permanent settlement the ruling class with its sole interest in power and profit remained alien to Taiwan. For Shi Ming, the class stratification in the Taiwanese society under the Qing rule was reinforced by the colonial structure (Chapter 8). The binary societal opposition between the native Taiwanese and the Qing colonisers resembled strikingly the confrontation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders in the post WWII Taiwan.

Following the same logic, Shi Ming no longer perceived the return of Taiwan to China after WWII as a national reunification but as yet another imposition of colonial rule on the Taiwanese. Moreover, he argued that the Taiwanese people were subject not only to the GMD’s colonial rule but also to the influence of Western neo-colonialism, mainly in the form of the American aid program (695-1182, Chapter 11).
Shi Ming argued that as in the preceding periods the national confrontation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders coincided with the class cleavage. While labelling the GMD regime a colonial rule, Shi Ming equally rejected the CCP’s call for reunification. The appeal to national reunification by the Beijing government was illegitimate in his view as it was yet another attempt to colonise Taiwan under what he called ‘socialist imperialism’ and Han chauvinism. Indeed Shi Ming drew an equation between Taiwanese nationalism and opposition to China (1516-1721).

A few years after the publication of *Four Hundred Years of Taiwanese History*, Shi Ming published another long article devoted especially to the discussion of the formation and development of the Taiwanese nation.\(^{101}\) In many ways, this article was a condensed version of his previous massive history, where he presented his key arguments. What bears direct relevance to our analysis is the first half of the article which provided a theoretical discussion of nation and nationalism. This part informs us that Shi Ming’s theoretical understanding of nationalism was much influenced by the Marxist theory on the nation. As revealed by the arguments, Shi Ming was of the opinion that the issue of nationality and its related research after WWII focused on the relations between different nations and the liberation of former colonies. In his view, the key question in the studies on nation shifted from “what is the nature of a nation?” in the pre-war period to the social system of the nation and the relationship between nation and class. With the change in the key research question in the study of nationalism, Shi Ming argued that the Marxist theories had produced significant results in tackling the relationship between nation and class, the capitalist system and the issue of nationality.

From this theoretical perspective, Shi Ming restated the key point which underlined his account of the four-hundred-year Taiwanese history: that the relationship between the Taiwanese and the successive alien rulers had constantly been characterised by a confrontation between two nations and by a class conflict as well. The Taiwan Independence Movement was thus the natural consequences of the historical reinforcement of national contradiction and class contradiction to which the

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\(^{101}\) Shi Ming first published “Taiwan minzu – qi xingcheng yu fazhan” (Formosan Nation – Its Formation and Development)” in *Duli Taiwan (Formosa Independent)*, Tokyo: Duli Taiwan Hui (Association of Independent Taiwan), No. 6-11, continued in No. 14-23. And later in 1992 he expanded the ideas and published the article in the form of a book, also by his own financial means, titled *Minzu xingcheng yu Taiwan minzu (Nation Formation and the Formosan Nation)* (Tokyo: 1992).
Taiwanese people had been subject. In the 1992 edition of the same book, the Taiwanese nation for Shi Ming still excluded the GMD government and the Mainlanders who had arrived in Taiwan after 1945. In a conclusive way Shi Ming asserted that the Taiwanese nation was “nothing but a historical product developed out of the (Taiwanese) struggles to break away from China’s control” (1992:125).

As compared to Shi Ming’s two-volume saga, the book, *Formosa – A Sad History* by Dr. Wang Yude published two years later (1964) could be read as a condensed version of the former. Basically, Wang Yude shared with Shi Ming in the historical periodisation and the nature of Taiwanese history: covering the period of Taiwan under Dutch colonial rule till the withdrawal of the ROC from the UN in 1971 the history of Taiwan, as depicted by Wang Yude, was a sad history due to the successive colonial rules. ¹⁰² From a Taiwanese standpoint, Wang Yude (1993a) concluded in the final chapter, this history was the process of a life-and-death struggle where the people searched for their land of freedom and happiness. And this history testified that independence was the necessary passage to obtain their utopia.

The core idea of Wang Yude's understandings of the Taiwanese nation which defined his interpretation of the history was more systematically presented in his article “On the Formosan Nation” published in *Formosan Youth*. ¹⁰³ In brief, Wang Yude first argued against the idea that the Chinese nation had existed for 4000 years. Nation, as he understood, was a modern product after the birth of capitalism and modern Chinese nationalism emerged around mid-19th century. The Han Chinese should be better understood as ‘Han Volk’ and Wang gave credit to the achievements of the Chinese by calling the ‘Han Volk’ a ‘super Volk’. Although the Han people in Taiwan constituted a ‘small Volk’ within the ‘super Han Volk’, the two did not make

¹⁰² According to Wang Yude’s long-term comrade, also a leading intellectual and activist in the TIM, Huang Shaotang (1994:224), the main reason for Wang to publish such a book was to counter Liao Wenyi’s definition of the Taiwanese nation. Wang also disagreed with Liao on the interpretation of the nature of the Zheng Dynasty and the Republic of Taiwan in 1895. ¹⁶ So far I have only come across the echoing of Liao Wenyi’s idea in some informal online articles by anonymous pro-independence individuals and one single article in an edited book (Shen Jiande 1997:241-264). Based on a self-made model, Shen Jiande came to the conclusion that the Taiwanese are of mixed blood where Han Chinese blood makes up less than 10 per cent. But the style of the article shows that it is more a partisan propaganda than based on serious academic research.

up one nation. Mainland China and Taiwan followed different historic trajectories in the formation of their respective national consciousness. The process of modernisation in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule paved the way for the transformation of Han Volk in Taiwan into the Taiwanese nation. But it was only after the February 28 Incident that the Taiwanese national identity became crystallised. For Wang, the formation of a Taiwanese nation would only be completed after the Taiwanese established their own state. Taiwanese nation, for Wang Yude, comprised the Aborigines and the Han immigrants arriving in Taiwan before 1945. The Mainlanders, who had arrived in Taiwan after WWII, belonged to the Chinese nation.

6.3.3 Crafting A National Language: Wang Yude

Wang Yude’s main contribution to TIM was to be found in another field than historiography. A linguist by training, Wang Yude combined the promotion of vernacular writing in Taiwanese with the quest for Taiwan independence. For him the language issue was closely linked to the construction of Taiwanese national identity. In his view, the construction of a written form of Taiwanese was one important way for the colonised people to reject or subvert the cultural hegemony imposed by the colonisers. In the 1960s, Taiwan Youth established by Wang Yude provided the public forum to initialise the language movement. From April 1960 to January 1964, Wang Yude had published a total of 24 series of “Lectures on Vernacular Taiwanese” in Taiwan Youth. As suggested by the title, the series of articles dealt with the linguistic study of written Taiwanese. Apart from the main focus on the systematic introduction of spoken Taiwanese, in these articles, Wang Yude reflected and commented upon the relationship between language, culture, identity, and Taiwan independence.

104 In the original text, Wang Yude deliberately wrote the term “Volk” without giving a Chinese equivalence. His purpose was to make a clear-cut differentiation between the concept of ‘nation’ and that of ‘Volk’.

105 These articles were originally in Japanese. In 1993 they were translated into Mandarin and edited into one single book by Huang Guoyan and published with the title of Taiwanhua jiangzuo (Lectures on Vernacular Taiwanese) in Taipei by Zili Evening Post. The references and quotations that appeared in the following analysis are based on this edition.
For Wang Yude, the suppression of the use of Taiwanese by different colonial rulers was the vivid illustration of Taiwan’s ‘sad history’. He lamented that “(i)t is the Taiwanese tragic fate that we cannot speak Taiwanese. (…) Since birth, we have been forced to lead a bilingual or trilingual life” (ibid 54). The construction of a writing system for the Taiwanese therefore was highly relevant to the independence movement. This is evidenced by his refutation of the suggestion that one’s linguistic capability in Taiwanese bore no direct link to Taiwan independence. He argued that: “in order to promote the independence movement and advocate Taiwanese nationalism, an indispensable prerequisite is to make the Taiwanese aware clearly that they are Taiwanese” (ibid 264).

From his writing we can also discern that for Wang Yude the cultural construction of the nation was indispensable for the political demand for independence. That the Taiwanese cultural movement under the Japanese colonial rule intertwined with the anti-colonial political movement with the former actually constituting an integral part of the latter was cited as historical precedent (ibid 120). As a linguist, he believed that “Taiwanese independence is for the Taiwanese to recover vernacular Taiwanese” (ibid 89).

Wang Yude’s linguistic nationalism found its base in the particularity of the Taiwanese language. For him, the Taiwanese language was an independent language entirely different from Mandarin Chinese. In a lengthy comparison between the Hoklo spoken in Taiwan with Mandarin, Wang Yude identified significant differences in terms of phonetics and vocabulary. As a way of conclusion, he argued that “(s)ome linguistic differences between Mandarin and Taiwanese are even greater than those between English and German. (…) Generally speaking, Mandarin Chinese and Taiwanese are different languages. They have different phonetic systems and vocabulary and diverge to some extent in their grammars” (ibid 76). By his attempt to prove that the status of vernacular Taiwanese as an autonomous language was different from Mandarin, Wang Yude rejected the Chinese nationalist’s claim that “Taiwan was part of Chinese territory”.

However, Wang Yude acknowledged the reality that Hoklo remained till then a language without its own writing system. Therefore a significant part of his research was devoted to the creation of a standardised Hoklo writing system. After comparing the advantages and disadvantages of both the Romanised writing system and the Chinese writing system Wang Yude proposed the creation of a Hoklo writing system
based on a combination of both the roman alphabet and Chinese characters. This new writing system resembled the combination of Chinese characters and Japanese syllabary, katakana: when the Hoklo terms could find their equivalence in Mandarin, Chinese characters would be used; otherwise the spoken Hoklo would be codified phonetically according to the Roman syllabary; all foreign names of individuals and places as well as names of new things should be codified with Roman alphabet. But Wang Yude’s proposal remained only a theoretical construction as he did not produce any work in this new writing system. It was not until 1966 that some Taiwanese started to experiment the Hoklo with writings based on a mixture of roman alphabets and Chinese characters.

The significance of Wang Yude’s study on the written form of vernacular Taiwanese could be best summed up by his own words: “the Taiwanese are different from the Chinese. The Taiwanese have the right to create their own culture and they must create such a culture” (ibid). For Wang Yude, language was not simply a means of communication. His nationalist discourse emphasised the symbolic function of language for the process of nation building as a means to challenge and reject what he called the Chinese cultural domination.

6.3.4 Peng Mingmin: The Taiwanese Nation Defined by Subjective Identification and Territory

The common opposition of the Mainlander and Taiwanese intellectuals to the authoritarian GMD regime in Taiwan proper changed the thinking of the overseas TIM. In the mid 1970s, a new definition of Taiwanese emerged among the political dissidents and opponents both inside Taiwan and abroad. According to the new definition, “no matter where one’s birthplace is, no matter when one arrived in Taiwan, as long as s/he identifies herself/himself with Taiwan, s/he is Taiwanese” (Huang Shaotang 1994:214). The pro-independence intellectual and activist Huang Shaotang (ibid) coined the expression “the thesis of non-differentiating identity” for the notion of Taiwanese thus defined. In his view, the historical background for the emergence of this new definition was the active participation of some second-generation Mainlanders in the independence movement. Another factor that we need to take into account is the generational difference. In the 1970s, most of the overseas
Taiwanese students who joined the TIM were in their 20s and 30s. Born around or after 1945, they grew up in a Taiwanese society where the Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese co-existed side by side. Such socialisation called into question the status of the Mainlanders within the construction of a Taiwanese nation.

More specifically, the thesis of non-differentiating identity contained three key arguments (ibid 215-216). First, the territory of Taiwan became the primary object of national identification. Second, with territory being the defining criterion for drawing the national boundary, the Mainlanders residing in Taiwan were no longer excluded from the community. Third, individual voluntary identification with the territory of Taiwan and Taiwan nation was vital in determining membership in the nation. In this regard, though by objective criteria such as language and history individual native Taiwanese should belong naturally to the Taiwan nation, membership of the Taiwan nation could not be ascribed to individuals who voluntarily identified themselves as Chinese.

Peng Mingmin defended a very different view of the Taiwanese nation. In 1964, as the director of the political science department of the National Taiwan University, Peng Mingmin drafted “the Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation” together with two students. Before they could distribute the print-outs of the declaration, they were arrested. In 1970 Peng, being put under house arrest, managed to flee abroad and sought political asylum in the US. He then joined the overseas TIM, and as the senior supervisor of the WUFI continued propagating his ideas amongst Taiwanese students studying overseas. It was in his autobiography, A Taste of Freedom, published in 1972, that Peng developed in full his idea of Taiwanese nationhood. In a manner similar to Shi Ming’s view, Peng portrayed the cross-Strait relationship in terms of the Taiwanese people struggling to escape the yoke of the mainland through a succession of rebellions (1972: 239). With the history of Taiwan thus interpreted, Peng made the analogy between the native Taiwanese and other pioneering peoples such as the Americans and the Australians. Upon their arrival in the new lands, these pioneering peoples had the right to create their own states regardless of their ethnic ties with their previous land of origin (ibid 241).

106 In Canada, Peng had obtained his Ph.D. in international aviation law. Because he was internationally known in his field, the GMD sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment, which was quite light under the political circumstances. Later, in response to mounting international pressure, his sentence was changed to house arrest.
The cession of Taiwan to Japan was taken as evidence of the Mainland authorities’ lack of concern for Taiwan. Peng argued that since 1895 there had been only four years of direct contacts across the Taiwan Strait, between 1945 and 1949. And yet these four years saw the suffering of the Taiwanese people under the authorities dominated by Mainlanders and the disappearance of a whole generation of the Taiwanese elite (ibid 240). Peng also argued from the perspective of international law that at the end of WWII, Taiwan was detached from Japan as the latter renounced the claim to its sovereignty. However, given the absence of any international treaty in determining the status of Taiwan, Taiwan at the time should be regarded as undetermined territory (ibid 241-242).

While making the case of Taiwan’s unique history as a base to justify Taiwanese right to their own state, Peng Mingmin acknowledged the fact that a large number of Mainlander migrants actually resided in Taiwan. In response to the ethnic division in post-war Taiwanese society, Peng Mingmin developed an alternative conception of the nation as a political community. Much influenced by Ernest Renan’s *Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation*, Peng Mingmin defended the view that the most vital component for the modern nation was not any such objective element as biological origin, culture, religion, or language, but “a sense of common destiny and belief in shared interests”. “These subjective feelings”, he argued, “which rise out of a common history, are not necessarily related to the objective criteria of biology, religion, and language” (ibid 93-94). The modern nation-state was first and foremost a political community. Thus the national identity was a political identity based on freedom of political association, instead of on the objective criteria of an ethnic community.

With such a conceptualisation of the nation, Peng Mingmin was able to include all the diverse groups living in Taiwan while maintaining their political separation from the Chinese nation. Peng argued that it was because a nation was a political association, not an ethnic group, that some modern states could come into being, despite their ethnic heterogeneity, or that several states might grow out of one homogeneous ethnic group.107 This argument rejects the use of historical links by the

107 Peng Mingmin (1972: 93-94) cited Belgium and Switzerland as examples of where peoples of different origin and background constitute a single state based upon feelings of common interest. And the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are examples where they mainly share the Anglo-Saxon
GMD and the CCP as a justification for their claims on Taiwan. It further affirms the right to self-determination and to free political association as the justification for Taiwan independence.

The implications of Peng’s idea about nation are far-reaching. It contributed to a shift in the discussion of Taiwan nationalism from its previous focus on ethnicity and historicity to a more civic version. That is to say, a nation in the modern sense is a free political association based not merely on objective criteria such as ethnic distinctiveness, language and cultural heritage, but more on the subjective affiliation of a certain group or groups of people. Some pro-independence activists draw a parallel between the TIM and American independence. They argue that the fight for Taiwan independence is for the pursuit of liberty, which is inherently democratic in nature. Moreover, criticizing the authoritarian nature of the GMD and CCP regimes, they perceive the TIM as a major contribution to the promotion of democracy and humanitarian values in the world (Song 2002: 242).

6.4 Summary

In the exploration of the resurgence and development of post-war Taiwanese nationalism, this chapter looks at both its material context and its ideational components. To pick up the analysis of the historical context in this period as presented in the preceding chapter, upon the GMD’s takeover of Taiwan in 1945, the Taiwanese enthusiastically embraced their return to the motherland which proved their identification with China. However, as identity is not a given but situation-related, it gets constantly defined and redefined by individuals according to their experiences and understandings of the changing material context. The GMD’s misrule led quickly to an identity-related clash, the February 28 Incident in 1947. Instead of redressing the resultant antagonism between the Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese, the establishment of the GMD’s authoritarian rule after 1949, during which the power was centralised in the hand of a small group of Mainlanders, further aggravated the situation.

Moreover, the GMD promoted its official Chinese nationalism at the expense of the suppression of local identities. The confrontation between the Mainlander and tradition of common blood, language and religion and, in large part, of laws, yet each exhibits a separate political constitution and forms a separate nation.
the native Taiwanese subsequently developed into a new social fault-line dividing post-war Taiwanese society. As the GMD regime was characterised by Mainlander-dominated authoritarianism, potentially the opposition movement could maximise its mobilisation by combining the demand for democracy with the issue of unbalanced distribution of power between the Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese. The coupling of democratic aspirations and Taiwanese nationalist sentiment could be identified in the overseas TIM. However, the opposition movement inside Taiwan, namely, Dangwai only took the ‘ethnic turn’ after the Gaoxiong Incident in 1979. The task of imagining a Taiwanese nation into being in this period was thus undertaken mainly by the intellectuals and activists in the overseas TIM.

Following the analysis of the historical context, this chapter demonstrates that both ethnic and civic conceptualisations of the nation interplay in the overseas TIM nationalist ideologies. Concentrating on the elites, I examined the thinking of several prominent TIM leaders and intellectuals. As blood ties were traditionally evoked as a strong argument in the construction of the Chinese nation, both by the GMD and the CCP, Liao Wenyi formulated a powerful and simple counter-argument by categorising the native Taiwanese as a people of mixed blood. Such an argument, regardless of its validity, represents a perfect example of imagining the nation based on a primordial and exclusive ethnic account. The nation became nothing more than a fortuitous conglomerate of individuals bound together by biological affinities.

But when tracing the source of inspiration of Liao Wenyi’s argument in the earlier work of his brother, Liao Wenkui we see that the latter had used this argument mainly for strategic clarity and that he situated the formation of the Taiwanese nation primarily within a long history of group interaction. And the political right for the Taiwanese nation to establish its own independent state, for Liao Wenkui, stemmed from the moral antinomy of national self-determination versus imperial despotism. Although history played an important role in the formation of the Taiwanese nation, Liao Wenkui avoided the fallacy of historical determinism by pointing out that the shift in Taiwanese national identity after WWII, partially shaped by their historical experiences, was a political choice against the GMD’s despotism.

The search for the historicity of the Taiwanese nation was elevated to a new level with Shi Ming’s monumental work, *The Four Hundred Years of Taiwanese History*, and to a less extent, with Wang Yude’s *Taiwan: A Sad History*. Taking the existence of the Taiwanese nation as a given, both Shi Ming and Wang Yude used
narrative history as the model of representation to depict the persistence of the nation throughout four hundred years. Combined with his Marxist conviction, Shi Ming further juxtaposed the class cleavage with the national cleavage and limited the Taiwanese nation to the middle and lower class native Taiwanese. Confining the Taiwanese nation to the native Taiwanese, Shi Ming and Wang Yude lamented that for four hundred years the Taiwanese had been subjected, unjustly, to successive colonial rules. The encyclopaedic account of the Taiwanese nation followed typically “a set of mythic patterns: a migration story, the time of settlement, a golden age of cultural splendour, the fall into a dark age, then a period of regeneration, perhaps beginning in the present” (Hutchinson 1994: 45). By way of emplotment, these two historical accounts reinterpreted various historical events and reorganised them into a sequence of episodes in the Taiwanese national tragedy.

Wang Yude further considered that in the historical formation of the Taiwanese nation the core of the nation was located in its unique and differentiated culture. A key manifestation of the Taiwanese culture was its language. Given the state of underdevelopment of the Taiwanese language, Wang Yude devoted his research to the promotion and construction of a written system of the vernacular Taiwanese. The need to defend the Taiwanese cultural uniqueness also led Wang Yude to the conclusion that an independent Taiwanese state was indispensable for cultural protection.

Basically, in the 1950s and 1960s the political leaders and scholars in the overseas TIM differentiated the Taiwanese nationals from the Mainlanders who arrived in Taiwan after WWII as well as the Han Chinese in Mainland China. Such a dualistic opposition expressed, on the one hand, the pro-independence elites’ antagonism towards the GMD regime, and on the other hand, their rejection of Chinese nationalism and of the idea of national reunification.

However, reality forced the GMD regime and the Mainlanders into a permanent settlement in Taiwan: on the political level, the GMD was compelled to initiate the process of Taiwanisation and controlled liberalisation in response to the changes in the international situation; on the societal level, the Mainlanders came into close interaction with the native Taiwanese on a daily basis. Such changes exerted an impact on the TIM’s conceptualisation of the Taiwanese nation, particularly among the younger generation of the TIM members. The introduction of the notion of ‘non-differential identity’ in the 1970s and the Peng Mingmin’s ideas of the nation
stemmed precisely from reflections of Taiwan’s social reality. Unlike previously history- and culture-centred arguments, the new conceptualisation of the Taiwanese nation focused more on the here and now. National boundaries were drawn according to the principle of territoriality and national solidarity derived from the act of assertion and confirmation of the Taiwanese identity by the individual residents within the territory of Taiwan.

The nationalist ideologies of the overseas TIM were thus characterised by both civic and ethnic conceptualisations of the nation, complementing and competing with each other. But before the lifting of martial law in 1987, these nationalist ideologies exerted only a limited influence on the Taiwanese population at large. When the process of Taiwanisation deepened along with democratisation in the post-martial law period, political parties and the state apparatus began to play a vital role in shaping the Taiwanese nationalist ideologies.
Chapter Seven

Taiwanese Nationalism in the Post Martial Law Taiwan


On April 9 1986, the GMD Central Standing Committee formed a task force to study major political reforms including the lifting of martial law, liberalising political associations, and changing the parliamentary bodies (Liu Guoshen 2000:2). Following the task force recommendations, the Central Standing Committee passed a resolution in October 1986 to end the thirty-eight-year-old martial law in the following year. The GMD’s initiative for political reform was necessitated by changes in Taiwanese society and the challenge from the opposition. In September 1986 the opposition forces grouped under the so-called Dangwai banner formed the first opposition party in Taiwan in defiance of the regime’s ban on opposition parties. The government tolerated this move and responded by lifting restrictions on opposition parties and a free press during 1988-1989 (Cheng & Haggard 1992: 15).

Scholarship of Taiwan studies generally regards 1986 - 1987 as the crucial turning point that marks the commencement of the process of democratisation in Taiwan. Throughout the 1990s the process of democratisation in Taiwan advanced with big strides. In 1991-1992 both national representative bodies, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, were completely re-elected. These elections granted the citizens some control over the national public institutions and governmental processes (Tien & Chu 1998: 97-126). The direct election of the provincial Governor in 1994 and eventually the first Taiwan-wide direct presidential election in 1996 symbolised the completion of the regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy (You

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108 The task force was formed to study the following crucial political issues: (1) the restructuring of the National Assembly, (2) local autonomy, (3) martial law, (4) civic organisations, (5) social reform, and (6) internal party reform.

109 The initial reaction of the GMD leadership towards the formation of the DPP was divided. With time, it became apparent that the former ROC president Jiang Jingguo was inclined to tolerate opposition parties and had opposed repression as favoured by the conservatives.
By 1996 Taiwan had evolved from a one-party authoritarian rule to a fully-fledged and vibrant democracy characterised by universal suffrage, a multi-party system, direct executive and legislative elections, political accountability, the separation of powers, and an enfranchised civil society. In the second direct presidential election in 2000 the DPP candidate, Chen Shuibian, won out. The DPP replaced the GMD as the ruling party and thus ended over half a century of GMD rule on Taiwan. Democracy was consolidated in Taiwan.

The profound changes in Taiwan since 1987 have been comprehensive in scope and complex in their dimensions. Prominent among changes that were brought on by the process of democratisation is the liberty to address the issue of national identity, which was considered a taboo only a few years earlier. The open discussion of national identity brings the confrontation between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism to the fore. In Taiwan proper this confrontation is manifested, on the one hand, by the surfacing of the sub-ethnic conflict between the Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese as well as the political realignment along this cleavage. On the other hand, the idea of national reunification at the core of the GMD’s ideology came into sharp conflict with the advocacy of building an independent Taiwanese nation.

There are crucial differences between the period 1987-2000 and the preceding two periods (1895-1945, 1945-1986) as regards the unfolding of Taiwanese nationalism. First, depending on the nature of the respective ruling regimes in the first two periods – the Japanese colonial regime and then the GMD authoritarian regime – the native Taiwanese were almost entirely excluded from the state apparatus. The advocacy of Taiwanese nationalism was formally forbidden. In these two periods, Taiwanese nationalist ideologies were part of the opposition movement and stood in stark opposition to the official nationalism. Therefore, the construction of Taiwanese nationalist ideologies operated outside the state apparatus through various social and political dissident movements. By contrast, in the period between 1987 and 2000, the process of democratisation made it legal for the advocacy of Taiwanese nationalism to compete with other nationalist ideologies in society. With the pro-independence DPP evolving into a major political party and the GMD Taiwanised, the development of

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110 All Taiwan’s executive officials – with the exception of the premier, who is appointed by the president and whose choice is approved by the parliament – are subject to popular election since 1996.
Taiwanese nationalism took place within the state itself and the process of nation-building became entwined with the process of state-building.

Secondly, democratisation also resulted in a plurality of the actors participating in the construction of the Taiwanese nation. In the preceding two periods, the Taiwanese nationalist movement operated as an opposition movement outside the framework of the state, and it is possible to analyse individual elites in the movement as a single group with relative homogeneity in the analysis. With democratisation opening up avenues for propagating Taiwanese nationalism, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate and categorise the actors involved in the process. The process of democratisation initiated in 1987 has also changed the nature of politics as a profession. One possible differentiation is to treat the political elites and the cultural elites as two separate groups for analysis since these two types of elites popularise their nationalist vision through particular strategies, organisations, and ideology. Within the political arena, political parties are the key actors in the shaping of nationhood whereas at the societal level the cultural elites contribute to the nationalist discourse through their professional practice. Inside the political arena the DPP started off as the single key advocate of Taiwanese nationalism. But the same period also saw the Taiwanisation of the GMD under Li Denghui’s leadership and a gradual convergence of the nationalist ideology of the GMD with that of the DPP.

Thirdly, since the late 1970s, the confrontation between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan came to assume a new political dimension, namely, the cross-Strait relations. Unlike in the previous periods where Taiwan was insulated from Mainland China, first by Japanese colonialism then by the Cold War confrontation, since the late 1980s Taiwan came into direct interaction with Mainland China, following the GMD’s lifting of the travel ban to Mainland China in 1987. One consequence of this policy change is that Beijing’s official nationalism aiming at the reunification of Mainland China and Taiwan came into interplay with the development of identity politics in Taiwan.

The impact of the cross-Strait relation is most visible in the political arena. As the politics of nationalism articulates and maintains a certain national identity first of all by means of opposition and differentiation, one important dimension in the construction of the Taiwanese nation since the mid 1980s lies in the definition of Taiwan’s international status, particularly its relation with Mainland China. This has led to the intensification of the contention over Taiwan’s sovereignty. With the
entanglement of the process of state-building and nation-building, the political elites are confronted first and foremost with the task of defining the boundary of the national community.

Before proceeding into the analysis of Taiwanese nationalism per se, it is necessary to provide an account of the change in the context within which the identity politics operates. As there exists already a large body of literature analysing and explaining the process of democratisation in Taiwan, I hereby choose to provide a synthetic account of this literature so as to help the readers to understand why and how democratisation in Taiwan came about. As far as the operating context of Taiwanese nationalism in this period is concerned, the impact of a new dimension, namely, the cross-Strait interactions, should not be neglected. Therefore, following the brief summary of the various explanatory accounts of Taiwan’s regime transition, section 3 will depict briefly the interplay between Taiwan and Mainland China after 1987.

Then I will divide the ensuing analysis of the development of Taiwanese nationalism between 1987 and 2000 into two parts. In the first part (section four), the analysis will focus on the articulation and modification of Taiwanese nationalism within the political arena. The development of Taiwanese nationalism within the political arena is manifested mainly by the contention between the ideas of national reunification and Taiwan independence (dutong zhi zheng). Political parties are the main agent advocating Taiwan independence and the election procedure serves as the main channel for the dissemination of nationalist ideas. Party documents and discourses of individual political elites of the two main parties, the DPP and the GMD, will be taken as the units of analysis.

The second part of this analysis (section five) will be devoted to the analysis of Taiwanese nationalism within the cultural arena. Cultural intellectuals from various fields such as literature, language, history and fine arts have contributed to the process of imagination of the nation. However, due to space limitation, it would be impossible to cover in depth the many discourses in all cultural fields. In line with the analysis of the overseas Taiwanese nationalist ideologies during the martial law period, I will focus on how the pro-independence intellectuals appeal to historical memory and collective cultural symbols to construct a distinctive national history. More specifically, the high school textbook reform in 1997 for the new course, Knowing
Taiwan, will be taken as a concrete case to illustrate the unfolding of Taiwanese nationalist ideologies in the cultural field.

**7.1 Explaining Regime Transformation**

Since the 1980s scholars of comparative politics have studied the collapse of authoritarian regimes and their transition to democracy. Divergent in their analytical angles and methodological approaches, scholars disagree on the causes, on the nature of the process and on the results of democratisation. Basically, there are three explanatory accounts of the process of democratisation. The ‘modernisation approach’, also called ‘precondition approach’ by some, focuses on the necessary social and economic preconditions in bringing about democratisation. The ‘transition approach’ emphasises the elite’s behaviour, choice and strategy in the political process. The ‘structural approach’ stresses the changes in the power structure conducive to democratisation (Potter 1997: 1-40).

Scholars of Taiwan studies apply Western theories of democratisation to understand the causes and the manner of regime transformation in Taiwan. As each individual scholar investigates from his/her own angle, the approaches adopted vary, also the conclusions. In fact, not a single theory or one single variable can explain such a complex phenomenon as the democratic transition.

Lipset (1973) represents the modernisation or the precondition approach. Using a number of indicators of economic development Lipset has studied comparatively the interrelationship between the level of economic development and the degree of political democratisation in a number of European, North American and Latin American countries. He comes to the conclusion that there is a close correlation between democracy and the level of socioeconomic development in a society. As he sees it, “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1973: 49-50). In other words, the precondition approach to democratisation tends to believe that social changes follow a universal and uniform direction and that developing countries can learn from the developmental experiences of the developed ones in pursuing goals of economic modernisation and political democratisation.

In the preceding chapter, I have made a brief overview of the dramatic changes in Taiwan’s economic development during the martial law period. Many
economists regard Taiwan’s economic performance from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s as ‘an archetypal Asian Newly Industrializing Economy’ (Howe 1998: 127). For some scholars, the regime change in Taiwan in the 1980s can be largely explained by its rapid and continuous economic development. Such is the viewpoint of Tien Hung-mao in his work, Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, published in 1989. With a series of economic indicators Tien depicts Taiwan’s economic development and its impact on class stratification and urbanisation from 1951 to 1987. Tien considers that the economic rise and social changes helped to create ‘a socio-economic environment conducive to broader political participation’ and to bring about ‘the emergence of an even larger middle class’, and ‘increasing expectations for democratisation’ (198: 42). Similarly, Thomas Gold (1998) argues that under the impetus of the economic boom, by the 1980s virtually all the socioeconomic correlates of democracy enlisted by theorists – high levels of urbanisation, industrialisation, rising per capital income, high literacy rates, the spread of mass communication technologies, the growth of middle class and the proliferation of civil society – were present in Taiwan.

Although the precondition approach is valid in pointing out the correlation between economic development and democratisation, it fails to explain the causal relationship between the two (Rustow 1970: 337-342; Potter 1997: 12). In other words, the precondition approach provides only a static account of the process of democratisation and fails to explain how ‘the democratic threshold is actually crossed’ (Cheng & Haggard 1992: 2). The precondition approach is further challenged by the fact that, despite the presence of most socioeconomic preconditions, Taiwan remained a highly authoritarian society in the 1970s while countries like India and Costa Rica enjoyed relatively stable democratic development in the absence of the necessary economic conditions.

Since the precondition approach does not apply universally to all cases, some scholars turned to the transition approach for explanation. The transition approach

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111 Manufacturing and services have become the main generators of employment and income since the 1980s. In 1950, Taiwan’s per capital GDP amounted to about US$ 100, and in 1986 it reached nearly US$ 4,000. Whereas in the 1950s, more than half of the population lived in rural areas, by the early 1980s nearly 90 percent of the population were urbanised with a predominating middle class. Today Taiwan has the highest foreign currency reserves in the world per capita and it stands as the 14th largest trading nation in the world.
stresses the strategic interaction between the political agents which play the key role in regime transformation. While emphasising the role of the political elite, it looks at the drive behind the process for democratisation: Is democratisation a top-down process engineered by the ruling elite or is it a bottom-up process pushed forward by the pressure exerted from the civil society? Scholars largely disagree on this question. As far as Taiwan is concerned, some scholars give Jiang Jingguo credit as the key designer of democratisation, some think Li Denghui has played an active and crucial part, and yet others argue that democratisation is the result of the activities of the opposition forces.

Chou Yang-shan and Andrew Nathan (1989) identify several factors accounting for Taiwan's liberalisation and democratisation: the idea of democratic constitutionalism in the GMD ideology, the Taiwanese people’s economic, social and political maturity, and Dangwai’s continuous push for democracy through elections. In the early 1980s the GMD faced the challenge of a number of pressing issues: the declining health of Jiang Jingguo brought the question of succession to the fore, the loss of GMD’s credibility as a result of several scandals in 1984-1986, and the international community’s concern on Taiwan’s human right. Chou and Nathan (1989:281) argue that the contextual factors aside, the ultimate drive behind the political liberalisation comes from Jiang Jingguo as he obviously believed that democratic reform would not only facilitate smooth succession but also improve Taiwan’s international image. Therefore in 1986, Jiang Jingguo instructed a 12-membered task force to draft plans for reform, and at the same time made political contacts with the opposition forces. When the opposition announced the formation of the DPP, Jiang Jingguo stood for toleration and continuation of reform against the hardliners’ urge for suppression.

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112 These events include first the murder of the biographer of Jiang Jingguo, Jiang Nan in October 1984, which was believed to have close connections with Taiwan’s security apparatus; second, the Tenth Credit Company financial scandal involving bribery of some high ranking GMD officials’ bribery and their improper investments. These events seriously challenged the GMD’s declining legitimacy.

113 In a comparative study between democratisation in South Korea and Taiwan, Hsiao Hsin-huang and Hagen Koo (1997) argue that democratic transition in both cases remains largely a process controlled and maintained from above by the ruling elites.
Acknowledging Jiang Jingguo’s crucial role in the process of liberalisation in Taiwan, some scholars nevertheless disagree that political liberalisation and democratisation should be considered as a regime-led or state-initiated reform. Instead, these scholars adopt a bottom-up approach and give prominence to the opposition forces in explaining the regime transformation. Such is the view of Wang Zhenhuan (1989), You Yinglong (1993), and Huang Defu (1992), to name but a few. In the viewpoint of these scholars, the essential drive behind Taiwan’s democratisation was to be found in the opposition movement.

For Wang Zhenhuan post-war Taiwan had experienced two major political transitions: first the process of Taiwanisation since 1972, where Jiang Jingguo integrated the native Taiwanese into the core of the political power structure, and then the process of political liberalisation initiated by the GMD regime from 1986. Both political transitions were necessitated by the GMD’s need to re-legitimise its rule. Nevertheless, Wang investigates the reason why the GMD adopted different strategies in the 1970s and the 1980s. His analysis argues that the emergence of the political opposition movement based on the Taiwanese consciousness of the native population, particularly its middle and lower social classes since the mid 1970s, had exerted an increasing pressure on the GMD through electoral performances. Despite the GMD’s initial suppression of it, the political opposition force that emerged in the mid-1970s joined forces with the various social movements organised spontaneously by civil society in the 1980s. Wang concluded that the combined force of the organised political opposition movement and the awakening civil society should be regarded as one, though not the only, key explanatory factor that pushed forward the process of political liberalisation in Taiwan.

Equally departing from the perspective of the opposition movement as the main explanatory factor, Huang Defu gave credit to the DPP as the promoter and accelerator of Taiwan’s political democratisation. He argued that the smooth transition of a long-term authoritarian society into a democracy depended mainly on the development of the opposition party. In the case of Taiwan, the emergence and evolution of the DPP had speeded up the demise of the GMD’s authoritarian regime. The GMD undertook a series of political reforms mainly as a passive response to the challenges from the opposition movement led by the DPP.

Yet other scholars disagree with the either top-down or bottom-up analysis of the elite’s role in Taiwan’s democratisation. These scholars stress instead the strategic
interaction between the various political agents in the process of political transformation (Ni Yanyuan 1995: 30-34; Cheng & Haggard 1992: 12-18). In this view Taiwan’s democratisation is essentially a political process where the GMD and the opposition forces interact with each other. As these scholars see it, the focus on the historical processes by which democratic forces in Taiwanese society emerge, grow, and out-maneuver the regime to establish a new institutional framework provides a dynamic account of how democracy is fought, negotiated, and consolidated.

Undoubtedly the elite, both in the ruling regime and in the opposition, played an active and crucial role in pushing forward Taiwan’s liberalisation and democratisation. But the transition approach leaves some important questions unanswered. For instance, the question how and why the opposition movement was able to arise within an authoritarian society and develop to such an extent that it could threaten the survival of the authoritarian regime.

In explaining the emergence of Taiwan’s opposition movement, some scholars come to notice the impact of elections as a political institution on the process of democratisation. For scholars who consider the transformation as initially a process engineered by the ruling elite from above, the impact of the elections as an institution cannot be neglected. Here we find a third approach to explain Taiwan’s democratisation, i.e., the structural approach which emphasises the role of the electoral system. For Hu Fo and Zhu Yunhan (1992) election helped to transform the social structural changes induced by Taiwan’s rapid industrialisation into political forces, which in turn destabilised and weakened the authoritarian rule. Combining the social and ideological basis of both the candidates and the voters, Hu & Chu examined the correlation between electoral competition and political democratisation. Their study of several elections found that electoral participation produced several elements conducive to democratic transition, including a gradual increase in voters’ party identification, and the popular support given to the DPP’s appeal for democratic reform. Their study’s findings also suggested that both the political cleavage (democratic value, national identity) and social cleavage (provincial origin) had a significant influence on voter’s party identification.

Using Bolivar Lamounier’s theory of democratisation, the American scholar Shelly Rigger (1999: 1-33) gives special weight to the electoral process as one important dimension to be taken into account in explaining Taiwan’s democratisation.
Lamounier develops his theory on the democratisation of the authoritarian regime mainly from his case analysis of regime transition in Brazil. According to him, the implementation of elections, however limited, within an authoritarian regime served primarily to address the regime’s legitimacy crisis. However, once implemented in practice, the electoral process would voluntarily produce its own consequences which would push the liberalising regime irreversibly towards greater opening. Elections reshaped the political landscape in the authoritarian regime in the following ways. First, elections created sites for criticism of the regime. Second, electoral successes provided the reformers with weapons to challenge the conservatives within the authoritarian regime. Third, the electoral success helped to increase the organisational strength and popularity of the opposition. Fourth, as a process of political socialisation, elections helped strengthen the identification of the population with the party and their enthusiasm for democratic institutions in general. And finally, Lamounier concluded that the momentum of elections would eventually carry the opposition into power.

Applying Lamounier’s theory to the case of Taiwan, Rigger started from the viewpoint that elections should not be regarded simply as one of the results achieved by democratisation but as one of the causes of democratisation. Through her detailed chronological analysis of the evolution of the electoral system and practices in Taiwan, Rigger demonstrated effectively the applicability of Lamounier’s theory to Taiwan’s experience, and that the electoral process was one important cause of democratisation.

In my opinion all three approaches are helpful to advance our understanding of Taiwan’s regime transition. For instance, if we take one important aspect of democratisation, the development of a competitive party system, the three approaches mentioned above all help to explain Taiwan’s transformation from a party-state to today’s multiparty competition. From the viewpoint of transition approach, the rapid development of the opposition movement in the 1970s and 1980s could account for the ruling GMD’s tolerance the creation of an opposition party and a series political reforms such as the opening of the supplementary elections to the National Assembly (1969) and the Legislative Yuan (1972), and for the process of Taiwanisation within the GMD itself. In the initial period, the GMD played a leading role in liberalisation. An analysis from the precondition perspective helps us to understand why the GMD had to initiate political reform and opt for gradual liberalisation.
While the interactive account of the elite’s role in the process of democratisation offers a path-dependent and dynamic explanation, the structural approach is valid in the sense that it helps to expound the rise of the opposition movement and the interaction between democratising forces and democratic institutions with its focus on the evolving electoral processes. But by no means can the three approaches summarised above exhaust all the explanatory accounts of Taiwan’s regime transition. Other factors such as political culture (Hsiao Hsin-huang 2003), the international political and economic system (Xiao Quanzheng 1995: 7-20), and the impact of mass media (Wei Meijuan 1997; Qu Wenfang 2001; Rawsley & Rawnsley 2001) are also considered to have important bearings on political change in Taiwan. No single theory or single variable is sufficient to explain Taiwan’s democratic transition.

Moreover, as pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, the politics of nationalism offers yet a further avenue to understand Taiwan’s political development. One important cause for the strong demand of democracy in Taiwan is the imbalanced distribution of political positions and power between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlander population in the post-war Taiwan society. While the process of Taiwanisation overseen by Jiang Jingguo since the 1970s had addressed this imbalance to some extent, the momentum of political reform was reinforced by a popular demand for the redistribution of power through democratic means. Then with the unfolding of the process of democratisation, identity related issues such as the sub-ethnic conflict between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders and the contention between the idea of national unification with Mainland China and that of Taiwan independence became quickly politicised and in turn reshaped Taiwan’s political landscape. Various political outcomes such as inter/intra party factional interactions, constitutional reforms, voter alignment, and foreign policy making are all intricately linked to the contention over national identity.

7.2 An Additional Situational Variable: the Cross-Strait Relations in Retrospect

After the founding of the PRC on the mainland in 1949, Beijing had sought to ‘liberate’ Taiwan by force. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s this policy led to a series of armed conflicts between both sides of the Taiwan Straits. At the same time, both
sides also engaged in competition for international recognition of the legitimacy of the regime each represented. The international community’s major shift of recognition between the two regimes during the 1970s reached its climax with the U.S. formalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing while withdrawing its recognition of Taibei in 1979. The post-Mao leadership subsequently decided to adopt a new approach toward Taiwan and consequently launched a peaceful offensive against it. As elaborated in the nine-point proposal put forward by Ye Jianying in 1981, the then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 5th National People’s Congress, the new approach called for peaceful unification of Taiwan with mainland China. Ye suggested that talks be held between the CCP and the GMD and requested the resumption of three direct links (i.e. direct transport, commercial and postal service links) and four exchanges (i.e. academic, cultural, economic and sport exchanges) as the first step to “gradually eliminate antagonism between them and increase mutual understanding” (Beijing Review 1981/10/05:11). In 1984, Deng Xiaoping advanced the formula of “one country, two systems” as the political settlement for Taiwan’s eventual reunification with the mainland.

Thus, Beijing’s new policy toward Taiwan can be summarised as “peaceful reunification through the ‘one country, two systems’ formula.” To make the formula more acceptable to Taibei, Beijing declared that under this prescription Taiwan would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, including administrative power, legislative power, independent judiciary power, the power to keep its armed forces, and certain power of international relations, such as signing commercial and cultural treaties with foreign countries. However, Beijing’s policy also noted that “only the PRC represents China in the international arena” (China Daily 1993/09/01). In short, according to Beijing, the formula will not be a take-over of Taiwan by the mainland, but peaceful co-existence between them within one country.

Although Jiang Jingguo initially rejected Beijing’s overtures and responded instead with a ‘three Nos’ policy (i.e. no contact, no negotiation, no compromise), military tensions across the Taiwan Strait continued to diminish. Pressures from the oppositions and various civil interest groups eventually pushed Jiang Jingguo to revise the ‘three Nos’ policy and lift the travel ban to the mainland in 1987. Such an ice-breaking decision led quickly to trade and investment between the two sides. By 1998 total cross-Strait trade (including both direct and indirect trade) had expanded
from US$76 million in 1979 to US$22.5 million, representing an average growth rate of 30 per cent per year. Today Mainland China and Taiwan are each other’s fourth largest trading partners, indicating the importance of bilateral trade to the development of their respective economies.

However, with the deepening of democratisation in Taiwan, Beijing grows increasingly concerned over the burgeoning influence of the pro-independence forces in Taiwan’s identity politics. Beijing has made it clear that whatever happens in the island’s internal politics, the fact that Taiwan is a part of China will never change. It contends that democratisation and sovereignty are two different concepts and hence that Taiwan’s internal political changes should not infringe upon China’s sovereignty over Taiwan (Li Jiaquan 1994). And to safeguard China’s territorial integrity Beijing still retains the use of force as the last resort to realise the project of national unification. But Beijing’s military manoeuvres in the 1995-96 crises had unintentionally contributed to Li Denghui’s landslide victory in the first island-wide presidential election. Taiwanese scholars suggest that the use of military threats by Beijing has served as a ‘pushing force’ which might further alienate the Taiwanese population from the idea of national unification (Chu & Lin 1998: 12). Between political stalemate and economic integration, the evolution of the cross-Strait relations in the past two decades is characterised as “a fascinating combination of economic dynamism and political fragility” and will continue to play an important role in the process of nation-building in Taiwan (Scalapino 1995: vii).

7.3 Conceptualisation of A Taiwanese Nation in the Political Arena: from Differences to Consensus

As argued earlier, one feature of the development of Taiwanese nationalism in this period is that nation-building takes place in close interaction with state-building: the construction of a Taiwanese ‘self’ is taking place in close connection with the issue of statehood and sovereignty. Taiwanese nationalism in the political field strives first and foremost to define Taiwan as a sovereign state which inevitably touches upon the thorny issue of cross-Strait relations. Regarding Taiwan’s status, this period witnesses a gradual convergence in the positions of the DPP and the GMD. In the next section I
will endeavour to analyse the evolution of the two main parties’ nationalist discourses alongside with the transformation of Taiwan’s party system.

7.3.1 Early Development of DPP’s Nationalist Discourse: from Self-Determination to Taiwan Independence (1986 – 1991)

As the analysis in Chapter Six made clear, since 1945 the GMD had constructed and propagated its own version of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. The official nationalist discourse justified to a large extent the implementation of martial law and the establishment of the authoritarian regime. Seeds of confrontation between official Chinese nationalism and the opposing Taiwanese nationalism were sowned during the February 28th Incident in 1947. In the following decades the sub-ethnic tension augmented because of the imbalanced distribution of political power between the Mainlander and the native Taiwanese population with the former dominating the national level politics and the latter competing in factions on the local level politics.

In challenging the authoritarian regime and the imbalanced power structure, the first opposition party, the DPP, and its forerunner, Dangwai, called the legitimacy of the GMD’s official Chinese nationalism into question (Wang Fuchang 1996: 169). Right from the start, the opposition movement had linked up its desire for democratisation with the sensitive identity issue. Already in the numerous opposition magazines emerging in the late 1970s and the 1980s democratisation and national identity featured as two entwined central themes. In 1983 the opposition movement put forward the principle of self-determination and democratisation as the two central themes. Until the DPP’s second National Assembly in 1987, the opposition built up its electoral support by highlighting the shared sense of suffering and deprivation among the native Taiwanese. In concrete terms, Taiwanese nationalism at this stage implied first and foremost the demand for fair and equal treatment of the native

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114 For example, *Taiwan zhenglun (Taiwanese Political Review)*, started by the two prominent Dangwai leaders, Kang Ningxiang and Huang Xinjie, and their associates in 1975 rallied most Dangwai activists and made a fresh departure in opposition politics. The first half of the 1980s saw a boom in Dangwai political magazines. These journals challenged the legitimacy of the GMD government and promoted a ‘Taiwanese consciousness’.
Taiwanese. DPP’s advocacy of self-determination in this sense amounted to the demand for the so-called Taiwanisation of the political system.

When the DPP came into being in 1986, it continued its opposition activities along the line of democratisation and Taiwanisation. But then the Beijing government’s increasing pressure for Taiwan to come to terms with the project of national reunification and the gradual expansion of non-official cross-Strait exchange had led the DPP to take Beijing’s official nationalism into serious account in its opposition against the Mainlander-dominated GMD regime. Faced with the challenge from two versions of Chinese nationalism, the DPP tactically based its construction of Taiwanese nationalism at this stage on the bottom line of safeguarding Taiwan’s security and independence. The expression of the DPP’s perception of Taiwan’s status and its relation to Mainland China, which can be better labelled as the party’s China Policy, can be found in various party platforms, resolutions and policy white papers adopted by the party congress, and the different proposals put forward by various factions within the DPP. While party platforms and resolutions underline the guiding principle for the making of China Policy, the white papers show concretely the DPP’s understandings of the relation between Taiwan and Mainland China. However, different factions within the DPP have different interpretations of the commonly adopted resolutions and policies, due to their different nationalist visions. Competition and compromise at both inter-party and intra-party factional level often influence the eventual outcome of the making of the DPP’s China Policy.

Generally speaking, in terms of the DPP’s position regarding Taiwan’s present status and the future arrangement of cross-Strait relations, its guiding principle at the time when the party came into being was the principle of self-determination without any explicit advocacy of Taiwan independence. Then the early 1990s witnessed the radicalisation of the nationalist position with the addition of the clause of Taiwan independence in the party charter (1991); the period between 1992 and 2000 was marked by intra-party ideological contention over the advocacy of Taiwan independence and a gradual moderation of the party’s stand on Taiwan independence along a pragmatic line. This resulted in the breakaway of the radical advocate of Taiwan independence and the foundation of the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP) in 1996.

In fact, the notion of people’s self-determination first appeared during the period of the Dangwai movement prior to the foundation of the DPP. Both in the
overseas TIM and *Dangwai* movement arguments based on international law had been given to justify the position that Taiwanese people enjoyed the right to self-determination. The main argument maintained that at the end of WWII Taiwan was “undetermined territory” as no international treaty has ever granted either the ROC or the PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. The decision on Taiwan’s sovereignty should be left to be settled by the local population, in accordance with the principle of self-determination. It was very much thanks to this understanding that in the 1950s, the idea of placing Taiwan under the UN’s temporary trusteeship was quite popular in the TIM (Song 2002).

In September 1986 when the DPP’s first party congress discussed the party programme, the notion of ‘people’s self-determination’ was put forward formally for the first time. The principle was later adopted to be the guiding principle of the party program. As maintained in the basic party programme, “the future of Taiwan should be determined by all the inhabitants in Taiwan in free, autonomous, universal, just and equal ways. No government or government coalition has the right to decide Taiwan’s political belonging.” Despite the assertion of the people’s right of self-determination, there was no precision in the party programme as to under what circumstances and by what manner should such right be exercised. Moreover, various factions within the party had different visions regarding the future of Taiwan (Lu Xiuyi 1998).

Interpreting from a strong Taiwanese nationalist stand, the New Tide Faction either equated self-determination with Taiwan independence or saw the former as a stepping stone to the latter.\(^{115}\) But for other factions or some individuals without faction affiliation, Taiwan independence and self-determination remained two different things. In their eyes, the assertion of Taiwanese people’s right of self-determination did not lead automatically to Taiwan independence.\(^{116}\)

\(^{115}\) For instance, Jiang Pengjian, the DPP’s founding chairman and one of the leaders of the New Tide Faction, stated that self-determination was the party’s main objective. Then Yao Jiawen, Jiang’s successor as DPP chairman and a key figure in the New Tide Faction, went further in stating that self-determination was the stepping stone for independence.

\(^{116}\) The distinction between independence and self-determination was evidenced by the statement of Huang Xinjie, the DPP’s third term chairman and then the head of the moderate Formosan Faction. According to Huang, the political environment in Taiwan was not yet conducive to the island’s
was only one of several possible options for the future of Taiwan. Self-determination
in this view served as the principle and the means to resolve the current contention
over the future of Taiwan (Liu Jincai 1998: 146-147).

At this point, it would be useful to distinguish between ‘self-determination’ and
‘independence’. Semantically, ‘self-determination’ is more comprehensive and
inclusive than ‘independence’. ‘Self-determination’ can lead to anything from the
maintenance of the status quo to Taiwan’s permanent independence from Mainland
China, or to the reunification of Taiwan and Mainland China. On the contrary,
‘independence’ would only mean Taiwan’s becoming an independent political entity,
permanently separated from Mainland China. The differentiation made by the
Formosan Faction between these two terms did not necessarily mean that they
imagined the nation differently. The main difference between the two main factions is
not their nationalist objective but their prioritisation between democratisation and
independence: the Formosan Faction put democratisation above independence and
thus defended a more inclusive view of self-determination; the New Tide Faction on
the contrary considered independence as the necessary prerequisite of democracy. For
them, as long as Taiwan’s political status remained unsettled, there could not be real
democracy.

The concept of ‘self-determination’ left various DPP elites with large room for
interpretation. The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the notion of self determination
made it possible to accommodate the existing contention between different national
visions within the DPP. The advocacy of people’s right of self-determination instead
of national right of self-determination here was also a cautious choice as people’s
right of self-determination conformed to the liberal idea of individual freedom of
choice. The use of ‘people’s right of self-determination’ instead of ‘national right of
self-determination’ helped to rally both the supporters of democratisation and
Taiwanese nationalists.

In accordance to the guiding principle of self-determination on 13 October
1987 the DPP published its first China Policy. At the opening of the policy paper, the
DPP reiterated the principle of self-determination as the base of its China Policy.
Then challenging directly the GMD’s three Nos Mainland Policy (i.e. no contact, no
independence and, for the time being, it would be more realistic to advocate the right of the Taiwanese
people to self-determination.
negotiation, no compromise) and its national unification project the DPP called for the termination of the ‘antagonism between both sides of the Strait’ and the establishment of direct and equal contacts (DPP China Affairs Office 2001). Although the DPP’s advocacy of cross-Strait exchange was declared to bring about a thawing of the hostile confrontation, it did not intend to bring about reunification. This is evidenced by the statement that international customs should be applied in the legal cases arising from cross-Strait interaction. This indicates that the DPP defined the cross-Strait relation to be one between two equal entities: “before the talks on the political level take place, legal cases that arise out of the contacts between people on both sides of the Strait shall be dealt with in accordance with international customs with a humanitarian and tolerant attitude” (ibid 151). At this stage, the DPP’s advocacy of opening cross-Strait interaction should be understood more as an act of opposition in its overall confrontation with the GMD.

Successful political reforms and increasing democratisation in Taiwan since 1986 had enabled the advocates of Taiwan independence or self-determination to increase their activities. This period witnessed the gradual radicalisation of the DPP’s position on the definition of Taiwan’s international status. Between late 1989 and early 1990 two radical pro-independence groups, namely, the New Nation Coalition (1989. 11) and the New Nation Alliance (1990. 4), were founded. Key members of each group were simultaneously members of the New Tide Faction. Asserting Taiwan’s sovereignty and its independence from Mainland China, the Coalition pushed for the adoption of a new Taiwanese constitution and the establishment of a Taiwanese national parliament and government. It also advocated the construction and promotion of a Taiwanese culture (L.Y. Liu 1991: 199). For the Alliance, the objective was to establish a new and independent country in Taiwan. To members in this group, Taiwan independence was not a mere slogan, but a concrete political objective (ibid).

In the period 1987-1991, there was an obvious increasing radicalisation of the DPP’s nationalist position. This can be demonstrated by the adoption of various party documents.117 Intra-party factional rifts were an important factor influencing the final

117 On the party level, the important documents adopted in this period include the Declaration “The Citizens have the Freedom to Advocate the Independence of Taiwan” (1987. 10), the Resolution of 417 (1988. 4), the Resolution 1007 (1990. 10), and the revised Basic Party Platform (1991. 10).
outcome of the party’s position on the future of Taiwan and on cross-Strait relations. In the early 1990s members of the overseas TIM returned in great number to Taiwan and boosted the radical faction. With their advantage in absolute numbers in the party’s decision-making body and their tight organisation the more radical New Tide Faction prevailed over the loosely-organised moderate Formosa Faction and thus pushed vigorously the party towards an explicit demand for Taiwan independence.

The radicalisation of the DPP’s nationalist position did not come all of a sudden. In the Declaration “The Citizens have the Freedom to Advocate the Independence of Taiwan” the DPP still formally adhered to the principle of self-determination as the basic policy for settling Taiwan’s future. This is evidenced by the fact that when the Declaration referred to proposals put forward by all circles of society regarding Taiwan’s future prospects, Taiwanese independence was listed as one among a wide range of options. On the surface, the main purpose of the Declaration seems to lie simply in the defence of the freedom of speech and human right. But taking into account the later development of the DPP’s China Policy, it actually signifies the beginning of a change in the DPP’s nationalist position: although Taiwan independence was still presented as one among several possible formulas for the future of Taiwan to be determined by the people of Taiwan, the fact that the expression, ‘Taiwanese independence’, appeared for the first time in the party’s official document should not be neglected. Short of an explicit indication of the DPP’s endorsement of Taiwanese independence, we nevertheless can detect such an inclination by the fact that over half of the text of the declaration was devoted to justifying the citizen’s right to advocate Taiwanese independence. Some statements to be found in the Declaration such as “the ideas of Taiwanese independence have a long-standing historical, sociological and political background” and that these ideas “have produced a strong echo in Taiwanese society over the time”, can be read as justifications for the demand of Taiwanese independence (ibid 153).

At the First Extraordinary Meeting of the Second National Congress in 1988, representatives of the New Tide faction lobbied actively for the proposal to revise the Party Platform with the additional clause calling for Taiwan independence. In view of

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118 The other proposals for Taiwan’s future political status all envisage an eventual unification of Taiwan and Mainland China but they disagree with each other in terms of the form and manner the unification should take. Proposals include the “German Model”, the “Singapore Model”, “One Country – Two Systems”, to a “Greater Chinese Federation” (DPP China Affairs Office 2001: 152).
the potential danger of making such a radical move, the proposal was shelved (Liu Jincai 1998: 155-156). Resolution 417 adopted at the Meeting was the result of a factional compromise which can be seen from the contradictory statements in the resolution. On the one hand, the central statement of the resolution maintained that “Taiwan has international sovereignty and independence and does not belong to the ‘People’s Republic of China’ with Beijing as its capital” (DPP China Affairs Office 2001:154). On the other hand, four conditions were listed under which the DPP would proclaim Taiwan to be independent, these four conditions being “if the GMD and the CCP hold unilateral peace talks; if the GMD sells out the benefits of the people; if the Communist Party unifies Taiwan; if the GMD does not implement a really democratic constitution” (ibid). The DPP also demanded that the “ruling authorities” make adjustment of Taiwan’s political and legal structures in accordance to the reality so as to “make the system of a nation-state the normal situation in Taiwan” (ibid). There is an obvious contradiction between the DPP’s assertion of Taiwan’s international sovereignty and independence and the four conditions for the declaration of independence. Is Taiwan already an independent and sovereign state or not? If yes, then why the need of proclamation of independence?

Despite the divergence of opinions within the DPP as revealed by the contradictory statements, the four conditions constituted a carefully controlled strategic move in the DPP’s discourse on Taiwan independence. Such is the opinion of the Taiwanese scholar, Guo Zhengliang (1998). With the four conditions, Taiwan independence was raised not as the party’s sacred mission but was turned into a possible outcome of cross-Strait interaction and the political development inside Taiwan. Consequently, the responsibility of preventing further radicalisation of the DPP’s stand on Taiwan independence was shifted onto the shoulders of the GMD and the CCP (Guo 1998: 65-66).

The attempt to clarify Taiwan’s international status so as to justify the sovereignty claim was further concretised by the adoption of the Resolution 1007 at the DPP’s Second National Congress in 1990. The resolution affirmed that “the de facto sovereignty of our country does not cover Mainland China and Outer Mongolia” (DPP China Affairs Office 2001: 10).\textsuperscript{119} The choice of the notion of ‘sovereignty’

\textsuperscript{119} In the draft proposed by the New Tide faction the wording was “the sovereignty of Taiwan does not cover Mainland China and Outer Mongolia”. In the finalised version of the resolution, the moderates
instead of ‘independence’ here is both significant and deliberate. This was the first
time that the DPP openly challenged the ROC’s territorial boundary as defined by the
GMD and consequently the existing constitutional system based on its sovereignty
claim to the whole of China, including Outer Mongolia. All parties agreed that the
ROC on Taiwan already possesses sovereignty; unlike independence, sovereignty
needs not be declared. This way the DPP tactically avoided entering into discussion
on the legality of the political entity of Taiwan and gaining a reputation
internationally as a “troublemaker”.

Once the *de facto* territorial boundary of Taiwan was drawn, it became only
logical for the DPP to suggest making the law conform to the reality. Hence the
demand, “our country’s future constitutional system, domestic policy, and foreign
policy should be established based on the actual territorial position” (ibid). For the
strong Taiwanese nationalists within the New Tide Faction, the drafting of a new
constitution and the formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence pressed urgently on
the agenda. In the DPP’s Fifth National Congress in 1991 the New Tide pushed for a
revision of the Party Platform. Following debates between the radicals and the
moderates, the New Tide Faction’s proposal of “Establishing a Sovereign,
Independent and Autonomous Republic of Taiwan” was added with some
modification as the first creed of the Party Program (ibid 11-12).

In an added creed the DPP advocated formally and explicitly the establishment
of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan. In the opening sentence, the key
point of Resolution 417 was reiterated. That Taiwan enjoyed ‘independent
sovereignty’ was argued as a ‘historical fact’, the ‘reality’ and a ‘common
understanding of the international community’. The DPP thus called for the drafting
of a new constitution and Taiwan’s return to international society. Later in the text it
was mentioned that the advocacy of Taiwan’s sovereignty and of the drafting of a new
constitution were proposals to be determined by referendum. Together with
Resolution 417 and Resolution 1007, the Taiwan independence plank in the revised
Party Platform made it explicit that the DPP’s Taiwanese nationalism was based on
the rejection of the legitimacy of the GMD’s rule of Taiwan, hence the refusal to
identify with the ROC, as well as the denial of Beijing government’s claim to

pushed for the replacement of ‘Taiwan’ with ‘our country’. The name of the country was deliberately
unspecified so as to avoid the complicated issue of the legitimacy of the ROC.
sovereignty over Taiwan. In all these documents, the title ‘Republic of China’ was never mentioned. When referring to the political entity of Taiwan, either ‘Taiwan’ or vague terms such as ‘our country’ was put in place (Fu Xicheng 2001: 130).

While the adoption of Taiwan independence as a plank in the party platform led to elite settlement within the DPP itself, it caused the hardliners in the GMD as well as the Beijing government to regard the DPP with enmity. From 1991 onwards, both Beijing government and foreign observers tended to label the DPP as a reckless pro-independence party. Moreover, with the revised Party Platform radicalising the DPP’s nationalist stand, Taiwanese nationalism ran into conflict with democratic procedures: if Taiwan independence was the only vision for Taiwan’s future, the assertion of the people’s right to self-determination became an empty statement. Essentially it created a tension with democracy as “national identity (…) revolves around the exclusive concept of legitimacy and symbol of worth. Thus, it yields competing demands that cannot easily be broken down to negotiable increments” (Tien & Chu 1996: 144).

Prior to 1991, one could still make the observation that the DPP had a pro-independence inclination but did not necessarily aim at Taiwan independence. The revised Party Platform had turned such an inclination into a ‘sacred mission’. Here, in its mobilisation of identity politics, the DPP shifted from the previous (sub-)ethnic cleavage between the Mainlanders and native Taiwanese to the issue of unification versus independence. From 1990 onwards, the DPP began the campaign to promote Taiwan’s joining of the UN under the name of Taiwan. While electoral mobilisation based on the campaign against ethnic discrimination had initially brought the opposition forces a good return, the DPP’s radicalisation on the issue of independence versus unification in 1991 did not enhance its popularity. At the end of 1991, the first comprehensive re-election of the National Assembly took place. The DPP based its election campaign on the advocacy of Taiwan independence but obtained only 20 per cent of the vote, the lowest since its foundation in 1986. The principle New Tide

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120 The refusal to identify with the ROC is instanced by the fact that some elected DPP members to the National Assembly replaced “ROC” in their oath upon assuming office with “Taiwan” or “Taiwanese people”.

121 This term is used by Rigger (1999: 25).

122 In both general and provincial elections in December 1989, the DPP received as much as 38 percent of the popular vote as compared to the 20 percent in 1991.
candidate, also the brain behind the revised Party Platform, Lin Zhuoshui, even failed to be elected.\(^{123}\)

The radicalisation of the DPP on the issue of independence versus unification can be accounted for by both factional rifts within the party itself and the impact of the transformation of the GMD on inter-party competition. On the one hand, the radicalisation of the DPP’s stand on Taiwan independence was the result of intra-party factional competition between the radical New Tide Faction and the moderate Formosan Faction. Moreover, the return of many overseas Taiwanese dissidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s also helped to accelerate the surge in pro-Taiwan independence activism (Wachman 1994: 118). On the other hand, Taiwan independence was put forward as a new electoral issue once the deepening of the process of Taiwanisation and democratisation gradually redressed the unbalanced power distribution along the ethnic division within Taiwanese society. With the transformation of the GMD, and particularly with the rise of Li Denghui, a native Taiwanese, to the post of president in 1988, the ground for the opposition’s appeal to ethnic grievances was gradually removed (Rigger 1999: 126-127).

### 7.3.2 Transformation of GMD’s Nationalist Ideology under Li Denghui

In the 1990s the GMD under Li Denghui’s leadership furthered the process of Taiwanisation of the party. By 1993, over half of the GMD Central Committee members were native Taiwanese (Huang Teh-fu 1996: 117). Together with the Taiwanisation of the GMD, Li Denghui gradually steered the party away from its Chinese nationalism and undermined the idea of national unification. Most notably on the interpretation of Taiwan’s status and the arrangement of cross-Strait relations, the view of the GMD under Li Denghui gradually moved towards the position of the moderate Taiwanese nationalists within the DPP. The Taiwanisation of the GMD

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\(^{123}\) Although most studies attributed the DPP’s defeat in the 1991’s National Assembly election to its radical advocacy of Taiwan independence, pro-DPP scholar, Wu Nai-de (1996) disagreed with such analysis. For him the defeat should be better accounted by the DPP’s image as a violent party as in this period the DPP legislators engaged frequently in feast-fightings in the parliament and the party mobilised in the form of street demonstration. For Wu, the DPP blames its political setbacks too readily on the advocacy of Taiwan independence which is not necessarily the real cause.
under Li Denghui’s leadership not only led to a change in Taiwan’s party alignment, but also pushed the DPP to tune down the radicalism in its nationalist thinking in the ensuing years. Between 1988 and 2000 Li Denghui played a significant role in Taiwan’s political changes and the transformation of the GMD. Both mass media and academic circles label this period the ‘Li Denghui era’.

In 1988, when Jiang Jingguo died, his hand-picked successor, Li Denghui found himself in a precarious position. With the disappearance of this strong figure, the GMD was soon plagued by intra-party power struggles. Li faced the task of consolidating his position both as the interim GMD party chairman and as the ROC president. As a native Taiwanese, he was perceived by the veteran members of the GMD, mostly Mainlanders, as an outsider. They did not trust him to carry on Jiang Jingguo’s policies. On the other hand, he needed to compete with the DPP by appealing to the native Taiwanese voters, while avoiding the trap of becoming a copy-cat of the DPP in his political agenda. As Carl Shaw (2002: 132) observed in this typical process of power struggle for succession, Li Denghui adopted mainly the politics of de-legitimisation, manoeuvring to undermine the bases of legitimacy of his rivals both inside and outside the GMD.

Before he could successfully consolidate his position within the party, Li Denghui skilfully sought a balance between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism so as to maximise popular support. This is evidenced by his presidential inauguration speech in 1990, entitled “Initiating the New Era of the Chinese Nation”. On the one hand he reiterated the official nationalism and the idea of national unification in stating that:

“(Although) the ROC’s various constructions in the past forty years are confined only to the region of Taiwan, Peng-hu, Kin-men and Mastu, all the projects have the future of the whole China in mind. Taiwan and Mainland China are an indivisible territory and all Chinese are compatriots of the same blood tie. (...) All Chinese should strive to realise the aim of national unification through peaceful and democratic ways.”

(GIO 1992: 35)

On the other hand, Li put forward three preconditions under which Taiwan would willingly improve its relation with Mainland China, namely that “Mainland
China should practice a liberal democratic system, renounce the use of force in the cross-Strait relations and not hinder Taiwan from developing its external relations” (ibid). At the same time, he announced the intention of ending the ‘Period of Counter-insurrection and National Mobilisation’ within one year, which, as he maintained, would amount to a formal recognition of the CCP’s political legitimacy, and in turn the CCP should recognise Taiwan as a political entity on an equal footing (Hughes 1997: 66).

On the level of public administration, to consolidate his position within the GMD, Li Denghui oversaw the establishment of the National Unification Council (NUC, 1990) under the Office of the President, the reorganisation of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, 1991) under the Executive Yuan, and the ‘non-official’ Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF, 1991). While the NUC and the MAC are responsible for research, overall planning and consideration of government policy in cross-Strait relations, the SEF deals directly and practically with cross-Strait exchanges. The establishment of these institutions and the “Guidelines for National Unification” formulated by the MAC in 1991 seemed to indicate Li’s commitment to the idea of national unification. And in a way the radicalisation of the DPP’s position on the issue of Taiwan independence in the early 1990s should be seen as a reaction against Li Denghui’s seemingly pro-unification measures.

At the same time, Li Denghui tactically appropriated the various proposals put forward by the opposition into his own policies. Between 1991 and 1992, Li sought actively for a political compromise and ideological accommodation from the DPP by conceding to a significant number of DPP’s political demands. In response to the DPP’s demand for further democratisation and Taiwanisation, Li Denghui began to reconstruct the institutional mechanisms and initiated a series of constitutional amendments. These included the termination of the Period of Mobilisation and Combating Rebellion, the abolition of Article 100 of the criminal code, the enforced retirement of the senior Mainlander representatives in all three national representative bodies by 1991\textsuperscript{124}, and a commitment to hold direct popular elections for president by

\textsuperscript{124} Ten constitutional articles were either amended or added in 1991, providing the legal basis for the comprehensive elections of the three central representative bodies. All the senior parliamentarians, who were elected on the Chinese mainland in 1947 or 1948 and had never been re-elected since then, had to retire in December 1991. All of the seats in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were open for public competition in 1991 and 1992, respectively.
Concerning the cross-Strait relations, he conceded to the DPP’s demand that the GMD would not hold party-to-party talks with the CCP. At the same time he took concerted diplomatic initiatives for Taiwan to join the UN and its related agencies under the name of ROC (Chu & Lin 1996: 85). As president, he was able not only to carry out the political agenda for further democratisation but also to take credit for its success. The political and constitutional reforms overseen by Li not only redressed the previously (sub-)ethnically imbalanced distribution of power within Taiwanese society but also shelved the GMD’s nationalist goal of unification.

Li Denghui’s administration witnessed a significant shift in the GMD’s foreign policy: the ‘national interest’ (here ‘national’ means Taiwanese) replaced the previous ‘anti-communism, recovery of the mainland’ as the guiding principle for foreign policy. Under the new strategy of pragmatism, Taiwan no longer asked its friends to sever or downgrade relations with Beijing as a precondition of establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taipei has tried to establish diplomatic relations and upgraded substantial relations with more countries that do not recognize the ROC. In addition, Taipei has been very active in seeking membership in inter-governmental organizations in the past decade. For instance, the government has taken over the opposition’s initiative and started making bids for a seat in the UN since 1993 and sought to be an observer to the World Health Organization.

The readjustment of foreign policy became the testing ground for the ROC’s pursuit of dual recognition and dual representation, equalling an assertion of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Furthermore, constitutional ratification in 1991 and 1992 led to the reorganisation of Taiwan’s political institutions as well as the reorientation of the GMD’s Mainland policy. In 1993 the MAC redefined the meaning of ‘one China’ in a white paper. According to the white paper, under the current separation sovereignty of China should be suspended or frozen (MAC 1993). This redefinition of the meaning of ‘one China’ by the GMD amounted to an official acknowledgement of the existence of two equal political entities in a divided nation. In 1999, such a position was made explicit when Li Denghui (1999/06/09) defined the cross-Strait relations as ‘state-to-state’ relations.

The constitutional and political reforms overseen by Li Denghui constitute an important part of the construction of a Taiwanese identity. They pave the way for the
ruling regime to redefine the international status of Taiwan. In his autobiography, *The Advocacy of Taiwan*, Li gave his own definition of ‘Taiwanese identity’:

“What exactly is the so-called ‘Taiwanese identity’? Some people may think that it means Taiwan independence. But in my opinion although we need to clarify Taiwan’s international status, we should not be sticklers for ‘independence’. Our vital and urgent task at hand is to give substance to ‘the ROC on Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan’s ROC’.”

(Li 1999: 62-63)

So while Li’s discourse on the issue of sovereignty coincided with the opposition’s position, he carefully steered clear of an explicit advocacy of Taiwan independence. Li’s strategy at this stage remained different from that of the DPP: for the DPP Taiwan’s sovereignty was not yet *a fait accompli* but should be realised first and foremost by the rejection and overthrow of the ROC regime in Taiwan. The way to go about it was the exercise of the right of self-determination and a declaration of independence. By creating the notion of ROC on Taiwan Li Denghui aimed at rescuing the GMD under his leadership from the legitimacy crisis while redefining the political boundary of the nation.

Li Denghui’s participation to the process of nation-building did not stop short at the issue of sovereignty. Once his power consolidated, Li not only continued the systematic reform of the political structure but also advanced ideas in an effort to overcome the sub-ethnic cleavage between the native Taiwanese and Mainlanders and to instil a common sense of belonging in Taiwanese society. During 1988 and 2000 Li Denghui advocated on various occasions a number of interrelated concepts and ideas – *Gemeinschaft (shengming gongtongti)* (1991), popular sovereignty (*zhuquan zai min*) (1994), and ‘new Taiwanese’ (*xin Taiwanren*) (1994) – to advance the project of national reconstruction.

Between 1991 and 1993 Li Denghui talked publicly about the necessity for Taiwanese society to reach a consensus on the construction of a ‘*Gemeinschaft*’ (community). Using this concept Li called for Taiwanese society to overcome its (sub-)ethnic differences and conflicts and to construct a community through an individual subjective identification with the territory of Taiwan (NDN 1992/07/23).
While acknowledging the ethnic diversity within Taiwanese society, Li tried to promote ethnic harmonisation and social integration with the usage of this concept. Although the word ‘nation’ did not appear in his discourse, the idea of *Gemeinschaft* should be understood as an expression of Li’s idea of nation: with his emphasis on the importance of individual will, it can be argued that Li necessarily defended a constructivist view of the nation.

Li’s conceptualisation of the nation as an imagined community based primarily on the individual’s subjective identification of a certain territory and a set of political and social norms was further elaborated in his advocacy of the ideas of ‘popular sovereignty’, or ‘sovereignty of the people’. Addressing a GMD conference in the yearend of 1994, Li explained that the notion of popular sovereignty served to stir up the consciousness of every citizen to be the ‘master of his own country’ (*guojiadezhuren*) while the cohesion of the *Gemeinschaft* arose from integrating the free will of the individual with the wealth and good of society. It is clear that ‘the people’ Li had in mind was not the Chinese nation but the millions of voters of Taiwan. This was evidenced by his public speeches on various occasions such as the celebration ceremony of the National Day in 1994 and the presidential inauguration ceremony in 1996. For Li, individuals derived their membership in the *Gemeinschaft* by their adherence to the principle of popular sovereignty and by so-doing they would surpass the ethnic differences and become all ‘new Taiwanese’.

In fact, a similar notion of the ‘new Taiwanese’ could be traced back in opposite on nationalist thinking at least as far as the notion of ‘non-differential identity’ that emerged among the overseas TIM in the 1970s. Similar views had been advanced by *Dangwai* elites in the 1980s, for instance, the notion of ‘living community of shared destiny’ (*mingyun gongtongti*) coined by Xie Changting in 1984 (Xu Mingqian 2001: 48).  

Although Li Denghui traced the origin of his ideas to Goethe and Kant, a comparison of the use by Li of the concept of *Gemeinschaft* and the use by the opposition of the expression of ‘community of shared destiny’ shows a close association between the two.  

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125 Xie Changting was the chairman of the DPP between 2000.7 and 2002.7.

126 This was also evidenced by the fact that during the GMD’s Thirteenth Central Standing Committee Li’s suggestion to revise the party charter by including the ideal of creating a *Gemeinschaft* in Taiwan
The political reforms initiated by Li Denghui transformed Taiwan’s party politics. On the intra-party level, following the 1990’s presidential election, the GMD was split into two factions. The Mainstream Faction (zhuliu pai) comprised mainly reform-minded native Taiwanese, supporting Li Denghui while most Non-mainstream (fei zhuliu pai) politicians were conservative Mainlanders. The GMD’s divide along the Mainlander/native Taiwanese ethnic fault-line was caused by differences in political views as well as national identities. The Non-mainstream Faction questioned Li Denghui’s commitment to Chinese nationalism and objected to his efforts to seek ideological accommodation with the opposition. The Mainstream Faction accused its opponent of identifying more closely with Mainland China than with the twenty-one million people on the island. Between 1991 and 1992, the two factions clashed over almost every major political issue. The further Taiwanisation of the GMD combined with the transformation of the Mainstream Faction’s nationalist discourse eventually led to the first split of the GMD when some elites from the Non-mainstream Faction withdrew from the GMD and formed the New Party (NP) in 1993. Since then the NP claimed itself to be the ‘orthodox GMD’ and continued upholding Chinese nationalism and advocating unification.

The split of the NP marked the completion of Li Denghui’s project of Taiwanising the GMD. In 1994, Li Denghui made it clear that for him the Taiwanisation of the GMD was necessary because until then the GMD had remained a “foreign regime”. Using skilfully his native Taiwanese origin, Li appealed to the native Taiwanese sense of historical grievances by lamenting the “sadness of being born a Taiwanese” (Shiba Ryotaro 1994/04/30). Scholar Chen Guangxing rightly points out that in the politics of nationalism after 1987, with his native Taiwanese background Li Denghui successfully removed the ethnic issue from the opposition’s mobilisation agenda (Chen Guangxin 1994:201).

In the inter-party competition, the DPP suddenly found itself left with few original proposals for democratic reform. With the intra-GMD power struggle replacing the contention between the GMD Mainlanders versus the DPP Taiwanese over national identity, the DPP realised that, “(their) convergent discourse of Taiwan nationalism and democratisation was suddenly deconstructed by the rise of Li

was rejected by some committee members on the ground that the idea had its origin in Peng Mingmin (Hughes 1997:98).
Following the lifting of the travel ban, economic and social interaction across the Taiwan Strait grew increasingly intensive. For Taiwan, Mainland China no longer constituted simply an enemy but an important motor for its economic development. Beijing’s policy of peaceful reunification without renouncing the use of force as last resort also came into interplay with the identity politics in Taiwan. Faced with the internal changes and external challenges, the DPP was pushed to reformulate its discourse on Taiwan independence and handle the cross-Strait relations in a more pragmatic manner.

7.3.3 Moderation of the DPP’s Nationalist Discourse

Although the radical New Tide gained the upper hand in the 1991’s addition of the independence plank to the Party Platform, the DPP remained divided as ever over the choice between Taiwanese independence and democratisation as its first priority. The Formosan Faction’s approach of promoting democracy through a coalition with the GMD or the NP had initially led to vehement condemnation from the New Tide. But Li Denghui’s reconstruction of the GMD and the ROC à la Taiwanese gradually took away the ground for the opposition to challenge the regime’s legitimacy. Moreover, the electoral constraints due to the lack of popularity of the independence claim also played an important role in the moderation of DPP’s nationalist discourse. The transformed DPP nationalist discourse equated the maintenance of the status-quo with Taiwan independence. For the independence movement, the priority was not the declaration of independence, but the construction of a new Taiwanese identity (Guo Zhengliang 1998: 75).

The transformation of DPP’s nationalist discourse took place on two dimensions, corresponding respectively to the changes in Taiwan’s internal politics and its external environment, especially the cross-Strait interactions. Internally, it was

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127 As early as in 1991, the DPP politician, Aiu Yiren had made the observation that “the Chinese GMD is becoming the Taiwanese GMD.” (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2001/12/19, p.11)

128 That radical pro-Taiwan independence found little support among the voters was demonstrated by the result of the 1996’s first Taiwan-wide direct presidential election: the DPP candidate, the long-term pro-independence activist, Peng Mingmin, had polled less votes than the combined votes of the openly anti-independence candidates, Chen Lüan and Lin Yangkang. (Peng Mingmin had polled 21.1% of votes while Chen Lüan and Lin Yangkang got 9.98% and 14.9% of the votes respectively.)
argued that the transformed GMD under Li Denghui should no longer be regarded as ‘a foreign regime’. Therefore all Taiwanese should combine forces in front of the threat from the Chinese Communists. In order to instil a sense of solidarity and overcome the ethnic division, some political elites as well as intellectuals adopted a new historicist perspective to replace the previous lens based on historical ressentiment. Connections between Taiwan’s past, present and future were sought to legitimise a nation of new Taiwanese.

A well-known example was the book, *Xinxin minzu* (*The Rising Peoples*) written by former DPP chairman Xu Xinliang (1995). In this book, Xu equated the Taiwanese with a number of historical peoples - the Mongols in the 13th century, the Manchu in the 17th century, the Dutch in the 16th and 17th, the British in the 18th and 19th and the Americans and Japanese in the 20th century – and considered it to be a new rising nation because of its economic dynamism and entrepreneurial internationalism. Xu thus used common economic interests, modernity and the entrepreneurial spirit to define the nation. To differentiate Taiwan from Mainland China, Xu explicitly spoke of a traditional maritime culture (*haiyang wenhua*) in Taiwan. And undoubtedly for Xu Taiwan’s maritime culture accounted largely for its economic and political achievement as it stood for tolerance and multiculturalism, modernity and democracy, material aspiration and success, and evolutionary creativeness and adaptability.

Externally, Beijing’s steadfast opposition to separatism and the lack of international support for the course of independence led the DPP to modify its sovereignty discourse in a more pragmatic manner. Instead of pushing for independence, on various occasions the DPP leadership argued that Taiwan is already an independent and sovereign state. Hence there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence. For instance during the 1993 gubernatorial and mayoral election campaign Xu Xinliang stated that “even if the DPP becomes the ruling party in the future, this does not mean that it would change the name of the country; if the DPP comes into office, its top priority is the security of the twenty million Taiwanese people. Therefore the DPP will not unilaterally declare Taiwan independence” (Ferhat-Dana 1998: 34-36). In 1995 at an international conference on Taiwan’s security and defence held in Washington D.C. the then party chairman Shi Mingde
publicly maintained that if the DPP came to power, a declaration of Taiwan independence was unnecessary and would not happen (ibid).129

Apart from the impact of democratisation, a generation change within the party is also an important factor behind the moderation of the DPP’s discourse of Taiwan independence. Ten years after the foundation of the DPP, a group of young party members, most in their thirties, formed a self-claimed ‘New Generation’ (xin shidai) group and began to advance their own ideas regarding the party line. As most members of the New Generation have not experienced the suppression during the Martial Law Period, they do not share with the older generation from the Dangwai period a sense of grievance and deprivation.130 The New Generation had thus their own ideas concerning Taiwanese independence and was dissatisfied with the existing party line.

After the DPP lost the 1996 presidential election, in April the same year members of the New Generation held the Grand Debate on the Opposition Movement in a New Generation (xin shidai fandui yundong dabianlun) in order to revise the party line. Following the Debate a “New Generation Program of the Taiwan Independence Movement” (taidu yundong de xin shidai gangling) was formulated, revising the ideas of the older generation. The New Generation considered that for the DPP to come into power, it should develop new issues to distinguish itself from the GMD and the NP instead of being trapped by the out-dated view of Taiwan independence. The ten articles in the Program thus gave a new interpretation of the meaning of Taiwan independence. By disassociating the question of Taiwan independence from historical grievances and from the resistance put up by the oppressed, Taiwan independence was turned into a movement of the entire nation instead of the sacred mission of the DPP. It became a forward-looking means to realise social transformation rather than a redress of past wrongs.131

129 Shi mingde served as the DPP chairman between 1994.4 and 1996.6.
130 Guo Zhengliang (1998: 45) identifies four differences that set the New Generation apart. Most importantly, as the GMD they know is no longer dominated by a small group of Mainlanders but run mainly by native Taiwanese by means of democratic elections, the New Generation can thus transcend the historical grievance to which the native Taiwanese had been subjected since the February 28th Incident. Therefore members of the New Generation adopt a pragmatic view of politics, be it concerning inter-party competition or cross-Strait relations.
131 The New Generation Program of Taiwan Independence states that:
However, not everyone accepted pragmatism in dealing with national identity. After the defeat in the 1996’s presidential election, the ideological difference between the extreme nationalist and the moderate eventually led to the split of the DPP: Peng Mingmin announced the formation of a Nation Building Association, which became a formal political party on 16 August 1996, to ‘carry the burden’ of independence for the DPP (Hughes 1997: 93). While the split had no lasting impact on the DPP, it facilitated the DPP’s moderation and transformation of its nationalist discourse. After 1996 the DPP increasingly downplayed the advocacy of Taiwan independence in election campaigns by shifting emphasis on positive issues such as clean government and anti-corruption policies.

The urge for a more pragmatic and moderate party policy concerning Taiwan’s status was made official with the adoption of the “Resolution on Taiwan’s

1. Taiwan independence is not a sacred mission but a pragmatic political position.
2. Taiwan independence is not caused by the foreign regimes’ oppression imposed upon the Taiwanese in the past four hundred years. Neither does it stem from Taiwanese’s hatred and fear of China; Taiwan independence is not a reaction to the past but a future prospect.
3. Taiwan independence is not a political goal of top priority but a means to realise the ideals of social transformation.
4. The Taiwan independence movement does not encompass the whole range of political-social reform movements.
5. Taiwan independence does not necessary require the use of ‘Taiwan’ as the country. It is not the aim of the Taiwan independence movement to change the country’s name, national flag or national anthem.
6. The Taiwan independence movement may no longer be an opposition movement but a goal of the entire nation.
7. Taiwan independence does not need to be obtained by the DPP or other groups in the Taiwan independence movement. The success of the Taiwan independence movement is not necessarily linked to the DPP’s coming into power or not.
8. The Taiwan independence movement takes the cohesion of the twenty million people’s national consciousness and identity as its base as well as its priority. Hence, the need for social reconciliation. Without reconciliation there will be no Taiwan independence movement.
9. The Taiwan independence movement is a movement that unites the society. It is not the instrument of division and retaliation. There is no such thing as an orthodox Taiwan independence movement.
10. Taiwan independence is not the private property of the DPP or any other organisation or party. It is the public good of the Taiwanese people.

132 By 2000 there were around 90 registered political parties in Taiwan but scholars of Taiwan studies generally considered the party system to be predominately a two-party system plus the NP striving to be the third viable force. A most recent party realignment was the second split of the GMD in 2001.
Future” (Taiwan qiantu jueyiwen) at the Eighth National Congress in 1999. The Resolution recognised that the maintenance of Taiwan’s status-quo amounted to Taiwan independence. Any change of the status-quo should be decided by means of a referendum. The significance of the Resolution lies in the fact that it was for the first time that the DPP officially acknowledged ROC as the title of the state on Taiwan. By the presidential election in 2000 the position of the DPP candidate, Chen Shuibian, regarding Taiwan’s international status overlapped largely with that of the GMD candidate, Lian Zhan. Such similarities indicated a clear convergence of the two main parties’ nationalist discourse.

7.4 Conceptualisation of the Taiwanese Nation in the Cultural Arena

While the reflection of Taiwan’s statehood and sovereignty dominated the nationalist discourse in the political arena since 1986, the construction of Taiwanese nationalism has been equally vigorous in the cultural field. With the focus on the issue of sovereignty, political elites have been dealing mainly with the task of boundary-drawing. But mere identification with the territory or assertion of the sovereign status of the political entity is not enough for the creation of a ‘community of life’ in Taiwan since “a national identity involves, not just a sense of place, but a sense of history” (Poole 1999: 140). The construction of a Taiwanese self in cultural terms becomes all the more urgent when across the Taiwan Strait Beijing constantly appeals to the common historical and cultural heritage shared by the people on both sides of the Strait to justify the idea of national reunification. For the Taiwanese nationalist, it is pivotal to identify, and in certain case, even to ‘invent’ cultural traits specific to the Taiwanese people.

As A-chin Hsiau (2001) demonstrates in his well-documented book, Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, the surge of Taiwanese nationalism in the political arena since the lifting of martial law has led to the politicisation of a number of cultural spheres such as literature, language, history and fine arts. And the pro-independence minded humanist intellectuals have undertaken the task of “authenticating the political assertion of identity by creating collective symbols, reclaiming Taiwanese literature, reviving Hoklo language, and rewriting Taiwanese history” (2001: 181). Elsewhere, the historian, Edward Wang (2002) has made a similar observation in his brilliant overview of the evolution of historiography as a
discipline in Taiwan in the past fifty years. According to Wang, one of the most signification developments in Taiwan’s study of history since 1987 is the emergence and predominance of Taiwanese history both as a research subject and a discipline on its own, which constitutes an important part of the on-going nation-building project.

In the following, I will confine my analysis to the expression of Taiwanese national imagination in the cultural field to one single case, the compilation of the new textbook serial, Renshi Taiwan (Knowing Taiwan), a crucial part of the education reform brought about by the process of democratisation, and the debate it invoked in 1997. The textbook reform offers a good site to observe the contradictions and contestations between two different national imaginations in the post-martial law Taiwan. Not only did the textbook reform bring the Taiwan-centred approach in historical research in Taiwan to the limelight as a part of nation-construction project. It also revealed how democratisation and the Taiwanisation of education interplayed with the reallocation of power in the state apparatus and the political elites’ pursuit of a new Taiwanese identity. So, on the one hand, as revealed by the content of the textbook, individual humanist scholars’ professional practice was informed and conditioned by his/her national identity, on the other hand, the textbook offered a site where various political forces interacted with academic development in the pursuit of control over legitimate knowledge.

7.4.1 The Context of the Textbook Reform

Since the retrocession of Taiwan in 1945, the GMD government had attached great importance to the eradication of Japanese influence and the promotion of Chinese consciousness among the population. The promotion of Mandarin Chinese was one vivid example of the official effort of resinicisation. The educational system as a whole was then highly centralised: before the 1980s, the Ministry of Education prescribed the contents of the curriculum and textbooks and controlled the appointment of school principals and university presidents in the public sector. The National Institute of Compilation and Translation was responsible for the editing and publishing of national standardised textbooks for the nine-year compulsory education. The content of the textbooks had since long reflected the GMD’s version of Chinese nationalism. History had been a key subject for the dissemination of official
nationalism in the educational channel. Western history was taught in complementarity with the national history. In the China-centred historical narrative, Taiwan occupied the status of a periphery region and consequently Taiwan’s local history and culture received little coverage in the textbooks. The teaching of history emphasised the common blood ties, cultural background and political development shared by Taiwan and Mainland China.  

Since the late 1980s, political democratisation has provided an opportunity for the opposition parties and various social pressure groups to turn the state monopolised educational system into a field of contention (Xue Xiaohua 1996). Basically their call for education reform has contained two goals, the liberalisation of the textbook market and the removal of political indoctrination from textbook content. Such demands received strong support inside the parliament from the DPP and the Mainstream GMD. On various occasions, Li Denghui had spoken in favour of education reform. And he echoed the demands of some DPP legislators that the compulsory teaching should cover more of Taiwan’s history and geography. Out of the interaction between the political elites and the civil society, a series of educational reforms were implemented. The Ministry of Education oversaw several waves of textbook deregulation (J. Chen 2000; Corcuff 2001; Law 2002). Throughout the 1990s, the Ministry of Education gradually opened up the compilation and publication of textbooks for primary and secondary schools to the private market. The main functions of the Ministry were limited to the prescription of a standard curriculum upon which textbooks were assessed and the final approval of textbooks.

While liberalisation targeted mainly the form of textbook production in Taiwan, the increased Taiwanese self-consciousness challenged directly the domination of Chinese nationalism in curriculum setting and the content of textbooks.

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133 As observed by historian Dai Shicun (1994: 117), in the five-volume history textbook for junior high school, the teaching material related to Taiwan took up only four percent.

134 Social movements demanding campus democracy and school autonomy developed as part of the process of democratisation in the 1980s. In its course of mobilisation, they quickly developed links with welfare and human rights organisations. 1994 witnessed a peak of the education reform movements with a wave of protest involving some 210 pressure groups.

135 Li was reported to have said that “I intend to have more courses on Taiwan’s history, geography and the roots of the Taiwanese in the national primary school education. In the past the schools taught all about the mainland but nothing about Taiwan. This is really ridiculous education” (quoted in Shiba Ryotaro 1994/04/30).
In 1994, a new course, “Knowing Taiwan”, was added to the curriculum at the level of junior high school as part of the Ministry of Education’s curriculum reform. In August 1997 the textbook serial, Knowing Taiwan, compiled by a panel of education specialists including university professors and editors, was published by the National Institute of Compilation and Translation (NICT) as the teaching material for this new subject. A textbook in three volumes - one on history, one on geography, and one dealing with Taiwanese society – would replace the first year of a two-year course in Chinese history, as it was previously taught. Around the time when the new textbook was examined, the trial version provoked a large-scale heated debate. The reaction to the new textbook, critical or supportive, eventually involved a large number of scholars and received wide-scale media coverage. In its essence, the debate on the textbook was aroused by “the competition between two opposing nationalisms for the right to speak in the educational institution” (Lu Jianrong 1999: 272).

7.4.2 The Textbook Authors’ Objectives and Arguments

At the time when the textbook was evoking disputes, the textbook reform committee members as well as individual authors either wrote column articles or spoke in interviews to explain or clarify their objectives and their choices of material for the new textbook. They stressed that in the compilation of the textbook there was no official involvement, that the committee had included scholars of different political stands. The aim was to present an objective account of Taiwan’s history without any

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136 The education reform started in 1994 had two tasks, the opening up of textbook market and the Taiwanisation of curriculum. While the three main parties’ consensus on the first task had resulted in the gradual but rapid textbook deregulation process, the Taiwanisation of curriculum initiated mainly by DPP legislators and pro-independence organisations was contested by the NP.

137 In his detailed study of the 1997 textbook debate, Stéphane Corcuff (2001:5) points out the fact that for the same textbook serial there existed five different versions between 1997 and 1999. And it was the “model version” (muben), labelled by Corcuff as the “initial version” (version initiale) for the sake of clarity, produced in May 1997, that provoked the scholarly debate, despite the fact that this version had not been published nor distributed publicly. In my analysis, I use the trial version of the NICT edited versions published in 1997 which was used during the academic year 1998-1999, including Guomin zhongxue renshi Taiwan: (lish pian) (National Secondary School Knowing Taiwan: History) and Guomin zhongxue renshi Taiwan: (shehui pian), (National Secondary School Knowing Taiwan: Society), (Taipei: NICT, 1997).
ideological bias. And the fact that the writing of the textbook was done from a Taiwan-centred perspective reflected the general social tendency following the process of democratisation and Taiwanisation (Huang Xiuzheng 1997a & 1997b; Wu Wenxing 1997). The critical review of the history teaching in Taiwan in 1997 by Du Zhengsheng can be read as a prelude to a justification of the necessity of textbook reform. As Du observed:

“The teaching of history in Taiwan in the past fifty years has been filled with Chinese chauvinism, and sometimes with narrow Han chauvinism. The history of Taiwan finds no place of its own in the education system from primary school to university (…) People who have been educated in Taiwan in the past fifty years know nothing about the history of Taiwan. They are equally ignorant of Taiwanese literature, art, religions, and customs.”

(Du 1998: 153-154)

As a historian, Du was fully aware of the close relationship between the teaching history and the construction of a national identity. He assumed that amongst all the modern scientific disciplines the discipline of history gave the truest reflection of social reality. As he saw it, subjected to strong political and ideological influence the teaching of history in Taiwan since 1949 had been China-centred and thus failed to present a truthful account of Taiwan’s contemporary history and international status. For Du (1995) the dogged emphasis on the bonds between Taiwan and Mainland China in the school syllabus was a distortion of historical truth. Elsewhere when expounding the aim behind his participation in the textbook reform, Du (1997/07/06) maintained that he had only one position, “that is to identify oneself

138 Professor of history, Huang Xiuzheng directed the compilation of Knowing Taiwan: History. Wu Wenxing, also a professor of history, was responsible for the writing of the history of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period.

139 Between 1995 and 2000 Du was the director of the Institute of History and Philology at the Academia Sinica. He was one of the editors-in-chief of the textbook, Knowing Taiwan, responsible for the editing of the volume, Society.
with Taiwan’. The teaching of history, according to Tu, should take into consideration the needs of realpolitik: concretely speaking, the construction of national identity in Taiwan necessitated, in this regard, the reinterpretation of history by replacing the Chinese nationalism advocated by the former GMD government with a native historical consciousness. The key issue at stake in the construction of a native Taiwanese consciousness was how to ‘have a footing on Taiwan’ (lizu Taiwan) while at the same time defining Taiwan’s position in the world. To this end Du (1997a) advanced an original approach for the teaching of history in secondary schools. For this approach, he coined a new concept, the ‘concentric circles historical view’ (tongxinyuan shiguan). The design of the textbook according to this new approach should take Taiwan as the central point of the concentric circles. The inner circle included the local history and the history of Taiwan. Then seriatim the second circle covered Chinese history, the third the history of Asia, and finally world history in the outmost circle. The main purpose of the concentric presentation of history to students was to “make the students identify with Taiwan” through the construction of historical consciousness (Du 1997b).

Du’s idea of ‘concentric circles’ was later taken up by the then Minister of Education, Guo Weifan to explain the objective of educational reform. As Corcuff (2001: 13-14) rightly points out, what the concept of ‘concentric circles’ revealed was precisely the position of the participants in the textbook reform: “in order to put an end to the profound identity disorientation among the Taiwanese, (the construction of) national identification should first go through the identification with Taiwan.”

7.4.3 The Identity Discourse in the Textbook Knowing Taiwan

Concretely, the textbook serial was made up of three individual volumes: Geography, History and Society. The controversy targeted mainly the content of History and

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140 In the defence of the textbook, one of the authors responsible for the volume on history, Zheng Zi (1997/06/06) also argued that the textbook was written based on the guideline, “writing the history of Taiwan from a Taiwanese perspective” (yi Taiwan ren de guandian xie taiwanshi).

141 Original quotation: L’identification nationale doit d’abord passer par l’identification à Taiwan, pour mettre fin à la profonde disorientation identitaire des Taiwanais.”
Society whilst the writing of Geography posed few problems. The volume Society comprised ten chapters, covering topics as diverse as ethnic relations, religious belief, cultural life, economic development, democratisation and environmental protection. The main feature in its writing was the emphasis on the plurality of Taiwanese society and its culture. For the author-group, the pluralistic characteristic was to be found in Taiwan’s cultural heritage as well as in its ethnic composition. Regarding the ethnic composition of the Taiwanese population, in the second chapter of Society (1997: 8-9), “Our Identity”, instead of the customary categorisation along the Han versus non-Han line, the authors identified four ethnic groups in Taiwan today: Aborigines, the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the Waishengren (also labelled as ‘New residents’). The authors further argued that due to cross-group inter-marriage, individual Taiwanese could belong to several ethnic groups at the same time. It was, therefore, inappropriate to categorise individuals into single ethnic unit. The multi-ethnic composition of the population, in their view, illustrated the pluralistic characteristics of Taiwanese society.

Paradoxically, while the authors stressed the aboriginal cultural heritage, they asserted that Taiwan was essentially an immigrant society. Moreover, the authors seemed to take it for granted that upon their arrival on Taiwan the immigrants spontaneously developed a strong identification with Taiwan. This was evidenced by the opening statement of the textbook:

“The Island of Taiwan is long north-south and narrow east-west, its shape resembling that of a sweet potato. (That is the reason why) Some Taiwanese self-claim to be the ‘sons of sweet potato’ and use sweet potato to symbolise the Taiwanese spirit.”

(Society 1997: 1)

The analogy drawn here between the Taiwanese people and the sweet potato was used to symbolise the people’s capacity to endure hardships. For the textbook authors, like the sweet potato that could survive and flourish under any harsh conditions, the Taiwanese developed their roots on the territory of Taiwan despite all kinds of difficulties.

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142 The authors of the volume of Society were Du Zhengsheng, Lin FuShi, and Peng Minghui.
However, while the construction of a common Taiwanese identity invoked multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism, the common experience of historical grievances was also considered an important basis for the formation of such an identity. In Chapter Eight “A Taste of Democracy” the authors lamented that “since the Dutch invasion of Taiwan in the 17th century, in the past four hundred years, most of the time Taiwanese people could not determine their destiny. (...) The political history of Taiwan is a sad history of foreign rule without the consent or the participation of the local residents” (Society 1997: 63). Although the textbook did not label explicitly the GMD government as yet another foreign regime, the statement in the textbook that Taiwanese people did not become their own masters (dangjiazuozhu) until the direct presidential election in 1996 suggested strongly otherwise (ibid 55). And against such a tragic account of Taiwan’s colonial history, the authors identified the spirit of rebellion as one defining characteristics of the Taiwanese:

“The Taiwanese were not born rebels, nor do they take pleasure in rebelling. It is only because for more than three hundred years the ruling ethnic groups had rarely treated the Taiwanese people on equal terms, the long term humiliation and repeated suppression forced the Taiwanese to strive for equality, liberty and dignity.”

(ibid 53)

The similarity between the historical narrative in the textbook and those made by pro-independence historians such as Shi Ming and Wang Yude was more than obvious. Both examined Taiwanese history over a period of four hundred years and both suggested a strong sense of historical grievances among the Taiwanese due to their involuntary subjection to foreign rule. In their view, historical grievances held implications for Taiwan’s future outlook: “if we do not want history to repeat itself, our primary mission is to safeguard our territorial security and our people’s dignity” (ibid 90). Such a discourse of historical grievances and the rebellion spirit of the people manifested a clear nationalist message.

While the discourse of historical grievances implied strongly that the native Taiwanese formed a we-group consciousness through their experience of successive foreign rule, including that of the GMD regime, the authors nevertheless tried to transcend ressentiment and avoid an antagonistic representation of the relation
between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders by suggesting the formation of a ‘community of common destiny’ in Taiwan towards the end of twentieth century. Territoriality and common institutions in this sense became the important demarcation criteria for the ‘community of common destiny’, echoing Li Denghui’s notion of Gemeinschaft:

“Since the GMD’s retreat from Mainland, the territories under the ROC’s effective rule, Tai-Peng-Kin-Ma, form one entity, customarily called ‘Taiwan’ by the international community. After its withdrawal from the UN, the government has developed a pragmatic diplomacy and joined various international economic organisations under the name of Tai-Peng-Kin-Ma. Tai-Peng-Kin-Ma has evolved into a virtual community of common destiny.”

(Society 1997: 6)

Taiwan’s territorial boundary thus delimited was further explained by the fact that:

“since Li Denghui succeeded as President, (… he) no longer insisted that the ROC was the sole legitimate government representing China but stressed that China was ruled separately by two equal political entities. Hence, the ROC is a sovereign and independent state.”

(History 1997: 95)

For the authors, the fifty years of common history also brought integration of the whole population in Taiwan. Native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders overcame their differences not only by their identification with the same territory but also by their identification with the same political and legal institutions:

“On this land we follow the same political institutions and abide by the same legal norms, we communicate with each other in a common language, script and life customs, we acquire equal identity, rights and obligations.”

(Society 1997: 88)
Similar to the volume of *History*, the construction of a Taiwanese nation was evidenced by the fact that use of ‘Han Chinese’ (*hanren*) in referring to the people of Taiwan deliberately avoided the usage of ‘Chinese’ in its political sense, as in *Zhongguoren*, or in an ethno-nationalist sense, as in ‘*Zhonghua minzu*’ (Chinese nation). Here we see a clear resonance of the political elite’s discourse on Taiwan’s sovereignty and Taiwanese identity as analysed in the preceding section.

The establishment of a Taiwanese ‘subjectivity’ (*zhutixing*) by way of differentiating Taiwan’s history from Chinese history was attempted by the authors of *Knowing Taiwan: History*. To begin with, in the “Introduction” of the volume, the authors outlined four essential characteristics of Taiwan’s history: (1) its pluralistic culture; (2) its international character; (3) prosperous foreign trade; and (4) the spirit of taking risks, struggling and overcoming difficulties (*History* 1997: 4). According to Edward Wang (2002: 224), such a characterisation of the history of Taiwan implies that Taiwan is different from China, since traditionally China was characterised as an ancient country with agrarian culture where ‘international character’ and ‘foreign trade’ were not taken as its defining features.

The historical periodisation of the textbook differed from the narrative of Chinese nationalism. Starting with the Portuguese love at first sight with the beautiful island (ilha Formosa!), the textbook examined modern Taiwanese history over a four-hundred-year period. The period during which the Dutch and the Spanish partially ruled Taiwan was not depicted in colonial terms but labelled as the period of ‘international competition.’ The return of Taiwan to the ROC in 1945 signified merely ‘the end of WWII’ instead of the notion of “glorious retrocession” (*guangfu*) in the GMD’s Chinese nationalist terminology. In the text Li Denghui’s notion of “ROC on Taiwan” was also used to refer to the post-war Taiwan.

More conspicuously, the evaluation of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan in *History* stood out in its difference from the previous accounts given in the pre-reform history textbook. The difference could be detected from two features: the proportion of this historical period within the whole textbook and the evaluation of it. With two lengthy chapters, the coverage of Japanese colonial rule in the new textbook exceeded that of ‘the period of Qing occupation’ or ‘the period of ROC on Taiwan’. Moreover, the author writing on this period, Wu Wenxing offered a positive account of Japanese colonial rule, elaborating extensively its economic, educational and social advancements. In fact, the term ‘*riben tongzhi*’ (Japanese rule) instead of the usual
‘riju’ (Japanese occupation) was used to label this period. The imposition of the Japanese language was seen as having “served the function of an important instrument for the Taiwanese to acquire modern knowledge and thus accelerated the modernisation of the Taiwanese society” (History 1997: 72). As for the Japanese discrimination against the Taiwanese, Wu just touched upon the issue only lightly. Overall, the half century Japanese colonial rule was presented as progressive and modern (Lu Jianrong 1999: 277).

Regarding Taiwan’s relation with the mainland, in line with the short-term objective indicated in the government’s mainland policy the cross-Strait relations was envisaged to develop into a ‘win-win’ situation according to the principles of ‘rationality, equality and mutual benefit.’ But there was no mention of the prospect of peaceful reunification as encapsulated in Guidelines for National Unification for the long-term perspective (History 1997: 90).

7.4.4 Criticisms of the Textbook

The Taiwan-centred account of history in the textbook attracted extensive criticisms as well as approval from the public, intellectuals and political elites during its trial period. Criticism came from both the pro-unification camp and the pro-independence camp. For the advocates of Taiwan independence, especially the radical ones, although the textbook did some justice to the history of Taiwan to a certain extent, it was still far from fulfilling the demand of Taiwanese nationalism (Lu Jianrong 1999: 273; 275). For those who supported the idea of unification, the new textbook was a product of ideological manipulation by independent-minded scholars backed up by the political forces. And it was the public symposium organised by the then NP legislator, Li Qinghua on June third 1997 concerning the textbook that set off a heated debate along the pro-unification and pro-independence spectrum. A number of

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143 Due to its new and positive interpretation of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, the textbook, Knowing Taiwan, attracted attention in Japan. In 2000, the Taiwan Studies Association in Japan translated and published the textbook in Japanese, the first ever history textbook in Taiwan being translated in Japanese.

144 This view was first expressed by the TAIP, in an article in China Times (1997/06/06), criticising the textbook’s failure to stick to Taiwan’s Subjectivity and calling for re-compilation. Then in summer 1997 five DPP legislators raised the same issue to Legislative Yuan debated.
historians, most of whom were members of the Taiwanese History Research Association and China Tide, also lent support to Li Qinghua’s position and defended a Chinese nationalistic account of the history (Wang Zhongfu 2001). 145

Generally speaking, criticisms made by the pro-unification camp focused on three aspects, (1) the deliberate attempts to de-sinicise Taiwan; (2) the distorted and unfaithful representation of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan by glorifying it; and (3) the strong influence of political ideology. Criticism targeted both the historical view expressed in the textbook and mistakes of historical fact (Wang Fuchang 2001; Corcuff 2001; Kang 1998). In response to the criticisms, the textbook’s authors also published newspaper articles to defend their position. Later they also introduced changes in the revised version of the textbook, incorporating part of the criticisms put forward by the pro-unification scholars. In a comparison of different versions of the textbook, Wang Fuchang notes that while the revised version of History incorporated most proposed changes regarding the accuracy of specific historical facts, only a small part of the suggested changes relating to historical perspectives were adopted, for instance, ‘Japanese rule’ was replaced by ‘Japanese colonial rule’. On the contrary, the editor-in-chief of Society, Du Zhengsheng disregarded most criticisms and challenges as he considered most of them targeted mainly at him personally (Wang Fuchang 2001: 184-185).

The debates surrounding the textbook reform proved that the issue of identity touched upon by the textbook attracted extensive attention in Taiwanese society. In the three months following Li Qinghua’s public symposium the issue of textbook reform became a news headline and a theme of several conferences. According to an estimation made by Du Zhengsheng, over two hundred and fifty news reports, eighteen editorials, one hundred special columns, and more than two hundred letters

145 The China Tide group was organised by some leftists with a strong Chinese identity in the 1980s within the Dangwai democratic camp. The forum for the group members to publicise their views was the journal, China Tide. Later, the Taiwanese History Research Association published an edited book (Wang Zhongfu 2001), The Textbook of Knowing Taiwan: A Reference, wherein the principal criticisms of the textbook serial were presented. Some of the articles in the edited book are also available online, http://www.china-tide.org.tw/history/knowpaper. The criticism by Li Qinghua was originally put forward in a pamphlet, titled “Renshi Taiwan? Huo wujie Taiwan? – Dui guozhong Renshi Taiwan jiaokeshu neirong de zhiyi” (Knowing Taiwan? Or Misunderstanding Taiwan? – Questioning the Content of Junior High School Textbook, Knowing Taiwan). Full text of this pamphlet is later included in the edited volume (Wang 2001: 134-138).
Looking at the exchange of arguments and the eventual outcome of the textbook reform where changes in the revised version involved mainly semantic adaptations, we can observe that the Taiwan-centred intellectuals seem to have gained the upper hand in disseminating their ideas through educational channels. Despite the authors’ self-proclaimed objectivity in the writing of the textbook, their Taiwan-centred viewpoints nevertheless were informed by the surging Taiwanese nationalist ideologies in the post-martial law Taiwanese society. Intentionally or unintentionally, the new narrative coincided with the Taiwanese nationalist position of the dominating political elites and hence provided them with the necessary cultural justifications for such a position.

7.5 Summary

In this chapter I examined the unfolding of Taiwanese nationalist ideologies in the post-martial law period. In terms of context, this period was characterised by the regime transition from the previously authoritarian rule to a democracy. A series of political and institutional reforms, such as the re-election of the parliamentary bodies and the direct presidential election on the one hand fulfilled the opposition’s demand for political democratisation while on the other hand, dismantling the institutional bases that were used to symbolise the GMD’s legitimate succession as the legal and orthodox Chinese government. These reforms resulted in an environment much more favourable to discussions of sensitive issues such as national identity. Moreover, since its foundation in 1986, the DPP became increasingly vocal on Taiwan independence and made national identity one of the key electoral issues in this period’s political mobilisation.

With democratisation opening up institutional channels for the political elites to propagate their national imaginations among divergent constituencies, this chapter took the two main political parties, the GMD and the DPP, as the key units for an

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146 Du said that the statistics cited was only a count in the newspapers issued publicly. He had not included the coverage of the debate in electronic media such as television, radio commentary and debate, listeners’ call-in, individual letters and leaflets. He exclaimed that with the amount of material available one could write a Ph.D. dissertation on the debate. Lu Jianrong (1999:273-274) also counted four public forums organised at the time publicising the debate. He sarcastically called the debate which spread over the period of a few months “one exciting cultural Carnival”.
analysis of the construction of nationalist ideologies in the political arena. The study found out that up to the early 1990s, the DPP played primarily an offensive role by pressurising the GMD for greater democracy and equal redistribution of power. The upholding of the principle of self-determination in various DPP policy papers indicated a convergence of democratic and national discourses. As Chang Mau-kuei (1994:115) points out, in this period,

“The nature of Taiwan’s political opposition can be said to carry two banners: democratization and Taiwanization. Though they are sometimes undifferentiated in political rhetoric, they do possess different meanings. Democratization implies representative government and the promotion of human rights, while Taiwanization implies equal political and economic participation by (native) Taiwanese, including advancing Taiwanese pride and Taiwan independence. (…) Because of these two characteristics (i.e., [sic] mainlander GMD political domination and exclusivity plus the State’s suppression of human rights and democracy in the name of the ROC), the opposition perceives the mainlanders’ domination as the source of political mobilization.”

In this period, DPP’s understanding of Taiwanese nationalism was basically part and parcel of its counter-state ideologies. This was particularly true of the radical faction, New Tide, for whom self-determination equated Taiwan independence with the exclusion of the mainlanders.

The analysis further demonstrated that during Li Denghui’s administration the deepening of the process of Taiwanising the GMD’s power centre marginalised the previously dominant mainlanders and eventually led to the split of the NP from the GMD. Such a process also enabled Li Denghui to remove the issue of ethnic inequality from the DPP mobilisation agenda and further gave Li full credit as Mr. Democracy. Once Li Denghui had successfully consolidated his power inside both the party and the state apparatus, the ball was in the Taiwanised GMD’s court. Li Denghui gradually distanced himself from the GMD’s Chinese nationalism and developed a new agenda for national reconstruction. Externally, by appropriating the DPP’s initiatives in promoting Taiwan’s international status into the official foreign
policy Li Denghui attempted to redefine the relationship between the ‘ROCOT’ and
the PRC on a special state-to-state basis. Internally he invented such novel notions as
‘Gemeinschaft’, ‘sovereignty in the people’ and ‘new Taiwanese’ in order to instil a
civic national identity in the Taiwanese society. Slowly but surely, Li Denghui
pushed the process of nation-formation toward Taiwan independence while at the
same time the DPP gradually moderated its nationalist line. Towards the second half
of the 1990s, political elites of the two major parties showed a considerable consensus
in their definition of the Taiwanese nation.

In my view, at the core of the convergent nationalist discourse lies the
innovative notion of ‘new Taiwanese’. As a political concept, the notion contains
several meanings. First, in an effort to transcend the ethnic cleavage that divides
Taiwanese society, the notion of ‘new Taiwanese’ emphasises tolerance and mutual
respect as the new basis for generating social integration. The identity of a new
Taiwanese is based on a farewell to historical grievances and the adoption of a
forward-looking attitude. Second, a new Taiwanese is someone who identifies with
the effective state apparatus and the common political institution on the territory of
Taiwan. And third, the notion is used to assert the Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis the
mainland on equal terms and to affirm the Taiwanese position in the international
community. Although there is no denial that the idea of ‘new Taiwanese’ is often
evoked strategically by different politicians for electoral mobilisation, with the
principle of territoriality and the identification with the state and the common political
institution at its base it aims at the construction of a civic nation.

In many ways the development of Taiwanese nationalism in the cultural arena
was strongly informed by the political changes in this period. Taiwanisation provided
the historical and social setting for the textbook reform in 1997. The content of the
textbook, Knowing Taiwan and the debate it generated revealed an identity shift
among intellectuals from a Chinese national identity to a Taiwanese national identity.
Although the authors of the textbook insisted that the compilation and edition were
effected in accordance with the principle of academic impartiality, the national
discourse conveyed in the text resonated with the dominant nationalist ideology in the
political arena. In its construction of a Taiwanese identity, the textbook conjoined
civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation: while the account of the multi-culturalism,
political democratisation and economic liberalism of Taiwanese society reflected the
image of a civic Taiwanese nation, the historical narrative based on a sense of
ressentiment and tragedy was constructed to bring to life a historically contiguous Taiwanese subjectivity.

To sum up, an analysis of the Taiwanese nationalist ideology in this period reveals that while elites incorporate both civic and ethnic conceptualisations of the nation in their national imagination, there is a clear dominance of the civic understanding of the nation. In my opinion, the predominance of the civic understanding of the nation is, to a large extent, conditioned and inspired by the specific structural context in which the politics of nationalism operates, namely, the process of democratisation and Taiwanisation.
Part Four

Conclusion
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

Nation, as Brubaker (1996:7) reminds us, is “a category of practice, not (in the first instance) a category of analysis.” A never finished product of social construction, a modern nation comes to life through a social process of construction and reification. The central task of students of nationalism, therefore, is to “account for this social process of reification – this process through which the political fiction of the nation becomes momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice” (Brubaker 1996:16). Stemming from such a constructivist understanding of the nation, this study has taken nationalism, not the nation, as its central analytical unit. The case under investigation is Taiwanese nationalism. In terms of methodology, an elitist perspective is adopted to explore the ideological force behind the process of nation-building in Taiwan. The investigation of the ideology is also undertaken from a historical perspective. Essentially this study sets out to describe and understand the ideological history of Taiwanese nationalism between 1895 and 2000.

Based on my previous observation that a significant number of works in the existing literature on Taiwanese nationalism have been based on the theoretical distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, I start the investigation initially with a question in mind: is Taiwanese nationalism a civic variant or an ethnic one? The overview of the recent works on Taiwanese nationalism given in Chapter Four shows that the analyses conducted by a number of scholars of Taiwan studies point strongly in favour of Taiwanese nationalism as civic in its nature. Moreover, for these authors, the civicism is not only a characteristic of contemporary Taiwanese nationalism but also the ideal state according to which the on-going project of nation-building in Taiwan should be directed. There is a general tendency, though not necessarily intended, among contemporary scholarship on Taiwanese nationalism to combine the empirical analysis of the phenomenon with a normative assessment.

While the overview of the theories of nationalism conducted in Part One testifies to the relevance of the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism to concrete case studies, it nevertheless suggests that the question of whether nationalism in a concrete case is civic or ethnic is ill-formulated. This is so
because the binary theoretical distinction is in its essence a generalising ‘ideal type’ conceptual scheme. The examination of the definition of the ‘ideal type’ concept by Max Weber shows that firstly, through theoretical abstraction and a one-sided emphasis on certain features of a social phenomenon, an ideal type concept is constructed to help the investigator to understand its composition and development. But, in so far as such a concept is useful for analytical purposes, it does not mirror social reality, nor can the reality be categorised accordingly. Moreover, the ideal type concept is an analytical tool designed to undertake empirical analyses, not normative assessments. Its application therefore cautions us against the conflation of these two types of analyses.

Theories of nationalism display two ideal-type variants: civic nationalism defines a nation primarily in terms of territory and the individual’s voluntary identification with the common institutions and political norms and values, while the ethnic nationalism perceives the nation as a historical community based on objective biological, ethnic and cultural factors. A theoretical review suggests that the distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism could offer itself as a useful conceptual tool to capture the different currents of thought in the discursive ideology behind the process of nation-formation. Therefore, the question that I set out to answer in the empirical part is how over time these two idealised conceptions of nation have informed and shaped the way the Taiwanese elite imagine the nation.

In Chapter Five, Six and Seven of the empirical part, I have constructed a historical analysis of the emergence and ideological formation of contemporary Taiwanese nationalism in three different periods, the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945), the post-war martial law period (1945-1986), and the post-martial law period (1987-2000). As the discursive ideology stands in an interactive relation with the specific social and political context out of which it emerges, in all three chapters I begin with a depiction of the structural context of the respective period. Applying the ideal distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism to the case study, I argue that the historically contingent ideology of Taiwanese nationalism has constructed the notion of the Taiwanese nation both as a Taiwanese Staatnation and a Taiwanese Kultuurnation. To the extent that the political discourse and the cultural discourse overlapped throughout the entire ideological history, under different socio-political contexts they varied in the intensity with which each in turn predominated.
In Chapter Five, I argue that the special type of nationalism that emerged in the period of Japanese colonial rule was induced by the experience of a colonial regime and was a liberating effort to free the local population from the imposed alien rule. With assimilation at the core of its colonial policy, Japanese colonialism sought to incorporate the newly acquired territory and its population into the expanding Japanese Empire, albeit in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Japanese home country. Although unintended, Japanese colonialism generated for the first time an island-wide ‘sphere of pilgrimage’: while the establishment of the modern administrative system drew the spatial boundaries, the imposition of the Japanese language provided native Taiwanese with a common *lingua franca*. When the racial difference between the native Taiwanese and the Japanese was further reinforced by the colonial cleavage, the Taiwanese naturally developed a common group consciousness. But the politicisation of such a consciousness in nationalist terms had to await the coming to age of a new generation of Taiwanese elites.

Towards the late 1910s, thanks to the introduction of the colonial education system, a generation of Taiwanese elites, mainly students with modern higher education, emerged. However, given the discriminatory nature of the colonial regime, these elites were crippled in their social and political mobility in the overall power structure. The ethnically discriminatory treatment, coupled with a sense of marginalisation, compelled the Taiwanese elites under Japanese colonial rule to develop a counter discourse along nationalist lines. Based on a number of articles and speeches made by the leading figures in the political and cultural movements in the 1920s and 1930s, I look into how the notion of a Taiwanese nation was developed.

An examination of the successive anti-colonial organisations and their activities shows that in the 1920s Taiwanese elites concentrated their demands on equality and autonomy through political campaigns first for the abolition of the discriminatory Law 6.3 and then the establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. The nationalist thinking was strongly influenced by the Wilsonian doctrine of national self-determination just emerging at the time. In their construction of a Taiwanese ‘self’ eligible for the right to self-determination, Taiwanese elites had conjoined both civic and ethnic-cultural conceptions of the nation. In the anti-assimilation arguments given by Cai Pei-huo and Lin Chenglu, the Taiwanese Han ethnicity and Chinese cultural heritage were invoked to differentiate them from the Japanese. And yet in demanding Taiwan-wide political autonomy and self-rule, the same elites drew the
boundary of the political community according to the territorial delimitation of the colony instead of calling for their return to the Chinese nation. While the colonial context necessitated such a pragmatic strategy, the analysis of Jiang Weishui’s understandings of the relation between nation and state suggested that Taiwanese elites used the civic conception of nation to defend a Taiwanese common interest against the Japanese coloniser.

In the 1930s, with the advocacy of the nativist literature and the creation of the writing system of the vernacular Taiwanese in the New Literature Movement, Taiwanese elites elaborated the specificity of the Taiwanese nation in cultural terms. A cultural conception of the nation deviant from the Chinese cultural nationalism emerged. But the distinctive Taiwanese national culture was not defined in terms antagonistic to the Chinese culture. As I see it, it was articulated as a counteraction to the intensified Nipponisation so as to create a sense of subjectivity for the territorially defined political entity of Taiwan. We can thus conclude that in the elites’ construction of the Taiwanese nation during the colonial period the demand for national self-determination in political terms preceded the cultural imagination of the nation.

In Chapter Six I analyse the overseas TIM and anti-GMD Taiwanese nationalism after WWII. From the account of the Taiwanese reactions to the GMD takeover in 1945 we can see that the post-war TIM was not a historical continuation of the Taiwanese nationalist movement in the colonial period. But when the native Taiwanese expectations for autonomous self-rule and equal status with their mainland compatriots were ruthlessly crushed by the corrupt and despotic GMD rule, especially after the February 28 trauma, the native Taiwanese elites in exile turned national and produced the overseas TIM. Throughout the 38-year-long martial law period, the GMD’s authoritarian regime conditioned the clandestine and diaspora nature of Taiwanese nationalism.

As in the preceding period, the overseas TIM started off as an elitist movement with the native Taiwanese scholars who became refugees after the February 28 Incident and expanded later among the Taiwanese students studying abroad. In the 1950s and 1960s, predominant arguments to justify the political aspiration for an independent Taiwan were formulated in ethnic and cultural terms. While Liao Wenyi’s thesis of mixed blood was the most radical account, Shi Ming and Wang Yude used historical narrative to trace the Taiwanese national trajectory
independent of China. The logic behind the arguments was that given its specific historicity and cultural distinctiveness, the Taiwanese nation had a right to independent statehood. While these ethno-nationalist articulations may be deliberate discursive constructions designed to effectuate a clear-cut disassociation of Taiwan from mainland China both culturally and historically, they reflected Taiwanese nationalist elites’ deep-seated disillusion with the GMD and its proclaimed representation of the Chinese nation. The disproportionate representation of native Taiwanese and Mainlanders in the ROC’s national bodies and the establishment of Chinese hegemony at the expense of the Taiwanese culture further aggravated the Taiwanese nationalists’ antagonism.

In the 1970s, the ROC’s severe diplomatic setbacks severely damaged the crucial source of legitimacy for the GMD regime, i.e., international recognition, particularly that by the US. The GMD was forced to open up limited electoral avenues as well as to initiate the process of Taiwanisation in the attempt to gain more internal support. At the same time, through participation in local elections and supplementary national elections, sporadic dissent in Taiwan proper, from native Taiwanese and Mainlanders, gradually gathered momentum and developed into a quasi-opposition party, the Dangwai. Striving primarily for democracy, the opposition movement only took the nationalist turn towards the idea of Taiwan independence after the Gaoxiong Incident in 1979.

Despite the emergence of an ethnic cleavage between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders, these two communities have co-existed in Taiwan since 1945 and dissidents from both communities made joint efforts to democratise Taiwan. Therefore, demarcation of the Taiwanese national community based exclusively on this ethnic cleavage would be highly problematic. In the 1970s the new conceptualisation of the Taiwanese nation took shape in the overseas TIM. Representative of this new conceptualisation were Peng Mingmin’s conception of the nation and the notion of ‘non-differential identity’ which defined the Taiwanese nation as a political community based on common consent. By emphasising the principle of territoriality, the subjective understanding of the nation aimed to transcend the ethnic division in the Taiwanese society.

Taken as a whole, the nationalist discourse in the overseas TIM during the first two decades of the martial law period was characterised by an ethnic understanding of the nation. Romantic accounts of the distinct Taiwanese history, language and
genealogy were formulated to unearth the existence of a historical nation. In this regard, the creation of a political state was believed to preserve better the cultural nation. Later, a more political, or civic understanding of the nation was introduced which did not necessarily call for the congruence of the political boundaries with the cultural ones. However, it would be wrong to assume that the political conception of the nation was put forward to wipe out the historicity of the Taiwanese nation. To the extent that the progression in such a political conception rendered it more accommodating and inclusive as compared to the ethnic conception, it was also a strategic move on the part of the Taiwanese nationalist elites to legitimise the establishment of an independent Taiwan state.

In Chapter Seven I expound the transformation of the Taiwanese nationalist ideology following the lifting of martial law in 1987. The period is characterised by the dramatic regime transition with the previous authoritarian regime replaced by democratic rule. Structural changes in the socio-political context resulted in an environment more conducive to the development of Taiwanese nationalism. With the organisational advantages, political parties became the forerunners in initiating and formulating identity-related discussions.

Reborn from the Dangwai, the DPP emerged as the genuine opposition party and staged serious challenges to the GMD on the issues of democratisation and national identity. The analysis of the DPP’s documents and policy papers in the second half of the 1980s reveals that the principle of people’s self-determination formed the core of its nationalist discourse. While the principle reflected an adherence to the party’s nature as a democratic opposition movement, the ambiguity embedded in this principle left various factions room for flexible interpretations of what was meant by the people as well as the types of institutional arrangement to realise self-determination. The DPP’s electoral mobilisation, based on an appeal to the native Taiwanese sense of deprivation in the uneven power distribution on the national level, also demonstrated the rhetorical function of the adherence to the principle of people’s self-determination in its nationalist policy. The radicalisation of the DPP’s position on the issue of Taiwan independence in 1991, evidenced by the inclusion of the independence clause in the party programme, showed the temporary dominance of the ethnic understanding of the Taiwanese nation.

Playing along with the opposition’s demands for democratisation and Taiwanisation, Li Denghui implemented a series of institutional and constitutional
reforms. As a result, he tactically transformed the image of the GMD from that of an ‘alien ruler’ to a native party. The ROC’s grand and imaginary boundaries drawn according to the situation in 1949 were also reinterpreted with a differentiation between *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignty. Carefully steering a pragmatic middle way between Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism, Li Denghui managed first to consolidate his power within the GMD. His deviation from the orthodox GMD ideology led to a split of the party. While using his image as the first native Taiwanese president and appropriating the opposition central platforms pre-emptively into state policy, Li Denghui nevertheless discredited the DPP as radical and irresponsible by pursuing a pragmatic Taiwanese nationalism. Essentially his pragmatic nationalism maintained that, according to the principle of ‘sovereignty of the people’, the nation in Taiwan was a ‘community of lives’ made up of the ‘new Taiwanese’ residing in the independent sovereign state of ‘ROCOT’. Through such a civic conception of nation, Li addressed the divided national identities which plagued the Taiwanese society and advocated, at least on a discursive level, the transcendence of historical and ethnic differences and social integration.

The changes facilitated the moderate faction within the DPP to adjust its position and ideology. The revolutionary counter-state mentality which rejected the existing political order was revised. The DPP gradually toned down its radical stand on the issue of Taiwan independence and acquiesced in Li’s pragmatic interpretation of Taiwan’s international status and the Taiwanese identity. After the first Taiwan-wide direct presidential election and the split of the radical TAIP from the DPP, the two main parties converged on the issue of national identity. The mainstream pragmatic nationalist discourse defined the Taiwanese nation on the basis of an identification with the current political boundaries and institutions. In such a discourse, the PRC was defined as the ‘other’. Although common cultural affinities between Taiwan and the PRC were recognised, the two remained distinct political entities.

Concurrent with the process of the formation of the Taiwanese nationalist ideology in the political sphere, a movement to construct a national culture corresponding to the political boundary had been launched by cultural elites. The main thrust of this politicised cultural enterprise was the discovery and cultivation of a Taiwanese subjectivity. A similar process of Taiwanisation took place in a wide range of academic and cultural domains, such as cinematography, literature, musicology, and humanity studies. While the process started off as a spontaneous

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cultural movement, its coincidence with the mainstream political ideology had quickly led to the involvement of the state. The interaction of cultural elites and the state was most visible in the educational institutions, the milieu *par excellence* to disseminate political ideas and norms by way of socialisation. The analysis of the textbook reform, especially the debate on the textbook of *Knowing Taiwan*, illustrates the state-sponsored nationalising cultural project. The textbook conveyed a mixed nationalist message, blending the political conception of the Taiwanese nation with a romantic account of the Taiwan-centred national history.

However, the debate on the nationalist ideology behind the textbook as evidenced by the criticisms made by the Mainlander scholars, who tended to embrace their Chinese identity and were obviously marginalised in this process of Taiwanisation, revealed an identity dilemma. And the reality is that such an ambivalent national identity is not confined to a minority of the marginalised Mainlander elites. Survey studies testify to the fact that the Taiwanese population at large claim a dual-identity, that they are both Chinese and Taiwanese.\(^{147}\) Although in this study I take Taiwanese nationalist ideology as the authentic manifestation of the Taiwanese nationalist elites’ identity, there is always an instrumental and strategic side to this discursive identity. The predominance of the civic nationalist discourse does not necessarily mean that it is more inclusive and morally desirable: although such a conception of nationhood might contribute to greater social harmony within Taiwan, the exclusive understandings of sovereignty and territorial integrity inherent in this conception of the nation-state have augmented cross-Strait tensions on the sovereignty issue, which is counter-productive to the economic and social integration achieved so far. In the worst case scenario, should both Beijing and Taibei adopt an intransigent stand on the issue of sovereignty, not only the interests of the people on both sides would be in peril, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region would also be severely hampered.

\(^{147}\) The annual survey conducted by MAC supports such an observation. Although throughout the 1990s there is an increase in the number of people who identify themselves exclusively as Taiwanese and support the existing political order, there is still a large portion of the population who consider themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. Moreover, on the long-term prospect of cross-Strait relations, majority are split between permanent independence and eventual unification. See http://www.mac.gov.tw.
# GLOSSARY

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Zheng Kunwu 郑坤伍
Zheng Zi 郑梓
Zhou Wanyao 周婉窈
Zhu Yunhan (Chu Yun-han) 朱云汉

Notions, Expressions, Names of Organisations
Baojia 保甲
Benshengren (Ben Sheng Jen) 本省人
Dangjia zuozhu 当家作主
Dangwai 党外
Dôka 同化
Dutong zhi zheng 独统之争
Fenlie zhuyi 分裂主义
Fei zhuliupai 非主流派
Guangfu 光复
Guojia zhuyi 国家主义
Guójia rentong 国家认同
Guojia de zhuren 国家的主人
Guomindang (Kuo-min-tung) 国民党
Guoyu 国语
Guozu 国族
Guozu rentong 国族认同
Haiyang wenhua 海洋文化
Hakka 客家
Hokklo 河洛/福佬
Jiayuan 家园
Jiguan 籍贯
Jinshen jieji 缙绅阶级
Komin 公民
Kôōgakkôō 公学校
Lizu Taiwan 立足台湾
Mansei Movement 万岁运动
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