2. ‘The Patience of a Nation is Measured in Centuries’. National Revival in Tatarstan and Historiography

Introduction

The Tatars have always been part of Russian history and politics, yet distinct from them. Historical self-perceptions have kept the Russians and the Volga Tatars apart. The Russians cannot forget the ravages of the Golden Horde, which allegedly shut Russia off from Europe for 240 years and, as some believe, has left a lasting 'Oriental' mark on its polity ever since. For the Tatars, this is a 'black legend' that does not correspond to reality. In their view, the Horde actually kept Russia from falling apart and defended it from the invasions from the West, preventing Russia from being colonized by the Teutonic Order, Lithuania, Poland or Sweden. In fact, a salient tradition of Russian thinkers - from the historians Nikolai Karamzin and Georgi Vernadsky to the ethnologist Lev Gumilev - concurred with this view to a certain extent. For their part, the Tatars cannot forgive the Russian state for their defeat and the destruction of the Kazan Khanate at the hands of Tsar Ivan the Terrible in 1552, and the forced Christianization and Russification that followed.¹²³

Mutual wounds inflicted in history and enshrined in folk memory are hard to forget. It is equally true that after the Russian conquest the Tatars gradually found a modicum of co-existence with the Russians. Tatar blood flowed in the veins of many outstanding figures of Russian history and culture - from the tsar Boris Godunov to the poet Anna Akhmatova, as it did in the veins of the world-famous ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev.

Russian armies of the tsars and Bolsheviks were sometimes commanded by Tatar generals. Just as, on the eve of 1917, the well-off section of the Tatar population identified themselves with the tsarist monarchy (despite all its wrong-doing against the Tatars), in 1991 the Tatar ruling elites could not but feel a certain affinity with the October Revolution (despite all its unfulfilled promises). After all, it was the Bolsheviks that gave the Tatars their first (Soviet) republic in 1920.

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It is to be remembered that it was Tatar revolutionaries with impeccable Tatar patriotic credentials who helped install Soviet power in Tatarstan in 1918, and that what these people were acting out - even if they could only partly achieve it - was the Tatar (and Muslim) political agenda as they understood it at that particular juncture. What these revolutionaries dreamed of was a self-governing Republic of Turan which would include the entire Turkic-populated areas of the Soviet Union, and would be a spearhead of revolution in the colonial East, complete with its own army, a separate Communist Party and a Colonial International independent of the Komintern. What they achieved, however, was an Autonomous Tatar Republic (the Tatar ASSR) controlled by Moscow and cut off from the Muslim East.

Many Tatar historians nowadays create a vision of history in which a full set of historical arguments for the Tatars as a distinct oppressed nationality is mustered, so that the question of independence begs itself, even if it is not directly posed. One gets an impression of rather acute discomfort, among some sections of the nationally-conscious Tatar intelligentsia, at living in Russia, and of the huge difficulty of preserving their cultural and historic identity - but it is a discomfort that, in their view, has to be patiently endured for lack of a better outcome. As one Tatar author has put it, 'the patience of a nation is measured in centuries'.

Nevertheless, both politicians and scholars in present-day Tatarstan deny harbouring secessionist objectives. Tatarstan's major ideologist, the Director of the Kazan-based Institute of History and one of the founders of the Tatar Public Centre (TPC) - an umbrella Tatar nationalist organization, which emerged in the general context of Gorbachev's perestroika - Republic of Tatarstan (RT) Presidential Advisor Rafael Khakimov, has denied that the ultimate objective of the Tatar national movement is independence: 'To suppose that, say, Tatarstan pursues a “false-bottomed” policy is not serious; the republic is not interested in secession, and there are valid reasons for this. Suffice it to say that 75 per cent of Tatars live outside Tatarstan, and that, incidentally, they live mostly in their historic homeland, that is, on the territory of the former Kazan, Astrakhan, Kasimov and Siberian Khanates. Thus a substantial part of Russia is Tatar to the same extent as it is Russian. It is in the interest of Tatarstan to conduct a policy of enhancing its influence on Russian matters for the purpose of preserving a treaty-based status for the republic and developing the culture of Russia’s Tatars.' The message here is clear: we do not advocate secession, but we do intend to increase our influence. This does not mean that in the event of a denial of 'what is due', the Tatars may not remember their 'historic rights' and put secession on the agenda. The protean character of nationalism, which is contingent on the conditions in which the given ascriptive group lives and on how these people perceive these conditions, implies that radical changes in the formulation of political goals cannot be excluded.
In the following we will analyse the unstable, transient and recurrent character of Tatar nationalism and the role of historiography in the legitimization of nationalist objectives. We will first analyse the three periods of the Tatar national revival over the last century or so, with particular emphasis on the third, which is currently under way. We will dwell on the reasons for the initial rise and subsequent decline of the radical Tatar nationalism of today. We will then deal with the shifting attitudes of Tatar intellectuals towards Tatarstan’s place in Russia, the correlation between Soviet, Tatar émigré and post-Soviet Tatar historiography and the difficult problems engendered by the incompatible nature of Russian and Tatar state-centred historical narratives.

The Three Attempts at a Tatar National Revival

The latest spell in the Tatar national revival (roughly 1989 to the present) is the third in a series since the end of the nineteenth century. The first was associated with the activity of Islamic reformers (the Jadids), Tatar cultural figures and politicians of ca. 1880-1918. This period may be said to have started at the time when the Tatar educator and historian Shigabutdin Marjani opened his first reforming medresse in Kazan and another educator, Kayum Nasyri, wrote the first textbook in the Tatar vernacular. The period saw the first Tatar political parties which attempted to guide the Muslim national movement in the whole of Russia. Their agenda included cultural-national autonomy, i.e., autonomy in matters of religion and education, without an army or a territorial administration other than that dealing with religious and educational matters (and the financing thereof).

In 1917, under the Kerensky government in Russia, the Russian army disintegrated, with soldiers of various nationalities deserting from the front in their millions. Amid general anarchy, some national movements began forming their national units even before they put forward the slogan of independence for their nations. By the end of 1917, Tatar politicians were divided between the advocates of a non-territorial, cultural-national autonomy for Russia’s Muslims, and the so-called ‘territorialists’, who were proponents of territorial autonomy for the Turkic peoples of the Volga-Ural region. Both denied an intention to secede. The former, led by Sadri Maksudi, were largely composed of anti-Bolshevik, liberal and moderate socialist parties which controlled the parliament of the Muslim cultural-national autonomy. This non-territorial autonomous entity of the Muslims of inner Russia and Siberia – without the Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus, who had their own political plans – had been proclaimed in July 1917, and its parliament convened in November the same year. By the end of 1917, the parliament had some troops under its command. The ‘territorialists’
tufrakchylar (mostly) consisted of non-Bolshevik leftist parties that controlled the Tatar Military Council, the Harbi Shuro, which was also in command of some troops. In early 1918, the Harbi Shuro scheduled the proclamation of an autonomous Turco-Tatar state of Idel-Ural (the Volga-Ural State) within the RSFSR for 1 March 1918.

The Bolsheviks feared that the two factions and their armed units would merge and that the anti-Bolshevik parliament would assume command over them. Had it had time to do this and mobilize the entire Tatar population under the nationalist slogans, the Bolsheviks might have had a major conflict on their hands. The local Russian Bolsheviks of the Kazan Soviet were opposed to the creation of Idel-Ural and were prepared to fight it by force of arms (Lenin's generous promises to Russia's nationalities were not always shared by local Bolshevik leaders). The logic of struggle might sway even the conciliatory, leftist Tatar elements into the anti-Bolshevik camp. On the eve of the proclamation of Idel-Ural, therefore, the Bolsheviks, led by Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, first arrested the Harbi Shuro leaders and then released them on condition that they refused to proclaim Idel-Ural. Soon after, the Bolsheviks disarmed the Tatar units and dispersed the Turco-Tatar parliament, but promised to set up a Soviet Tatar-Bashkir Republic within the borders of Idel-Ural. This defused the situation, and the conflict between Tatars and the Soviets was nipped in the bud. Some Tatar politicians who had planned the creation of Idel-Ural (Galimjan Sharaf and Ilias Alkin, among others) would later co-operate with the Soviet government. A recent Tatar textbook for students expresses relief that the Muslim movement of Idel-Ural did not then become a hotbed of civil war.

The second attempt at national revival is associated with the activities of the Tatar National Bolsheviks (Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev and others) after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Owing to the opposition of the Bashkir national movement led by Akhmet Zaki Validov, the Bolsheviks could not make good their promise of a Tatar-Bashkir Republic, and they set up separate Soviet republics for the Tatars and the Bashkirs. The Tatar Autonomous Republic, established in 1920, was the first Tatar state (although a part of Soviet Russia and with restricted functions) since the fall of the Kazan Khanate to the hosts of Ivan the Terrible in 1552. The period was marked by a more lenient policy on the part of the Tatar Bolsheviks towards members of the local cultural and religious élite than that practised under the tsars or, later, under Stalin. This period came to an end in 1928, with the second and definitive arrest of Sultan-Galiev.

In the years that have passed since the start of the latest upsurge of the Tatar national movement in 1989, the latter has had its ups and downs. It gained a certain momentum in the years just preceding the break-up of the USSR. The TPC (Tatar Public Centre) mobilized certain sections of the Tatar population under the slogan of upgrading the Tatar Autonomous Republic, a second-level territo-
rional entity in the hierarchy of Soviet republics, to the status of a Union republic – a long-standing Tatar demand common to both the élite and the intellectuals. Being a Union republic meant direct entry into the USSR by a Union Treaty, on a par with the Russian Federation. According to the Soviet Constitution, Union republics were sovereign and had the right to withdraw from the Union. Under pressure from below, the Tatar communist leadership effectively adopted this programme as its own, and the movement secured the passing by Tatarstan’s parliament of the republic’s Declaration of State Sovereignty in August 1990. At that time, the nationalist publications did not distinguish between the sovereignty proclaimed in the above Declaration and complete independence. According to them, Tatarstan would be a Union republic of the USSR for as long as it suited its interests. Let us note in passing that after the Declaration was adopted, the USSR had little more than a year to live.

As Gorbachev was losing and Yeltsin asserting control over the Kremlin, the Tatar national movement was growing more radical, losing touch with public opinion and political realities in the process. The second TPC programme (February 1991) accused the RSFSR, then under the democratic leadership of the early Boris Yeltsin, of ‘embarking on the path to creating a state of a unitary and totalitarian type’. At that time the TPC claimed that Tatarstan’s parliament had to delegate to the Union (not RSFSR) bodies only those powers that were needed to further the republic’s sovereignty, and had the right to withdraw these powers from the centre and reclaim them at any time. ‘History shows’, the programme went on, ‘that neither Russia nor the USSR can act as guarantors of human rights; for the Tatars, it is only the state in the person of the Tatar Republic that can guarantee them’. Even more radical groupings, such as the Ittifak (‘Alliance’) party, the Sovereignty Committee, the Iman (‘Faith’) Youth Islamic Culture Centre, the Azatlyk (‘Freedom’) Union of Tatar Youth, and others, strove for immediate and complete independence for Tatarstan, with Azatlyk, at its second Kurultai (congress), in a resolution of entitled ‘On Territorial Demands to the Russian Empire Named the RSFSR’ (October 1991), demanding a ‘reunification of all the native Tatar lands that existed before the conquest of the Kazan Khanate (1552) by the Russian colonialists, enlisting historians and the general public in that task’. The latter point underscores the importance of history for the nationalist enterprise.

A fairly high level of Tatar nationalist mobilization in 1990-91 pushed the ex-communist Tatar leadership into a more assertive policy vis-à-vis Russia. This circumstance, along with a certain disorientation in Moscow in a period just after the break-up of the USSR, caused great perplexity among the Russian leaders. But the Tatar leadership generally managed to contain the nationalist upsurge. Relations between the intellectuals grouped in the Tatar national movement and the official Tatar leadership contained elements of both rivalry and co-

operation. The balance of forces at the time may be represented by a rectangle composed of 1) Moscow, 2) the Tatar nationalists, 3) the ethnic Russian 'democrats' in Tatarstan and 4) the Tatarstan leadership. In this constellation, Moscow, with the help of the Russian 'democrats' in Tatarstan, attempted successfully to woo the Tatarstan leadership to its side with threats and material benefits. The Tatar nationalists opposed both Moscow and the local Russians and put pressure on the Tatarstan leadership when it seemed to succumb to pressure from Moscow, but defended that leadership when it opposed Moscow. The Tatarstan leadership embroiled both the ethnic Russian and the Tatar opposition with each other and succeeded in asserting itself as the only valid partner for Moscow.

Thus from the very start the paths of Tatarstan's leadership and the Tatar national movement ran at times counter, at times parallel to each other. The former was reaping the political benefits from the movement, extending and entrenching its power in the sovereign state that Tatarstan became. This combination of factors led Moscow and Kazan to agree on a devolution of powers between the centre and the Republic of Tatarstan. In February 1994, the devolution process led to the conclusion of a Power-Sharing Treaty between Moscow and Kazan. This treaty between the two seats of government – the Kremlin of Moscow and Kazan – were largely based on informal agreements between the two respective presidents, Yeltsin and Shaimiev. The Treaty did not come under public scrutiny, nor was it ratified by the two parliaments, which makes some observers wonder if it will survive under President Vladimir Putin. But the Treaty did establish de facto dual sovereignty based on the acceptance of inconsistencies between the constitutions of Russia and Tatarstan. In the process, the Tatar government side invoked the fact that the Russian Constitution provides that the republics are states. A state is sovereign by definition. Hence Tatar sovereignty, in Tatarstan's opinion, does not run counter to the Russian Constitution even though the latter makes no mention of republic sovereignty. The Treaty did much to calm spirits in both Kazan and Moscow. After 1993, the already weakened Tatar national movement dwindled almost to nothing as a political force.

The Changing Fortunes of the Tatar National Movement

This third attempt at national revival, at the start of the 1990s, may be explained by various factors. As sociologists point out, in the 1960s a process of stepped-up urbanization ushered in a relative increase in the specific weight of the Tatar intelligentsia and administrators in the republic compared to their ethnic Russian counterparts. In average educational level the Tatars began to approach local Russians, the social status of the Tatars rose more dynamically than that of ethnic Russians, and Tatar administrative personnel came to occupy a predominant
position in the republic. Their rising social status led to an increased Tatar national awareness. The upper strata of Tatar society, firmly established by that time, had begun to feel that the republic’s Soviet-type autonomous status, involving restricted budgets and fewer possibilities for developing local culture, was too narrow for them. The Tatar national revival of the early 1990s was formed within the state and academic institutions created in the Soviet era. It probably involved more intellectuals than the previous two revivals but its potential was short-lived, with the result that it registered only partial gains.

While the Tatar party and government elite was more concerned about channeling greater resources from the centre to the republic, the intellectuals were naturally more concerned with culture and history. They were thus acutely aware of the fact that the Soviet nationalities and demographic policy had left three-quarters of the Tatar population beyond the republic’s borders. At the same time, communist construction projects like the giant Kamaz plant in Naberezhnie Chelny (in Tatar: Yar Chally) in Tatarstan absorbed great masses of Tatar village youths who were feeling ill-at-ease in the Russophone urban environment (let us add that these newcomers were also lower-skilled and underpaid), and such new urban centres were thus to become the future focal points of nationalist mobilization. In sum, by the end of the 1980s, Tatar nationalism had acquired both a growing number of oracles and an expanding circle of followers.

The rise of Tatar nationalism and secessionism was also linked to a particular political conjuncture, and its decline to the change in that conjuncture. What we are referring to is the internal split in Soviet society that led to the break-up of the USSR at the end of 1991. Secession may be facilitated by internal strife, civil war, world war, revolution or foreign occupation. Some of the contending forces in the metropolitan power may become an ally of a secessionist force. So the Tatar nationalists had (or thought they had) an unmissable historic chance of jumping on the bandwagon of the republics seceding from the Soviet Union.

The role of social science in the process of legitimizing sovereignty was twofold: first, social scientists – historians, economists, jurists, sociologists and political scientists – together with teachers, doctors and writers, provided the nucleus of the movement for sovereignty; second, recourse was made to science in trying to ensure distributive justice, set legal safeguards and restore historical truth. The demand for distributive justice could be illustrated by the widely-held, if naive, belief that if the proceeds from all the oil pumped from Tatarstan’s oil-wells since 1946 had gone into the republic’s exchequer, Tatarstan would have been a ‘second Kuwait’. The naivety lay in forgetting that the Tatar ASSR would not have been able to finance its oil production alone, while export routes lay through Russian territory and could be cut off at any moment. Legal standards to ensure Tatar sovereignty were said to be necessary owing to the fact that the Tatar ASSR, set up by Bolshevik decree in 1920, had its prerogatives cur-
tailed in the 1930s precisely because the republic had been set up ‘from above’ and not by a legally binding agreement. What had been granted ‘from on high’ could be withheld in an arbitrary manner. Historical truth required the cleaning of the Augean stables of Soviet historiography and the re-establishment of a national narrative.

Thus, as the 1990s began, radical sections of the Tatar intelligentsia raised the banner of national independence. However, Tatar society was politically fragmented from the start, and the more radical the nationalists became, the less support they received from the general public and academia. Dmitry Gorenburg has analysed the data obtained by two groups of US sociologists who randomly polled selected groups of the population in four Russian republics, including Tatarstan, in 1993. Signalling the key influence of the Institute of Language, Literature and History in Kazan as the founder of the contemporary Tatar nationalist movement (intellectuals, including academics, accounted for half of the delegates at the first two TPC congresses), Gorenburg found that, among the population groups, those supportive of Tatar nationalism included certain groups of Tatar intellectuals (mostly those educated in the Tatar language: academics, members of the creative intelligentsia, doctors and teachers, especially those from the countryside), and migrant Tatar workers who had come to the big cities from the villages, while those not inclined to support it included the party elite, factory and agricultural workers, practising Muslims and women. A Tatar youth journal also lists ‘petty and middle-ranking officials, teachers and students in Tatar schools, and the intelligentsia’ among the ‘strata close to the national idea’, and ‘Tatar businessmen, workers, commercial and service-sector personnel, and rural dwellers, as well as mixed-marriage and Russified Tatars’ as ‘pro-Soviet strata’ who were not in favour of it.13

To this should be added the fact that roughly half of the population was ethnic Russian, who could only be enlisted to the Tatar cause by a discourse of so-called ‘parity nationalism’ (Tatarstan as a sovereign but polyethnic society with equal rights for ethnic Russians and Tatars, not one based on Tatar privilege) – and also the fact that 42 per cent of all marriages in Tatarstan in 1993 were mixed Russo-Tatar marriages. Nationalists in Tatarstan often claim that the language spoken in such families is almost invariably Russian and that children born of such marriages also more frequently speak Russian than Tatar, which adversely affects the potential for Tatar nationalist mobilization.

The Tatar movement has so far not found the means to integrate the various existing groups of Tatars and their possible allies into an overall political strategy for secession. These include: the Tatars living in the Republic of Tatarstan (1.765 million); the inhabitants of Tatarstan of various nationalities (3.638 million); the Tatars generally (including those of the Urals and Siberia) (5.543 million); the Tatars in conjunction with other Turkic (and possibly Finno-Ugrian) peoples of
the Volga-Urals region (8.853 million); and the total population of the Volga region, including the area of habitation of the Kazan Tatars (roughly 17 million). This population mosaic discourages rather than encourages any possible Tatar plans to achieve secession, although it may stimulate both interethnic communication and qualified forms of autonomy or sovereignty.

Especially since the end of 1991, leadership in the national movement has passed into the hands of the Tatar nomenklatura, which, Gorenburg believes, is not nationalist-minded. We would describe it as either pro-Russian, Soviet-style ‘internationalist’ or parity-nationalist in the sense outlined above, but not secessionist. The French researcher Jean-Robert Raviot likewise denies that this élite has separatist leanings, believing Tatarstan ‘sovereignty’ to be a form of adaptation of the Tatar Soviet-era élite to post-Soviet reality. He characterizes the Tatarstan regime as an ‘enlightened oligarchy’ and a regime of President Mintimer Shaimiev’s personal power.

From this perspective, Kazan’s bargaining with Moscow may be seen not as just another symptom of the crumbling of the Soviet system but as an established mode of that system’s functioning. Incidentally, in Russia as a whole, after the defeat of the hard-line ‘putsch’ of August 1991, the ‘mass-meeting democracy’ of the ‘democrats’ gave way to a new version of rule by various strata of the nomenklatura. The Gaidar reforms, begun in 1992, and the decline of living standards sapped the influence of the ‘democrats’ even more, as the people became less preoccupied with politics than with their own survival. As popular pressure dwindled, the Tatarstan post-Soviet élite seized the nationalist banner from the nationalists, institutionalized their demands in the referendum to confirm the Declaration of State Sovereignty of March 1992 and the Tatarstan Constitution of November 1992, and then made a deal with Moscow, enshrined in the 1994 RF-RT Power-Sharing Treaty. The opposition Tatar nationalists were excluded from parliament and government at all levels.

The change of fortunes of the Tatar national movement may be illustrated by one example: in May 1991 its members staged a successful hunger strike in a square in Kazan, demanding that the parliament of Tatarstan rescind its decision to allow the Russian presidential election to be held in Tatarstan. The nationalists were supported by a 50,000-strong demonstration by the Tatar population in the streets of Kazan. The Tatarstan parliament’s decision was rescinded and the election disrupted. The hunger strikers were carried into the parliament building and showered with flowers. In summer 1999, the same nationalists and some other opposition figures went on hunger strike in a Kazan square, but this time they demanded the introduction in Tatarstan of Russian electoral laws, which, in their view, were more democratic than those introduced by President Shaimiev’s regime. Almost no one in either Kazan or Moscow paid any attention to this hunger strike. The former TPC leader Fandas Safiullin, who did not sup-
port it, was elected to the Russian Duma in December 1999 in contradiction to the strongly defended slogans of his organization in 1991 or 1993; he now sees independence for Tatarstan as a position of last resort in case the centre takes an expressly anti-Tatar line; and in January 2000 a 'common front' of about fifteen parties in Tatarstan – Tatar nationalist and non-nationalist alike – called on Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin to send an RF representative to the republic, similar to those serving in other regions and republics, in order to combat the abuses of rights and freedoms stemming from disparities between the RF and RT constitutions, and to bring the latter into conformity with the former.19 Thus nationalism in Tatarstan has come full circle and turned against itself, which leads one to agree with a thesis advanced by Rogers Brubaker, namely that in many cases moments of high nationalist mobilization – where they did occur – proved ephemeral; “nation” was revealed to be a galvanizing category at one moment, but not at the next.20

The Contingency of the Tatar Nationalist Mobilization – A Historical Outline

The fluidity, transience or intermittent character of Tatar nationalism is linked among other things to the difficulty of sustaining nationalist mobilization at boiling-point. This is a further explanation for the failure of radical demands to become embedded in the Tatar nationalist movement. Radical changes in the mobilization potential of emancipatory objectives can be observed throughout Tatar history. Scholars note, for example, that rebellions aimed at liberation from Russia kept breaking out among the Tatars (often jointly with the Bashkirs and Finno-Ugrian peoples, and sometimes with Russian peasants and Cossacks in social revolt) for more than two centuries after the capture of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Nonetheless, at the end of the Time of Troubles, in 1612, Tatar warriors took part in Kuzma Minin and Dmitri Pozharsky's militia formed to recapture Moscow from the Polish interventionists, and in the following year, 1613, the Tatar nobles took part in the election of the first tsar of the Romanov dynasty by the convention of all Russian estates (the Zemski Sobor). The contemporary Tatar political scientist Aidar Khabutdinov points out that in the eyes of the upper strata of Tatar society this latter fact served as a legitimization of the Tatars' presence in Russia's fold right up until the revolution of 1917.21

Periodic campaigns to Christianize the Tatars, especially in the first half of the eighteenth century, did nevertheless draw forth new rebellions. After the repeal by Catherine II of a number of anti-Tatar restrictions (a ban on the building of mosques, Muslim schools, and commercial activity), Russia experienced no more Tatar rebellions for the whole of the first half of the nineteenth century.
Afterwards, the constraints (in the field of education and trade) resumed, which again led to Tatar unrest, the appearance of anti-Russian sects and the Tatars' partial emigration to Turkey in the second half of the same century.

The Tatar intelligentsia took an active part in the pan-Russian opposition movement before and during the revolution of 1905. However, after that revolution, when many censorial restrictions were lifted and new possibilities for the development of Tatar culture opened up (along with the suppression of pan-Turkist propaganda in a number of Tatar medresses), the Tatar nationalist movement almost died out from 1907 until 1917. Tatar sentiment changed again during the October Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1918-20, when a far greater number of Tatars fought on the side of the Bolsheviks than on the side of their opponents – the Whites who stood for ‘Russia single and indivisible’. The Tatar masses viewed the latter as their enslavers of yesterday and allies of Western imperialists. The Tatar revolutionaries wished to rouse the Oriental countries to rebellion against Western colonialists and to play a pre-eminent role in that struggle. The separatist movement is thus contingent and experiences now a phase of ascendancy, now a phase of decline. All of the above also illustrates the difficulty of making a straightforward, ‘nationalist’ interpretation of history, especially if one tries to preserve the standards of objectivity.

Tatar Historiography in the Soviet Period

Shifting meanings of the concept of a Tatar nation and of the place of the Tatar nation in Russia are to be found in twentieth-century historiography. Soviet and dissident émigré interpretations of historical traditions were followed in the second half of the 1980s by historians eager to explore parts of Tatar history that had previously been suppressed.

In the Soviet period, Tatar historiography became the ‘history of the Tatar ASSR’, which narrowed the scope of research chiefly to the early Middle Ages on the territory of present-day Tatarstan. In practice this meant devoting primary attention to the history of the Bulgars and the Bulgar Khanate examined in an ethnographic spirit, as a branch of study of the local lore of one of Russia’s regions. Scholars were in effect forbidden to study the history of those ancestors of modern Tatars who lived outside Tataria and did not belong to the Bulgar ethnos. The resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee of 9 August 1944 ‘On the Present State of Mass Political and Ideological Work in the Tatar Party Organization and Measures for its Improvement’ placed a ban on independent Tatar studies of the Golden Horde that touched on subjects of Tatar national concern. Also banned was the national epic Idegei, which made reference to the wars of the Tatar epic hero Idegei against Russia. This epic, whose
text had been restored prior to the second world war by Tatar and Russian scholars, was not published in Kazan until 1990. It was prescribed that the conquest of Kazan by Russia in 1552 was to be regarded as a voluntary affair. Tatar history was studied, by the Tatar scholars among others, mostly from Russian chronicles, and was inscribed into the framework of Russian history. The Jadid enlighteners - especially those of the early twentieth century, who had dissented from the reigning orthodox Marxist ideology (for instance by lapses into pan-Turkism) or had committed transgressions against the Soviet regime - were proclaimed to be reactionaries, and ritualistically denounced, and Tatar scholars were discouraged from carrying out research in their political and cultural activity. The uncomfortable subjects in Tatar history (such as the ideas and role of Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev) were omitted. It is clear that under such ideological pressure Tatar historians could not pursue open, public debates on autonomy for the republic or ground such autonomy using historical material. What remained for them to do was mostly to study the local problems of history and culture of the Bulgar period without any broad theoretical scope and to stress the Tatars' positive role in all the 'historic feats' of the Soviet period.

The Uses of History Made by Émigré Tatar Nationalists: the Case of Gayaz Iskhaki

The émigré Tatar nationalists, for their part, while striving to play the role of custodians of undistorted historical memory, nonetheless sometimes created no less rigid and slanted patterns of Tatar history bearing the hallmark of the 'telos of the oppressed'. Among the émigrés who wrote on historical subjects, a prominent place is held by Gayaz Iskhaki (1878-1954). This is due to the following reasons. First, although not a professional historian, he was the first to give a clear-cut substantiation of Tatar nationalism. Second, being an émigré, he was free to express his thoughts and be explicit in saying what others could not or did not want to say. Third, his work was republished in Kazan in 1991 and his personality has received acclaim in present-day Tatarstan – among other things, Iskhaki's works are classics of Tatar literature and his is a household name among his own people.

In an essay entitled Ídel-Ural, which was published in Paris in 1933, Iskhaki conveys a number of themes and motifs that run throughout the Tatar nationalist narrative. To start with, it is not the Tatar people that is the subject of secession for him, but the Turco-Tatar people of Ídel-Ural – a vast region stretching in the form of a misshapen triangle between the Volga, the Urails and Turkestan, that is, the historic zone of habitation of the Tatars, Bashkirs and neighbouring Finno-Ugrian peoples. Implicit in this conception is the idea of the domination

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of the Tatar element – as the one most highly educated and best prepared for state administration – over the Bashkirs and the Ugro-Finns in the Idel-Ural State. In 1917-20, different sections of the Tatar political élite had already raised the subject of unification with Bashkiria in the form of the Volga-Ural State as the territorial autonomous state referred to above, and in the form of the Tatar-Bashkir Republic as a federated state within the ‘greater’ RSFSR, before the latter’s partition into Union and autonomous republics. But as far back as the period of the Civil War of 1918-20 the Bashkirs had shown an unwillingness to go along with the plans of Tatar politicians to form a common Tatar-Bashkir state, and they developed their own, Bashkir nationalism, with an anti-Russian and anti-Tatar colouring. This attitude left unresolved the question of how Tatarstan would achieve independence without the support of allies.

Another keynote idea of Gayaz Iskhaki’s, which is echoed by present-day Tatar historiography, concerns the deep-rooted traditions of Turco-Tatar statehood, and the continuity of the people’s struggle for liberation after it had been lost. The version of Tatar history he provides rekindles the nation’s pride and imparts it assurance of its own strength. The history of the Turco-Tatars is ancient and majestic. The Huns, the Kypchaks, the Khazars, the Volga Bulgars and the Ugro-Finns all took part in the genesis of this people. On their long historic path they created a number of powerful, rich and highly civilized states – the Turkic and Khazar Khanates, the Bulgar Khanate, the Turkicized Golden Horde and the Kazan Khanate. These states enjoyed thriving handicrafts and arable farming, carrying on extensive commerce with the countries of East and West. Islam, embraced by the Bulgars and, later, after the Mongol invasions, entrenched in the Golden Horde, was tolerant of other religions. The Kazan Khanate guaranteed freedom of belief and custom to its non-Muslim inhabitants, the Chuvash, the Mari, the Udmurt and the Mordva.

All this was crushed after the conquest of the Kazan Khanate by the Russians, whose role in history is described by Iskhaki in an exceptionally negative light. The recurring periods of oppression of the Tatars by the Russian state are shown in bold relief, while the periods of a more favourable attitude to them on the part of the latter, and any progress in Tatar life under Russian conditions generally, are explained by the national struggle of the Tatars themselves and by the concessions Russia’s ruling classes were making to the Tatar national movement. This kind of ‘state Tatar history’ has found a champion in today’s Tatarstan in the writings of the academician Indus Tagirov, while other Tatar historians often make a point of emphasizing the contribution made by the Tatars to the Russian language, culture and history.

Iskhaki concludes his essay with a eulogy about the enterprising and hard-working people of Idel-Ural who, once independent and in possession of their mineral-rich region, would be able to develop industry and agriculture to a high
degree and compete successfully with Europeans. ‘Despite the long years it spent under the Russian yoke, that people had never lost hope of restoring its former greatness, and there is no doubt that at the first opportunity it will take the administration of its native land into its own hands and very soon re-establish order and legality therein, so as- together with other peoples- to free itself from the Muscovite yoke and follow the path of progress and freedom.’25 Such were the ideals of Tatar nationalism.

Tatar Historiography During and After Perestroika

In the early perestroika years many historians used the new-found opportunities to fill in the ‘blank spots of history’. Here again they confronted the need to restore historical truth, a major preoccupation of the Tatar national movement. Somewhat like their counterparts in Moscow vis-à-vis the Bolshevik leader Nikolai Bukharin, the Tatar historians of perestroika portrayed the images of liberal Tatar communists who died in the Stalinist purges. Foremost among them was the long-vilified Sultan-Galiev. Although a thorough analysis of his views still remains to be made, his biography as reconstructed by the historian Bulat Sultanbekov and the published excerpts from his pre-trial confession made it possible to modify and even disprove the image of Sultan-Galiev as it had been drawn by Western historians of the 1970s and 1980s, who seemed to have taken the Stalinist accusations at face value.

While Sultan-Galiev has not been found by modern Tatar historians to be an opponent of revolution and Soviet power, he did oppose Stalin on the question of the diminished status of Soviet autonomous republics – an issue of great political importance for Tatarstan in the early 1990s. He was gravely concerned at the prospect that Great-Russian chauvinism would defeat the revolution. It may be said that he was experiencing a nationalism that was growing in direct proportion to his ebbing belief in the revolution’s capacity to keep its internationalist spirit intact. Towards the end of the 1920s he came to the conclusion that if (or when) the revolution was defeated, he would be ready to make common cause with the most extreme pan-Turkist nationalists and fight the resurgent Russian empire in the guise of the Soviet Union, whose demise he predicted.26 Of course, we know that confessions made in prison are not always reliable, and this case awaits critical study. Everything that happened to Sultan-Galiev was and remains very topical for the Tatars of today (and not for them alone).

Tatar historians have made a study of the leaders of the first national revival – the Islamic reformers, pre-1917 politicians and the leaders of the national movement. The study of the Jadids has made it possible to coin the concept of ‘Euro-Islam’ – a specifically Tatar version of Islam characterized by religious tolerance...
and openness towards European values. As Tatarstan negotiators were bargaining with Moscow over the nature of federalism and the extent of substate sovereignty, Tatar historians were rediscovering the debates at the first Muslim congress in 1917 over territorial federalism (as championed by the Azeris or Bashkirs) or cultural-national autonomy (as championed by the Tatars at the time). This gave a solid historical background to the contemporary Tatar demands for treaty-based federalism from below.

The advent of sovereignty in Tatarstan posed the question of ‘upgrading’ Tatar history from a study of local lore to the study of a country, albeit one situated within a larger state, and of the relationship between Russian and Tatar versions of history. The teaching of the history of Tatarstan was introduced in a number of Tatar institutes of higher learning. ‘Russia is simultaneously a country of many peoples (a multinational country)’, wrote the Tatar historian Y. Shara-pov, ‘and, so to speak, a country of many countries, a federation of many republics [having the status of] states … The history of Tatarstan is called on to reflect independently the place of the country and its people in world history, to show their contribution to world civilization. Tatarstan’s history can only be understood in the context of the history of Russia, which should be freed from ideological stereotypes. For Tatarstan and the Tatar people, Russia and the Russian people have been and remain their nearest neighbours and partners, although their relationship in history included both confrontation and co-operation. 27

We have already noted that the Soviet regime imposed on Tatar historians the patterns of the past that were comfortable for the Russians’ self-perception and corresponded to perceived Russian national interest. Even if we ignore the purely Soviet requirements of the historian (in the form of ‘class struggle’, ‘proletarian internationalism’ and so forth) and the falsifications involved in adjusting Tatar history to fit the Russian pattern, still the question remains of the incompatibility between certain aspects of the two state-centred visions of the world – Russian and Tatar.

To take one example: the Russians generally tend to show indifference to the life of their Muslim (and Tatar) compatriots; for a Tatar historian, to look at his republic with the eyes of his mainstream Russian counterpart would probably mean viewing Tatarstan as a province that is secondary from the standpoint of Russia’s overall development. At least traditionally, it means seeing the ancestors of today’s Tatars as barbarous invaders who swept across Russia with the hordes of Genghis Khan, and seeing the conquest of Kazan by the Russians in 1552 as a felicitous event marking the end of one of the last vestiges of the Golden Horde. Surely, were the Tatar historian to think along these lines, some of his colleagues would say that he was perpetuating the provincialism of his ‘sovereign republic’ and cultivating the mentality of a conquered, colonized people among the
Tatars. As things now stand, this Tatar historian would rather portray the era of the Golden Horde as a colourful and eventful historical period of Tatar life when Russia was merely a not-very-interesting provincial adjunct of the Golden Horde. In sum, he would centre not on what the Tatars meant in the Russian context, but rather on what Russia meant when viewed through the prism of Tatar interests (including the interests of 'own truth' and prestige). Different national priorities lead to a different emphasis. Thus a Russian cultural studies expert would describe St Basil's Cathedral in Red Square in Moscow as a monument of Russian architecture of the period of Ivan the Terrible. He would say that it was built to celebrate the capture of Kazan by that tsar, a worthy deed in the eyes of the Russian people of that time. A Tatar historian would say that that temple was a direct replica of the Kul Sharif mosque in Kazan, destroyed by the Russians during the capture of the city. For the Tatars, Kul Sharif is a symbol of the lost Tatar culture and the need to rebuild it.

Conclusion

The protean character of Tatar nationalism is primarily linked to shifting attitudes towards Russia. Ever since Kazan was conquered, with two-thirds of the Tatar population now dispersed across Russia outside present-day Tatarstan and the territorial link with the Muslim world severed by tsar and Bolshevik alike (by the latter more than the former), the fate of the Tatars has been decided in the Kremlin. Independence remains a dream, and Tatar thought presents not a blueprint for separation from Russia, but rather a sequence of disparate strategies for securing equal rights for the Tatars in Russian society. Each generation of Tatar thinkers picks up where the previous one left off in disillusion, struggling against unequal odds, confronted with a geopolitical situation not of its own choosing, which cannot be radically changed. But they have to try again and again if the Tatar nation is to survive. In the process, the Tatars are contributing to both their own and the Russians' liberation from the legacy of empire.

Secession studies cannot be free from prescribed policy goals or from value orientations, nor can they always do without a certain dose of teleology. In the hands of 'late nations' still in the making, such as Tatarstan, the social sciences turn into a battlefield. Cognitive frames conceived by scholars from the metropolitan powers do not satisfy the intellectuals of such nations, if only because they have to create their own history, their own culture, their own vision of the world. The scholars of newly independent states (including substates that have proclaimed their sovereignty) act under some kind of public compulsion: to prove that their nation (or at least the ethnos living on the same territory) has always existed, that their state has deep historical roots. Thus history becomes
the history of struggle for independent statehood, loss of statehood, regaining statehood.

Scholars of metropolitan powers may look down on the sometimes biased, precocious strivings of their colleagues from the 'new nations' – but they do not have to prove the very existence of their own ethnic groups, nations and states and therefore do not have to tackle the numerous difficulties inherent in this question. For the latter scholars, in contrast, the wish to 'uphold' their place in history, to 'redeem' past wrongs, to 'prove' the justice of their struggle urch et orbi become a permanent object of search and endeavour. And only with the passage of time can such a partisan image of the world give way to a more balanced discourse, devoid of providential telos. The Quebecois historical narratives, for instance, gradually changed their character from being pastoral pictures of rural Francophone society devoted to the values of Catholicism, whose untainted nature was threatened by the onslaught of the modern Anglophone civilization, to quite a different view of the world where businessmen, farmers and entrepreneurs from Quebec compete on equal terms with their counterparts from Anglophone Canada and the USA. It is possible that the same prospect also lies in store for the scholars of Tatarstan.

Notes

1 The word 'Tatar' or 'Tartar' as applied to the Turkic peoples is in fact a historical misnomer. According to many Orientalists, this was originally the name of an awe-inspiring, warlike Mongol tribe at the time of Genghis Khan which left its trace in the Chinese chronicles of the thirteenth century as 'ta-ta' or 'ta-tan'. Although Genghis Khan destroyed that tribe, its name became associated with the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan himself. When news of the Mongol invasions reached Europe, the Europeans, fearing the dreadful invaders, blended the word 'Tatar' with the Greek 'Tartaros', the realm of the dead. From here flowed the designation 'Tartary', still used on Western maps well into the eighteenth century, as the broad land-mass east of the Caspian Sea and reaching to the Pacific Ocean, inhabited by 'Tartars' – a collective name for the Turks and Mongols of Eurasia. The contemporary Oxford Dictionary, for instance, still lists 'Tartar' (also 'Tatar') as 'a member of a group of Central Asian peoples including Mongols and Turks', and also (in the form of 'tartar') as a 'violent-tempered or intractable person'. See Concise Oxford Dictionary, Eighth Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 1249.

The Tatar historian Abrar Karimullin thought that the name 'Tatar', originally signifying 'Mongol', was first applied to the Bulgars of the Kazan Khanate by the Russians after they conquered that khanate in the mid-sixteenth century. The Turks of the Volga region, according to Karimullin, used the name 'Bulgar' and not 'Tatar' as their own designation until the very end of the nineteenth century. See Abrar G. Karimullin, Tatary: etnos i etnonim, Kazan, Tatarkoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1989, pp. 62-67. In the Russian language, the word 'Tatar' is used for both the Mongol-Tatars and the Turkic Tatars of today. This results in a situation where the opprobrium associated with the former is involuntarily or intentionally laid at the door of modern Tatars. This, in part, has even prompted a section of Tatar public opinion nowadays to

2 While the Westernizing tradition in Russian political thought laid the blame for Russia's separation from the rest of Europe on Mongol-Tartar rule, historians such as Robert Wipper and Sergei Platonov held that the Tartars had little to do with it. In their view, keeping Russia from Europe was an age-old concern of those European powers - Lithuania, Poland, the Baltic German monastic orders and Sweden - that had prevented Russia from reaching the Baltic Sea until the eighteenth century. See V poiskakh svoego puti: Rossiya mezhdu Yevropoi i Aziei, Moscov, Logos, 1997, p. 6. It should be stressed that the issue of how closely the Kazan Tatars relate to the Turkicized population of the Golden Horde and its domination of Russia is a matter of debate between historians. The forebears of the Kazan Tatars, for example, did not take part in the early Mongol campaigns against Ancient Rus in the 1230s, nor in the famous battle at Kulikovo Pole in 1380, which formed a rallying-point for the resurgent Russian spirit in its struggle against Tartar domination.

3 On the Tatar cultural and economic regression wrought by the Russian conquest, see the work written in the 1920s by a Soviet historian, professor Mikhail Khudyakov, a native of Kazan - and one which, despite the author's Russian descent, is currently regarded in Tatarstan as part of Tatar historiography: Mikhail Khudyakov, Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo khana, Moscow, IN SAN, 1991, pp. 154-155, 162-163.

4 The expression is taken from a Tatar author, Zufar Fatkutdinov. See Zufar Fatkutdinov, 'Terpenie naroda izmeryaetsya stoletiyami', Idel, No. 11-12, 1995, pp. 20-23.


7 In the view of Tatar historians, this Bashkir nationalist opposition to unification with Tatarstan facilitated Soviet Russia's 'divide and rule' policy aimed at splitting the two nations.


9 Ibid., pp. 133, 137, 262.


11 Since 1996, the institute has been divided into the Institute of Language, Literature and Art and a separate Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences.

12 Dmitry Gorenburg, Nationalism for the Masses: How Nationalist Elites Mobilize Their Followers, a paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 28 August 1998 (manuscript).


14 We have borrowed the expression 'parity nationalism' from Damir Iskhakov, in Guboglo (ed.), op. cit., p. 25.

15 S. Abashin, 'Situatsiya v Respublike Tatarstan (itogi 10-letnego “suverenteta” i dal’neishie perspektivy)', to be published in Konflikt - dialog - sotrudnichestvo, No. 1, 1999, Moscov, Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, p. 115.

16 Numbers derived from census data for 1989 and the following sources: Damir M. Iskhakov, 'Gde zhivut tatarsy', Tatarstan, No. 5, 1993, p. 37; Rossiiskie regiony nakanune vyborov-95,
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Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1995, passim; Lev Perepelkin and Tatyana M. Mastyugina, Etnologiya, Moscow, Znanie, 1997, quoted from a computer file version kindly provided by the authors).

19 Izvestia, 15 January 2000.
21 A. Khabutdinov, 'Problema istoricheskoi samoidentifikatsii tatarskogo sotsiuma v nachale XX v.', in Sotsial'no-istoricheskie znanie v Tatarstane istoricheskie traditsii i sovremennost', Kazan, AN Respubliki Tatarstan, 1995, p. 64.
22 The Bulgar Khanate existed from the eighth to the first third of the fifteenth century AD (capital: Bulgar). Bulgar was in the territory of present-day Tatarstan, not far from Kazan. In fact, the Bulgar tribe once lived in the North Caucasus, and from there one part of it, under Khan Asparukh, went to the Balkans in the seventh century AD to found Bulgaria (mixing with the Slavs there), while another group went to the banks of the Volga and Kama rivers, where they still live today. After being devastated by the Mongol-Tartars in 1236, the Bulgar Khanate became, like the Russian principalities, a vassal of the Golden Horde. The city of Bulgar itself was destroyed in 1361 by one of the khans of the Golden Horde and the place was abandoned as a settlement in the fifteenth century. The successor to the Bulgar Khanate was the Kazan Khanate (1439-1552).
23 The question of Bashkiria (Bashkortostan) still retains its urgency and is a key one from the standpoint of the conceivable secession of Tatarstan. The contemporary Tatar political scientist Engel Tagirov notes that, in adopting the Declaration of State Sovereignty in 1990, Tatarstan hoped that a similar declaration would be passed by Bashkortostan and that both republics would then march towards independence together. See Engel R. Tagirov, Tatarstanskaya model': mif i real'nost', Kazan, Ekopolis, 1997, p. 5. It was for this reason that the above-mentioned declaration did not refer to Tatarstan as being part of Russia or mention that the Tatar SSR had been proclaimed a Union republic within the USSR. But, independently of the 'Bashkortostan factor', Tatar scholars are acutely aware that Tatarstan is too small and the Tatars are too dispersed across Russia's territory for them to attain their goals single-handed.
24 Iskhaki pays no attention to the phenomena of the Russo-Tatar 'historical symbiosis', such as those referred to in the works of Russian Eurasianist scholars. See Georgi V. Vernadsky, 'Dva podviga sv. Alexandra Nevskogo', in Russkii uzel yevraziistva, Moscow, Belovodie, 1997, pp. 227-249; by the same author, 'Mongol'skoe igo v russkoi istorii' in Ibid., pp. 250-264; Pyotr N. Savitsky, 'Step' i osedlost', in Kontinent Yevraziya, Moscow, Agraf, 1997, pp. 332-335.
28 See the chapter by Ronald Rudin in this volume.