Introduction

1989 seems certain to go down in the history of international politics as a watershed year. A series of ‘revolutions’ in what is now referred to as East-Central Europe was highlighted by the fall of the wall in East Berlin. John Mueller (1995) has argued that the end of the Cold War created a situation reminiscent in important ways of that resulting from the ends of the First and Second World Wars. Certainly the analogy is valid enough in the sense that the Cold War’s demise, like the real World Wars before it, leaves in its wake an international system, and Great Power relationships, profoundly different than were in place previously. It is natural to wonder whether this dramatically changed structure will prove conducive to peace, or to disastrous, war-prone breakdown.

One of the reasons such curiosity is natural is that the structures produced by the Allied victories in the two World Wars produced such strikingly different results. That arising from the ashes of World War I produced in a fairly short time the even more disastrous World War II. The post-World War II system often seemed, particularly in its earlier years, perhaps, headed for an even more disastrous, quite possibly cataclysmic World War III. But in retrospect we know that in fact the post-World War II system produced The Long Peace (Gaddis, 1987). The Cold War years were often tense, there were proxy wars and Third World Wars in some abundance, producing sufficient mayhem and suffering to make the phrase ‘The Long Peace’ sound at least a tad ethnocentric. Nevertheless, the Cold War system was ‘peaceful’ in the sense that it never fell apart in actual, military, warring confrontations among the major powers in the international system.

In fact, the Cold War coincided, by some calculations, with longest period of peace among the major powers in the history of the modern international system. Can that peace be preserved now that the international structure produced by Cold War antagonisms has been so profoundly altered? The ‘law of averages’, in a sense, might seem to militate against such an outcome. Surely pres-
sures for war must build up after such a prolonged period of peace. In any case, most of the major powers in the current international system are still European (even though Russia is not wholly European), and the United States is so deeply involved in European international politics as to count as a quasi-European power at least. So the question about the preservation of peace among major powers coincides to an important extent with the focus of this conference, as well as this paper, on the future of peace in Europe.

John Mearsheimer (1990), of course, has argued that the bipolar structure of the Cold War era, as elaborated theoretically and abstractly in Waltz (1979) was a powerful force for peace. Now that this structure has been altered, Mearsheimer concludes reasonably enough that this peace is in danger of collapsing. This argument is countered from a number of quarters; we will concentrate here on the counter-argument offered by the advocates of the democratic peace proposition, or the idea that democratic states have not and are not likely to initiate international wars against each other (Rummel, 1975-1981, 1997; Russett, 1993; Ray 1995). Fortunately for attempts to evaluate the relative merits of these two bases of prognostication about the future of international politics in Europe, the current situation in Europe leads these two theoretical schools of thought to point in quite diametrically opposed directions when they attempt to chart that future. Since the bipolar Cold War structure helped preserve the peace, according to ‘neorealists’ such as Mearsheimer and Waltz, its modification is dangerous. And it has quite clearly been dramatically altered. But according to advocates of the democratic peace proposition, peace has been preserved in Western Europe at least in part because it became uniformly democratic after the Second World War, and now that democracy has spread to East-Central Europe, and even (albeit tentatively and unevenly) to Russia and other post-Soviet republics, peace should be even more securely established.

It is convenient, too, for this paper dealing with the debate between neorealists and advocates of the democratic peace proposition (who might be labelled neoliberals, even though the label connotes a wider array of ideas) that both agree that an ability to provide a basis for accurate predictions is an important indicator of the quality or validity of a theory. Mearsheimer notes in his article on the dangers facing Europe in a post-Cold War Europe that ‘social sciences should offer predictions on the occurrence of momentous and fluid events like those unfolding in Europe’, and further that ‘predictions of events soon to unfold provide the best tests of social science theories’ (Mearsheimer, 1990: 9). And Bruce Russett, one prominent advocate of the democratic peace proposition, along with the author of this paper, have recently argued that ‘predictions cannot be...modified consciously or sub-consciously, in order to accommodate the events upon which they focus, since the outcomes to be accounted for by the predictions are unknown. This makes the future an important, even irreplaceable, arbiter between contrast-
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This paper, then, addresses a theoretical controversy (with clear policy implications) within a specific question regarding whether anarchy or democracy will prevail in Europe. This question can be interpreted in at least two basic ways. The first interpretation would be based on the assumption that both anarchy (in the specific neorealist sense to be discussed below), as well as democracy, will continue to exist in Europe. The question then becomes a matter of which phenomenon, anarchy or democracy, will have the greater impact on the future of international relations in Europe. In simple terms, if anarchy prevails over democracy, then warfare among European states is likely to break out. In contrast, if democracy prevails over anarchy, then according to the advocates of the democratic peace proposition anyway, peace is likely to reign. We will address first the question interpreted in this way.

But the question might also be interpreted to focus on the question of whether anarchy and/or democracy will continue to exist in Europe. Obviously if one continues to exist, and the other does not, then the survivor will have a greater impact on the future of Europe. As it happens, continuation of neither anarchy, nor democracy in Europe is assured. Perhaps the European Union will replace ‘anarchy’ in the neorealist sense of the word. And/or perhaps democratic governments will give way to autocratic regimes, in at least an important proportion of European states. The first would presumably reduce the danger of war in Europe. The second might dramatically increase that probability. The second part of this paper will evaluate the probability that either anarchy or democracy will prevail, in the sense that they will continue to exist.

The Relative Potency of Anarchy, or Democracy in Europe

If anarchy refers, as neorealists use the term, to the absence of a central government-like entity, then Europe has always been anarchic, even during the ‘peaceful’ years of the Cold War. So neorealists like John Mearsheimer do not argue that anarchy makes war inevitable. What made Europe peaceful during the Cold War was not, from the neorealist point of view, the absence of anarchy, but the presence of a bipolar structure buttressed by the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. And it is perhaps worth pointing out here that the pessimistic, neorealist forecast by Mearsheimer is based on assumptions about how drastically the end of the Cold War would alter the bipolar international systemic structure that have so far proved unwarranted. Mearsheimer (1990: 5) envisioned that the ‘Cold War comes to a com-
complete end’. He also assumed that the Soviet Union would withdraw all of its forces from Europe. That assumption proved warranted. What he did not assume was that the Soviet Union would dissolve. In that respect, the post-Cold War structure has moved even more dramatically away from the Cold War structure of U.S.-Soviet confrontation than Mearsheimer (1990) anticipated. But in many respects the post-Cold War structure of Europe is less dramatically altered than Mearsheimer assumed for his ‘thought experiment’ regarding the future of Europe. He assumed in 1990 that the Warsaw Pact and NATO would be dissolved. He also assumed that all American troops would be withdrawn from Europe. But NATO has not been dissolved, and 100,000 American troops remain in Europe. ‘NATO’s robust health is particularly striking for an organisation that had seemed, at the end of the cold war, to be in danger of becoming redundant’ (‘A New Kind of Alliance’, 1996: 19). Instead of dissolving, it has taken preliminary, official steps toward adding new members, i.e., Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

It may be worth pointing out, in this evaluation of neorealist theory as it applies to Europe, that it was probably neorealist thinking that played a role in leading Mearsheimer to expect, in 1990, that NATO would soon dissolve, and that the United States would soon pull all of its troops out of Western Europe. With the Soviet Union in shambles, and the Warsaw Pact extinct, the more purely realistic, or neorealist reasons for NATO to exist, and for American troops to stay in Europe, disappear. It would be natural, then, neorealistically speaking, to anticipate that NATO and the American troops would also disappear. That they have not is already some evidence then, that neorealist ideas have not pointed in a direction that would have helped us anticipate future trends in international politics within Europe. The levels of co-operation among Western European states, and between those states and the United States, indicated by NATO’s continued existence and by the remaining American troops in Europe, would not be anticipated by a neorealist.

Furthermore, since the preconditions imagined by Mearsheimer have not come to pass, even a neorealist, at present, would have to assume that his pessimistic prognostications about the future of Europe are not fully warranted. In other words, since NATO has not fallen apart, and American troops have not pulled out entirely, even a neorealist could not now be as pessimistic about stability in Europe as Mearsheimer was in 1990.

On the other side of the coin, the preservation of NATO, as well as the EU, after the demise of the Cold War and the Soviet Union provide some evidence in support of the neoliberal way of looking at the world (within which falls the democratic peace proposition). It is not true that it is impossible to envision cooperation within a realistic framework. Moravcsik (1991), for example, tries to show how the negotiations leading up to the Single European Act in 1986 were compatible with ‘national interests’ defined in a traditional, ‘realistic’ manner.
Nevertheless, such co-operation is at least potentially anomalous for realism, while it falls squarely within the expectations of neoliberals or institutionalists. In short, ‘neorealism is not compelling in explaining the co-operation that continues among Western countries. While post-Cold War Europe has had its disputes, the European disorder predicted by extreme neorealists has not emerged’ (Krupnick 1996b; for a more pessimistic view, see Porter, 1995).

According to an oft-quoted assertion by Jack Levy (1988: 661), ‘the evidence is conclusive that...there is one aspect of the military behaviour of democratic states...that is clearly distinguished from that of non-democratic states...democratic states do not fight each other’. Levy goes on to observe that this empirical evidence provides support for a generalisation that ‘comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’ (1988: 662). If democracy is such a clear guarantee of peace, why should stability and peace in Europe be in doubt as long as almost all European states are democratic?

The beginning of an answer to such a question is that it has not been demonstrated to everybody’s satisfaction that in fact democratic states are so unlikely to fight wars against each other. The validity of such an assertion depends vitally and obviously on how one defines the key terms ‘democracy’, and ‘war’. The definition of a ‘war’ is certainly the less controversial one (although it is not beyond controversy). The definition that has been accepted in most academic evaluations of the democratic peace proposition that asserts that democratic states have not and will not fight international wars against each other identifies as ‘war’ military confrontations between independent nation-states that result in an at least 1000 battle deaths (Small and Singer, 1982). What is ‘democracy’, and how one identifies a democratic state for the purpose of evaluating the assertion that democratic states have not fought wars against each other is an issue not so easily resolved. Most of the important evaluations of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between regime type and international conflict have relied on quantitative indicators of ‘democracy’ (Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992b, 1993b). They categorise as a democracy states that achieve a certain threshold on those indicators. This strategy is defensible for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not in general it is true that there is a systematic statistical tendency for democratic states to avoid going to war with each other. It is less relevant or appealing to an attempt to evaluate controversial cases, in order to in turn assess the relative validity of the claim that the democratic peace proposition points to a lawlike pattern, to which there are no, or only trivial exceptions.

For dealing with controversial cases, a definition of democracy, ideally, would be simple, intuitively plausible, and theoretically based. Let me immodestly suggest, at least for the purposes of discussion, that I have devised such a definition. At the very least, this definition is designed specifically for the purpose of evaluating controversial cases central to the debate about the validity of
the democratic peace proposition. This definition is based first on recognition of
the fact that democracy is a continuous concept, not a categorical one. States
cannot logically or intuitively be sorted into two categories, democratic and
undemocratic. Rather the various states of the world fall onto points on a con-
tinuum ranging from most autocratic to most democratic. Picking a point on
that continuum for the purposes of answering the question regarding how many
wars there have been between democratic states is going to be to some extent
arbitrary and therefore problematic, no matter how persuasively that point may
be selected and defended.

And yet it must be done if the validity of the democratic peace proposition is
to be evaluated. The proposition asserts that wars between democratic states
have never, or only rarely occurred. Obviously, that assertion cannot be evalu-
ated unless one is willing to specify or define a category of states, which are suf-
ficiently democratic so as to experience or benefit from the alleged pacifying
effect of democracy. That is the purpose of the definition to be discussed here,
i.e., to specify that point on the continuum from most autocratic to most demo-
cratic above or beyond which we will find states that are sufficiently democrat-
ic they will not initiate interstate wars against each other.

For that purpose I think it is most useful to conceive of ‘democracy’ on a
broad conceptual level as a ‘form of government in which the identities of the
leaders of the executive branch and the members of the national legislature are
determined in fair, competitive elections’ (Ray, 1995: 97). It is fairly easy to
identify ‘competitive’ elections. They are ones in which at least two formally
independent political parties present candidates for the executive and legisla-
tive offices.5 What makes a competitive election ‘fair’ is a considerably more
difficult question. For many decades adherents of Marxist-Leninist argued pas-
sionately that electoral arrangements in ‘bourgeois’ regimes could not possibly
be ‘fair’. Even in the post-Cold War era there are plenty of analysts who argue
that elections in most ‘democratic’ states are not really ‘fair’ no matter how
many formally independent political parties may participate, because the
process is dominated by the rich. The result is that formally independent parties,
such as the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, are so fun-
damentally similar that ‘the people’ are not offered any meaningful choice as to
which kind of government they have. In other systems with more parties, there
may be real distinctions between or among the parties, but only a very narrow
range of those parties have any real chance of electoral victory leading to signif-
ificant influence over governmental processes. And these arguments may have
real merit on a philosophical level, to the extent that their implication is that
‘the people’ have very little if any significant impact on political processes in
most allegedly ‘democratic’ countries.

But fortunately for our purposes here we do not really have to deal with fund-
damental philosophical questions regarding the extent of influence ‘the people’
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have on governance in democratic countries. The more narrow question of interest here is: Are there governmental structures that make states sufficiently democratic so that they are highly unlikely to fight wars against each other? And the proposal here is that such states can be identified in a fairly straightforward fashion. Such states or regimes must first allow at least 50% of the adult population to vote, and most crucially, they must have demonstrated that it is possible within those systems, for the leaders of the government to be defeated in an election and replaced by the winners of those elections.

If we identify as sufficiently democratic those regimes in which the identities of the leaders of the executive branch, and members of the national legislature are determined in elections in which at least 50% of the adult population are allowed to vote, and in which there is at least one historical precedent suggesting that executive power can be transferred from one formally independent political party to another, we bypass several sticky problems. We do not have to determine whether or not, for example, the press or the media within the country are really ‘free’. We also do not have to determine whether civil rights in a country are enshrined in a country’s constitution in a meaningless way, or whether rumours of dozens, hundreds, or thousands of political prisoners in that country are valid. I would also argue that it is a strength of this definition that it is so sensitive to the possibility that the governing party can be thrown out of office by election, because virtually all the strains of theoretical arguments regarding the impact of democracy on international conflict behaviour, whether they be of the cultural/normative type (Russett, 1993), or of the structural/strategic/rationalist type (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1996; Chan, 1997), ultimately depend at some point on the likelihood or the possibility that the political leaders will be exposed to the possibility of losing power through elections. Furthermore, I would and have argued that if this definition of democracy is relied upon, none of the cases usually pointed to as candidates for disproving the validity of the democratic peace proposition in its most pristine form, such as the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain, or the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, or the Boer War, for example, can be categorised as interstate wars between democratic states.

The disputes about such cases are potentially quite important, not the least because the dramatic and beautifully simple argument that democratic states have never fought interstate wars against each other almost certainly accounts for the public impact that the proposition has had, not only as reflected in policy statements by President Clinton and key foreign policy officials in the United States, but as reflected to some extent in staging of conferences such as this one in Belgium. Disputes about individual cases are unusually important within the context of the debate about the democratic peace proposition because both democracies and wars have been so rare. Wars have been unfortunately fre-
quent in the history of mankind, and democratic governments have become much more numerous in recent decades and years. But statistically speaking, wars especially are a rare phenomenon. The vast majority of states generally verging on 99% (especially if one is counting pairs of states) are at peace in any given year. This means that there is some reasonably good chance that democratic states could have avoided wars against each other, even entirely, just by chance, with perhaps a smidgen of good luck. It also means that even if there have been actually only a few wars between democratic states, then the difference between the war records of democratic states viewed as a group, and what might be expected statistically just by chance, could be eliminated entirely. Thus the conclusions about even relatively small numbers of cases could have a dramatic impact on the quality of the evidence that can be summoned in defence of the democratic peace proposition.

And not all analysts are happy of course, with the conclusion that there have been no wars among democratic states, if one defines as democratic (or sufficiently democratic) states in which political leaders are elected in competitive elections open to at least 50% of the voters in systems with a proven capacity to transfer political power from one independent political party to another in peaceful, constitutional processes. Raymond Cohen (1994: 211) argues that ‘there is no consensus at all among peace researchers about what constitutes a democracy’ and accuses this writer of inconsistency on the issue. Christopher Layne (1994: 40) asserts that ‘it is only intellectual suppleness — the continual tinkering with definitions and categories — that allows democratic peace theorists to deny that democratic states have fought each other’, and goes on to point out that ‘a good example is James L. Ray’. David Spiro (1994: 60) acknowledges that ‘in Ray’s examination of possible exceptions to the rule that democracies never fight each other, he finds that all can be explained away’, and then objects to particular explanations. Farber and Gowa (1995: 134-135) point out that ‘some contributors to this literature exclude, for various reasons, some wars between democratic polities from their analysis’ and accuse this writer of ‘ad hoc isolation of some wars’.6

But Cohen (1994) creates the impression of inconsistency by quoting an assertion from Ray (1993) as if it were a thesis sentence, when in fact it is a description of an extreme position, which the paper explicitly rejects and deliberately avoids. Layne’s comments about ‘continual tinkering with definitions’, as well as references by Farber and Gowa to ‘ad hoc’ isolation of some wars have a tendency to obscure the fact that the definition and criteria in question were applied consistently to all the wars in question. Spiro’s case rests heavily on the fact that Great Britain bombed Finland in 1941. But this bombing took place several months before Finland and Great Britain were officially ‘at war’ with each other. In addition, Great Britain bombed a nickel mine under the control of Germans at the time (no Finns were killed; see Weart, 1994), and the
source cited by Spiro in connection with this bombing asserts also that ‘the declarations of war [by Great Britain and allies against Finland] did not mean at any stage of the Second World War that Finland became involved in real hostilities with the Western allies’ (Manninen, 1983: 168).

So, I believe that it is possible to argue credibly that there has never been an interstate war between democratic states, or, to make a somewhat more cautious claim that no democratic state has ever initiated an interstate war against another (sufficiently) democratic state. And this provides some reason for confidence that if the states of Europe remain more or less uniformly democratic, then one can be reasonably confident that Europe will remain a peaceful place. But it is still possible, to return to an argument we alluded to earlier, to maintain that even if it is true that no interstate war has ever been initiated by one democratic state against another democratic state, this is nothing more than a predictable function of the statistical rarity of wars, and to some extent, until most recently of democratic states. Such statistical analyses as those of Bremer (1992), as well as Maoz and Russett (1992b, 1993b) suggest that the statistical probability of there being no wars between democratic states by this time is pretty low. But the argument is complicated by many factors, one of which has to do with the lack of independence between multiple observations of the same pairs of states year after year, of a kind included in many such analyses. Nevertheless, such analysts as Weede (1992), Russett (1995), Rummel (1997) and Maoz (1997) have eliminated some of the interdependence between observations of pairs of states by aggregating yearly observations into longer periods, and they still find that the absence of wars between democratic states is statistically significant. In addition, a recent application of statistical techniques arguably more capable of dealing with interdependence between multiple observations of the same pair of states over time reveals that ‘the regime type component of the democratic peace hypothesis...survives’, i.e. that the relationship between regime type and conflict, or democracy and peace, remains statistically significant (Beck and Tucker, 1996).

But doubts about the validity of the democratic peace proposition (and about the possibility that democracy can maintain peace and stability and Europe) cannot be removed entirely even if it can be established that the absence of wars, historically, among democratic states cannot be explained just by chance or very good luck. Even if the pattern is sufficiently striking as to rob this ‘null hypothesis’ of much credibility, it is still possible that the pattern does not prove that there is a causal connection between democracy and peace. It is trite but true that correlation does not prove causation.

One approach to this problem is to analyse carefully individual cases, to see whether or not ‘process tracing’ can reveal that democracy really did have a causal impact on the peace that follows. It is possible that democracy has its most potent impact by making it unlikely that such cases for analysis will arise.
in the first place. In other words, while it may be instructive to examine serious disputes or crises between democracies in order to see how the democratic nature of the regimes may have played a role in preventing those disputes or crises from evolving into war, one of the most important impacts of democracy may be visible, so to speak, in the relative scarcity of such disputes or crises. (Bremer, 1993; Maoz and Russett, 1993b). In order to ‘see’ this impact within single cases, one would have to examine non-disputes or non-crises that ‘resulted’ in non-wars, or peace. It is not clear, to put it mildly, exactly how one goes about such analyses of non-events leading to non-results.

It is still possible, however, that some of democracy’s pacifying impact might be visible to efforts to trace causal processes within single cases. In fact, I have argued that such analysis of single cases is especially laudable within the context of the debate about the democratic peace proposition. Wars are so statistically rare, to repeat, that the statistical pattern providing evidence in favour of the democratic peace proposition is always going to be relatively subtle. This increases the desirability of generating what persuasive power and evidence one can by analysing individual cases, or comparing crucial individual cases.7

Christopher Layne (1994) has examined several interesting cases, and concludes that the democratic nature of the participants in these crises did not have any important impact on their peaceful resolution.8 There are two points to be made in response to arguments like Layne’s (and even in response to those who conclude to the contrary that individual cases show signs of a pacifying impact of democracy, such as Owen, 1994). Layne’s basic conclusion is that realpolitik calculations and power politics factors played a bigger role than democracy in preserving the peace in the cases he analyses, casting doubt, he says, on the validity of the democratic peace proposition. But the democratic peace proposition does not suggest that democracy is always and everywhere the most important pacifying factor at work in all crises, even those involving democratic states on both sides. In fact, some analyses by advocates of democratic peace themselves show statistically that power ratios (and by implication, power politics calculations) generally have a greater impact on the outcomes of disputes than the regime type of the disputants. But this does not suggest that democracy has no impact. It is certainly possible that power politics calculations and democracy both have a pacifying impact on certain crises. In general, in a point to which we shall return, the self-interested calculations of politicians and the democratic nature of the regimes in which they operate are quite capable of working hand in hand, so to speak, in their impact on the resolution of crises.

The second point that needs to be made with respect to efforts to trace causal processes to produce evidence relevant to an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition is that democracy might have an important impact on the outcomes of crises even if the decision-makers involved do not talk, write or think explicitly about that impact in the historical records regarding that crisis.
In short, there is a tendency in some quarters (in both critics of the democratic peace proposition such as Layne, for example, and those more favourably disposed such as Owen) to argue implicitly or even quite explicitly that an individual case does not provide evidence in favour of the democratic peace proposition unless causal process tracing reveals instances of decision-makers, preferably on both sides, saying something roughly along the lines, of ‘Well, we are a democracy, and they are a democracy, and therefore we ought not to fight a war against each other’. Although Owen (1994) has in fact uncovered evidence that there are in fact such cases available in the historical record, advocates of the democratic peace proposition would not concede that it is only in such cases that supporting evidence can be found. Such an assertion is quite capable of provoking outcries of ‘obscurantism’ from critics of the democratic peace proposition (see, for example, Layne, 1995). But this point is really not that obscure. If one were to interview voters exiting voting booths, for example, one could inquire about the factors that led them to vote as they did. Chances are that few and probably none of them would say, I voted the way I did because of the socialising influence of my parents. They would be much more likely to explain their behaviour in terms of issues in the elections, impressions of the candidates, reactions to the campaigns, etc., in general factors of more immediate salience. But it would obviously be a mistake to conclude from this absence of direct verbal reference by voters to the impact of their parents on their political attitudes and behaviour that their parents had in fact no impact on the political behaviour in question. Similarly, if in studies of individual cases, one fails to find direct reference by decision-makers involved in those crises to the pacifying impact of democracy, that does not necessarily mean that the impact does not exist.

Other critics of the democratic peace proposition contend that while it may be the case that international relationships among democratic states have historically been unusually peaceful, there are factors that only happen to correlate or coincide with democracy that account for this peace, and it is not democracy itself that has brought it about. One such argument contends that in the contemporary era, during which most democracies have existed, and therefore the era from which most important examples of democracy correlated with peace fall, the democratic states have been too rich and interdependent to make wars rational. Therefore, they have avoided such wars, and they would have whether or not they were democratic.

One response to this argument would suggest that the wealthiest and most interdependent states in today’s international system are wealthy and interdependent at least in important part because they are democratic, and that therefore wealth and interdependence are merely some of the intermediate factors in the process leading from democracy to peace, rather than alternative factors which make democracy irrelevant. Nevertheless it is possible that wealth and interde-
pendence (in the form of trade and foreign investment, for example) are more importantly a cause of democracy, rather than an effect. If they also bring about peace, then democracy is arguably irrelevant to the production of that peace (in other words, the relationship between democracy and peace is spurious).

But statistical analyses of the relationship between democracy, wealth, and peace (e.g., Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992b, 1993b) suggest that the relationship between democracy and peace remains visible, statistically speaking, even when wealth is ‘controlled for’. Admittedly, the evidence regarding the relationship between democracy, interdependence in the form of trading ties, and peace is rather more ambiguous. For instance, Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett (1996) and Oneal and Russett (1997) report that interdependence has a pacifying impact, along with democracy, while Barbieri (1996) reports that at least under some circumstances trade can exacerbate conflicts between states. Perhaps it might be pointed out in the context of the focus of this paper that before 1945, the continent of Europe was quite clearly the most wealthy and interdependent one on the globe (the levels of relative wealth and interdependence in Europe were particularly high in 1914). Yet at the same time Europe was the site of the world’s bloodiest wars.

Another argument disputing the significance of the correlation between democracy and peace, even assuming that the correlation cannot be explained away as a coincidence or uncommonly good luck, suggests first that the clear majority of peaceful years for democratic pairs of states that constitute the bulk of the empirical evidence in favour of the democratic peace proposition consist of pairs of states in Western Europe during the Cold War. These states were allies with the United States versus the Soviet Union and its allies during those years, and so naturally, this argument would have it, these states did not fight wars against each other (Mearsheimer [1990: 51], for example, asserts that ‘the Soviet threat can explain the absence of war among the Western democracies since 1945’). It was, in short, common geopolitical interests, with perhaps a dash of hegemonic control exerted by the United States that led to much of the peace among democratic states that constitutes the bulk of the evidence in support of the democratic peace idea, but for which in fact, according to this argument, democracy does not really deserve any credit. Farber and Gowa (1995, 1997) are among the more energetic proponents of this idea; Thompson’s (1996) emphasis on ‘regional primacy’ as the real or most important cause of peace among democratic states (rather than regime type) might also fit in this category, even though Western Europe in the Cold War era is not one of those cases he analyses in his defence of this thesis.

One line of counter-attack against such a thesis would rely on statistical analysis of the relevant data. If common interests, or alliance ties account for peace among democracies, rather than their democratic political regimes, then an empirical evaluation of the available evidence containing a control for
alliance ties while also looking at the relationship between regime type and conflict should reveal that the latter relationship disappears when such ties, or the common interests upon which they rest are thus controlled for (Maoz, 1997). But analyses such as those by Maoz and Russett (1992b, 1993b), as well as that by Bremer (1992) reveal that the correlation between democracy and peace does not disappear when the presence of alliance ties between the pairs of states being analysed is controlled for.¹⁰

Then, too Bueno de Mesquita (1981) has argued that states that are allied to each other, even according to ‘rational’ calculations are more likely to end up fighting wars against each other than are states that are not so allied.¹¹ Furthermore, Maoz and Russett (1992b), and Bremer (1992) have found that there is in fact on the bivariate level, a correlation between the presence of an alliance tie and the probability that two states will fight an international war against each other. Admittedly, both Maoz and Russett (1992b), as well as Bremer (1992) further find that more detailed analyses with appropriate controls will reveal that this bivariate correlation is probably spurious (and brought about by common causal origins for alliance ties and war in the contiguity or close proximity of the states involved). Nevertheless, the fact that allied states are in general, more rather than less likely to fight international wars against each other, and such examples as the conflict between Greece and Turkey in 1974, the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, and conflicts between Russia and Hungary in 1956, (not to mention Germany’s 1941 attack on its non-aggression pact co-signer) make it quite clear that the presence of alliance ties like those that existed among Western European states during the Cold War years are very far from a guarantee of peace among states. In fact, one would be at least partially justified in concluding that the states of Western Europe failed to fight wars against each other during the Cold War years in spite of the fact that they were allied, rather than because they were allied to each other. And in any case, wars and other conflicts between the Soviet Union and Hungary, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and China, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and Cambodia, demonstrate beyond much doubt that having a powerful ideologically antagonistic opponent, and resultant alliance ties, do not guarantee peace among those states sharing that opponent or those alliance ties.

Finally, let me address the idea that a belief in the democratic peace proposition is necessarily an ‘idealistic’ notion, as opposed to the more ‘realistic’ opinion that national leaders generally make ‘rational’ decisions in defence of national interests, etc. There is some flavour in the cultural version of democratic peace theory that democratic leaders are socialised to be ‘nice people’ who avoid international conflict because they are accustomed to resolving disputes non-violently within their domestic political arenas. Without necessarily discounting that idea, let me suggest here that there are other versions, or
emphases within the democratic peace literature that can accommodate quite nicely explanations of a more ‘realistic’ flavour, in both the theoretical and broader sense of the term. There is evidence that democratic states are particularly formidable opponents in war (Lake, 1992). There is further evidence that defeat in international war is particularly hazardous to the survival of democratic political regimes (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995). Recent theoretical, combined with some empirical evidence, also suggests that internal political dynamics within democratic political systems are likely to make ‘rational’ leaders be particularly likely to pick ‘safe’ opponents in international war (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1996), which, to repeat, democratic states tend not to be. In short, the idea that political leaders in general have as their primary motive maintaining themselves in power may lead them to be cautious in their selection of opponents not only because of some conception of the ‘national interest’, but out of concern for their own personal political fates. This is not exactly the more common idea that public opinion in democratic states exerts a consistently pacifying effect on political leaders in democratic states. There are lots of examples suggesting that public opinion in democracies can be infused with bellicose opinions and attitudes, even more bellicose than political leaders in those same societies on occasion. Rather, the theoretical stream of work to which I now allude argues that political leaders are capable of anticipating, in a rational, self-interested way, that public opinion will turn against a political leadership that gets the country involved in a losing war effort, and in a more effective way than will occur in autocracies on average.

So, in short, the notion that democracy may provide a substantial boost to the prospects for peace in Europe need not rest entirely, or even mostly, on some hope or theoretical argument that democratic leaders are likely to be ‘nice people’. A focused, self-interested desire to maintain themselves in office, presumably shared by political leaders almost universally, can also make an important contribution to peace, by the impact such self-interested calculations can have within democratic political systems.

The Future of Anarchy, and Democracy in Europe

So, it is certainly the position here that substantial confidence in the pacifying impact of democracy, within Europe in the coming decades, as well as elsewhere, is warranted. But as Mearsheimer (1990: 50), points out: ‘The possibility always exists that a democracy will revert to an authoritarian state ... Lamentably, it is not possible for even liberal democracies to transcend anarchy’.

However, it is possible that the liberal democracies of Europe will transcend anarchy quite literally, by establishing something like a central government in the
form of a significantly strengthened European Union. Admittedly, there are grounds for pessimism about the EU (Feldstein, 1993; Malcom, 1995; Dornbusch, 1996), among the more important of which may be that in attempting to preserve peace and stability in Europe it will extend its membership to so many states that the organisation will become hopelessly unwieldy. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that ‘academic analysis of the integration process in Western Europe, except for some initial enthusiasm, has been dominated by scepticism and pessimism...’ (Smith and Ray, 1993). In spite of that, the EU survives, and succeeds, even if in fits and starts. One recent analysis of the EU concludes that:

The trend toward disintegration [in Europe] however, may be ready to be reversed...Six months ago I would have bet that the introduction of the single currency would be delayed and perhaps deferred indefinitely. I am now willing to bet it will take place on time, even if the convergence criteria have to be modified...More important, there is a widespread feeling that disintegration of Europe has gone far enough. People have been profoundly affected by the tragedy of Bosnia. That is a sentiment on which it is possible to build (Soros, 1996: 14).12

In short, one reason to doubt that anarchy will prevail in Europe in the coming years is that it will at least be diluted to some extent by the emerging strength of the European Union.

Nevertheless, I would be willing to concede that the fate of democracy in Europe, especially the nearly universal democracy, at least among the most important states, that must be preserved if ‘democratic peace’ in Europe is to be preserved, is probably more in doubt than the fate of ‘anarchy’, or the absence of a central government. One critic of the democratic peace idea puts this criticism in stark terms by asking: ‘What is the utility of a theory predicting the absence of wars between democracies if a democratically elected leader can legally suspend the constitution, quickly change the regime to a fascist one, and then initiate a global war’ (Spiro, 1994: 61).

This is a legitimate question, and a criticism of the idea that democracy can be counted on to preserve peace in Europe, or elsewhere, indefinitely. On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the fact that neorealism, or I suspect any rival to democratic peace theory can be subjected to quite analogous criticism. One might ask, for example: ‘What is the utility of a theory predicting the absence of wars in bipolar systems if one of the pillars of the bipolar system can fall apart virtually overnight, leaving the European continent exposed to the terrifying dangers of multipolarity?’. Furthermore, the wisdom or the policy relevance of neorealist responses to the sudden disappearance of its advocates’ favourite pacifying factor are at least questionable. Mearsheimer’s (1990) suggestion, for example, is to
restore some measure of the safety based on the previous nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States by seeing to it that Germany, but preferably not other European states, acquires nuclear weapons. Compared to that advice, the basic policy prescription based on the democratic peace idea that democracy in Europe should be protected and extended if possible, appears to this writer at least to be at worst relatively benign.

Admittedly, just what steps ought to be taken in order to preserve and/or extend democracy in Europe are not exactly explicitly derived, or patently obvious within research and writing on the democratic peace proposition so far. The United States, as well as some other Western European countries, have created foreign aid programs of various kinds in the former Warsaw Pact countries, including the republics of the former Soviet Union, in the hope that these programs will foster and preserve democracy in these areas. It is sobering, and possibly even relevant to recall that in the early 1960s the United States became concerned about the political and economic fates of the countries of Latin America, especially in the wake of the Cuban Revolution; out of the concern was born the Alliance for Progress. However, ‘during the first eight years of the Alliance, sixteen military coups took place in the Latin American countries’ (Levinson and De Onis, 1970: 77). Certainly it was not the original intended purpose of the Alliance to foster right-wing military dictatorships, yet that seemed to be one result of the effort.

There are those who believe that an already existing ‘Alliance’ is the key to preserving democracy in East-Central Europe, i.e., that the expansion of NATO is a key to preserving democracy, and peace on the European continent. ‘East-Central Europe’s democrats well understand’, according to Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee (1993: 28) that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, and military community. But one potential danger of such a strategy is quite obvious:

To attempt to incorporate Eastern Europe into NATO’s sphere of influence, at a time when Russia is in dangerous turmoil and when that nation’s prestige and self-confidence are badly damaged would surely be an outstanding act of folly. It could well provide a catalyst that would enable extreme chauvinistic elements in Russia to exploit frustrations, resentments and wounded national pride in ways that would have unpleasant consequences both internally and internationally (Harries, 1993: 43).

William Odom (1995) feels, however, that extending NATO might actually have a favourable impact on the probability of democracy surviving in Russia. He bases this conclusion on what he sees as a clear historical pattern. ‘Liberal reform in Russia’, Odom points out, ‘has never prospered in periods of East-
West détente or when the West was conciliatory toward Russian autocracy and later communism’. Russian autocracy, according to Odom, liberalised in the wake of military defeats, like the Crimean War and the Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1905. Gorbachev’s perestroika, Odom believes, was a response to defeat in Afghanistan and relentless pressure from the Reagan administration. ‘Liberal reform in Russia today will certainly perish without sustained pressure from the West’ (Odom, 1995: 47).

Perhaps, but perhaps also it is fair to wonder whether Russian weakness is at present not so extreme as to make it highly unlikely it will respond favourably to more pressure from the West, or the United States, or an expanded NATO. The situation is so extreme that one prominent Russian foreign policy specialist has concluded that ‘today there is no state as such —as the West understands it— in Russia’ (Fairbanks, 1995: 19).14 To repeat, alliance ties do not guarantee peace. Outside of Europe, alliance ties to the United States, during the Cold War era, did not obviously either evoke or guarantee democracy within those allied regimes. And not all historical analogies point in the direction of putting more pressure on Russia. ‘Weimar Germany’ comes to mind as an instructive analogy. Although internal dynamics mostly account for its development into a fascist state, the international community contributed to Germany’s expansionist probes....[I]t makes sense to avoid gratuitous slights to Russian pride’ (Motyl, 1996: 33).

Perhaps NATO can have its cake and eat it, too. NATO’s Partnership for Peace (Ruggie, 1997), as well a security agreement between Russia and NATO have led Boris Yeltsin to declare recently that ‘we will accept the situation much more calmly than before’ (Associated Press, May 15, 1997; cited in Ray, forthcoming).

In any case, the fate of democratic peace in Europe obviously depends on the fate of democracy in Europe, and that fate in East-Central Europe, and in the European states within the former Soviet Union, is obviously an uncertain one. Even one significant failure, such as in Russia, could produce tension and even war, rather than democratic peace. ‘Russia is a former empire that has still not defined its relations with its neighbours...Very few countries with a living standard of less than $5000 per capita a year have been able to operate as democracies. Russia is less than half way to this target...Thus the prognosis for the future of democracy in Russia must be rather grim’ (Rutland, 1994/95: 12).15 Nevertheless, one observer of the recent electoral victory for Yeltsin in Russia concludes that ‘this election —both its occurrence and its results—gives one reason to believe that, for all its problems, democracy is now entrenched in Russia’ (Treisman, 1996: 77).

In East-Central Europe, the persistence or the return of former communists to power in many states has been a source of concern. ‘To the surprise of most observers, the collapse of communist rule involved no comprehensive turnover of elites. The founding of democratic regimes has instead been accompanied by a marked continuity of elite composition, albeit a continuity whose extent dif-
fers importantly from country to country’ (Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski, 1996: 135). This continuity is not necessarily, and everywhere a bad thing. ‘Although it sounds perverse, the essential continuity of elites is one reason why democracy has been able to progress in Central and Eastern Europe: Democracy has not constituted a dire threat to most established elites (Higley et al., 1996: 138). Admittedly, this determinedly optimistic interpretation applies most readily to such states as Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. ‘In the southern countries of Central Europe...very high degrees of elite continuity have gone hand-in-hand with postcommunist regimes that hide the substance of authoritarianism behind a veneer of democratic forms’ (Higley et al., 1996: 138).

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski (1993: 3), ‘regarding the broad lessons of the transformation process [in East-Central Europe], the first is that expectations on both sides —in the old communist states and in the West— were much to high, and rather naive’. Recently, perhaps, naïveté has given way to pessimism that is also perhaps a bit Overdone. The transformation process in most East-Central European countries has been difficult, even traumatic. But it is not entirely clear that the move toward democracy that began so promisingly with the revolutions of 1989 has petered out entirely. Freedom House in the United States publishes annual evaluations of the status of democracy in virtually every country of the world on an annual basis. Their evaluations are not simple, and they are also occasionally controversial. Nevertheless, they may be useful for acquiring some feel for broad trends over several countries for several years. In Table 1 are presented Freedom House democracy scores for a list of East-Central European states for the years from 1993 to 1996. One could find well-informed people who would object to every numerical rating in that table, perhaps. But it may still be worth noting that the only state in that table that has suffered substantial deterioration in its democratic status during that time period is Belarus. Only 3 other states have suffered any deterioration at all. 14 out of the 18 states were at least as ‘democratic’ at the end of that time period as they were at the beginning, and 10 of those 14 experienced (according to Freedom House) some improvement in their level of ‘democracy’.

To some important extent, the future of democracy in East-Central Europe may be affected by its global context and environment. If the ‘third wave’ (Huntington, 1991) of democracy is really over, and a powerful ‘reverse wave’ asserts itself, many of the regimes in East-Central Europe may be swept up in that wave. There are reasons to believe that such a reverse wave is in its initial stages. Many newer democracies are deteriorating, and some of the most powerful authoritarian states are becoming more assertive, while showing few outward signs of democratising. China is almost certainly the most important of these. Yet Larry Diamond argues that there is not yet a reverse wave in motion, and that ‘a reverse wave may well be avoidable’ (1996: 31). Military establishments the world over seem somewhat more reluctant than in previous eras to
seize power. And ‘no antidemocratic ideology with global appeal has emerged to challenge the continued global ideological hegemony of democracy as a principle and a formal structure of government’ (Diamond, 1996: 32). Perhaps no country in the world is more important in its potential impact on global trends in democracy than China. It is the most populous country in the world. In recent years, it has had one of the most, and often the most rapidly growing economy in the world. This stands in particularly stark contrast to the economic performance of Russia, which as a result of economic disasters is widely perceived to have ‘democratised’ prematurely. One recent forecast about China’s political trends is not optimistic about chances for political reforms in the direction of democracy, at least in the short run (Bueno de Mesquita, Newman and Rabushka, 1995: 83-89). However, William Overholt:

China is authoritarian, but the improvement in freedom of speech, information, movement, and occupation in the last 15 years is unprecedented...Competitive elections affect the lives of ordinary Chinese more than elections affect ordinary citizens of democratic India...China after Deng will remain more unified, stable, and secure than at any time in the last two centuries (William Overholt, 1996: 78).

But, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995) have warned us that democratising states are dangerous, more likely to get into wars than other states, such as stable autocratic states. If we take their finding to heart, we must be pessimistic about the future of democratic peace in Europe, even if the East-Central European states, or possibly especially if those states achieve rapid progress toward greater degrees of democracy in the coming years (partially inspired perhaps, by democratising trends elsewhere, such as in China). There are some methodological problems that decrease to some extent the confidence we can have in the validity of this finding (see Enterline, 1996; Thompson and Tucker, 1997).17 Perhaps the answer lies in what happens to the states surrounding the democratising ones. Oneal and Russett (1997) report, at least, that democratising states are not at higher risk of war, unless those states are surrounded by autocratic neighbors. So that encouraging democratisation may not after all be a dangerous thing, unless it succeeds too partially.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has created conditions for an ‘historical experiment’ with uncommonly clear implications (this is not to say that the implications will be entirely clear). The Cold War’s termination, accentuated by the demise of the
Soviet Union, has brought to an end an era of bipolarity which, according to neorealist thinking, was peaceful, in Europe especially, and among major powers in particular, precisely because of that bipolar international structure. It has also coincided with the disappearance of many highly autocratic regimes, which have been replaced by new ones which are ‘democratic’ to varying degrees. Neorealists naturally believe, then, that the disappearance of the nuclear confrontation and the bipolar international structure of the Cold War era is likely to bring to an end the prolonged period of stability in Europe that began in 1945. Advocates of the democratic peace proposition to the effect that democratic states will not initiate wars against each other, or neoliberals in general are prone to believe, in contrast, that the spread of democracy throughout parts of Europe deprived of it up to the end of the Cold War, should enhance peace and stability among the states on that continent.

It is possible that the European international subsystem will remain anarchical (i.e., without a central governing body); it is also possible that numerous nascent democratic regimes in East-Central Europe will survive. If so, the future of peace and stability in Europe will be determined by the relative potency of anarchy, on the one hand, and democracy on the other. Anarchy is seen by neorealists as a fundamental condition leading to international conflict and war. Democracy, according to neoliberals, exerts an important pacifying effect, especially on relationships among jointly democratic states. However, the bipolar system has not disintegrated in exactly the fashion anticipated by neorealists like John Mearsheimer. He expected, for example, that NATO as well as the Warsaw Pact would fall apart. Neoliberalism has already, in that respect anticipated post-Cold War developments more accurately than neorealism. There are reasons to be sceptical about democracy’s pacifying impact. However, aggregate data analyses, close analysis of important or crucial cases, as well as an examination of theoretical support for the democratic peace proposition all provide important reasons for confidence that a uniformly democratic Europe will remain a peaceful and stable continent.

However, neither the future of anarchy, nor democracy in Europe is entirely secure. The European Union may develop to the point that the anarchical nature of the international subsystem may be diluted to an important degree, making it more likely to remain peaceful. The future of many democracies, especially in East-Central Europe, is uncertain. Neorealist criticisms of the democratic peace proposition that fasten on this possibility are insensitive, perhaps, to the possibility that their own favourite pacifying factor, i.e., bipolarity, is also subject to disappearance. There are those who advocate the expansion of NATO as a step toward preserving fragile democracies in East-Central Europe. This step does pose some obvious dangers in the form of its impact on domestic Russian politics. Furthermore, there is little evidence that such alliance ties evoke or sustain democratic regimes, or that alliance ties are a guarantee of peace. The return or
the continuation of former communists in position of power throughout much of East Central Europe is a cause for concern, but such stability among the elites may help preserve democracy in at least some East-Central European states. Despite considerable alarm and pessimism about democracy in East Central Europe in the post-Cold War era, one systematic survey reveals that democracy has at least held its own, or made some advances in the majority of states in the region. The global context may have an important impact on regime transitions in East-Central Europe. The ‘third wave’ of democratisation has not necessarily been reversed, and some feel that the immensely influential case of China may, in the not too distant future, move in the direction of greater democracy. There is some empirical evidence that democratising states are more war prone. But a closer look at this evidence suggests that this is the case only if the democratising states in question are surrounded by autocratic states. So efforts to move East-Central European states in the direction of democracy are unlikely to have the dangerous effects some have hypothesised, unless the successes for this policy are isolated, and surrounded by failed movements toward a democratic status.

Notes

1. ‘As with World Wars I and II, a consequence of the recent cataclysm [that is, the end of the Cold War] was that a major empire was dismembered, important political boundaries in Europe were reorganised, and several nations were politically transformed. And, as the ancient institution of monarchy met its effective demise in Europe in World War I and as the newer, but dangerous and seemingly virile, ideologies of Nazism and Fascism were destroyed by World War II, so a major political philosophy, Communism, over which a tremendous amount of ink and blood had been spilled, was discredited and apparently expunged in World War III’ (Mueller, 1995: 1).

2. The Economist goes on to note that ‘five years on from the collapse of the Soviet Union, few mainstream politicians in Europe or North America are now questioning NATO’s utility’ (The Economist, 1996: 19, ‘A New Kind of Alliance’).

3. ‘No hostility involving one or more system members qualified as an interstate war unless it led to a minimum of 1,000 battle fatalities among all the system members involved’ (Small and Singer, 1982: 55).

4. For example, if one chooses to categorise states as ‘democratic’ if they achieve a score of 7 on an indicator of institutionalised democracy provided by Jaggers and Gurr (1995) in a data set referred to as Polity III, states with quite dramatically different political characteristics will be so categorised, because that score of 7 consists of a sum of scores on more detailed dimensions. So, the category of states categorised as ‘democratic’ can turn out to be rather confusingly diverse. These data are evaluated in more detail in Gleditsch and Ward (1997).

5. Several decades ago it was commonly argued that it was possible to have genuinely competitive and therefore genuinely democratic elections within one party systems. It is the impression of this writer that decades of experience and observation of one party systems have discouraged widespread belief in the actual achievement of this logical possibility. One party regimes are still defended vigorously in some quarters, but almost always the rationale is that the state in question cannot afford or is still some time away from being able to benefit from a democratic regime, not that democracy can be achieved within such a regime.

6. Recently, Elman (1997: 21) has also argued that ‘scholars with different definitions of democracy and war have omitted cases that provide evidence against the democratic peace phenomenon.’
In Ray (1995), for example, I compared in some detail the Spanish-American War and the Fashoda crisis.

Similarly, Hongying Wang’s (1992) analysis of the Fashoda Crisis leads her to the conclusion that democracy’s role in bringing that dispute to a peaceful conclusion was not very important. John Owen’s (1994) case studies, however, lead him to conclude that democracy can have an important pacifying impact.

Layne (1995: 176) asserts at one point, for example, that ‘Professor Russett...attacks my case studies on post-modernist grounds, implying that historical evidence of what and why decision-makers did what they did is inherently unreliable...’ Post-modernism may have a place in art museums but it should be kept out of the study of international relations.

The reasons provided by Farber and Gowa (1995) for refusing to include alliance ties as a control variable in their analyses are not entirely persuasive. They assert that ‘using alliance status as an explanatory variable is problematic. Both alliances and serious disputes are likely to be affected by a common set of unmeasured variables (e.g., variables measuring the congruence of interests). As a result of these omitted variables, the use of alliances as an independent variable in a multivariate regression analysis of disputes will create biased parameter estimates.’ (p. 138).

It is certainly true that including a control variable that is only spuriously related to the dependent variable of interest will bias the results of analyses in an undesirable fashion. But alliance ties are arguably quite a good measure of ‘congruence of interests,’ rather than spuriously related to the occurrence of disputes because of the impact of congruent interests, making it even more desirable to include such ties as a control variable in analyses of the relationship between regime type and international conflict.

I have found also that this relationship holds for a somewhat broader range of circumstances and definitions than Bueno de Mesquita deals with. See Ray (1990).

For a more pessimistic view in the same issue of the same publication, see Dornbusch (1996), who argues that ‘the battle for the common currency may be remembered as one of the more useless in Europe’s history’ (p. 113).

Fairbanks (1995: 21) goes on to conclude that ‘NATO expansion to the east is destined to be particularly divisive. Pushing the alliance to the border of the old Soviet Union would be a powerful symbol of Russian otherness, of its rejection by the West.’

Motyl (1996: 32) argues that ‘the question of whether or not Russia can survive as a democracy is misguided. Russia is protofascist’.

These authors note that this is ‘perceived by many observers both inside and outside the region as a troubling indicator of the lack of change in postcommunist regimes, or as evidence of the continuing legacy of communism...’ (Higley et al., 1996: 136).

It should also be acknowledged that Mansfield and Snyder (1996) do a thorough and at least partially convincing job of responding to some of these methodological criticisms.